Online research in philosophy

We review the literature on the hot hand fallacy by highlighting the positive and negative aspects of hot hand research over the past 20 years, and suggesting new avenues of research. Many researchers have focused on criticising Gilovich et al.'s claim that the hot hand fallacy exists in basketball and other sports, instead of exploring the general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human cognition and probabilistic reasoning. Noting that researchers have shown that people perceive hot streaks in a (...) gambling domain in which systematic streaks cannot possibly exist, we suggest that researchers have paid too much attention to investigating the independence of outcomes in various sporting domains. Instead, we advocate a domain-general mechanistic approach to understanding the hot hand fallacy, and conclude by suggesting approaches that might refocus the literature on the important general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human probabilistic reasoning. (shrink)

David Lewis (1983, 1988) and Laurence Nemirow (1980, 1990) claim that knowing what an experience is like is knowing-how, not knowing-that. They identify this know-how with the abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize experiences, and Lewis labels their view ‘the Ability Hypothesis’. The Ability Hypothesis has intrinsic interest. But Lewis and Nemirow devised it specifically to block certain anti-physicalist arguments due to Thomas Nagel (1974, 1986) and Frank Jackson (1982, 1986). Does it?

The paper illustrates how organic chemists dramatically altered their practices in the middle part of the twentieth century through the adoption of analytical instrumentation - such as ultraviolet and infrared absorption spectroscopy and nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy - through which the difficult process of structure determination for small molecules became routine. Changes in practice were manifested in two ways: in the use of these instruments in the development of 'rule-based' theories; and in an increased focus on synthesis, at the expense (...) of chemical analysis. These rule-based theories took the form of generalizations relating structure to chemical and physical properties, as measured by instrumentation. This 'Instrumental Revolution' in organic chemistry was two-fold: encompassing an embrace of new tools that provided unprecedented access to structures, and a new way of thinking about molecules and their reactivity in terms of shape and structure. These practices suggest the possibility of a change in the ontological status of chemical structures, brought about by the regular use of instruments. The career of Robert Burns Woodward (1917-1979) provides the central historical examples for the paper. Woodward was an organic chemist at Harvard from 1937 until the time of his death. In 1965, he won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry. (shrink)

David Hume's sympathetic principle applies to physical equals. In his account, we sympathize with those like us. By contrast, Adam Smith's sympathetic principle induces equality. We consider Hume's “other rational species” problem to see whether Smith's wider sympathetic principle would alter Hume's conclusion that “superior” beings will enslave “inferior” beings. We show that Smith introduces the notion of “generosity,” which functions as if it were Hume's justice even when there is no possibility of contract. Footnotes1 An earlier version (...) was presented at the 18th-Century Scottish Studies Society, Arlington meeting in June 2001. We benefited from conversations with and comments from Gordon Schochet, Roger Emerson and Silvia Sebastiana. A letter from Leon Montes helped sharpen the argument. The readers for the journal contributed to the output. We remain responsible for the errors and omissions. (shrink)

Written by a team of distinguished scholars, this is an authoritative and comprehensive history of Western philosophy from its earliest beginnings to the present day. Illustrated with over 150 color and black-and-white pictures, chosen to illuminate and complement the text, this lively and readable work is an ideal introduction to philosophy for anyone interested in the history of ideas. From Plato's Republic and St. Augustine's Confessions through Marx's Capital and Sartre's Being and Nothingness, the extraordinary philosophical dialogue between great Western (...) minds has flourished unabated through the ages. Dazzling in its genius and breadth, the long line of European and American intellectual discourse tells a remarkable story--a quest for truth and wisdom that continues to shape our most basic ideas about human nature and the world around us. That quest is brilliantly brought to life in The Oxford History of Western Philosophy. With spectacular illustrations--including sixteen pages of full-color plates--this splendidly written volume takes the reader on a magnificient chronological tour through the revolutions of thought that have forged the Western philosophical tradition from ancient times to the present. Throughout, the six contributors--an internationally renowned team of philosophers including Roger Scruton, Anthony Quinton, and Anthony Kenny--bring the astonishingly diverse, wide-ranging landscape of intellectual history into sharp focus, emphasizing how notions seen today as part of an inevitable march of ideas were in their own time often considered radical, if not revolutionary. Thus we are treated, for example, to lively accounts of how Plato's "theory of forms" and Aristotle's pioneering exercises in logic broke with the past to irrevocably alter the course of Western thought. The authors also reveal the relationships between landmark thinkers, and the ways they drew on their intellectual heritage. They show, for instance, how St. Augustine and Aquinas, though advancing the cause of Christian doctrine, picked up where their pagan Greek forebears had left off. We witness how, during the Renaissance, the profound empiricist ideas underlying Descarte's famous utterance--"I think, therefore I exist"--lived in a tense but complementary relationship with Locke's rationalist theories. Moving into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the book explores how Hume greatly influenced Kant's conception of the "transcendental aesthetic," and how Hegel drew upon the lesser known (but groundbreaking) work of Fichte and Schelling. The authors bring the story up to our own time, vividly recounting the existential trend from Nietzsche ("God is dead") to Sartre, along with other increasingly fractious schools of thought. Along the way, we not only encounter the vast intellectual riches of the Western mind, but we also meet the personalities behind the great thoughts, from the saintly Hume (described by Adam Smith as having "come as near to perfection as anybody could") to the ill-mannered outcast Fichte. And the hundreds of maps and striking illustrations (including full-color reproductions of art ranging from medieval manuscripts to the works of Raphael, Ingres, and Magritte) form an integral part of the book, revealing the interweaving of art and ideas through the ages, as artists have striven to give visual immediacy to philosophical concepts. The Oxford History of Western Philosophy is the most authoritative single-volume account ever written for the general reader. Engagingly written and astonishingly far-reaching, it provides the consummate introduction to the intellectual bedrock upon which Western civilization is built. (shrink)

From Plato's Republic and St. Augustine's Confessions through Marx's Capital and Sartre's Being and Nothingness, the extraordinary philosophical dialogue between great Western minds has flourished unabated through the ages. Dazzling in its genius and breadth, the long line of European and American intellectual discourse tells a remarkable story--a quest for truth and wisdom that continues to shape our most basic ideas about human nature and the world around us. That quest is brilliantly brought to life in The Oxford History of (...) Western Philosophy. Featuring hundreds of spectacular illustrations--including sixteen pages of full-color plates--this splendidly written volume takes the reader on a magnificient chronological tour through the revolutions of thought that have forged the Western philosophical tradition from ancient times to the present. Throughout, the six contributors--an internationally renowned team of philosophers including Roger Scruton, Anthony Quinton, and Anthony Kenny--bring the astonishingly diverse, wide-ranging landscape of intellectual history into sharp focus, emphasizing how notions seen today as part of an inevitable march of ideas were in their own time often considered radical, if not revolutionary. Thus we are treated, for example, to lively accounts of how Plato's "theory of forms" and Aristotle's pioneering exercises in logic broke with the past to irrevocably alter the course of Western thought. The authors also reveal the relationships between landmark thinkers, and the ways they drew on their intellectual heritage. They show, for instance, how St. Augustine and Aquinas, though advancing the cause of Christian doctrine, picked up where their pagan Greek forebears had left off. We witness how, during the Renaissance, the profound empiricist ideas underlying Descarte's famous utterance--"I think, therefore I exist"--lived in a tense but complementary relationship with Locke's rationalist theories. Moving into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the book explores how Hume greatly influenced Kant's conception of the "transcendental aesthetic," and how Hegel drew upon the lesser known (but groundbreaking) work of Fichte and Schelling. The authors bring the story up to our own time, vividly recounting the existential trend from Nietzsche ("God is dead") to Sartre, along with other increasingly fractious schools of thought. Along the way, we not only encounter the vast intellectual riches of the Western mind, but we also meet the personalities behind the great thoughts, from the saintly Hume (described by Adam Smith as having "come as near to perfection as anybody could") to the ill-mannered outcast Fichte. And the hundreds of maps and striking illustrations (including full-color reproductions of art ranging from medieval manuscripts to the works of Raphael, Ingres, and Magritte) form an integral part of the book, revealing the interweaving of art and ideas through the ages, as artists have striven to give visual immediacy to philosophical concepts. The Oxford History of Western Philosophy is the most authoritative single-volume account ever written for the general reader. Engagingly written and astonishingly far-reaching, it provides the consummate introduction to the intellectual bedrock upon which Western civilization is built. (shrink)

