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  1. Frederick R. Adams, Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory of Meaning.
  2. Frederick Adams, Names That Name Nothing.
    This paper defends a direct reference view of empty names, saying that empty names literally have no meaning and cannot be used to express truths. However, all names, including empty names, are associated with accompanying descriptions that are implicated in pragmatically imparted truths. A sentence such as “Vulcan doesn’t exist” pragmatically imparts that there is no tenth planet. This view is defended against objections.
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  3. Frederick Adams, "Simon Says&Quot.
    Herbert Simon says that the lines of communication should be opened between cognitive science and literary criticism. Why? Is it so that the two disciplines will be better able to appreciate and understand one another? I think so and Simon thinks so too. Is it so that cognitive scientists can learn something from literary critics and their understanding of the process of interpreting texts, so that cognitive scientists might better understand how minds work when engaged in this task? Again, I (...)
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  4. Fred Adams, Simon Says.
    Herbert Simon says that the lines of communication should be opened between cognitive science and literary criticism. Why? Is it so that the two disciplines will be better able to appreciate and understand one another? I think so and Simon thinks so too. Is it so that cognitive scientists can learn something from literary critics and their understanding of the process of interpreting texts, so that cognitive scientists might better understand how minds work when engaged in this task? Again, I (...)
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  5. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa, Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
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  6. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (forthcoming). Why the Mind is Still in the Head. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, (...)
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  7. Fred Adams & João Antonio de Moraes (forthcoming). Erratum To: Is There a Philosophy of Information? Topoi:1-1.
    Erratum to: Topoi DOI 10.1007/s11245-014-9252-9The affiliation of the second author was incorrectly published in the original article. The author’s correct affiliation appears in this erratum.
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  8. Fred Adams & João Antonio de Moraes (forthcoming). Is There a Philosophy of Information? Topoi:1-11.
    In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other (...)
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  9. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Challenges to Active Externalism. In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge.
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  10. Fred Adams (2014). What is a Cognitive Process? Foundations of Science 19 (2):133-135.
    In this commentary to Serrano et al. (2013), I applaud this foundation article for being a breath of fresh air because it addresses the question “What is cognition?” Too often in the cognitive sciences, we leave that question unanswered or worse, unasked. I come not to criticize but to offer a helpful suggestion aimed a pulling together some of the separate strands weaved throughout this article.
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  11. Fred Adams (2013). In Memoriam: Fred Dretske. The Philosophers' Magazine 63:9-10.
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  12. Fred Adams & Rebecca Garrison (2013). The Mark of the Cognitive. Minds and Machines 23 (3):339-352.
    It is easy to give a list of cognitive processes. They are things like learning, memory, concept formation, reasoning, maybe emotion, and so on. It is not easy to say, of these things that are called cognitive, what makes them so? Knowing the answer is one very important reason to be interested in the mark of the cognitive. In this paper, consider some answers that we think do not work and then offer one of our own which ties cognition to (...)
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  13. F. Adams (2012). Philosophy, Neuroscience and Consciousness * Edited by Rex Welshon. Analysis 72 (3):629-632.
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  14. Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.
    This article examines the intersection of the theory of extended mind/cognition and theory of knowledge. In the minds of some, it matters to conditions for knowing whether the mind extends beyond the boundaries of body and brain. I examine these intuitions and find no support for this view from tracking theories of knowledge. I then argue that the apparent difference extended mind is supposed to have for ability or credit theories is also illusory.
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  15. Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Julia Figurelli (2012). Towards Closure on Closure. Synthese 188 (2):179-196.
    Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories (...)
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  16. John A. Barker & Fred Adams (2012). Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
  17. Fred Adams (2011). Husker Du? Philosophical Studies 153 (1):81-94.
    Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker’s account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory.
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  18. Fred Adams (2010). Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):619-628.
    Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet. On a non-embodied approach, the sensory system informs the cognitive system and the motor system does the cognitive system’s bidding. There are causal relations between the systems but the sensory and motor systems are not constitutive of cognition. For embodied views, the relation to the sensori-motor system to cognition is constitutive, not just causal. This paper examines some recent empirical evidence used to support the view that cognition is embodied and raises questions about some (...)
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  19. Fred Adams (2010). Information and Knowledge À la Floridi. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):331-344.
    Abstract: Luciano Floridi has impressively applied the concept of information to problems in semantics and epistemology, among other areas. In this essay, I briefly review two areas where I think one may usefully raise questions about some of Floridi's conclusions. One area is in the project to naturalize semantics and Floridi's use of the derived versus nonderived notion of semantic content. The other area is in the logic of information and knowledge and whether knowledge based on information necessarily supports closure, (...)
