Search results for 'Adverbialism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  13
    Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). Realism, Relativism, Adverbialism: What's the Difference? Comments on Mazviita Chirimuuta's Outside Color. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Mazviita Chirimuuta's Outside Color is an important book, the first philosophical monograph since Hardin’s Color for Philosophers (1988) to carve out deep new channels between cognitive science and the philosophy of visual color. In it, she argues that color vision is embedded in other visual functions and cannot therefore be said to detect color as in independent variable. In this commentary, I concentrate here on two provocative themes in her book. The first is that contemporary color realism descends from scholasticism, (...)
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  2.  50
    Hilla Jacobson & Hilary Putnam (2014). The Needlessness of Adverbialism, Attributeism and its Compatibilty with Cognitive Science. Philosophia 42 (3):555-570.
    Although adverbialism is not given much attention in current discussions of phenomenal states, it remains of interest to philosophers who reject the representationalist view of such states, in suggesting an alternative to a problematic ‘act-property’ conception. We discuss adverbialism and the formalization Tye once offered for it, and criticize the semantics he proposed for this formalization. Our central claim is that Tye’s ontological purposes could have been met by a more minimal view, which we dub “attributeism”. We then (...)
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  3. M. D. Conduct (2008). Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error. Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that (...)
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  4.  39
    Greg Janzen (2013). An Adverbialist–Objectualist Account of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):859-876.
    Adverbialism, broadly construed, is the thesis that pains (and other sensations) are modes of awareness, and objectualism, broadly construed, is the thesis that pains are objects of awareness. Why are we inclined to say that pains are modes of awareness and yet also inclined to say that they are objects of awareness? Each inclination leads to an account of pain that seems to be incompatible with the other. If adverbialism is correct, it would seem that objectualism is mistaken (...)
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  5. Murat Aydede (2014). How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...)
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  6.  23
    Casey Woodling (2016). The Limits of Adverbialism About Intentionality. Inquiry 59 (5):488-512.
    Kriegel has recently developed an adverbial account of intentionality, in part to solve the problem of how we can think of non-existents. The view has real virtues: it endorses a non-relational conception of intentionality and is ontologically conservative. Alas, the view ultimately cannot replace the act-object model of intentionality that it seeks to, because it depends on the act-object model for its intelligibility at key points. It thus fails as a revisionistic theory. I argue that the virtues of adverbialism (...)
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  7.  68
    Alexander Dinges (2015). The Many-Relations Problem for Adverbialism. Analysis 75 (2):231-237.
    Adverbialists propose to analyse sentences of the form ‘Jane has a blue afterimage’ as ‘Jane afterimages blue-ly’. One commonly raised objection to adverbialism is the many-property problem, the problem of accounting for sentences that seem to ascribe more than one property to an afterimage . Plausible responses to this objection may be on offer. In this note, however, I will argue that the many-property problem resurfaces at the level of relations and that, at this level, no solution for the (...)
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  8.  9
    M. D. Conduct (2008). Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error. Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to a relational view of experience and a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that acceptance of (...)
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  9.  83
    Rocco J. Gennaro (2015). The 'Of' of Intentionality and the 'Of' of Acquaintance. In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge 317-341.
    I first provide some background on Sartre’s theory of consciousness and prereflective self-awareness, especially with respect to how it might be favorably compared to my own version of HOT theory. I then critically examine a few initial attempts to understand the ‘acquaintance’ relation and to link it with Sartre’s notion of prereflective self-awareness. I then briefly address a related problem often raised against HOT theory, namely, the problem of misrepresentation. I also critique several further attempts to explain the acquaintance relation (...)
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  10. Uriah Kriegel (2008). The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
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  11.  23
    Anja Berninger (2016). Thinking Sadly: In Favor of an Adverbial Theory of Emotions. Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):799-812.
    Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.
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  12. Murat Aydede, Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the Transparency Datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some (...)
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  13. Murat Aydede (forthcoming). A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure. In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. Oxford University Press
    [This is the penultimate version, please send me an email for the final version]. Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of an experiential-desire account.
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  14.  41
    Christopher Mole (2011). The Metaphysics of Attention. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press 60-77.
    This paper gives a brief presentation of adverbialism about attention, and explains some of the reasons why it gives an appealing account of attention's metaphysics.
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  15.  6
    Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). There is No Simpliciter Simpliciter. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249-278.
    This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family (...)
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  16. Uriah Kriegel (2016). Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (2):1-15.
    The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround his account of its nature. In this paper, I argue that Brentano’s mature account of the nature of intentionality construes it, not as a two-place relation between a subject and an object, nor as a three-place relation between a subject’s act, its object, and a ‘content,’ but as an altogether non-relational, intrinsic property of subjects. I will argue that the view is more (...)
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  17. Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics. Dissertation, Princeton University
    This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
     