In Soi-meme comme autre Ricoeur defines personal identity as singularity, this being the manner in which each individual structures a deposit of common experiences and ways of being-in-the-world in a space-time, and as such as a personalized manner of responding to the challenges of circumstances. For what is common and shared, the other is an alter ego. Identity is a holon that can't be divided into atoms, as the puzzle cases and Musil's L'Homme sans qualites seek to do. Ricoeur (...) divides identity into sameness and ipseity. Sameness designates a cumulative center of experiences; ipseity designates the other of oneself, i.e. the historical and changing quality of sameness. With the theories of Bremont and Greimas, Ricoeuer finds in literary narration the best examples of the dialectic between sameness and ipseity. In adddition he considers, with Mclntyre, that it is the best medium for formulating ethical judgments on the basis of discrete experiences. (shrink)

Ideal for survey courses in social and political philosophy, this volume is a substantially abridged and slightly altered version of Steven M. Cahn's Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy (OUP, 2001). Offering coverage from antiquity to the present, Political Philosophy: The Essential Texts is a historically organized collection of the most significant works from nearly 2,500 years of political philosophy. It moves from classical thought (Plato, Aristotle) through the medieval period (Aquinas) to modern perspectives (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, (...) class='Hi'>Adam Smith, Hamilton and Madison, Kant). The book includes work from major nineteenth-century thinkers (Hegel, Marx and Engels, Mill) and twentieth-century theorists (Rawls, Nozick, Foucault, Habermas, Nussbaum) and also presents a variety of notable documents and addresses, including the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and speeches by Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr. The readings are substantial or complete texts, not fragments. An especially valuable feature of this volume is that the works of each author are introduced with an engaging essay by a leading contemporary authority. These introductions include Richard Kraut on Plato and Aristotle; Paul J. Weithman on Aquinas; Roger D. Masters on Machiavelli; Jean Hampton on Hobbes; A. John Simmons on Locke; Joshua Cohen on Rousseau and Rawls; Donald W. Livingston on Hume; Charles L. Griswold, Jr., on Adam Smith; Bernard E. Brown on Hamilton and Madison; Paul Guyer on Kant; Steven B. Smith on Hegel; Richard Miller on Marx and Engels; Jeremy Waldron on Mill; Thomas Christiano on Nozick; Thomas A. McCarthy on Foucault and Habermas; and Eva Feder Kittay on Nussbaum. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that L'Étranger , Camus's famous novel about an outsider, had by as early as 1946 become just as much of an 'insider' in terms of its affiliation to the Parisian literary tradition. More than an insider simply by virtue of its contemporary place in the French canon, then, the novel is also intertextually bound to a tradition of oxymoronic poetics dating back to Charles Baudelaire's Paris Spleen ( Les Petits poèmes en prose ). I shall examine the (...) way in which L'Étranger performs its prose poetics, thereby establishing it as exemplary of a Parisian model of modernity. Additionally, the famous scene on the beach will be considered as a liminal space and as a literary translation of Paris into the desert, which, once a joke for Paris's relationship to provincial France, became after the Second World War a new allegory for the capital's self-alterity. (shrink)

Is there a vacuum in nature? This is a question which preoccupied natural philosophers for millennia. Great thinkers including Democritus and Newton maintained the existence of a vacuum, while Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz argued strongly that there was not, and perhaps could not be, any such thing. A casual glance at the literature of contemporary physics may leave the impression that scientific progress has produced a definitive positive answer, so that the philosophers' debates are now of only historical interest. Not (...) only is the attainment of high vacua a multimillion dollar industry, but almost every text and research paper in theoretical high energy or condensed matter physics or cosmology includes multiple references to the vacuum and its often surprising properties. And yet we have it on the authority of no less a scientist than Einstein himself that his general theory of relativity vindicates Descartes' conclusion that there could be no vacuum since the idea of space without matter is unintelligible! Does this mean that there is after all no scientific consensus on this issue, and that the ancient philosophical debate should simply be resumed with renewed vigor? I shall argue that it does not. The progress of physics has given rise to such a proliferation of different (though related) uses of the word 'vacuum' as to irretrievably alter the terms of that debate. Rather than asking whether there is a vacuum in nature, one should ask how well what counts as the vacuum in some physical theory represents reality. This in turn splits up into a semantic question (What aspect of which model counts as the vacuum in this theory?) and an empirical question (How strong is the evidence that nature is faithfully represented by this aspect of the model?) I shall focus mainly on the prior, semantic question here. (shrink)

Over the past decades, mood enhancement effects of various drugs and neuromodulation technologies have been proclaimed. If one day highly effective methods for significantly altering and elevating one’s mood are available, it is conceivable that the demand for them will be considerable. One urgent concern will then be what role physicians should play in providing such services. The concern can be extended from literature on controversial demands for aesthetic surgery. According to Margaret Little, physicians should be aware that certain aesthetic (...) enhancement requests reflect immoral social norms and ideals. By granting such requests, she argues, doctors render themselves complicit to a collective ‘evil’. In this paper, we wish to question the extent to which physicians, psychiatrists and/or neurosurgeons should play a role as ‘moral gatekeepers’ in dealing with suspect demands and norms underlying potential desires to alter one’s mood or character. We investigate and discuss the nature and limits of physician responsibilities in reference to various hypothetical and intuitively problematic mood enhancement requests. (shrink)

Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...) property of being an A. In this respect, its logical form is the same as that of relative frequencies. For instance, we might talk about the probability of a human baby being female. That probability is about human babies in general — not about individuals. If we examine a baby and determine conclusively that she is female, then the definite probability of her being female is 1, but that does not alter the indefinite probability of human babies in general being female. Most objective approaches to probability tie probabilities to relative frequencies in some way, and the resulting probabilities have the same logical form as the relative frequencies. That is, they are indefinite probabilities. The simplest theories identify indefinite probabilities with relative frequencies.3 It is often objected that such “finite frequency theories” are inadequate because our probability judgments often diverge from relative frequencies. For example, we can talk about a coin being fair (and so the indefinite probability of a flip landing heads is 0.5) even when it is flipped only once and then destroyed (in which case the relative frequency is either 1 or 0). For understanding such indefinite probabilities, it has been suggested that we need a notion of probability that talks about possible instances of properties as well as actual instances.. (shrink)

The tendency to test outcomes that are predicted by our current theory (the confirmation bias) is one of the best-known biases of human decision making. We prove that the confirmation bias is an optimal strategy for testing hypotheses when those hypotheses are deterministic, each making a single prediction about the next event in a sequence. Our proof applies for two normative standards commonly used for evaluating hypothesis testing: maximizing expected information gain and maximizing the probability of falsifying the current hypothesis. (...) This analysis rests on two assumptions: (a) that people predict the next event in a sequence in a way that is consistent with Bayesian inference; and (b) when testing hypotheses, people test the hypothesis to which they assign highest posterior probability. We present four behavioral experiments that support these assumptions, showing that a simple Bayesian model can capture people's predictions about numerical sequences (Experiments 1 and 2), and that we can alter the hypotheses that people choose to test by manipulating the prior probability of those hypotheses (Experiments 3 and 4). (shrink)

Synaesthesia is a condition in which one type of stimulation evokes the sensation of another, as when the hearing of a sound produces photisms, i.e. mental percepts of colours. R is a 20 year old colour blind subject who, in addition to the relatively common grapheme-colour synaesthesia, presents a rarely reported cross modal perception in which a variety of visual stimuli elicit aura-like percepts of colour. In R, photisms seem to be closely related to the affective valence of stimuli and (...) typically bring out a consistent pattern of emotional responses. The present case study suggests that colours might be an intrinsic category of the human brain. We developed an empirical methodology that allowed us to study the subject's otherwise inaccessible phenomenological experience. First, we found that R shows a Stroop effect (delayed response due to interference) elicited by photisms despite the fact that he does not show a regular Stroop with real colours. Secondly, by manipulating the colour context we confirmed that colours can alter R's emotional evaluation of the stimuli. Furthermore, we demonstrated that R's auras may actually lead to a partially inverted emotional spectrum where certain stimuli bring out emotional reactions opposite to the normal ones. These findings can only be accounted for by considering R's subjective colour experience or qualia. Therefore the present paper defends the view that qualia are a useful scientific concept that can be approached and studied by experimental methods. (shrink)

