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  1. William Bechtel & Adele A. Abrahamsen (2013). Thinking Dynamically About Biological Mechanisms: Networks of Coupled Oscillators. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 18 (4):707-723.
    Explaining the complex dynamics exhibited in many biological mechanisms requires extending the recent philosophical treatment of mechanisms that emphasizes sequences of operations. To understand how nonsequentially organized mechanisms will behave, scientists often advance what we call dynamic mechanistic explanations. These begin with a decomposition of the mechanism into component parts and operations, using a variety of laboratory-based strategies. Crucially, the mechanism is then recomposed by means of computational models in which variables or terms in differential equations correspond to properties of (...)
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  2. Adele A. Abrahamsen & William P. Bechtel (2006). Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective. In R. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Basil Blackwell.
    Cognitive science is, more than anything else, a pursuit of cognitive mechanisms. To make headway towards a mechanistic account of any particular cognitive phenomenon, a researcher must choose among the many architectures available to guide and constrain the account. It is thus fitting that this volume on contemporary debates in cognitive science includes two issues of architecture, each articulated in the 1980s but still unresolved:
    • Just how modular is the mind? (section 1) – a debate initially pitting encapsulated (...)
    Our project here is to consider the second issue within the broader context of where cognitive science has been and where it is headed. The notion that cognition in general—not just language processing—involves rules operating on language-like representations actually predates cognitive science. In traditional philosophy of mind, mental life is construed as involving propositional attitudes—that is, such attitudes towards propositions as believing, fearing, and desiring that they be true—and logical inferences from them. On this view, if a person desires that a proposition be true and believes that if she performs a certain action it will become true, she will make the inference and (absent any overriding consideration) perform the action. (shrink)
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  3. Adele A. Abrahamsen (1993). Cognizers' Innards and Connectionist Nets: A Holy Alliance? Mind and Language 8 (4):520-530.
  4. William P. Bechtel & Adele A. Abrahamsen (1992). Connectionism and the Future of Folk Psychology. In Robert G. Burton (ed.), Minds: Natural and Artificial. SUNY Press.
  5. Adele A. Abrahamsen (1987). Bridging Boundaries Versus Breaking Boundaries: Psycholinguistics in Perspective. Synthese 72 (3):355 - 388.
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