27 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Adam Leite (Indiana University, Bloomington)
  1. Adam Leite, Austin, Dreams, and Skepticism.
    J. L. Austin’s attitude towards traditional epistemological problems was largely negative. They arise and are maintained, he charged, by “sleight of hand,” “wile,” “concealed motives,” “seductive fallacies,” fixation on a handful of “jejune examples” and a host of small errors, misinterpretations, and mistakes about matters of fact (1962: 3- 6, 1979: 87). As these charges indicate, he did not offer a general critical theory of traditional epistemological theorizing or of the intellectual motivations that lead to it. Instead, he subjected individual (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Adam Leite, Fallibilism.
    In the broadest sense of the term, fallibilism is an anti-dogmatic intellectual stance or attitude: an openness to the possibility that one has made an error and an accompanying willingness to give a fair hearing to arguments that one’s belief is incorrect (no matter what that belief happens to be about). So understood, fallibilism’s central insight is that it is possible to remain open to new evidence and arguments while also reasonably treating an issue as settled for the purposes of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Adam Leite, For Jim Pryor, with Gratitude, in Order to Find Out Exactly Where We Disagree.
    “Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Adam Leite & Sycamore Hall, Aleite@Indiana.Edu.
    In Knowledge and Its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge is a purely mental state, that is, that it is never a complex state or condition comprising mental factors and non-mental, environmental factors. Three of his arguments are evaluated: arguments from (1) the non-analyzability of the concept of knowledge, (2) the “primeness” of knowledge, and (3) the (alleged) inability to satisfactorily specify the “internal” element involved in knowledge. None of these arguments succeeds. Moreover, consideration of the third argument points the (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Adam Leite, What the Basing Relation Can Teach Us About the Theory of Justification.
    According to a common view, the activity of justifying is epistemologically irrelevant: being justified in believing as one does never requires the ability to justify one’s belief. This view runs into trouble regarding the epistemic basing relation, the relation between a person’s belief and the reasons for which the person holds it. The view must appeal to basing relations as part of its account of what it is for a person to be justified in believing as she does, but the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Adam Leite, Leite.
    I take as my starting point the evident fact that people are capable of modifying their beliefs in response to reasons in the course of deliberation. This fact is sufficient to make notions such as responsibility, blameworthiness, and praiseworthiness applicable to people with regard to their beliefs. If a state is such, and one is such, that one is capable of determining it through one’s best evaluations of reasons in the course of deliberation, then even if it isn’t under one’s (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Adam Leite (2013). But That's Not Evidence; It's Not Even True! Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):81-104.
    If p is false, it isn't evidence for anything. This view is central in one important response to a familiar sceptical argument. I consider and reject various motivations for refusing to accept this view – proposals arising from, e.g., our practice of providing rationalising explanations of people's beliefs, various locutions appearing to relativise evidence to persons, the significance of people's mental states for attributions of reasons to them, and the role of evidence in epistemic principles and requirements. I close by (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Kate Abramson & Adam Leite (2011). Love as a Reactive Emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):673-699.
    One variety of love is familiar in everyday life and qualifies in every reasonable sense as a reactive attitude. ‘Reactive love’ is paradigmatically (a) an affectionate attachment to another person, (b) appropriately felt as a non-self-interested response to particular kinds of morally laudable features of character expressed by the loved one in interaction with the lover, and (c) paradigmatically manifested in certain kinds of acts of goodwill and characteristic affective, desiderative and other motivational responses (including other-regarding concern and a desire (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Adam Leite (2011). Immediate Warrant, Epistemic Responsibility, and Moorean Dogmatism. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
    “Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Adam Leite (2010). How to Take Skepticism Seriously. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):39 - 60.
    Modern-day heirs of the Cartesian revolution have been fascinated by the thought that one could utilize certain hypotheses – that one is dreaming, deceived by an evil demon, or a brain in a vat – to argue at one fell swoop that one does not know, is not justified in believing, or ought not believe most if not all of what one currently believes about the world. A good part of the interest and mystique of these discussions arises from the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Adam Leite (2008). Believing One's Reasons Are Good. Synthese 161 (3):419 - 441.
    Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Adam Leite (2007). Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly's "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):456–464.
    Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Adam Leite (2007). Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):456-464.
    Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Adam Leite (2007). How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to DeRose's "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context". Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111 - 129.
    Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that ’knows’ is semantically contextsensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson’s suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Luca Ferrero Faulkner, Amy Gutmann, Paul Harris, Pamela Hieronymi, Karen Jones, Adam Leite, Wolfgang Mann, Peter de Marneffc, David Owens Minar & Connie Rosati (2006). Getting Told and Being Believed. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Adam Leite (2006). Epistemic Gradualism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice: Responce to Hetherington. Philosophia 34 (3):311-324.
    This paper responds to Stephen Hetherington's discussion of my ‘Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?’ (2004). The Infallibilist skeptic holds that in order to know something, one must be able to rule out every possible alternative to the truth of one’s belief. This requirement is false. In this paper I first clarify this requirement’s relation to our ordinary practice. I then turn to a more fundamental issue. The Infallibilist holds – along with many non-skeptical epistemologists – that Infallibility is epistemically superior (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Adam Leite (2006). Review of Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (4).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Adam Leite (2005). A Localist Solution to the Regress of Epistemic Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):395 – 421.
    Guided by an account of the norms governing justificatory conversations, I propose that person-level epistemic justification is a matter of possessing a certain ability: the ability to provide objectively good reasons for one's belief by drawing upon considerations which one responsibly and correctly takes there to be no reason to doubt. On this view, justification requires responsible belief and is also objectively truth-conducive. The foundationalist doctrine of immediately justified beliefs is rejected, but so too is the thought that coherence in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Adam Leite (2005). Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):505–533.
    Traditional epistemological reflection on our beliefs about the world attempts to proceed without presupposing or ineliminably depending upon any claims about the world. It has been argued that epistemological externalism fails to engage in the right way with the motivations for this project. I argue, however, that epistemological externalism satisfyingly undermines this project. If we accept the thesis that certain conditions other than the truth of one's belief must obtain in the world outside of one's mind in order for one (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Adam Leite (2005). On Williamson's Arguments That Knowledge is a Mental State. Ratio 18 (2):165–175.
    Is knowledge a mental state? For philosophers working within the idealistic tradition, the answer is trivial: there is nothing else for knowledge to be. For most others, however, the claim has seemed prima facie implausible. Knowing that p requires or involves the fact that p, or p’s truth, and that – with certain specifiable exceptions – is quite independent of my (or anyone’s) mind; so while knowledge may require or involve certain mental states, it itself is not a state of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Adam Leite (2005). Some Worries for Would-Be WAMmers. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):101-126.
    DeRose appeals to ordinary English usage to support his contextualist semantics for "know"-attributions. A common objection holds that though the relevant assertions are both appropriate and seemingly true, their seeming truth arises merely from their appropriateness. This Warranted Assertability Maneuver (WAM) aims to provide a stand-alone objection by providing a reason not to take the ordinary language data at face-value. However, there is no plausible model or mechanism for the pragmatic phenomena WAMmers must postulate. Given what the WAM requires, it (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Adam Leite (2004). Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):232 - 251.
    A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for 'knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Adam Leite (2004). On Justifying and Being Justified. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.
    We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Adam Leite (2004). Skepticism, Sensitivity, and Closure, or Why the Closure Principle is Irrelevant to External World Skepticism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12:335-350.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Adam Leite (2004). Skepticism, Sensitivity, and Closure. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):335-350.
    Is there a plausible argument for external world skepticism? Robert Nozick’s well-known discussion focuses upon arguments which utilize the Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle. Nozick claims, correctly, that no such argument succeeds. But he gets almost all the details wrong. The Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle are compatible; the Sensitivity Requirement is incorrect; and even if true, the Closure Principle is structurally incapable of generating a plausible and valid global skeptical argument. It is therefore a mistake to take (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Wallace I. Matson & Adam Leite (1991). Socrates' Critique of Cognitivism. Philosophy 66 (256):145 - 167.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Adam Leite, Taking Skepticism Seriously.
    Modern-day heirs of the Cartesian revolution have been fascinated by the thought that one could utilize certain hypotheses – that one is dreaming, deceived by an evil demon, or a brain in a vat – to argue at one fell swoop that one does not know, is not justified in believing, or ought not believe most if not all of what one currently believes about the world. A good part of the interest and mystique of these discussions arises from the (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation