Search results for 'Ad_hoc_hypothesis' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  62
    Maarten Boudry (2013). The Hypothesis That Saves the Day: Ad Hoc Reasoning in Pseudoscience. Logique Et Analyse 223:245-258.
    What is wrong with ad hoc hypotheses? Ever since Popper’s falsificationist account of adhocness, there has been a lively philosophical discussion about what constitutes adhocness in scientific explanation, and what, if anything, distinguishes legitimate auxiliary hypotheses from illicit ad hoc ones. This paper draws upon distinct examples from pseudoscience to provide us with a clearer view as to what is troubling about ad hoc hypotheses. In contrast with other philosophical proposals, our approach retains the colloquial, derogative meaning of adhocness, and (...)
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  2. Greg Bamford (1999). What is the Problem of Ad Hoc Hypotheses? Science and Education 8 (4):375 - 86..
    The received view of an ad hochypothesis is that it accounts for only the observation(s) it was designed to account for, and so non-ad hocness is generally held to be necessary or important for an introduced hypothesis or modification to a theory. Attempts by Popper and several others to convincingly explicate this view, however, prove to be unsuccessful or of doubtful value, and familiar and firmer criteria for evaluating the hypotheses or modified theories so classified are characteristically available. These points (...)
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  3.  47
    Simon Friederich, Robert Harlander & Koray Karaca (2014). Philosophical Perspectives on Ad Hoc Hypotheses and the Higgs Mechanism. Synthese 191 (16):3897-3917.
    We examine physicists’ charge of ad hocness against the Higgs mechanism in the standard model of elementary particle physics. We argue that even though this charge never rested on a clear-cut and well-entrenched definition of “ad hoc”, it is based on conceptual and methodological assumptions and principles that are well-founded elements of the scientific practice of high-energy particle physics. We further evaluate the implications of the recent discovery of a Higgs-like particle at the CERN’s Large Hadron Collider for the charge (...)
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  4.  38
    Jarrett Leplin (1975). The Concept of an Ad Hoc Hypothesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 5 (4):309-345.
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  5.  9
    Svetozar Sinđelić (1992). The Concept of Ad Hoc Hypothesis. Theoria 35 (2):19-40.
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  6.  37
    Greg Bamford (1993). Popper's Explications of Ad Hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content, and Scientific Practice. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):335-355.
    Karl Popper defines an ad hoc hypothesis as one that is introduced to immunize a theory from some (or all) refutation but which cannot be tested independently. He has also attempted to explicate ad hocness in terms of certain other allegedly undesirable properties of hypotheses or of the explanations they would provide, but his account is confused and mistaken. The first such property is circularity, which is undesirable; the second such property is reduction in empirical content, which need not be. (...)
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  7.  6
    Marco Mazzone (2014). Crossing the Associative/Inferential Divide: Ad Hoc Concepts and the Inferential Power of Schemata. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):583-599.
    How do we construct ad hoc concepts, especially those characterised by emergent properties? A reasonable hypothesis, suggested both in psychology and in pragmatics , is that some sort of inferential processing must be involved. I argue that this inferential processing can be accounted for in associative terms. My argument is based on the notion of inference as associative pattern completion based on schemata, with schemata being conceived in turn as patterns of concepts and their relationships. The possible role of conscious (...)
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  8. Greg Bamford (1989). Popper, Refutation and 'Avoidance' of Refutation. Dissertation, The University of Queensland
    Popper's account of refutation is the linchpin of his famous view that the method of science is the method of conjecture and refutation. This thesis critically examines his account of refutation, and in particular the practice he deprecates as avoiding a refutation. I try to explain how he comes to hold the views that he does about these matters; how he seeks to make them plausible; how he has influenced others to accept his mistakes, and how some of the ideas (...)
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  9.  83
    Lydia McGrew (2014). On Not Counting the Cost: Ad Hocness and Disconfirmation. Acta Analytica 29 (4):491-505.
    I offer an account of ad hocness that explains why the adoption of an ad hoc auxiliary is accompanied by the disconfirmation of a hypothesis H. H must be conjoined with an auxiliary a′, which is improbable antecedently given H, while ~H does not have this disability. This account renders it unnecessary to require, for identifying ad hocness, that either a′ or H have a posterior probability less than or equal to 0.5; there are also other reasons for abandoning that (...)
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  10.  55
    Greg Bamford (1996). Popper and His Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: A Close Shave for the Law of Gravitation? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2):207-232.
    Knowledge of residual perturbations in Uranus's orbit led to Neptune's discovery in 1846 rather than the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation. Karl Popper asserts that this case is untypical of science and that the law was at least prima facie falsified. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF), and that on the evidence the law was not, and was not considered, prima facie false. Many of Popper's commentators (...)
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  11.  34
    Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1980). Computation and Cognition: Issues in the Foundation of Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):111-32.
    The computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach is that there is a natural domain of (...)
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  12. Lydia McGrew (2005). Likelihoods, Multiple Universes, and Epistemic Context. Philosophia Christi 7 (2):475 - 481.