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  18. C. J. Ducasse (1942). Moore's Refutation of Idealism. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court 232-3.
  19.  58
    Andrea Borghini (2012). The Adverbial Theory of Properties. Metaphysica 13 (2):107-123.
    The paper presents a novel version of universalism—the thesis according to which there are only universals, no individuals—which is cashed out in terms of an adverbial analysis of predication. According to the theory, every spatiotemporal occurrence of a universal U can be expressed by a sentence which asserts the existence of U adverbially modified by the spatiotemporal region at which it exists. After some preliminary remarks on the interpretation of natural language, a formal semantics for the theory is first provided, (...)
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  20. Lydia Patton (forthcoming). Helmholtz's Physiological Psychology. In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 5. Routledge
    Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) contributed two major works to the theory of sensation and perception in the nineteenth century. The first edition of the The Doctrine of the Sensations of Tone was published in 1863, and the first edition of the Handbook of Physiological Optics was published in toto in 1867. These works established results both controversial and enduring: Helmholtz’s analysis of mixed colors and of combination tones, his arguments against nativism, and his commitment to analyzing sensation and perception using (...)
     
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  21.  32
    Mark Rowlands (2013). Sartre, Consciousness, and Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):521-536.
  22. Christopher Mole (2007). The Manifestability of Attention. Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society:111-130.
    This essay focuses on three features of attention: (1) that it can be manifested in behaviour; (2) that it improves one’s epistemic position vis-à-vis one’s activities; and (3) that attentive performance is experienced as single-minded concentration. I show that views according to which there is a particular process of attention struggle to accommodate all three of these features, and that the most natural alternative to these process-based views is a view that treats attention as an adverbial phenomenon analogous to unison.
     
