Search results for 'Agency' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Oisín Deery, Matthew S. Bedke & Shaun Nichols (2013). Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 126–50.score: 27.0
    Incompatibilists often claim that we experience our agency as incompatible with determinism, while compatibilists challenge this claim. We report a series of experiments that focus on whether the experience of having an ability to do otherwise is taken to be at odds with determinism. We found that participants in our studies described their experience as incompatibilist whether the decision was (i) present-focused or retrospective, (ii) imagined or actual, (iii) morally salient or morally neutral. The only case in which participants (...)
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  2. Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen (2008). I Move, Therefore I Am: A New Theoretical Framework to Investigate Agency and Ownership. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):411 - 424.score: 24.0
    The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a (...)
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  3. Markus E. Schlosser (2010). Agency, Ownership, and the Standard Theory. In A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 13-31.score: 24.0
    The causal theory of action has been the standard view in the philosophy of action and mind. In this chapter, I will present responses to two challenges to the theory. The first says, basically, that there is no positive argument in favour of the causal theory, as the only reason that supports it consists in the apparent lack of tenable alternatives. The second challenge says that the theory fails to capture the phenomenon of agency, as it reduces activity to (...)
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  4. Holly Andersen (2013). The Representation of Time in Agency. In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 24.0
    This paper outlines some key issues that arise when agency and temporality are considered jointly, from the perspective of psychology, cognitive neuroscience, phenomenology, and action theory. I address the difference between time simpliciter and time as represented as it figures in phenomena like intentional binding, goal-oriented action plans, emulation systems, and ‘temporal agency’. An examination of Husserl’s account of time consciousness highlights difficulties in generalizing his account to include a substantive notion of agency, a weakness inherited by (...)
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  5. Christian List & Philip Pettit (2006). Group Agency and Supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.score: 24.0
    Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must 'supervene' on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' individual judgments on that (...)
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  6. R. Jay Wallace (1999). Three Conceptions of Rational Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):217-242.score: 24.0
    Rational agency may be thought of as intentional activity that is guided by the agent's conception of what they have reason to do. The paper identifies and assesses three approaches to this phenomenon, which I call internalism, meta-internalism, and volitionalism. Internalism accounts for rational motivation by appeal to substantive desires of the agent's that are conceived as merely given; I argue that it fails to do full justice to the phenomenon of guidance by one's conception of one's reasons. Meta-internalism (...)
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  7. Glenn Carruthers (2012). The Case for the Comparator Model as an Explanation of the Sense of Agency and its Breakdowns. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):30-45.score: 24.0
    I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that (...)
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  8. Hanne De Jaegher & Tom Froese (2009). On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency. Adaptive Behavior 17 (5):444-460.score: 24.0
    Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked in the cognitive sciences, so strong is the consensus that only individual agents have constitutive efficacy. In this article we challenge this methodological solipsism and argue that interindividual relations and social context do not simply arise from the behavior of individual agents, but themselves enable and shape the individual agents on which they depend. For this, we define the notion of autonomy as (...)
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  9. Lynne Rudder Baker (2011). First-Personal Aspects of Agency. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.score: 24.0
    Abstract: On standard accounts, actions are caused by reasons (Davidson), and reasons are taken to be neural phenomena. Since neural phenomena are wholly understandable from a third-person perspective, standard views have no room for any ineliminable first-personal elements in an account of the causation of action. This article aims to show that first-person perspectives play essential roles in both human and nonhuman agency. Nonhuman agents have rudimentary first-person perspectives, whereas human agents—at least rational agents and moral agents—have robust first-person (...)
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  10. Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (2009). Agency, Consciousness, and Executive Control. Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.score: 24.0
    On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper (...)
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  11. Marilea Bramer (2011). Domestic Violence as a Violation of Autonomy and Agency. Social Philosophy Today 27:97-110.score: 24.0
    Contrary to what we might initially think, domestic violence is not simply a violation of respect. This characterization of domestic violence misses two key points. First, the issue of respect in connection with domestic violence is not as straightforward as it appears. Second, domestic violence is also a violation of care. These key points explain how domestic violence negatively affects a victim’s autonomy and agency—the ability to choose and pursue her own goals and life plan.We have a moral responsibility (...)