    Both advocates and opponents of the fine-tuning argument treat multiple universes with a selection effect as a legitimate hypothesis to explain the life-permitting values of the constants in our universe. I argue that, except where there is specific relevant prior information, the occurrence of multiple instances of a low-likelihood causal process should not be treated as an alternative hypothesis to a higher-likelihood causal process. Since an ’ad hoc’ hypothesis can be invented to give high likelihood to any evidence, we must (...)
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  13. Alfred Landé (1962). The Case Against Quantum Duality. Philosophy of Science 29 (1):1-6.
    (1) The idea that diffraction of matter particles can only be understood in terms of a temporary wave transformation or 'double manifestation' is an uneconomical ad hoc hypothesis, shattered already in 1923 by the unitary quantum theory of diffraction of Duane which in 1926 became part of the quantum mechanics, with a statistical interpretation of wave-like appearances. (2) Bohr's re-interpretation of Heisenberg's uncertainty of prediction as an indeterminacy of existence rests on an illegitimate literal translation of a wave result into (...)
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  14. Mario Günther, A Defence of Falsificationism Against Feyerabend's Epistemological Anarchism Using the Example of Galilei's Observations with the Telescope.
    I confront Feyerabend's position and critical rationalism in order to have a foundation or starting point for my (historical) investigation. The main difference of his position towards falsificationism is the belief that different theories cannot be discussed rationally. Feyerabend is convinced that Galilei's observations with the telescope in the historical context of the Copernican revolution supports his criticism. In particular, he argues that the Copernican theory was supported by deficient hypotheses, and falsifications were disposed by ad hoc hypotheses and propaganda. (...)
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  15.  11
    Brendan Shea (2016). Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science. In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Karl Popper (1902-1994) was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His work is notable for its wide influence both within the philosophy of science, within science itself, and within a broader social context. Popper’s early work attempts to solve the problem of (...)
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  16.  63
    Steven Swartzer (2013). Appetitive Besires and the Fuss About Fit. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):975-988.
    Some motivational cognitivists believe that there are besires—cognitive mental states (typically moral beliefs) that share the key feature of desire (typically desire’s ‘direction of fit’) in virtue of which they are capable of being directly motivational. Besires have been criticized by Humeans and cognitivists alike as philosophically extravagant, incoherent, ad hoc, and incompatible with folk psychology. I provide a response to these standard objections to besires—one motivated independently of common anti-Humean intuitions about the motivational efficacy of moral judgments. (...)
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  17.  9
    Gerhard Schurz (2014). Bayesian Pseudo-Confirmation, Use-Novelty, and Genuine Confirmation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):87-96.
    According to the comparative Bayesian concept of confirmation, rationalized versions of creationism come out as empirically confirmed. From a scientific viewpoint, however, they are pseudo-explanations because with their help all kinds of experiences are explainable in an ex-post fashion, by way of ad-hoc fitting of an empirically empty theoretical framework to the given evidence. An alternative concept of confirmation that attempts to capture this intuition is the use novelty criterion of confirmation. Serious objections have been raised against this criterion. In (...)
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  18.  3
    D. Mayo (2014). Some Surprising Facts About Surprising Facts. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):79-86.
    A common intuition about evidence is that if data x have been used to construct a hypothesis H, then x should not be used again in support of H. It is no surprise that x fits H, if H was deliberately constructed to accord with x. The question of when and why we should avoid such “double-counting” continues to be debated in philosophy and statistics. It arises as a prohibition against data mining, hunting for significance, tuning on the signal, and (...)
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  19.  24
    Arnold Zuboff (2014). A Justification of Empirical Thinking. Philosophy Now 102:22-24.
    Imagine two urns, each with a thousand beads - in one all the beads are blue while in the other only one of the thousand is blue. If one of these urns is pushed forward (based on the toss of a fair coin) and the single bead then randomly drawn from it is blue, we must infer that it is a thousand times more probable that the urn pushed forward is the purely blue one. The hypothesis that this was instead (...)
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  20.  16
    P. Rubio Fernandez (2007). Suppression in Metaphor Interpretation: Differences Between Meaning Selection and Meaning Construction. Journal of Semantics 24 (4):345-371.
    Various accounts of metaphor interpretation propose that it involves constructing an ad hoc concept on the basis of the concept encoded by the metaphor vehicle (i.e. the expression used for conveying the metaphor). This paper discusses some of the differences between these theories and investigates their main empirical prediction: that metaphor interpretation involves enhancing properties of the metaphor vehicle that are relevant for interpretation, while suppressing those that are irrelevant. This hypothesis was tested in a cross-modal lexical priming study adapted (...)
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  21.  84
    Michiru Nagatsu (2013). The Limits of Unification for Theory Appraisal: A Case of Economics and Psychology. Synthese 190 (2):2267-2289.
    In this paper I examine Don Ross’s application of unificationism as a methodological criterion of theory appraisal in economics and cognitive science. Against Ross’s critique that explanations of the preference reversal phenomenon by the ‘heuristics and biases’ programme is ad hoc or ‘Ptolemaic’, I argue that the compatibility hypothesis, one of the explanations offerd by this programme, is theoretically and empirically well-motivated. A careful examination of this hypothesis suggests several strengths of a procedural approach to modelling cognitive processes underlying individual (...)
