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Profile: Adam Pautz (University of Texas at Austin)
  1. Adam Pautz, Can Color Structure Be Explained in Terms of Color Experience?
    Hardin argues that Reflectance Physicalism about color fails because it cannot accommodate color structure. David Lewis and others have replied that the Reflectance Physicalist may explain color structure in terms of color experience. I argue that this reply fails.
     
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  2. Adam Pautz, Variation in Normal Color Vision and the Nature of Consciousness.
    It has been said that variation in normal color vision creates a problem for a certain theories of color. But there has been some controversy concerning the nature of the problem; indeed, it has been questioned whether there is even a problem at all. Here I do not use variation in normal color vision to develop a problem for any theory of color. Instead I use variation in normal color vision, together with certain natural assumptions, to develop a problem for (...)
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  3. Adam Pautz, Why Believe That Experiences Have Contents?
    I provide an argument from the best explanation for the claim that experiences have contents. In particular, I argue that a common factor account of experience in terms of content provides the best explanation of the fact that both veridical and non-veridical experience can ground the capacity for thought, of indeterminate and impossible experiences, and of other features of experience.
     
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  4. Adam Pautz, What Does It Mean to Say That Experiences Have Contents?
    I offer a formulation of the claim that experiences have contents.I also suggest a new method for determining what the contents of our experiences are, which can be applied to the issue of whether high-level properties such as being a tomato enter into the content of experience.
     
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  5. Adam Pautz, Is Physicalism Simpler Than Dualism?
    The problems with Physicalism that have most exercised its defenders are.
     
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  6. Adam Pautz, Sensory Awareness as Irreducible: From Internalist Intentionalism to Primitivism.
    I am going to develop an argument against Physicalism concerning qualitative mental properties. Unlike most arguments against Physicalism, it is not based on the usual _a priori_ considerations, such as what Mary learns when she comes out of her black and white room or the apparent conceivability of Zombies. Rather, it is based on two broadly _a posteriori_ premises about the structure of experience and its physical basis.
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  7. Adam Pautz, Tracking Intentionalism and Optimal Conditions: A Reply to Byrne and Tye.
    In the mid-nineties, Fred Dretske, William Lycan and Michael Tye published books defending an ambitious new reductive program. The program came in two stages. The first was to defend Intentionalism. The second was to reduce the secondary qualities to external physical properties and then to explain sensory representation in terms of tracking under optimal conditions or biological function. The old reductive program was internalist: the idea used to be that we could reduce experiences to brain states. The new reductive program (...)
     
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  8. Adam Pautz, The Intentional Structure of Consciousness: A Primitivist Theory.
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  9. Adam Pautz, The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.
    I am going to develop an argument against Physicalism concerning qualitative mental properties. Unlike most arguments against Physicalism, it is not based on the usual a priori considerations, such as what Mary learns when she comes out of her black and white room or the apparent conceivability of Zombies. Rather, it is based on two broadly a posteriori premises about the structure of experience and its physical basis.
     
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  10. Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (forthcoming). Festschrift for Ned Block. MIT.
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  11. Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (forthcoming). Themes From Block. MIT Press.
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  12. Adam Pautz (2013). Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs? Comments on Fish, Perception, Hallucination and Illusion. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.
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  13. Adam Pautz (2013). He Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: New Empirical Evidence for a Brain- Based Theory of Consciousnes. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer. 237-298.
  14. Adam Pautz (2013). Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford. 194-234.
    I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases" (independently discussed by Horgan here), "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia cases". However, at the end, I sketch a positive theory of the role of phenomenology in grounding content, drawing on David Lewis's work on intentionality. I suggest that within Lewis's theory the subject's total evidence (not natuarlness) plays the central role in fixing (...)
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  15. Adam Pautz (2011). Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World? Philosophical Issues 21 (1):384-433.
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  16. Adam Pautz (2010). An Argument for the Intentional View of Visual Experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
     
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  17. Adam Pautz (2010). A Simple View of Consciousness. In Bealer and Koons (ed.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford. 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
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  18. Adam Pautz (2010). Consciousness: A Simple Approach. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oup Oxford.
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  19. Adam Pautz (2010). Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.
    Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intentionality.
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  20. Adam Pautz (2010). Review of Jonathan Cohen, The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
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  21. Adam Pautz (2010). Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content? In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. 254--309.
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  22. Adam Pautz (2009). A Simple View of Consciousness. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau’s worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are ’reference magnets’.
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  23. Adam Pautz (2009). Colour, Philosophical Perspectives. In Axel Cleeremans, Patrick Wilken & Tim Bayne (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 144-149.
    An overview of the main positions on colour.
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  24. Adam Pautz (2009). What Are the Contents of Experiences? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.
    I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.
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  25. Adam Pautz (2008). An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):335 - 347.
    I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this response faces some (...)
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  26. Adam Pautz (2008). The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality. The Monist 91 (2):250-272.
    I address a second issue that arises once we accept intentionalism: can intentionalists accept the claim of Horgan and Tienson (among others) that phenomenology is in some sense prior to intentionality? And should they?
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  27. Adam Pautz (2007). Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.
    H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness.
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  28. Adam Pautz, Color Eliminativism.
    Philosophical theories of color divide over two issues. First, there is the issue of Reductionism versus Primitivism. _Reductionism_ holds that colors are identical with physical properties, dispositional properties, or other properties specifiable in non-chromatic terms.
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  29. Adam Pautz (2006). Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
    Physicalism about colour is the thesis that colours are identical with response-independent, physical properties of objects. I endorse the Argument from Structure against Physicalism about colour. The argument states that Physicalism cannot accommodate certain obvious facts about colour structure: for instance, that red is a unitary colour while purple is a binary colour, and that blue resembles purple more than green. I provide a detailed formulation of the argument. According to the most popular response to the argument, the Physicalist can (...)
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  30. Adam Pautz (2006). Sensory Awareness is Not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism. Noûs 40 (2):205-240.
  31. Adam Pautz (2003). Have Byrne and Hilbert Answered Hardin's Challenge? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45.
    I argue that Byrne and Hilbert have not answered Hardin’s objection to physicalism about color concerning the unitary-binary structure of the colors for two reasons. First, their account of unitary-binary structure seems unsatisfactory. Second, _pace_ Byrne and Hilbert, there are no physicalistically acceptable candidates to be the hue- magnitudes. I conclude with a question about the justification of physicalism about color.
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  32. Adam Pautz (1997). An Argument Against Armstrong's Analysis of the Resemblance of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):109 – 111.
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