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  12. Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. Psyche 13 (1):1 - 30.score: 24.0
    The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency and makes it clear that the experience of agency includes many other experiences as components. This paper examines the possible relations between these components of our experience of acting and the processes involved in action specification and action control. After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of action, it (...)
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  13. Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin (2010). Reconstructing the Minimal Self, or How to Make Sense of Agency and Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.score: 24.0
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more (...)
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  14. Thomas Metzinger (2013). The Myth of Cognitive Agency. Frontiers in Psychology 4 (931).score: 24.0
    This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analysed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition, such as mental agency, explicit, (...)
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  15. Ezio Di Nucci (2013). Addiction, Compulsion, and Agency. Neuroethics (1):1-3.score: 24.0
    I show that Pickard’s argument against the irresistibility of addiction fails because her proposed dilemma, according to which either drug-seeking does not count as action or addiction is resistible, is flawed; and that is the case whether or not one endorses Pickard’s controversial definition of action. Briefly, we can easily imagine cases in which drug-seeking meets Pickard’s conditions for agency without thereby implying that the addiction was not irresistible, as when the drug addict may take more than one route (...)
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  16. Roman Altshuler (2009). Agency and the A-Series. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):153-161.score: 24.0
    Debates between A-theorists and B-theorists about time often center on our experiential beliefs about reality. Because we experience events as past, present, or future, the A-theorists argue, a tenseless theory of time cannot account for reality. B-theorists, in response, have sought to painstakingly explain away every argument for the existence of A-properties on the basis of experience. Recently, the dominant strategy in this response has involved turning our attention away from our beliefs about experience and toward the truth-makers of those (...)
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  17. Paul Katsafanas (2011). The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche, Plato, and Schiller. Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (1):87-113.score: 24.0
    This paper examines Nietzsche’s concept of unified agency. A widespread consensus has emerged in the secondary literature on three points: (1) Nietzsche’s notion of unity is meant to be an analysis of freedom; (2) unity refers to a relation between the agent’s drives or motivational states; and (3) unity obtains when one drive predominates and imposes order on the other drives. I argue that these claims are philosophically and textually indefensible. In contrast, I argue that (1′) Nietzschean unity is (...)
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  18. Diana Tietjens Meyers (2009). Artifice and Authenticity: Gender Technology and Agency in Two Jenny Saville Portraits. In Laurie Shrage (ed.), You’ve Changed”: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity. Oxford UP.score: 24.0
    This paper addresses two related topics: 1. The disanalogies between elective cosmetic practices and sex reassignment surgery. Why does it seem necessary for me – an aging professional woman – to ignore the blandishments of hairdressers wielding dyes and dermatologists wielding acids and scalpels? Why does it not seem equally necessary for a transgendered person to repudiate sex reassignment procedures? 2. The role of the body in identity and agency. How do phenomenological insights regarding the constitution of selfhood in (...)
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  19. Andrea Lavazza & Mario De Caro (2010). Not so Fast. On Some Bold Neuroscientific Claims Concerning Human Agency. Neuroethics 3 (1):23-41.score: 24.0
    According to a widespread view, a complete explanatory reduction of all aspects of the human mind to the electro-chemical functioning of the brain is at hand and will certainly produce vast and positive cultural, political and social consequences. However, notwithstanding the astonishing advances generated by the neurosciences in recent years for our understanding of the mechanisms and functions of the brain, the application of these findings to the specific but crucial issue of human agency can be considered a “pre-paradigmatic (...)
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  20. Laura W. Ekstrom (ed.) (2001). Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom. Westview.score: 24.0
    A companion volume to Free Will: A Philosophical Study , this new anthology collects influential essays on free will, including both well-known contemporary classics and exciting recent work. Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom is divided into three parts. The essays in the first section address metaphysical issues concerning free will and causal determinism. The second section groups papers presenting a positive account of the nature of free action, including competing compatibilist and incompatibilist analyses. The third (...)
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  21. Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Agency, Simulation and Self-Identification. Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.score: 24.0
    This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally (...)