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  22.  38
    James Franklin (1991). Healthy Scepticism. Philosophy 66 (257):305 - 324.
    The classical arguments for scepticism about the external world are defended, especially the symmetry argument: that there is no reason to prefer the realist hypothesis to, say, the deceitful demon hypothesis. This argument is defended against the various standard objections, such as that the demon hypothesis is only a bare possibility, does not lead to pragmatic success, lacks coherence or simplicity, is ad hoc or parasitic, makes impossible demands for certainty, or contravenes some basic standards for a conceptual or linguistic (...)
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  23.  10
    Ioannis Votsis, Science with Artificially Intelligent Agents: The Case of Gerrymandered Hypotheses.
    Barring some civilisation-ending natural or man-made catastrophe, future scientists will likely incorporate fully fledged artificially intelligent agents in their ranks. Their tasks will include the conjecturing, extending and testing of hypotheses. At present human scientists have a number of methods to help them carry out those tasks. These range from the well-articulated, formal and unexceptional rules to the semi-articulated rules-of-thumb and intuitive hunches. If we are to hand over at least some of the aforementioned tasks to artificially intelligent agents, we (...)
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  24.  12
    Ronald Laymon (1980). Independent Testability: The Michelson-Morley and Kennedy-Thorndike Experiments. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):1-37.
    Grunbaum has argued that the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction hypothesis is not ad hoc since the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment can be used to provide a test that is significantly different from that provided by the Michelson-Morley experiment. In the first part of the paper, I show that the differences claimed by Grunbaum to hold between these two experiments are not sufficient for establishing independent testability. A dilemma is developed: either the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment, because of experimental realities, cannot test the uncontracted Fresnel aether theory, (...)
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  25.  27
    Jerome A. Berson (2008). Fundamental Theories and Their Empirical Patches. Foundations of Chemistry 10 (3):147-156.
    Many theories require empirical patches or ad hoc assumptions to work properly in application to chemistry. Some examples include the Bohr quantum theory of atomic spectra, the Pauli exclusion principle, the Marcus theory of the rate-equilibrium correlation, Kekule’s hypothesis of bond oscillation in benzene, and the quantum calculation of reaction pathways. Often the proposed refinements do not grow out of the original theory but are devised and added ad hoc. This brings into question the goal of constructing theories derived from (...)
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  26.  27
    William S. Robinson (1999). Qualia Realism and Neural Activation Patterns. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (10):65-80.
    A thought experiment focuses attention on the kinds of commonalities and differences to be found in two small parts of visual cortical areas during responses to stimuli that are either identical in quality, but different in location, or identical in location and different only in the one visible property of colour. Reflection on this thought experiment leads to the view that patterns of neural activation are the best candidates for causes of qualitatively conscious events . This view faces a strong (...)
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  27.  15
    Dan Lloyd (1999). Consciousness Should Not Mean, but Be. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):158-159.
    O'Brien & Opie's vehicle hypothesis is an attractive framework for the study of consciousness. To fully embrace the hypothesis, however, two of the authors' claims should be extended: first, since phenomenal content is entirely dependent on occurrent brain events and only contingently correlated with external events, it is no longer necessary to regard states of consciousness as representations. Second, the authors' insistence that only stable states of a neural network are conscious seems ad hoc.
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  28.  3
    Paula Rubio Fernández (2007). Suppression in Metaphor Interpretation: Differences Between Meaning Selection and Meaning Construction. Journal of Semantics 24 (4):345-371.
    Various accounts of metaphor interpretation propose that it involves constructing an ad hoc concept on the basis of the concept encoded by the metaphor vehicle . This paper discusses some of the differences between these theories and investigates their main empirical prediction: that metaphor interpretation involves enhancing properties of the metaphor vehicle that are relevant for interpretation, while suppressing those that are irrelevant. This hypothesis was tested in a cross-modal lexical priming study adapted from early studies on lexical ambiguity. The (...)
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  29.  75
    Luca Malatesti (2004). The Knowledge Argument. Dissertation, University of Stirling
    Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a very influential piece of reasoning that seeks to show that colour experiences constitute an insoluble problem for science. This argument is based on a thought experiment concerning Mary. She is a vision scientist who has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision but has never had colour experiences. According to Jackson, upon seeing coloured objects, Mary acquires new knowledge that escapes her complete scientific knowledge. He concludes that there are facts concerning colour experiences (...)
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  30.  54
    P. Hraskó (2003). Time Correlation in Tunneling of Photons. Foundations of Physics 33 (7):1009-1031.
    I propose to consider photon tunneling as a space-time correlation phenomenon between the emission and absorption of a photon on the two sides of a barrier. Standard technics based on an appropriate counting rate formula may then be applied to derive the tunneling time distribution without any ad hoc definition of this quantity. General formulae are worked out for a potential model using Wigner–Weisskopf method. For a homogeneous square barrier in the limit of zero tunneling probability a vanishing tunneling time (...)
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