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  20. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa, Causal Theories of Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are about dogs because dogs (...)
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  21. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (2010). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press. 67--80.
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  22. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press.
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark.
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  23. Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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  24. J. A. Barker & F. Adams (2010). Epistemic Closure and Skepticism. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):221-246.
     
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  25. F. Adams & K. Aizawa (2009). Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind. In John Symons Paco Calvo (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. 193--213.
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  26. Francis V. Adams & Marc K. Siegel (2009). Henderson's Equation (Review). Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52 (3):475-476.
  27. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (2009). anD the extenDeD MInD. In John Symons Paco Calvo (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. 193.
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  28. Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2009). Why the Mind is Still in the Head. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge. 78--95.
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  29. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell Pub..
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  30. Adams, Frederick & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell.
    This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not.
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  31. Fred Adams (ed.) (2007). Ethics and the Life Sciences. Philosophy Document Center.
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  32. Fred Adams (2007). Review of Andrew Brook, Kathleen Akins (Eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).
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  33. Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2007). Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8.
    Since Kripke's attack on Nozick's Tracking Theory of knowledge, there has been strong suspicion that tracking theories are false. We think that neither Kripke's arguments and examples nor other recent attacks in the literature show that the tracking theories are false. We cannot address all of these concerns here, but we will show why some of the most discussed examples from Kripke do not demonstrate that the tracking theories are false.
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  34. Fred Adams & Gary Fuller (2007). Empty Names and Pragmatic Implicatures. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):449-461.
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  35. Frederick Adams (2007). Introduction. Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):1-5.
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  36. Annie Steadman & Frederick Adams (2007). Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action. In C. Lumer & S. Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate Publishers.
    In a recent paper, Al Mele (2003) suggests that the Simple View of intentional action is “fiction” because it is “wholly unconstrained” by a widely shared (folk) concept of intentional action. The Simple View (Adams, 1986, McCann, 1986) states that an action is intentional only if intended. As evidence that the Simple View is not in accord with the folk notion of intentional action, Mele appeals to recent surveys of folk judgments by Joshua Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b). Knobe’s surveys appear (...)
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  37. F. Adams (2006). Review: The Act of Thinking. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (458):447-450.
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  38. Fred Adams (2006). Intentions Confer Intentionality Upon Actions: A Reply to Knobe and Burra. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):255-268.
    Is intentionally doing A linked to the intention to do A? Knobe and Burra believe that the link between the English words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ may mislead philosophers and cognitive scientists to falsely believe that intentionally doing an action A requires one to have the intention to do A. Knobe and Burra believe that data from other languages..
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  39. Fred Adams (2005). Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Veritas 50 (4):1-35.
    As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre o agente cognitivo e seu ambiente. Os estados cognitivos de um agente epistêmico fazem o rastreamento da verdade das proposições que são objeto de conhecimento ao embasarem a crença em indicadores confiáveis da verdade (evidência, razões, ou métodos de formação de crença). A novidade nessa abordagem é que se dá pouca ênfase no tipo de justificação epistêmica voltada ao fornecimento de procedimentos de decisão doxástica ou regras (...)
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  40. Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2005). Resurrecting the Tracking Theories. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.
    Much of contemporary epistemology proceeds on the assumption that tracking theories of knowledge, such as those of Dretske and Nozick, are dead. The word on the street is that Kripke and others killed these theories with their counterexamples, and that epistemology must move in a new direction as a result. In this paper we defend the tracking theories against purportedly deadly objections. We detect life in the tracking theories, despite what we perceive to be a premature burial.
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  41. Frederick Adams (2005). Preface. Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (Supplement):1-1.
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  42. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
  43. Ken Aizawa & Fred Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
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  44. Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  45. Hervé Abdi, Fred Adams, Shaaron Ainsworth, Erik Altmann, Richard Aslin, Robert Aunger, Jerry Balakrishnan, Dana Ballard, Sieghard Beller & Iris Berent (2004). Acknowledgment: Guest Reviewers. Cognitive Science 28:1041-1043.
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  46. Fred Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). What's in a (N Empty) Name? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):125-148.
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  47. Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...)
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  48. Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action and Moral Considerations: Still Pragmatic. Analysis 64 (3):268 - 276.
  49. Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
    There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties (and events). Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal (...)
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  50. Fred Adams (2003). Semantic Paralysis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):666-667.
    I challenge Jackendoff's claim that semantics should not be paralyzed by a failure to solve Brentano's problem of intentionality. I argue that his account of semantics is in fact paralyzed because it fails to live up to his own standards of naturalization, has no account of falsity, and gives the wrong semantic objects for words and thoughts.
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