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Adina L. Roskies [23]Adina Roskies [20]
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Profile: Adina Roskies (Dartmouth College)
  1.  26
    Adina Roskies & Eddy Nahmias (2016). “Local Determination”, Even If We Could Find It, Does Not Challenge Free Will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will” (free will that requires indeterminism), he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent (...)
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  2. Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols (2008). Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth. Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.
    Thought experiments have played a central role in philosophical methodology, largely as a means of elucidating the nature of our concepts and the implications of our theories.1 Particular attention is given to widely shared “folk” intuitions – the basic untutored intuitions that the layperson has about philosophical questions.2 The folk intuition is meant to underlie our core metaphysical concepts, and philosophical analysis is meant to explicate or sometimes refine these naïve concepts. Consistency with the deliverances of folk intuitions is a (...)
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  3. Adina L. Roskies (2006). Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):419-423.
  4. Adina L. Roskies (2008). Neuroimaging and Inferential Distance. Neuroethics 1 (1):19-30.
    Brain images are used both as scientific evidence and to illustrate the results of neuroimaging experiments. These images are apt to be viewed as photographs of brain activity, and in so viewing them people are prone to assume that they share the evidential characteristics of photographs. Photographs are epistemically compelling, and have a number of characteristics that underlie what I call their inferential proximity. Here I explore the aptness of the photography analogy, and argue that although neuroimaging does bear important (...)
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  5. Adina L. Roskies (2002). Neuroethics for the New Millennium. Neuron 35 (1):21-23.
    ics. Each of these can be pursued independently to a large extent, but perhaps most intriguing is to contem- plate how progress in each will affect the other. The past several months have seen heightened interest <blockquote> _<b>The Ethics of Neuroscience</b>_ </blockquote> in the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. In the The ethics of neuroscience can be roughly subdivided popular press, the topic grabbed headlines in a May.
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  6.  82
    Adina Roskies (2003). Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons From "Acquired Sociopathy". Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):51 – 66.
    Metaethical questions are typically held to be a priori , and therefore impervious to empirical evidence. Here I examine the metaethical claim that motive-internalism about belief , the position that moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating, is true. I argue that belief-internalists are faced with a dilemma. Either their formulation of internalism is so weak that it fails to be philosophically interesting, or it is a substantive claim but can be shown to be empirically false. I then provide evidence for the (...)
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  7.  43
    Adina Roskies (2003). Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons From "Acquired Sociopathy" [1]. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):51-66.
    Metaethical questions are typically held to be a priori, and therefore impervious to empirical evidence. Here I examine the metaethical claim that motive-internalism about belief (or belief-internalism), the position that moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating, is true. I argue that belief-internalists are faced with a dilemma. Either their formulation of internalism is so weak that it fails to be philosophically interesting, or it is a substantive claim but can be shown to be empirically false. I then provide evidence for the (...)
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  8. Adina L. Roskies (2007). Are Neuroimages Like Photographs of the Brain? Philosophy of Science 74 (5):860-872.
    Images come in many varieties, but for evidential purposes, photographs are privileged. Recent advances in neuroimaging provide us with a new type of image that is used as scientific evidence. Brain images are epistemically compelling, in part because they are liable to be viewed as akin to photographs of brain activity. Here I consider features of photography that underlie the evidential status we accord it, and argue that neuroimaging diverges from photography in ways that seriously undermine the photographic analogy. While (...)
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  9. Adina L. Roskies (2008). A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):633–659.
    This paper provides a novel argument against conceptualism, the claim that the content of human experience, including perceptual experience, is entirely conceptual. Conceptualism entails that the content of experience is limited by the concepts that we possess and deploy. I present an argument to show that such a view is exceedingly costly—if the nature of our experience is entirely conceptual, then we cannot account for concept learning: all perceptual concepts must be innate. The version of nativism that results is incompatible (...)
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  10.  12
    Prescott Alexander, Alexander Schlegel, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina L. Roskies, Thalia Wheatley & Peter Ulric Tse (2016). Readiness Potentials Driven by Non-Motoric Processes. Consciousness and Cognition 39:38-47.