The left ventricular assist device was originally designed to be surgically implanted as a bridge to transplantation for patients with chronic end-stage heart failure. On the basis of the REMATCH trial, the US Food and Drug Administration and the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services approved permanent implantation of the left ventricular assist device as a destination therapy in Medicare beneficiaries who are not candidates for heart transplantation. The use of the left ventricular assist device as a destination therapy (...) raises certain ethical challenges. Left ventricular assist devices can prolong the survival of average recipients compared with optimal medical management of chronic end-stage heart failure. However, the overall quality of life can be adversely affected in some recipients because of serious infections, neurologic complications, and device malfunction. Left ventricular assist devices alter end-of-life trajectories. The caregivers of recipients may experience significant burden (e.g., poor physical health, depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder) from destination therapy with left ventricular assist devices. There are also social and financial ramifications for recipients and their families. We advocate early utilization of a palliative care approach and outline prerequisite conditions so that consenting for the use of a left ventricular assist device as a destination therapy is a well informed process. These conditions include: (1) direct participation of a multidisciplinary care team, including palliative care specialists, (2) a concise plan of care for anticipated device-related complications, (3) careful surveillance and counseling for caregiver burden, (4) advance-care planning for anticipated end-of-life trajectories and timing of device deactivation, and (5) a plan to address the long-term financial burden on patients, families, and caregivers. Short-term mechanical circulatory devices (e.g. percutaneous cardiopulmonary bypass, percutaneous ventricular assist devices, etc.) can be initiated in emergency situations as a bridge to permanent implantation of ventricular assist devices in chronic end-stage heart failure. In the absence of first-person (patient) consent, presumed consent or surrogate consent should be used cautiously for the initiation of short-term mechanical circulatory devices in emergency situations as a bridge to permanent implantation of left ventricular assist devices. Future clinical studies of destination therapy with left ventricular assist devices should include measures of recipients' quality of end-of-life care and caregivers' burden. (shrink)

Recent advances in genetic engineering nowallow the design of programmable biologicalartifacts. Such programming may include usageconstraints that will alter the balance ofownership and control for biotechnologyproducts. Similar changes have been analyzedin the context of digital content managementsystems, and while this previous work is usefulin analyzing issues related to biologicalprogramming, the latter technology presents new conceptual problems that require morecomprehensive evaluation of the interplaybetween law and technologically embeddedvalues. In particular, the ability to embedcontractual terms in technological artifactsnow requires a re-examination (...) of disclosure andconsent in transactions involving such artifacts. (shrink)

Environmental ethics has been dominated by an idealist logic that limits its positive impact on the natural world about which environmental philosophers care deeply. Environmental ethicists need to alter the ways we think and talk about what we value and the relations among ideas, values, and actions. Drawing on the sociology of religion and Marxian philosophy among other sources, a new approach may increase our understanding of how ideas are lived out and how we might increase the impact of (...) our ideas about the value of nature. (shrink)

Designed to facilitate economic development, the corporate form now threatens human survival. This article presents an argument that organisations are yet to be ‘fit for purpose’ and that the corporate form needs to be re-designed to reach sustainability. It suggests that organisations need to recognise their agent status amongst a much wider and highly complex array of interconnected, dynamic economic, environmental and social systems. Human Factors theory is drawn on to propose that business systems could be made sustainable through re-design. (...) They could fit their environment more appropriately by improving: Efficiency, Adaptability and Social Cohesion. Leaders of organisations would also need to take a holistic approach to alter the organisation proactively to adapt to the systems within which it is embedded. (shrink)

Several of Krueger & Funder's (K&F's) suggestions may promote more balanced social cognition research, but reconsidered null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) is not one of them. Although NHST has primarily supported negative conclusions, this is simply because most conclusions have been negative. NHST can support positive, negative, and even balanced conclusions. Better NHST practices would benefit psychology, but would not alter the balance between positive and negative approaches.

Analytical reflections on tasks and functions of philosophy in the modern world, as well as, efforts deriving novel vision of practically all areas of the philosophical thought may become sound only after consideration of the innovations with which modern natural science has crossed the 20—21 centuries boundary. Discoveries in astrophysics at the end of the 20th century offer new and unprecedented perceptions of our world. In this world only 4% of the total Universe energy is attributed to the known forms (...) of the matter, 20% constitutes “dark matter” and 76% is in “dark energy”. The first decade of the 21st century will go on record inhistory of the civilization as the one associated with breakthrough experiments shedding light on the nature of the mysterious types of the matter, and construction of the unified theory of field. It is safe to regard modern science to be on the verge of profound transformations. These changes are bound to alter our outside world comprehension, redefining human being’s place in it. That advances a set of new serious requirements to philosophy as a science that must present ability to adapt to provide adequate and meaningful methodological interpretations to anticipated discoveries. This article addresses the characteristic features of modern conceptual knowledge of the world, with an attempt of offering their philosophical and methodological comprehension. (shrink)

This paper criticizes Coliingridge’s arguments against an epistemology of technological control. Collingridge claims that because prediction mechanisms are inadequate, his “dilemma of control” demonstrates that the sociopolitical impact of new technologies cannot be forecasted, and that, consequently, policy makers must concentrate their control measures on minimizing the costs required to alter entrenched technologies. I argue that Collingridge does not show on either horn that forecasting is impossible, and that his criticisms of forecasting methods are self-defeating for they undercut his (...) positive case for the control of entrenched technologies. Finally, I indicate an empirical base for forecasting risk that may define epistemic principles of technology assessment. (shrink)

What is it to be seen (naked) by one's cat? In “L'animal que donc je suis” (2006), the first of several lectures that he presented at a conference on the “autobiographical animal,” Jacques Derrida tells of his discomfort when, emerging from his shower one day, he found himself being looked at by his cat. Th experience leads him, by way of reflections on the question of the animal, to what is arguably the question of his philosophy: Who am I? It (...) is not so much that Derrida wants to answer this question as to be free of it. His task here is to determine the sense of it— where it leads, for example, when it comes to the nature of the diff erence between himself and his cat. Unlike animal rights activists (and unlike philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Cora Diamond, who have recently addressed this issue), Derrida does not want to erase this difference but wants to multiply it in order (among other things) to affirm the absolute alterity or singularity of his cat, which cannot be subsumed by any category (such as the animal). His cat is an Other in a way that no human being (supposing there to be such a thing, which Derrida is not prepared to grant) could ever be. And here is where “the question who?” leads as well, namely, to a path of escape from absorption into any identity-machine. As Derrida puts it in A Taste for the Secret: Who am I when I am not one of you? In a hospitable world one would be free not to answer. (shrink)

When a tree is chopped to bits, or a sweater unravelled, its matter still exists. Since antiquity, it has sometimes been inferred that nothing really has been destroyed: what has happened is just that this matter has assumed new form. Contemporary versions hold that apparent destruction of a familiar object is just rearrangement of microparticles or of 'physical simples' or 'world stuff'. But if destruction of a familiar object is genuinely to be reduced to mere alteration of something else, we (...) must identify an alteration proper to the career, the course of existence, of this something else; relatedly, the alteration must be characterizable without asserting the existence of the familiar object. All contemporary views fail one of these requirements. (shrink)

The question of enhancement occupies a prominent place not only in current bioethical debates but also in wider public discussions about our human future. In all of these, the problem of enhancement is usually articulated via two sets of questions: moral questions over its permissibility, extent and direction; and technical questions over the feasibility of different forms of regenerative and synthetic alterations to human bodies and minds. This article argues that none of the dominant positions on enhancement within the field (...) of bioethics is entirely satisfactory due to the limited, monadic, pre-technological and non-cultural conception of the human that is adopted in these models. Critically engaging with both opponents of enhancement (Habermas) and its advocates (Harris, Agar, Bostrom, Dworkin), Zylinska also takes some steps towards outlining a nonnormative ethics of enhancement. The latter sees its human and non-human subjects as always already enhanced, and hence dependent, relational and coevolving with technology. (shrink)

The major thesis developed in Sartre's L'imaginaire is that all imaginary acts can be subsumed under the heading of one "image family" and, therefore, that imagination as a whole can be theorized in terms of pictorial representation. Yet this theory fails to meet the objective of Sartre's study, to demonstrate that imaginary activity is not a derivative of perception but an attitude with a character and dignity of its own. The subsidiary account of imagination in terms of neutralization of belief (...) has the advantage of not being constrained by the requirement that imaginary activity serve a purely reproductive function of bringing an absent "original" into a quasi presence and, thus, leaves room for free creativity and fiction. It also points to a concrete lived experience of alterity at the heart of subjective life where the subject stages its life as if it were the life of an other, putting pressure onto Sartre's contention that the cogito defines subjectivity. (shrink)

Kant's 'Copernican Revolution', which began in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), had, by the early 1790s, fundamentally altered the terrain of German philosophy – but not entirely in the way that Kant had foreseen. Skeptical challenges to Kant's discursive account of cognition, in which experience arises from the separate faculties of sensibility and understanding, had led thinkers such as K.L. Reinhold and J.G. Fichte to attempt to provide a first, foundational principle for the critical philosophy. These efforts were enormously (...) influential, but by the middle of the 1790s, they too were facing a great deal of critical scrutiny. The central challenge to the Fichtean project came from an unlikely quarter: a group of young thinkers and poets who are collectively known as the early Romantics. For the Romantics, Fichte's project remains too 'subjectivist', for it tries to provide an account of the world by beginning with the conditions that govern subjectivity alone. Rather, the Romantics argue that the world must be understood in terms of a monistic Absolute, akin to Spinoza's substance, in which all dualisms are overcome. It is with this step that Absolute Idealism comes on the scene, and sets the stage for the development of Hegel's system in the early 1800s. This essay, which continues the story of 'Who's Who from Kant to Hegel I', examines the ways in which early Romanticism reacted to the Fichtean project, looks at a variety of anti-foundationalist idealisms that the Romantics – in particular Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher – developed, and traces the role that Friedrich Schelling plays in offering the first systematic account of Absolute Idealism. (shrink)

The original definition of a technical term, the paper argues, should not be altered without a good reason. This notion is applied to the conception of illocutionary acts suggested by Alston, which markedly differs from the conception originally introduced by John L. Austin. Alston appears to agree with the argument; at least, he does attempt to justify his re-definition. The paper argues, however, that the reasons he gives fail.

The conclusions on libertarianism Robert Nozick reaches are appropriate for a bygone era. In a modern market economy, libertarianism requires that employable people have the option of taking up a publicly provided income instead of employment. This is the only way to compensate the involuntarily unemployed that a market economy requires and to ensure that all employment is voluntary. Taxation on voluntary exchanges is unobjectionable because it alters prices, not property, and no one has a right to a particular price. (...) The best way to provide state incomes for the capable unemployed is through a negative income tax.Les conclusions de libertarisme que tire Nozick valent pour une époque révolue. Dans une économie de marché moderne, le libertarisme exige que les gens aptes au travail puissent opter pour un revenu de source publique plutôt que pour un travail. Voilà le seul moyen de compenser les sans-emploi involontaires que requiert l’economie de marché et de s’assurer que chacun travaille volontairement. Imposer les échanges volontaires est acceptable parce que cela affecte les prix, non la propriété, et que nul n’a droit à un prix prticulier. Le meilleur moyen pour l’État de fournir un revenu aux sans-emploi aptes au travail passe par un impôt sur le revenu négatif. (shrink)

This essay shows that Jean-Luc Nancy's reconceptualization of corporeality in such texts as L'Intrus and Corpus can be an important ally to feminist theories of body. I introduce Nancy's ontology and argue that his rejection of the unified, integrated body of humanist discourses in favor of dis-integrated bodies constituted by multiple alterities and his consequent reinterpretation of body as a "being-exscribed" begin the task of thinking bodies beyond traditional dualisms and their ahistorical and rationalist frameworks. I then address three potential (...) criticisms of Nancy's work and suggest that though there may be reasons to move cautiously in adopting the framework he provides, his work harbors resources directly beneficial to critiques of prevailing forms of gender normativity. (shrink)

In this paper I trace and explain the changes in Nietzsche’s conception of the Dionysian ideal. I identify five attributes of the Dionysian ideal, and claim that they are constitutive of it. I also claim that Nietzsche’s early conception of the Dionysian ideal owes less to his speculations concerning the origin of Greek tragedy than to his encounter with the mature music of Richard Wagner. It was through his encounter with Wagner’s music that Nietzsche believed he first discovered the key (...) to Dionysian experience, which key concerned one of the five attributes of the Dionysian ideal: ecstasy. On route to his later conception, Nietzsche excised one of these constitutive attributes and altered the meaning of Dionysian ecstasy. I argue that the later conception of the Dionysian surrenders the psychological complexity of the earlier conception, and diminishes considerably the viability ofthe Dionysian ideal as a cultural ideal.Dans le présent article, j’esquisse et j’explique les changements de conception chez Nietzsehe de I’ideal dionysiaque, dont j’identifie cinq attributs constitutifs. J’y affirme que la première conception nietzschéenne de I’ideal dionysiaque découle moins de ses spéculations relatives a l’origine de la tragédie grecque qu’à son experience de la musique achevée de Richard Wagner. À travers la musique wagnérienne, Nietzsehe crut découvrir pour la première fois la clé de I’experience dionysiaque, à savoir I’extase, soit I’un des cinq attributs constitutifs de I’idéal dionysiaque. Cependant, Nietzsche supprima par la suite I’un de ces attributs constitutifs et modifia le sens de I’extase dionysiaque. Je soutiens que cette conception plus tardive du dionysiaque se dépouille de la complexité psychologique de lapremière conception et diminue consiéerablement la viabilite de I’ideal dionysiaque en tant qu’ideal culturel. (shrink)

Those who are familiar with the development of contemporary philosophy and in particular of phenomenology, may have frowned at the prospect of having to sit through a praise of visibility. Indeed, if there is any praise to be sung, it is not the visible but the invisible that should be its subject. The realm of the visible suffers from an intrinsic defect: it lacks the depth to resist the movement of appropriation implied in seeing, or more generally in perceiving. It (...) does not dispose of whatLevinas would call the infinity that could help it withstand the gaze that catches it and helps it contest the subject of that gaze its power. There is not enough of the event in it to “summon the subject outside of its autarky.” “The flat phenomenon and the subject to which nothing ever happens form a pair,” Rudolf Bernet writes in a paper with the telling title “Le phénomène et l’invisible (le regard).” It seems indeed left to the invisible to remediate the shortcomings of the eye that sees. Its task is to divest the subject who sees of a handicap it cannot compensate for on its own, — of a kind of Midas complex: whatever it encounters in the light that it throws on things, is fatally robbed of its alterity, leaving the seeing or perceiving subject alone in a solitude that is but the reverse side of the power by which it subjects whatever crosses its way. “The exteriority of light,” Levinas writes in this vein, “does not suffice for the liberation of the I that is its own prisoner.”. (shrink)

A theory of occurrent factual memory is sketched out. The theory represents an alterative to the traditional theory in John L. Pollock’s Knowledge and Justification, in that it analyzes occurrently remembering that p without employing the notion of ostensible recollection that p. The latter notion, it is argued, can be understood in terms of occurrently believing (or being inclined to believe) that p. In defending his theory against nontraditional alternatives, Pollock employs arguments that conflict with his own principle of implicit (...) reasons. That principle, it is shown, sanctions cross-temporal justification of the sort presupposed by the alternative nontraditional theory. [CORRIGENDUM: Line 6 at the top of page 137 should read: memory, then if S occurrently remembers that p at t, then S, at t, has a justified (occurrent) belief that p such that (a) this belief that p constitutes, at t, S’s In lines 7–9 at the top of page 140, the sentence beginning with “For” and ending with “way” should be deleted, and in line 11 “fact” should be “face”.] . (shrink)