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  23.  63
    Christopher Mole (2010). Attention is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Highlights of a difficult history -- The preliminary identification of our topic -- Approaches -- Bradley's protest -- James's disjunctive theory -- The source of Bradley's dissatisfaction -- Behaviourism and after -- Heirs of Bradley in the twentieth century -- The underlying metaphysical issue -- Explanatory tactics -- The basic distinction -- Metaphysical categories and taxonomies -- Adverbialism, multiple realizability, and natural kinds -- Adverbialism and levels of explanation -- Taxonomies and supervenience relations -- Rejecting the process : (...)
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  24.  9
    Andrea C. Bottani (forthcoming). Bringing Back Intrinsics to Enduring Things. Synthese:1-22.
    According to David Lewis, the argument from temporary intrinsics is ‘the principal and decisive objection against endurance’. I focus on eternalist endurantism, discussing three different ways the eternalist endurantist can try to avoid treating temporary intrinsics as relational. Two of them, generally known as ‘adverbialism’ and ‘SOFism’, are familiar and controversial. I scrutinize them and argue that Lewis’ scepticism about them is well founded. Then, I sketch a further, to some extent new, version of eternalist endurantism, where the key (...)
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  25. Jiri Benovsky (2009). Eternalist Theories of Persistence Through Time: Where the Differences Really Lie. Axiomathes 19 (1):51-71.
    The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the stage view , and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism . Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by photographs, I will examine these four views, and compare them, with some interesting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view and the endurantist theories—are (...)
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  26.  57
    Peter W. Ross (2001). The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.
    According to color subjectivism, colors are mental properties, processes, or events of visual experiences of color. I first lay out an argument for subjectivism founded on claims from visual science and show that it also relies on a philosophical assumption. I then argue that subjectivism is untenable because this view cannot provide a plausible account of color perception. I describe three versions of subjectivism, each of which combines subjectivism with a theory of perception, namely sense datum theory, adverbialism, and (...)
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  27. Alan Thomas (2003). An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):161-85.
    This paper develops an adverbial theory of consciousness. Adverbialism is described and endorsed and defended from its near rival, an identity thesis in which conscious mental states are those that the mental subject self-knows immediately that he or she is "in". The paper develops an account of globally supported self-ascription to embed this neo-Brentanian view of experiencing consciously within a more general account of the relation between consciousness and self-knowledge. Following O'Shaughnessy, person level consciousness is explained as a feature (...)
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  28.  42
    Sebastian Watzl (2011). Review of Christopher Mole 'Attention is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology'. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    A relatively detailed review (~ 4000 words) of Christopher Mole's (2010) book "Attention is Cognitive Unison". I suggest that Mole makes a good case against many types of reductivist accounts of attention, using the right kind of methodology. Yet, I argue that his adverbialist theory is not the best articulation of the crucial anti-reductivist insight. The distinction between adverbial and process-first phenomena he draws remains unclear, anti-reductivist process theories can escapte his arguments, and finally I provide an argument for why (...)
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  29.  84
    Barry Maund (2003). Perception. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    The book includes chapters on forms of natural realism, theories of perceptual experience, representationalism, the argument from illusion, phenomenological senses, types of perceptual content, the representationalist/intentionalist thesis, and adverbialist accounts of perceptual experience. The ideas of Austin, Dretske, Heidegger, Millikan, Putnam, and Robinson are considered among others and the reader is given an invaluable philosophical framework within which to consider the issues.
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  30.  46
    Ernest Sosa (1985). Imagery and Imagination. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:485-499.
    1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the question answered. 10. (...)
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  31.  88
    Ryan Wasserman (2010). Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Problem of Change. Philosophy Compass 5 (3):283-286.
    Our world is a world of change. Children are born and grow into adults. Material possessions rust and decay with age and ultimately perish. Yet scepticism about change is as old as philosophy itself. Heraclitus, for example, argued that nothing could survive the replacement of parts, so that it is impossible to step into the same river twice. Zeno argued that motion is paradoxical, so that nothing can alter its location. Parmenides and his followers went even further, arguing that the (...)
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  32.  88
    Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). There Is No Simpliciter Simpliciter. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249 - 278.
    This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family (...)
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  33.  18
    Philipp Keller (2007). ∈ : Formal Concepts in a Material World Truthmaking and Exemplification as Types of Determination. Dissertation, University of Geneva
    In the first part, I consider different notions of determination, contrast and compare modal with non-modal accounts and then defend two a-modality theses concerning essence and supervenience. I argue, first, that essence is a a-modal notion, i.e. not usefully analysed in terms of metaphysical modality, and then, contra Kit Fine, that essential properties can be exemplified contingently. I argue, second, that supervenience is also an a-modal notion, and that it should be analysed in terms of constitution relations between properties. In (...)
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  34.  18
    Walter Horn (2013). The Rise and Fall of Disjunctivism. Abstracta 7 (1):1-15.
    In the direct realist tradition of Reid and Austin, disjunctivism has joined its precursors inproudly trumpeting its allegiance with naïve realism. And the theory gains plausibility, par-ticularly as compared with adverbialism, if one considers a Wittgensteinian line of argumentregarding the use of sensation words. But ‘no common factor’ doctrines can be shown to beinconsistent with the naïve realism that has served as their main support. This does notmean that either disjunctivism or the Wittgensteinian perspective on language acquisitionthat informed it (...)
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  35.  44
    Alan Thomas, Reconciling Conscious Absorption and the Ubiquity of Self-Awareness.
    This paper argues that there are two compelling intuitions about conscious experience, the absorption intuition and the ubiquity intuition. The former is the claim that conscious experience consists in intentional absorption in its objects; the latter is the claim that conscious experience ubiquitously exhibits a sense that the mental subject is conscious that she is so conscious. These two intuitions are in tension with each other and it seems no single theory of consciousness can respect both. Drawing on the early (...)
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  36.  1
    Anja Berninger (2016). Thinking Sadly: In Favor of an Adverbial Theory of Emotions. Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):799-812.
    Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.
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  37.  9
    Andrew Ward (1989). The Relational Character of Belief. Grazer Philosophische Studien 35:73-82.
    In his book Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Paul Churchland suggests that the singular terms for prepositional attitude predicates serve an adverbial function as elements of complex predicates. This view, called monadic adverbialism, has three problems. First the monadic predicates cannot be semantic primitives because this would compromise the learnability of the language containing them. Second, the account has no way to analyze general de dicto beliefs that does not compromise the language being learnable. Third, the account (...)
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  38. Jong-ho Ha (1988). A Direct Attribution Theory of Perceptual Knowledge. Dissertation, Brown University
    My purposes in this dissertation are to defend Chisholm's direct attribution theory as a theory of reference and intentionality and to propose a revised version of that theory with respect to the problems of perception and epistemic justification in perceptual knowledge. The direct attribution theory of reference has a remarkable merit that it can solve some theoretical difficulties with other theories of reference and explain comprehensively our intentional acts. Although I accept Chisholm's viewpoint on reference and intentionality, however, I disagree (...)
     
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  39.  22
    Ali Hasan (forthcoming). A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Perception. Bloomsbury Academic.
    We ordinarily take it as obvious that we acquire knowledge of our world on the basis of sensory perception, and that such knowledge plays a central cognitive and practical role in our lives. Upon reflection, however, it is far from obvious what perception involves and how exactly it contributes to our knowledge. Indeed, skeptical arguments have led some to question whether we have any knowledge, or even rational or justified belief, regarding the world outside our minds. -/- Investigating the nature (...)
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  40. Barry Maund (2014). Perception. Routledge.
    The philosophical issues raised by perception make it one of the central topics in the philosophical tradition. Debate about the nature of perceptual knowledge and the objects of perception comprises a thread that runs through the history of philosophy. In some historical periods the major issues have been predominantly epistemological and related to scepticism, but an adequate understanding of perception is important more widely, especially for metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. For this reason Barry Maund provides an account of (...)
     
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