  11.  30
    Adina Roskies (2016). Neuroethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  12.  83
    Adina L. Roskies (2009). Brain‐Mind and Structure‐Function Relationships: A Methodological Response to Coltheart. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):927-939.
    In some recent papers, Max Coltheart has questioned the ability of neuroimaging techniques to tell us anything interesting about the mind and has thrown down the gauntlet before neuroimagers, challenging them to prove he is mistaken. Here I analyze Coltheart ’s challenge, show that as posed its terms are unfair, and reconstruct it so that it is addressable. I argue that, so modified, Coltheart ’s challenge is able to be met and indeed has been met. In an effort to delineate (...)
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  13. Adina L. Roskies (1999). The Binding Problem. Neuron 24:7--9.
    (von der Malsburg, 1981), “the binding problem” has with the visual percept of it, so that both are effortlessly captured the attention of researchers across many disci- perceived as being aspects of a single event. I like to plines, including psychology, neuroscience, computa- refer to these sorts of problems as perceptual binding tional modeling, and even philosophy. Despite the is- problems, since they involve unifying aspects of per- sue’s prominence in these fields, what “binding” means cepts. In addition, there are (...)
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  14. Adina L. Roskies (2010). 'That' Response Doesn't Work: Against a Demonstrative Defense of Conceptualism. Noûs 44 (1):112-134.
  15. Timothy Schroeder, Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols (2010). Moral Motivation. In John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of motivation itself, and use that discussion to sketch four possible theories of distinctively moral motivation: caricature versions of familiar instrumentalist, cognitivist, sentimentalist, and personalist theories about morally worthy motivation. To test these theories, we turn to a wealth of scientific, particularly neuroscientific, evidence. Our conclusions are that (1) although the scientific evidence does not at present mandate a unique philosophical conclusion, it does present formidable obstacles to a number of popular philosophical (...)
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  16.  33
    Adina Roskies (2006). Patients with Ventromedial Frontal Damage Have Moral Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):617 – 627.
    Michael Cholbi thinks that the claim that motive internalism (MI), the thesis that moral beliefs or judgments are intrinsically motivating, is the best explanation for why moral beliefs are usually accompanied by moral motivation. He contests arguments that patients with ventromedial (VM) frontal brain damage are counterexamples to MI by denying that they have moral beliefs. I argue that none of the arguments he offers to support this contention are viable. First, I argue that given Cholbi's own commitments, he cannot (...)
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  17.  82
    Adina L. Roskies (2011). Why Libet's Studies Don't Pose a Threat to Free Will. In L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A Tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press 11--22.
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  18.  9
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy (2008). Brain Images as Legal Evidence. Episteme 5 (3):359-373.
    This paper explores whether brain images may be admitted as evidence in criminal trials under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which weighs probative value against the danger of being prejudicial, confusing, or misleading to fact finders. The paper summarizes and evaluates recent empirical research relevant to these issues. We argue that currently the probative value of neuroimages for criminal responsibility is minimal, and there is some evidence of their potential to be prejudicial or misleading. We also propose experiments that will (...)
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  19.  3
    Adina Roskies & Eddy Nahmias (2016). “Local Determination”, Even If We Could Find It, Does Not Challenge Free Will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will”, he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent concept. Moreover, determinism is unlikely (...)
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  20.  29
    Adina L. Roskies, N. J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks (2013). Neuroimages in Court: Less Biasing Than Feared. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):99-101.
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  21.  3
    Adina L. Roskies (forthcoming). Decision-Making and Self-Governing Systems. Neuroethics:1-13.
    Neuroscience has illuminated the neural basis of decision-making, providing evidence that supports specific models of decision-processes. These models typically are quite mechanical, the realization of abstract mathematical “diffusion to bound” models. While effective decision-making seems to be essential for sophisticated behavior, central to an account of freedom, and a necessary characteristic of self-governing systems, it is not clear how the simple models neuroscience inspires can underlie the notion of self-governance. Drawing from both philosophy and neuroscience I explore ways in which (...)
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  22.  44
    Adina L. Roskies (2012). Don't Panic: Self-Authorship Without Obscure Metaphysics1. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):323-342.