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  22. Kenneth Einar Himma (2009). Artificial Agency, Consciousness, and the Criteria for Moral Agency: What Properties Must an Artificial Agent Have to Be a Moral Agent? [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 11 (1):19-29.score: 24.0
    In this essay, I describe and explain the standard accounts of agency, natural agency, artificial agency, and moral agency, as well as articulate what are widely taken to be the criteria for moral agency, supporting the contention that this is the standard account with citations from such widely used and respected professional resources as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I then flesh out the implications of (...)
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  23. Joshua M. Wood (2014). Hume and the Metaphysics of Agency. Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):87-112.score: 24.0
    I examine Hume’s ‘construal of the basic structure of human agency’ and his ‘analysis of human agency’ as they arise in his investigation of causal power. Hume’s construal holds both that volition is separable from action and that the causal mechanism of voluntary action is incomprehensible. Hume’s analysis argues, on the basis of these two claims, that we cannot draw the concept of causal power from human agency. Some commentators suggest that Hume’s construal of human agency (...)
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  24. Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff (2003). Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.score: 24.0
    We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.
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  25. Glenn Carruthers (2010). A Problem for Wegner and Colleagues' Model of the Sense of Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):341-357.score: 24.0
    The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self-consciousness. Recently, Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms, the sense of agency is elicited by the inference (...)
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  26. Paul Shapiro (2006). Moral Agency in Other Animals. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):357-373.score: 24.0
    Some philosophers have argued that moral agency is characteristic of humans alone and that its absence from other animals justifies granting higher moral status to humans. However, human beings do not have a monopoly on moral agency, which admits of varying degrees and does not require mastery of moral principles. The view that all and only humans possess moral agency indicates our underestimation of the mental lives of other animals. Since many other animals are moral agents (to (...)
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  27. Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency. Theoria 77 (4):312-332.score: 24.0
    In this article, I challenge the dominant view of the importance of the debate over action-individuation. On the dominant view, it is held that the conclusions we reach about action-individuation make little or no difference for other debates in the philosophy of action, much less in other areas of philosophy. As a means of showing that the dominant view is mistaken, I consider the implications of accepting a given theory of action-individuation for thinking about doxastic agency. In particular, I (...)
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  28. Mathieu Doucet (2012). Can We Be Self-Deceived About What We Believe? Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception, and Rational Agency. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E1-E25.score: 24.0
    Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first-order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self-knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self-knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, (...)
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  29. Prasita Mukherjee (2012). Revolutionizing Agency: Sameness and Difference in the Representation of Women by Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain and Mahasweta Devi. ARGUMENT 2 (1):117-127.score: 24.0
    In this paper the sameness and difference between two distinguished Indian authors, Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain (1880–1932) and Mahasweta Devi (b. 1926), representing two generations almost a century apart, will be under analysis in order to trace the generational transformation in women’s writing in India, especially Bengal. Situated in the colonial and postcolonial frames of history, Hossain and Mahasweta Devi may be contextualized differently. At the same time their subjects are also differently categorized; the former is not particularly concerned with subalterns (...)
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  30. Paul Katsafanas (2014). Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):185-216.score: 24.0
    Kant and Nietzsche are typically thought to have diametrically opposed accounts of willing: put simply, whereas Kant gives signal importance to reflective episodes of choice, Nietzsche seems to deny that reflective choices have any significant role in the etiology of human action. In this essay, I argue that the dispute between Kant and Nietzsche actually takes a far more interesting form. Nietzsche is not merely rejecting the Kantian picture of agency. Rather, Nietzsche is offering a subtle critique of the (...)
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  31. Mattia Riccardi (2014). Inner Opacity. Nietzsche on Introspection and Agency. Inquiry:1-23.score: 24.0
    Inner Opacity. Nietzsche on Introspection and Agency. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2013.855659.
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  32. Michael Lynch (2013). Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical Reasons. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?
