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Profile: Adam Christopher Podlaskowski (Fairmont State University)
  1. Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith (2014). Probabilistic Regresses and the Availability Problem for Infinitism. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):211-220.
    Recent work by Peijnenburg, Atkinson, and Herzberg suggests that infinitists who accept a probabilistic construal of justification can overcome significant challenges to their position by attending to mathematical treatments of infinite probabilistic regresses. In this essay, it is argued that care must be taken when assessing the significance of these formal results. Though valuable lessons can be drawn from these mathematical exercises (many of which are not disputed here), the essay argues that it is entirely unclear that the form of (...)
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  2. Joshua A. Smith & Adam C. Podlaskowski (2013). Infinitism and Agents Like Us: Reply to Turri. Logos and Episteme (1):125-128.
    In a recent paper, “Infinitism and Epistemic Normativity,” we have problematized the relationship between infinitism and epistemic normativity. Responding to our criticisms, John Turri has offered a defense of infinitism. In this paper, we argue that Turri’s defense fails, leaving infinitism vulnerable to the originally raised objections.
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  3. Adam C. Podlaskowski (2012). Phenomenal Concepts and Incomplete Understanding. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):15-17.
    It is often thought that acquiring a phenomenal concept requires having the relevant sort of experience. In "Extending Phenomenal Concepts", Andreas Elpidorou defends this position from an objection raised by Michael Tye (in "Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts"). Here, I argue that Elpidorou fails to attend to important supporting materials introduced by Tye.
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  4. Adam C. Podlaskowski (2012). Simple Tasks, Abstractions, and Semantic Dispositionalism. Dialectica 66 (4):453-470.
    According to certain kinds of semantic dispositionalism, what an agent means by her words is grounded by her dispositions to complete simple tasks. This sort of position is often thought to avoid the finitude problem raised by Kripke against simpler forms of dispositionalism. The traditional objection is that, since words possess indefinite (or infinite) extensions, and our dispositions to use words are only finite, those dispositions prove inadequate to serve as ground for what we mean by our words. I argue (...)
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  5. Adam C. Podlaskowski & Nicholaos J. Jones (2012). Idealizing, Abstracting, and Semantic Dispositionalism. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):166-178.
    Abstract: According to certain dispositional accounts of meaning, an agent's meaning is determined by the dispositions that an idealized version of this agent has in optimal conditions. We argue that such attempts cannot properly fix meaning. For even if there is a way to determine which features of an agent should be idealized without appealing to what the agent means, there is no non-circular way to determine how those features should be idealized. We sketch an alternative dispositional account that avoids (...)
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  6. Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith (2011). Infinitism and Epistemic Normativity. Synthese 178 (3):515-527.
    Klein’s account of epistemic justification, infinitism, supplies a novel solution to the regress problem. We argue that concentrating on the normative aspect of justification exposes a number of unpalatable consequences for infinitism, all of which warrant rejecting the position. As an intermediary step, we develop a stronger version of the ‘finite minds’ objection.
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  7. Adam C. Podlaskowski (2010). Reconciling Semantic Dispositionalism with Semantic Holism. Philosophia 38 (1):169-178.
    Dispositionalist theories of mental content have been attacked on the grounds that they are incompatible with semantic holism. In this paper, I resist important worries of this variety, raised by Paul Boghossian. I argue that his objections can be avoided by a conceptual role version of dispositionalism, where the multifarious relationships between mental contents are grounded on the relationships between their corresponding, grounding dispositions.
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  8. Adam C. Podlaskowski (2010). Unbelievable Thoughts and Doxastic Oughts. Theoria 76 (2):112-118.
    From the dictum "ought implies can", it has been argued that no account of belief's normativity can avoid the unpalatable result that, for unbelievable propositions such as "It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining", one ought not to believe them even if true. In this article, I argue that this move only succeeds on a faulty assumption about the conjunction of doxastic "oughts.".
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