    In this paper I attempt to respond to the worries of the source incompatibilist, and try to sketch a naturalistically plausible, compatibilist notion of self-authorship and control that I believe captures important aspects of the folk intuitions regarding freedom and responsibility. It is my hope to thus offer those moved by source incompatibilist worries a reason not to adopt what P.F. Strawson called “the obscure and panicky metaphysics of Libertarianism” (P. F. Strawson, 1982) or the panic-inducing moral austerity of the (...)
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  23.  45
    Adina L. Roskies (2008). Robustness and the New Riddle Revived. Ratio 21 (2):218–230.
    The problem of induction is perennially important in epistemology and the philosophy of science. In response to Goodman's 'New Riddle of Induction', Frank Jackson made a compelling case for there being no new riddle, by arguing that there are no nonprojectible properties. Although Jackson's denial of nonprojectible properties is correct, I argue here that he is mistaken in thinking that he thereby shows that there is no new riddle of induction, and demonstrate that his solution to the grue paradox fails (...)
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  24.  8
    Adina L. Roskies & C. C. Wood (1992). Cinema 1-2-Many of the Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):221-223.
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  25.  27
    Alexander Schlegel, Prescott Alexander, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Peter Ulric Tse & Thalia Wheatley (2015). Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness Potentials with Non-Conscious Volition. Consciousness and Cognition 33:196-203.
    The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and (...)
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  26.  28
    Adina Roskies (2007). The Illusion of Personhood. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):55-57.
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  27.  90
    Adina Roskies, Visualizing Human Brain Function.
    Running head: Functional neuroimaging Abstract Several recently developed techniques enable the investigation of the neural basis of cognitive function in the human brain. Two of these, PET and fMRI, yield whole-brain images reflecting regional neural activity associated with the performance of specific tasks. This article explores the spatial and temporal capabilities and limitations of these techniques, and discusses technical, biological, and cognitive issues relevant to understanding the goals and methods of neuroimaging studies. The types of advances in understanding cognitive and (...)
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  28.  29
    Adina L. Roskies & Bertram F. Malle (2013). A Strawsonian Look at Desert. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-20.
  29.  19
    Adina L. Roskies (2008). Response to Sie and Wouters: A Neuroscientific Challenge to Free Will and Responsibility? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):4.
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  30.  41
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Adina Roskies (2010). Mele's Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 51 (3):127-143.
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  31.  28
    Adina L. Roskies (2011). A Puzzle About Empathy. Emotion Review 3 (3):378-280.
    Is empathy important for moral behavior? To answer this we will have to be conceptually clearer, empirically more detailed, and pay attention to the neural mechanisms underlying empathy-related phenomena.
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  32.  4
    Adina Roskies (1990). Seeing Truth or Just Seeming True? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):682-683.
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  33.  32
    Adina Roskies (2005). We Are Borg. Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3):611-622.
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  34.  23
    Adina Roskies (2010). Review of Paul Thagard, The Brain and the Meaning of Life. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7).
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  35. Adina Roskies (2005). A Case Study in Neuroethics: The Nature of Moral Judgment. In Judy Illes (ed.), Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy. OUP Oxford
     
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  36. Steven E. Petersen & Adina L. Roskies (2001). Visualizing Human Brain Function. In E. Bizzi, P. Calissano & V. Volterra (eds.), Frontiers of Life, Vol Iii: The Intelligent Systems, Part One: The Brain of Homo Sapiens. Academic Press
    Running head: Functional neuroimaging Abstract Several recently developed techniques enable the investigation of the neural basis of cognitive function in the human brain. Two of these, PET and fMRI, yield whole-brain images reflecting regional neural activity associated with the performance of specific tasks. This article explores the spatial and temporal capabilities and limitations of these techniques, and discusses technical, biological, and cognitive issues relevant to understanding the goals and methods of neuroimaging studies. The types of advances in understanding cognitive and (...)
     
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  37.  1
    Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong & Adina Roskies (2010). Alfred R. Mele's Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Philosophical Books 51 (3):127-143.
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  38. Adina L. Roskies (2011). .
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  39. Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols (2008). Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth. Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.
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