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  33. Brian W. Kulik (2005). Agency Theory, Reasoning and Culture at Enron: In Search of a Solution. Journal of Business Ethics 59 (4):347 - 360.score: 24.0
    Applying evidence from recently available public information on Enron, I defined Enron’s culture as one rooted in agency theory by asserting that Enron’s members were predominantly agency-reasoning individuals. I then identified conditions present at Enron’s collapse: a strong agency culture with collectively non-compliant norms, a munificent rare-failure environment, and new hires with little business ethics training. Turning to four possible antidotes (selection, objectivist integrity, integrity capacity, and stewardship reasoning) to an agency culture under these conditions, I (...)
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  34. Donovan Miyasaki, (2014) Feeling, Not Freedom: Nietzsche Against Agency.score: 24.0
    Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysical freedom of the will does not leave room for a morally substantial conception of freedom, particularly that of agency free will. His normative ideal of a higher, more valuable human type consists of the only kind of agency he believes to be possible: the mere feeling of freedom—the qualitative feeling alone, without deeper substance. Not only does the feeling of agency not imply any strong, morally significant freedom of agency, in practice it (...)
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  35. Joan Fontrodona & Alejo José G. Sison (2006). The Nature of the Firm, Agency Theory and Shareholder Theory: A Critique From Philosophical Anthropology. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 66 (1):33 - 42.score: 24.0
    Standard accounts on the nature of the firm are highly dependent on explanations by Coase, coupled with inputs from agency theory and shareholder theory. This paper carries out their critique in light of personalist and common good postulates. It shows how personalist and common good principles create a framework that not only accommodates business ethics better but also affords a more compelling understanding of business as a whole.
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  36. Alfred Mele & Joshua Shepherd (2013). Situationism and Agency. Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (1):62-83.score: 24.0
    Research in psychology indicates that situations powerfully impact human behavior. Often, it seems, features of situations drive our behavior even when we remain unaware of these features or their influence. One response to this research is pessimism about human agency: human agents have little conscious control over their own behavior, and little insight into why they do what they do. In this paper we review classic and more recent studies indicating “the power of the situation,” and argue for a (...)
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  37. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). The Unity and Disunity of Agency. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):308-312.score: 24.0
    Effective agency, according to contemporary Kantians, requires a unity of purpose both at a time, in order that we may eliminate conflict among our motives, and over time, because many of the things we do form part of longer-term projects and make sense only in the light of these projects and life plans. Call this the unity of agency thesis. This thesis can be regarded as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity and indeed on accounts of (...)
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  38. Vittorio Gallese (2000). The Inner Sense of Action: Agency and Motor Representations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):23-40.score: 24.0
    Discusses the possibility of reconciling different articulations of intentionality from a neurobiological perspective. The author analyzes the relationship between agency and representation and how representation is intrinsically related to action control. The author also presents a new account of action, arguing against what is still commonly held as its proper definition, namely the final outcome of a cascade-like process that starts from the analysis of sensory data, incorporates the result of decision processes, and ends up with responses (actions) to (...)
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  39. Andreas Herzig & Emiliano Lorini (2010). A Dynamic Logic of Agency I: Stit, Capabilities and Powers. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (1):89-121.score: 24.0
    The aim of this paper, is to provide a logical framework for reasoning about actions, agency, and powers of agents and coalitions in game-like multi-agent systems. First we define our basic Dynamic Logic of Agency ( ). Differently from other logics of individual and coalitional capability such as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) and Coalition Logic, in cooperation modalities for expressing powers of agents and coalitions are not primitive, but are defined from more basic dynamic logic operators of action (...)
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  40. Michael Brownstein (2014). Rationalizing Flow: Agency in Skilled Unreflective Action. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):545-568.score: 24.0
    In recent work, Peter Railton, Julia Annas, and David Velleman aim to reconcile the phenomenon of “flow”—broadly understood as describing the “unreflective” aspect of skilled action—with one or another familiar conception of agency. While there are important differences between their arguments, Railton, Annas, and Velleman all make, or are committed to, at least one similar pivotal claim. Each argues, directly or indirectly, that agents who perform skilled unreflective actions can, in principle, accurately answer “Anscombean” questions—”what” and “why” questions— about (...)