Sketch and Drive. The Gaze in Merleau-PontyIn Seminar XI (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis), Jacques Lacan interrupts the first session, which was to be devoted to the Freudian notion of the drive, in order to consider not this fundamental concept of psychoanalysis, but the way in which Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his posthumous book, The Visible and the Invisible, approaches the idea of the subject and how he points to the divergence between the eye and the gaze. Lacan sees in (...) Merleau-Ponty’s thesis concerning the gaze, a certain analogy with what Freud called the death drive. But, concerning voyance, Lacan wonders if Merleau-Ponty does not fall back into a Platonic imaginary of an ultra-gaze from which each body would issue. But or task now is to show that Merleau-Ponty remained faithful to the fact that the gaze cannot really be explained and that his philosophy of the flesh has not reduced the diverse dimension of experience to a central power of constitution. In order to apprehend better the notion of the flesh, we shall bring into play Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the Gestalt, which will allow us to show how, for Merleau-Ponty, the drive is always an irreducible alterity that stops the indivision of the whole from being able to be experienced as a synthesis.Adombramento e pulsione. Lo sguardo in Merleau-PontyNel seminario XI (I quattro concetti della psicoanalisi), Jacques Lacan sospende la prima seduta dedicata alla discussione della nozione freudiana di pulsione, per esaminare non il concetto fondamentale della psicoanalisi ma la maniera in cui Maurice Merleau-Ponty, nel suo libro postumo Il visibile e l’invisibile, affronta il tema e mostra lo scarto che esiste tra occhio e sguardo. Lacan scorge nella tesi di Merleau-Ponty concernente lo sguardo una certa analogia con ciò che Freud ha chiamato pulsione di morte. Ma, a proposito della voyance, Lacan si chiede se Merleau-Ponty non ricada in fondo nell’immaginario platonico di un ultra-sguardo dal quale dovrebbe provenire ogni corpo. Il nostro intento è quindi mostrare che Merleau-Ponty è rimasto fedele alla concezione dell’inesplicabilità dello sguardo estraneo e che allo stesso modo la sua filosofia della carne non ha ridotto le diverse dimensioni dell’esperienza ad un potere centrale di costituzione. Per meglio comprendere la nozione di carne faremo appello alla teoria merleau-pontiana della Gestalt, la quale ci permetterà di mostrare come, per il filosofo, la pulsione sia sempre un’alterità irreducibile tale da impedire che l’indivisione del tutto possa talvolta essere vissuta come sintesi. (shrink)

Notions of human nature and what is natural are vague and contradictory within the field of bioethics, especially evident through individuals critical of bodily diversity through nanobiology and biotechnology in general. This paper discusses the paradoxical aspects of these notions of human nature, while showing that they rely on a notion of a standard body that all humans allegedly share. I examine several writings on biotechnology by bioethicists, specifically by people working in policy—it is here that the normativity of human (...) nature becomes a pressing concern. Once it has been shown that there is no standard body, and indeed typical bioethical notions of human nature are internally contradictory, a more productive conversation can be engaged in that allows for morphological diversity, be it through biotechnological change or via nature itself. (shrink)

Cet article se donne pour tâche de souligner la place, incontestablement impensée, de l’altérité et de l’ecriture chez Gadamer. Son dialogue incessant avec Hegel lui a en effet permis d’insister considérablement sur la prédominance de l’autre au delà de toute saisie logique et dialectique. Oe c’est à partir d’un travail subtil de proximité et de distanciation vis-à-vis de la phénoménologie hégélienneque Gadamer pense véritablement la question de l’altérité comme première dans l’acte d’interprétation. C’est depuis cette problématisation que devient également possible (...) une confrontation indirecte avec Derrida dont la portée dépasse amplement la simple opposition dialogue-écriture dans laquelle on tente trop souvent d’enfermer le débat autour de l’identité du sens et de sa différance. Car l’ecriture fait bel et bien l’objet d’une attention particulière dans l’expérience herméneutique gadamerienne.This article attempts to clarify the position, incontestably neglected, of alterity and writing in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. His incessant dialogue with Hegel offered him the possibility of insisting on the predominance of the other over any logical and dialectical apprehension. Hence it is based on a subtle work of proximity and distance in regard to Hegel’s phenomenology that Gadamer can really interrogate the question of alterity as fundamental in the action of interpretation. This problematisation makes possible a real and indirect confrontation with Derrida, whose consequences transgress the simple opposition dialogue-writing to which the debate about the identity of sense and its différance is often confined. In fact, writing is actually the subject of particular attention in gadamerian hermeneutical experience. (shrink)

Lévinas never clarified his method himself. This article is an attempt to account for such an omission and also for the non-classical notion of method as it was constructed. By observing the originality of the means by which this philosophy operates, we come to understand that phenomenology is a necessary beginning to perceive the essential ambiguity of phenomenon and the “trace” of alterity. But since this can only be an indicative process, Lévinas must find alternative means of justification, as new (...) forms of reduction. This contingency implies a notion of truth as testimony. The last stage in the method of alterity consists of an “ethical vigilance” in order to distinguish what in Same is Other. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is focused on presenting the method of historical analysis built by Michel Foucault in his book Histoire de la Folie à l’Âge Classique as a “History of the Other”. Such term appears for the first time at Les Mots et les Choses’s Preface, in which Foucault analyses his method in the quoted book on madness (but also in La Naissance de la Clinique). In this sense, firstly we have to verify the hypothesis of this relation (...) between Foucault’s archeological method as a Thought of the Otherness, precisely concerning to that “Other History” proposed by the philosopher. Secondly, we need to analyse specifically Histoire de la Folie as a privileged work, as far as the approach on the relation with the other is concerned. KEY WORDS – Archeology of knowledge. History. Alterity. Madness. (shrink)

The philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty serves both as a ground and a site of departure for Levinas’ thinking. This essay takes up their relationship, with particular regard to the question of whether Merleau-Ponty’s later shift from phenomenology to ontology brings him under Levinas’ critique of ontology as a totalizing philosophy of power that ultimately either denies or negates the radical alterity of the other. Both thinkers are engaged in reconceiving the intersubjective relation, and focus much of their analyses on the (...) problem of Ianguage as the means by which this relation is expressed. However, though similar in scope, they arrive at fundamentally different positions regarding the self-other relationship, while jointly affirming the role paradox plays in the constitution of intersubjectivity. This essay considers not only their differences but their confluences in contributing to this existential question.La philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty sert à la fois de fondement et de point de départ pour la pensée de Lévinas. Le présent article aborde la question de leur relation en cherchant à savoir si le tournant de Merleau-Ponty, qui le mène de la phénoménologie à I’ontologie, place ce dernier sous la critique lévinassienne de I’ontologie comme philosophie totalisante du pouvoir qui, ultimement, nie I’alteriteradicale de l’autre. Les deux penseurs sont engagés dans le projet de reconceptualisation de la relation intersubjective et du langage qui exprime cette relation. Bien que similaires dans leur portée, ils aboutissent à des positions fondamentalement différentes relativement à la question du rapport soi-autre, alors qu’ils reconnaissent tous deux le rôle du paradoxe dans la constitution de I’intersubjectivité. Cet article considère non seulement leurs differences, mais leurs convergences dans la contribution de la question existentielle. (shrink)

Les divers visages du mouvement. Questions phénoménologiques et ontologiques sur le rapport entre la perception, l’expression et le mouvement dans le cours de Merleau-PontyLe monde sensible et le monde de l’expressionLe cours professé par Merleau-Ponty dans l’année 1952-53 est encore inédit, mais grâce au travail de Emmanuel de Saint Aubert et Stefan Kristensen il est possible de le lire en transcription en vue de sa publication. Ce cours, inaugurant les leçons au Collège de France, contient des analyses détaillées concernant la (...) relation entre monde sensible perceptif et monde de l’expression (non seulement linguistique). Il s’agit d’analyses importantes, possédant un caractère programmatique en vue des recherches effectuées ensuite par Merleau-Ponty jusqu’à l’époque de Le visible et l’invisible. Au sein de cette analyse une place importante est réservée au thème du mouvement, d’abord étudié en tant que médiateur entre perception et pensée, mais vite devenu question centrale du cours.Merleau-Ponty aborde le problème du mouvement par rapport à sa manifestation, considérée comme originale et non pas réductible à des éléments plus fondamentaux qu’elle, tels que l’espace et du temps. Il étudie ensuite le sujet du mouvement, en le liant avec le concept de schéma corporel, ce qui est amplement illustré et contient des développements intéressants à l’égard de la Phénoménologie de la perception. Enfin il étudie la question de la représentation du mouvement dans la peinture et le cinéma.Toutes ces approches au problème du mouvement esquissent, sans le dire ouvertement, la question de sa signification ontologique. Dans cet essai, j’ai essayé d’articuler cette question, en essayant d’en extraire les différentes valeurs: celle relative au statut du mouvement, celle portant sur la relation entre le mouvement et la manifestation, à savoir la manifestation comme mouvement, et enfin celle de la pluralité de sens ontologique inhérente à la conception de Merleau-Ponty, avec une attention particulière aux concepts d’altération, métamorphose, trace de l’être.De la discussion des ses remarques tout aussi pénétrantes que réticentes on est amené à conclure que Merleau-Ponty a vu la possibilité d’une ontologie «cinétique», c’est à dire d’une signification ontologique radicale du mouvement, mais sans arriver à une formulation explicite de cette perspective. Perspective qui semble refaire surface dans les oeuvres et dans les leçons suivantes, sans jamais recevoir une définition accomplie.I molti volti del movimento. Problemi fenomenologici e ontologici relativi alla relazione tra percezione, espressione e movimento nel corso su Il mondo sensibile e il mondo dell’espressione di M. Merleau-PontyIl corso tenuto da Merleau-Ponty nell’anno accademico 1952-53 è ancora inedito ma grazie al lavoro di Emmanuel de Saint Aubert e Stefan Kristensen è ora divenuto possibile leggerne la trascrizione in vista della sua pubblicazione. Questo corso, inaugurale delle lezioni al Collège de France, contiene analisi dettagliate relative al problema del rapporto tra mondo sensibile percettivo e mondo dell’espressione (anche ma non soltanto linguistica). Si tratta di analisi importanti anche per il carattere programmatico che esse posseggono in riferimento alle successive indagini condotte da Merleau-Ponty fino all’epoca della redazione di Il visibile e l’invisibile. All’interno di tali analisi un posto importante è riservato al tema del movimento, inizialmente indagato nella sua valenza di mediazione tra percezione e pensiero, ma presto assurto a tema centrale della riflessione.Merleau-Ponty discute il problema del movimento in relazione alla sua manifestazione, ritenuta originaria e non riconducibile, o peggio riducibile, a elementi più fondamentali come lo spazio e il tempo. Indaga poi il soggetto del movimento, articolandolo in connessione alla nozione di schema corporeo, che viene illustrata ampiamente e contiene interessanti sviluppi rispetto a Fenomenologia della percezione. Infine studia la questione della rappresentazione del movimento in pittura e nel cinema.Tutti questi approcci al movimento delineano, senza esplicitarla apertamente, la questione della valenza ontologica del movimento. In questo saggio ho provato ad articolare tale questione cercando di estrarne le diverse valenze: quella relativa allo statuto del movimento, quella concernente il nesso tra movimento e manifestazione, ossia la manifestazione come movimento; infi ne quella della pluralità di sensi ontologici intrinseca alla trattazione di Merleau-Ponty, con un’attenzione particolare per le nozioni di alterazione, metamorfosi, traccia d’essere.Dall’analisi di queste osservazioni insieme penetranti e reticenti mi pare di poter concludere che Merleau-Ponty abbia intravisto la possibilità di una ontologia “cinetica”, cioè di un significato ontologico radicale del movimento, senza però arrivare ad una formulazione esplicita di tale prospettiva. Prospettiva che sembra a tratti riaffiorare nelle opere e nelle lezioni successive, senza mai ricevere una compiuta definizione. (shrink)

Transpersonal psychology: Dean, S. R. The ultraconscious mind. Arasteh, A. R. Final integration in the adult personality.--The nature of madness: First, E. Visions, voyages, and new interpretations of madness. Van Dusen, W. Hallucinations as the world of spirits.--Biofeedback: White, J. The yogi in the lab. Kiefer, D. EEG alpha feedback and subjective states of consciousness.--Meditation research: Griffith, F. F. Meditation research: its personal and social implications. Kiefer, D. Intermeditation notes: reports from inner space.--Psychic research: Honorton, C. Tracing ESP through altered (...) states of consciousness. Johnson, C. W. Unexplored areas of parapsychology.--Paraphysics: White, J. Plants, polygraphs, and paraphysics. Reiser, O. L. Messages to and from the galaxy.--Biotechnology: Beal, J. B. The new biotechnology. Tiller, W. A. Energy fields and the human body.--The neurosciences: Conway, H. Life, death, and antimatter. Floyd, K. Of time and mind: from paradox to paradigm.--Ecological consciousness: Smith, R. A. Our passport to evolutionary awareness. Esser, A. H. Synergy and social pollution in the communal imagery of mankind.--Space travel and extraterrestrial life: Mitchell, E. D. Global consciousness and the view from space. White, J. Exobiology--where science fiction meets science fact.--Death as an altered state of consciousness: Tietze, T. R. Some perspectives on survival. Noyes, R. Dying and mystical consciousness. (shrink)

To believe in fairies is not to believe in rare Lepidoptera or the like, within a basically materialistic context. It is to take folk?stories seriously as accounts of the ?dreamworld?, the realm of conscious experience of which our ?waking world? is only a province, to acknowledge and make real to ourselves the presence of spirits that enter our consciousness as moods of love or alienation, wild joy or anger. In W. B. Yeats's philosophy fairies are the moods and characters of (...) human life, conceived not as alterations in a material being, but as the spiritual rulers of an idealistically conceived world. Yeats follows folklore in making them ambivalent: either the sweet undying voices of nature or the disillusioned destroyers of humane life. His prophecies of a New Age were of a world ruled unknowingly by fairies, spirits invoked by music, poetry, and love, that do not necessarily take much care of ordinary human life. The ?Fairy Faith? described by Yeats and Evans?Wentz is a variety of idealism, and by no means absurd. (shrink)

I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases" (independently discussed by Horgan here), "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia cases". However, at the end, I sketch a positive theory of the role of phenomenology in grounding content, drawing on David Lewis's work on intentionality. I suggest that within Lewis's theory the subject's total evidence (not natuarlness) plays the central role in fixing (...) mental content and ruling out deviant interpretations (such as that described by Robbie Williams). However I point out a huge unnoticed problem, the problem of evidence: Lewis really has no theory of sensory content and hence no theory of what fixes evidence. I suggest a way of plugging this hole in Lewis's theory. On the resulting theory, which I call "phenomenal functionalism", there is a sense in which sensory phenomenology is the source of all determinate intentionality. Phenomenal functionalism has similarities to the theories of Chalmers and Schwitzgebel. (shrink)

A recent account of the meaning of 'real' leads to a view of what anti-realism should be that resembles fictionalism, while not being committed to fictionalism as such or being subject to some of the more obvious objections to that view. This account of anti-realism explains how we might 'make up' what is true in areas such as mathematics or ethics, and yet these made-up truths are resistant to alterations, even by our collective decisions. Finally it is argued that the (...) sort of anti-realism suggested explains the appearance that the ethical domain supervenes on the naturalistic. (shrink)

This article offers an overview of the various formulations of "jihad" during the first six Islamic centuries (7th-13th CE), showing them to be embedded in particular socio-historical contexts. If the essential significance of "jihad" as righteous cause (i.e., action for the sake of a moral order) is shown to have been variously altered according to the needs and conditions of the Muslim community, significant possibilities arise for a contemporary understanding of "jihad" that is relevant to the needs and circumstances of (...) the Muslim community today. Some features of the "jihad" tradition, although specific to a particular period and with little relevance today, continue to inform the current discussion on "jihad." Discussion of the "jihad" tradition, then, should take care to distinguish the historically incidental features of the tradition from those with an enduring relevancy. By doing so, the "jihad" tradition will be able to contribute to discussions on the relation of religion to the public order and political organization, even those not limited to Islam. (shrink)

We are confident of many of the judgements we make as to what sorts of alterations the members of nature's kinds can survive, and what sorts of events mark the ends of their existences. But is our confidence based on empirical observation of nature's kinds and their members? Conventionalists deny that we can learn empirically which properties are essential to the members of nature's kinds. Judgements of sameness in kind between members, and of numerical sameness of a member across time, (...) merely project our conventions of individuation. Our confidence is warranted because apart from those conventions there are no phenomena of kind-sameness or of numerical sameness across time. There is just 'stuff' displaying properties. This paper argues that conventionalists can assign no properties to the 'stuff' beyond immediate phenomenal properties. Consequently they cannot explain how each of us comes to be able to wield 'our conventions'. (shrink)

A mutation alters the hemoglobin in some members of a species of antelope, and as a result the members fare better at high altitudes than their conspecifics do; so high-altitude foraging areas become open to them that are closed to their conspecifics; they thrive, reproduce at a greater rate, and the gene for altered hemoglobin spreads further through the gene pool of the species. That sounds like a classic example (owed to Karen Neander, 1995) of a causal chain traced by (...) evolutionary biology. But a view now nearly universal among philosophers maintains that such biological causation is always shadowed, perhaps even rivaled, by causation on a different level.1 That the subgroup of antelopes forages in areas closed to the conspecifics is a state of affairs embodied or realized, notes this view, in certain movements and state changes done by certain physical microparticles—untold billions of microparticles and movements, but a finite and determinate (more on this below) collection nevertheless. That the subgroup reproduces at a greater rate is likewise realized by a huge collection of microparticle movements, a different collection. And the microparticle happenings comprised in the first collection are causally responsible, strictly in accordance with the laws of microphysics, for the microparticle happenings in the second. Biological causation is always shadowed, perhaps even rivaled, by causation on the level of microphysics. The view I mean is general: any case of causing uncovered by any of the special sciences can be recaptured at the level of microphysics. This view is I think what most philosophers mean by “physicalism”; in any case, “physicalism” is the label I shall use. Physicalism comes in two forms. Modest physicalism holds that any causal transaction reported by the special sciences can be retraced by microphysics.2 Hegemonic physicalism holds that retracing such a transaction at the level of.. (shrink)