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  41. Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (2009). From Shared Agency to the Normativity of Law: Shapiro's and Coleman's Defence of Hart's Practice Theory of Rules Reconsidered. Law and Philosophy 28 (1):59 - 100.score: 24.0
    Colemanand Shapiro have recently advanced a second at- tempt to reconcile Hart’s practice theory of rules and the idea of the normativity of law; i.e., the idea that legal rules qua social rules give reasons for actions and, in some circumstances create and impose duties and obligations. Their argumentative strategy is to resort to elements in Bratman’s work on shared agency and planning, though they introduce important and substantive modifications to Bratman’s own explanation. Bratman describes his own theory as (...)
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  42. Manuel Vargas (2006). On the Importance of History for Responsible Agency. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.score: 24.0
    In this article I propose a resolution to the history issue for responsible agency, given a moderate revisionist approach to responsibility. Roughly, moderate revisionism is the view that a plausible and normatively adequate theory of responsibility will require principled departures from commonsense thinking. The history issue is whether morally responsible agency – that is, whether an agent is an apt target of our responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes – is an essentially historical notion. Some have maintained that responsible agents (...)
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  43. Fritz J. McDonald (2010). Agency and Responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2):199-207.score: 24.0
    According to Christine Korsgaard, Kantian hypothetical and categorical imperative principles are constitutive principles of agency. By acting in a way that is guided by these imperatives, an individual makes herself into an agent. There is hence, on her theory, an inextricable link between the nature of agency and the practical issue of why we should be rational and moral. The benefits of such an account would be great: in Korsgaard’s view, an account that bases morality on the nature (...)
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  44. Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Agency, Life Extension, and the Meaning of Life. The Monist 93 (1):38-56.score: 24.0
    Contemporary philosophers and bioethicists argue that life extension is bad for the individual. According to the agency objection to life extension, being constrained as an agent adds to the meaningfulness of human life. Life extension removes constraints, and thus it deprives life of meaning. In the paper, I concede that constrained agency contributes to the meaningfulness of human life, but reject the agency objection to life extension in its current form. Even in an extended life, decision-making remains (...)
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  45. Paul Katsafanas (2013). Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of action. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics explains the constitutivist strategy and argues that the attractions of this view are considerable: constitutivism promises to resolve longstanding philosophical puzzles about the metaphysics, epistemology, and practical grip of normative claims. Yet constitutivism faces a challenge: it must employ a conception of action that is minimal enough to be independently plausible, but substantial enough to (...)
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  46. Nir Lipsman & Walter Glannon (2013). Brain, Mind and Machine: What Are the Implications of Deep Brain Stimulation for Perceptions of Personal Identity, Agency and Free Will? Bioethics 27 (9):465-470.score: 24.0
    Brain implants, such as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), which are designed to improve motor, mood and behavioural pathology, present unique challenges to our understanding of identity, agency and free will. This is because these devices can have visible effects on persons' physical and psychological properties yet are essentially undetectable when operating correctly. They can supplement and compensate for one's inherent abilities and faculties when they are compromised by neuropsychiatric disorders. Further, unlike talk therapy or pharmacological treatments, patients need not (...)
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  47. M. Synofzik, G. Vosgerau & A. Newen (2008). Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.score: 24.0
    There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the ‘‘comparator model’’. In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator (...)
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  48. Tomis Kapitan (1991). Agency and Omniscience. Religious Studies 27 (1):105-120.score: 24.0
    It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know, and perhaps it is only by assuming divine omniscience that one can retain the confidence in the efficacy and (...)
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  49. Christian List & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (2010). Can There Be a Global Demos? An Agency-Based Approach. Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (1):76-110.score: 24.0
    Can there be a global demos? The current debate about this topic is divided between two opposing camps: the “pessimist” or “impossibilist” camp, which holds that the emergence of a global demos is either conceptually or empirically impossible, and the “optimist” or “possibilist” camp, which holds that the emergence of a global demos is conceptually as well as empirically possible and an embryonic version of it already exists. However, the two camps agree neither on a common working definition of a (...)
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  50. Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney (2013). Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.score: 24.0
    The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that (...)
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