The subjective effects and therapeutic potential of the shamanic practice of journeying is well known. However, previous research has neglected to provide a comprehensive assessment of the subjective effects of shamanic-like journeying techniques on non-shamans. Shamanic-like techniques are those that demonstrate some similarity to shamanic practices and yet deviate from what may genuinely be considered shamanism. Furthermore, the personality traits that influence individual susceptibility to shamanic-like techniques are unclear. The aim of the present study was, thus, to investigate experimentally the (...) effect of shamanic-like techniques and a personality trait referred to as "ego boundaries" on subjective experience including mood disturbance. Forty-three non-shamans were administered a composite questionnaire consisting of demographic items and a measure of ego boundaries (i.e., the Short Boundary Questionnaire; BQ-Sh). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: listening to monotonous drumming for 15 minutes coupled with one of two sets of journeying instructions; or sitting quietly with eyes closed for 15 minutes. Participants' subjective experience and mood disturbance were retrospectively assessed using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) and the Profile of Mood States-Short Form, respectively. The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between conditions with regard to the PCI major dimensions of visual imagery, attention and rationality, and minor dimensions of imagery amount and absorption. However, the shamanic-like conditions were not associated with a major reorganization of the pattern of subjective experience compared to the sitting quietly condition, suggesting that what is typically referred to as an altered state of consciousness effect was not evident. One shamanic-like condition and the BQ-Sh subscales need for order, childlikeness, and sensitivity were statistically significant predictors of total mood disturbance. Implications of the findings for the anthropology of consciousness are also considered. (shrink)

To fully understand human language, an evolved trait that develops in the young without formal instruction, it must be possible to observe language that has not been influenced by instruction. But in modern societies, much of the language that is used, and most of the language that is measured, is confounded by literacy and academic training. This diverts empirical attention from natural habits of speech, causing theorists to miss critical features of linguistic practice. To dramatize this point, I examine data (...) from a special population––the canal boat children of early twentieth century England––whose language developed without academic influence, but was evaluated using instruments designed primarily for academic use. These data, taken together with related research, suggest that formal instruction can convert language from a purely biological trait that was selected, to a talent that was instructed, while altering the users of language themselves. I then review research indicating that formal instruction can also mask or distort inter-sexual differences in the social applications of language, a significant handicap to evolutionary theorizing. I conclude that if biological theories of language are to succeed, they must explain the spontaneous speaking practices of naturally behaving individuals. (shrink)

What has not yet been imagined in thought is: how to remain together while still being two, how to be and become subjectively two, how to discover a way of coexisting as two beings … a way of living and thinking and loving as two beings without one being reduced to the other? … [t]hanks to the respect that I feel for the other as other, to articulate both attraction and restraint with respect to him. I go out from and (...) return to myself in order to respect his alterity, and this respect for the other becomes respect for myself, my life and my growth. So there is no longer fusion or submission, but the existence of a two which is irreducible to one or to the simple opposition between one (male) and the other (female), a reduction which makes them simply two poles of the one. Luce Irigaray , Democracy Begins Between Two 112-13. (shrink)

In Remnants of Auschwitz , Giorgio Agamben argues that the hidden structure of subjectivity is shame. In shame, I am consigned to something that cannot be assumed, such that the very thing that makes me a subject also forces me to witness my own desubjectification. Agamben’s ontological account of shame is problematic insofar as it forecloses collective responsibility and collapses the distinction between shame and humiliation. By recontextualizing three of Agamben’s sources – Primo Levi, Robert Antelme and Maurice Blanchot – (...) I develop an alternative account of shame as the structure of intersubjectivity , and of a collective responsibility that is more fundamental than the subject itself. On this basis, I sketch the preliminary outline of a biopolitics of resistance rooted in the ethics of alterity. The intuition driving this approach is that life is never bare ; even in situations of extreme affliction there remains a relation to alterity which provides a starting point for resistance. (shrink)

Recent work on the heat-shock protein Hsp90 by Rutherford and Lindquist (1998) has been included among the pieces of evidence taken to show the essential role of developmental processes in evolution; Hsp90 acts as a buffer against phenotypic variation, allowing genotypic variation to build. When the buffering capacity of Hsp90 is altered (e.g., in nature, by mutation or environmental stress), the genetic variation is "revealed," manifesting itself as phenotypic variation. This phenomenon raises questions about the genetic variation before and after (...) what I will call a "revelation event": Is it neutral, nearly neutral, or non-neutral (i.e., strongly deleterious or strongly advantageous)? Moreover, what kinds of evolutionary processes do we take to be at work? Rutherford and Lindquist (1998) focus on the implications of non-neutral variation and selection. Later work by Queitsch, Sangster, and Lindquist (2002) and Sangster, Lindquist, and Queitsch (2004) raises the possibility that Hsp90 buffering may play the role that was played by drift in Sewall Wright's shifting balance model, permitting transition from one adaptive peak to another. However, Ohta (2002) suggests that much of this variation may be nearly neutral, which in turn, would imply a strong role for drift as well as selection. The primary goal of this paper is to illuminate the alternative scenarios and the processes operating in each. At the end, I raise the possibility of a synthesis between evo-devo and nearly neutral evolution. (shrink)

The neuroanatomical substrates controlling and regulating sleeping and waking, and thus consciousness, are located in the brain stem. Most crucial for bringing the brain into a state conducive for consciousness and information processing is the mesencephalic part of the brain stem. This part controls the state of waking, which is generally associated with a high degree of consciousness. Wakefulness is accompanied by a low-amplitude, high-frequency electroencephalogram, due to the fact that thalamocortical neurons fire in a state of tonic depolarization. Information (...) can easily pass the low-level threshold of these neurons, leading to a high transfer ratio. The complexity of the electroencephalogram during conscious waking is high, as expressed in a high correlation dimension. Accordingly, the level of information processing is high. Spindles, and alpha waves in humans, mark the transition from wakefulness to sleep. These phenomena are related to drowsiness, associated with a reduction in consciousness. Drowsiness occurs when cells undergo moderate hyperpolarizations. Increased inhibitions result in a reduction of afferent information, with a lowered transfer ratio. Information processing subsides, which is also expressed in a diminished correlation dimension. Consciousness is further decreased at the onset of slow wave sleep. This sleep is controlled by the medullar reticular formation and is characterized by a high-voltage, low-frequency electroencephalogram. Slow wave sleep becomes manifest when neurons undergo a further hyperpolarization. Inhibitory activities are so strong that the transfer ratio further drops, as does the correlation dimension. Thus, sensory information is largely blocked and information processing is on a low level. Finally, rapid eye movement sleep is regulated by the pontine reticular formation and is associated with a ''wake-like'' electroencephalographic pattern. Just as during wakefulness, this is the expression of a depolarization of thalamocortical neurons. The transfer ratio of rapid eye movement sleep has not yet been determined, but seems to vary. Evidence exists that this type of sleep, associated with dreaming, with some kind of perception and consciousness, is involved in processing of ''internal'' information. In line with this, rapid eye movement sleep has higher correlation dimensions than slow-wave sleep and sometimes even higher than wakefulness. It is assumed that the ''near-the-threshold'' depolarized state of neurons in the thalamus and cerebral cortex is a necessary condition for perceptual processes and consciousness, such as occurs during waking and in an altered form during rapid eye movement sleep. (shrink)

A mutation alters the hemoglobin in some members of a species of antelope, and as a result the members fare better at high altitudes than their conspecifics do; so high-altitude foraging areas become open to them that are closed to their conspecifics; they thrive, reproduce at a greater rate, and the gene for altered hemoglobin spreads further through the gene pool of the species. That sounds like a classic example (owed to Karen Neander, 1995) of a causal chain traced by (...) evolutionary biology. But a view now nearly universal among philosophers maintains that such biological causation is always shadowed, perhaps even rivaled, by causation on a different level.1 That the subgroup of antelopes forages in areas closed to the conspecifics is a state of affairs embodied or realized, notes this view, in certain movements and state changes done by certain physical microparticles—untold billions of microparticles and movements, but a finite and determinate (more on this below) collection nevertheless. That the subgroup reproduces at a greater rate is likewise realized by a huge collection of microparticle movements, a different collection. And the microparticle happenings comprised in the first collection are causally responsible, strictly in accordance with the laws of microphysics, for the microparticle happenings in the second. Biological causation is always shadowed, perhaps even rivaled, by causation on the level of microphysics. The view I mean is general: any case of causing uncovered by any of the special sciences can be recaptured at the level of microphysics. This view is I think what most philosophers mean by “physicalism”; in any case, “physicalism” is the label I shall use. Physicalism comes in two forms. Modest physicalism holds that any causal transaction reported by the special sciences can be retraced by microphysics.2 Hegemonic physicalism holds that retracing such a transaction at the level of.. (shrink)

A comparative study of Plato's "Republic" and Rozenzweig's "Stern der Eriösung" proposed that the way of speaking determines which reality can be spoken and what types of relationality are possible. Rhetorical analysis shows that Plato's philosophy of language, in contrast to Rozenzweig's, undervalues the relational possibilities of time, alterity, and language. This is revealed through a study of the place and significance of the genera of arts for thinking and society.

A study is made of the general principles and theories pertaining to evolution, among which the definition, the evidences, the philosophical roots (the origin of life, the scale of nature, the morphogenetic potentialities), the three models (the Lamarckian, the Darwinistic and an alterative), and a further development of the last-mentioned model.

The dynamical integrity, a new concept proposed by J.M.T. Thompson, and developed by the authors, is used to interpret experimental results. After reviewing the main issues involved in this analysis, including the proposal of a new integrity measure able to capture in an easy way the safe part of basins, attention is dedicated to two experiments, a rotating pendulum and a micro-electro-mechanical system, where the theoretical predictions are not fulfilled. These mechanical systems, the former at the macro-scale and the latter (...) at the micro-scale, permit a comparative analysis of different mechanical and dynamical behaviours. The fact that in both cases the dynamical integrity permits one to justify the difference between experimental and theoretical results, which is the main achievement of this paper, shows the effectiveness of this new approach and suggests its use in practical situations. The men of experiment are like the ant, they only collect and use; the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But the bee takes the middle course: it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy (science); for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments and lay up in the memory whole, as it finds it, but lays it up in the understanding altered and digested. Therefore, from a closer and purer league between these two faculties, the experimental and the rational (such as has never been made), much may be hoped. (Francis Bacon 1561–1626) But are we sure of our observational facts? Scientific men are rather fond of saying pontifically that one ought to be quite sure of one's observational facts before embarking on theory. Fortunately those who give this advice do not practice what they preach. Observation and theory get on best when they are mixed together, both helping one another in the pursuit of truth. It is a good rule not to put overmuch confidence in a theory until it has been confirmed by observation. I hope I shall not shock the experimental physicists too much if I add that it is also a good rule not to put overmuch confidence in the observational results that are put forward until they have been confirmed by theory. (Arthur Stanley Eddington 1882–1944). (shrink)

Hegel claims that punishment is justified because it annuls crimes thereby revealing the criminal act for what it is, a will “null and void.” In this paper I analyze the complex notion of annulment, arguing that Hegel is claiming that punishment does not change the past, but alters the status of the criminal will so as to reveal that will for what it is, a violation of a victim’s rights. In short, punishment invalidates the criminal's will and validates the victim's (...) rights. I conclude that Hegel has offered a compelling reason to punish criminals and one that fits well a commitment to taking victim rights seriously. (shrink)

Since its inception, donor conception practices have been a reproductive choice for the infertile. Past and current practices have the potential to cause significant and lifelong harm to the offspring through loss of kinship, heritage, identity, and family health history, and possibly through introducing physical problems. Legislation and regulation in Australia that specifies that the welfare of the child born as a consequence of donor conception is paramount may therefore be in conflict with the outcomes. Altering the paradigm to a (...) child-centric model, however, impinges on reproductive choice and rights of adults involved in the process. With some lobby groups pushing for increased reproductive choice while others emphasise offspring rights there is a dichotomy of interests that society and legislators need to address. Concepts pertaining to a shift toward a child-centric paradigm are discussed. (shrink)

We used computer simulations to study the possible role of the dispersion of cellular coupling, refractoriness or both, in the mechanisms underlying cardiac arrhythmias. Local ischemia was first assumed to induce cell to cell dispersion of the coupling resistance (Case 1), refractory period (Case 2), or both of them (Case 3). Our numerical experiments based on the van Capelle and Durrer model showed that vortices could not be induced by cell to cell variations. With cellular properties dispersed in a patchy (...) way within the ischemic zone, a single activation wave could give rise to abnormal activities. This demonstrates the stability of the wave front under small inhomogeneities. Probabilities of reentry, estimated for the three cases cited above showed that a severe alteration of the coupling resistance may be an important factor in the genesis of reentry. Moreover, use of isochronal maps revealed that vortices were both stable and sustained with an alteration of the coupling alone or combined with a reduction of the action potential duration. Conversely, simulations with reduction of the refractoriness alone, inducing only transient patterns, could exhibit functionally determined reentries. (shrink)

Objective: To determine cryopreservation-induced alterations in the cytoskeleton of metaphase II mouse oocytes and the implications of these alterations in functionality of the cytoskeleton and polyploidy after fertilization.Design: Comparative study.Setting: Clinical and academic research environment at a medical school teaching hospital.Intervention(s): Oocytes were frozen using a slow-cooling (0.5oC/min) and slow-thawing (8oC/min) protocol in 1.5 M dimethyl sulfoxide and 0.2 M sucrose and were analyzed before and after fertilization.Main Outcome Measure(s): Cytoskeletal alterations, (...) class='Hi'> fertilization, and polyploidy rates.Result(s): When analyzed immediately after thawing, the oocytes displayed dramatic cytoskeletal alterations. Only slight recovery was observed upon removal of the cryoprotectants. However, incubation after thawing of 1 hour at 37oC completely reestablished a normal microfilament and microtubule pattern while partially restoring normal spindle morphology and chromosome alignment. Accordingly, insemination immediately after removal of cryoprotectants resulted in a significantly decreased fertilization rate and aberrant dynamics of cytoskeleton-dependent events, whereas oocytes inseminated after the post-thaw incubation displayed fertilization rates and cytoskeletal dynamics comparable to those in controls. Cryopreservation did not increase polyspermy but significantly increased digyny when the oocytes were inseminated after the post-thaw incubation. All digynic eggs displayed an abnormal spindle remnant in comparison with diploid or polyspermic eggs.Conclusion(s): A brief period of incubation after thawing allows recovery and positively affects fertilization and cytoskeletal dynamics. Cryopreservation does not impair the functionality of microfilaments and cytoplasmic microtubules during postfertilization events. Our findings suggest that the increased rate of digyny in cryopreserved oocytes may be related to the spindle disorganization, leading to failure in segregation of the chromosomes, rather than to direct malfunction of the microfilaments in polar body formation. (shrink)

The purpose of the present essay is to explain how the basic notions of Modern philosophy, forming Descartes’ optimistic attitude towards knowledge and human relations, were altered in order to be critically implemented into Vico’s more sober teaching. Several decades after Descartes took up the fight against skepticism, an Italian thinker, Giambattista Vico, critically approached the Cartesian project of Modernity. While Descartes believed that the essence of a human being consists in applying reason properly and using free will according to (...) its guidance in order to achieve the greatest success in science, mathematics, and philosophy, Vico insisted that human imagination and ingenuity ought to be directed to the humanities and legal studies and should aim at practical results. This was the eighteenth century Humanistic reply to Descartes. (shrink)

Susanna Goodin, in her article “Locke and Leibniz and the Debate over Species” , argues that Leibniz’s criticisms of Locke’s species conventionalism are inadequate as a refutation of Locke’s arguments, and if Leibniz were to buttress his criticisms by appeal to his own metaphysical commitments, he could do so only at the expense of so radically altering the nature of the debate that Locke’s original concerns would not even arise. I argue, however, that Leibniz has an argument within the Nouveaux (...) Essais which provides him with a mechanistically respectable counterproposal to Locke’s conventionalism and which demonstrates the explanatory superiority of natural kind realism. (shrink)