Search results for 'Agentive experience' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Oisín Deery (2014). Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism? :1-18.score: 180.0
    Is agentive experience compatible with determinism?. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2013.874495.
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  2. Robert Briscoe (2011). The Elusive Experience of Agency. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.score: 120.0
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that (...)
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  3. Adrian John Tetteh Smith, Bodily Experience and Bodily Self Knowledge: Feeling and Knowing Oneself as a Physical Agent.score: 84.0
    I tend to think of myself as bodily. Probably, so do you. Philosophically this takes some explaining. A candidate explanation is this: The bodily self is a physical agent. Knowledge of oneself as bodily is fundamentally knowledge of oneself as agentive; such knowledge is grounded in both experience of oneself as instantiating a bodily structure that affords a limited range of actions; and experience of oneself as a physical agent that tries to perform a limited range of (...)
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  4. Elisabeth Pacherie (2010). Self-Agency. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oup Oxford.score: 66.0
    We are perceivers, we are thinkers, and we are also agents, bringing about physical events, such as bodily movements and their consequences. What we do tells us, and others, a lot about who we are. On the one hand, who we are determines what we do. On the other hand, acting is also a process of self-discovery and self-shaping. Pivotal to this mutual shaping of self and agency is the sense of agency, or agentive self-awareness, i.e., the sense that (...)
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  5. Elisabeth Pacherie (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency. In Seemann Axel (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.score: 62.0
    This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.
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  6. Matthew Burstein (2007). Taking As: Experience & Judgment in the Life of Agents. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):227 – 243.score: 60.0
    Although appearances may deceive them, agents are capable of achieving their ends; this success is frequently explained by the fact that the agents may, for example, see a stick in water as bent without believing that it is actually bent. Although the notion of 'seeing as' is supposed to both bridge the gap between experience and action and explain our reaction to illusions, such accounts break down because of their exclusive focus on visual episodes and their tendency to interpret (...)
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  7. Maya Wardeh, Trevor Bench-Capon & Frans Coenen (2011). Arguing From Experience Using Multiple Groups of Agents. Argument and Computation 2 (1):51 - 76.score: 60.0
    A framework to support ?Arguing from Experience? using groups of collaborating agents (termed participant agents/players) is described. The framework is an extension of the PISA multi-party arguing from experience framework. The original version of PISA allowed n participants to promote n goals (one each) for a given example. The described extension of PISA allows individuals with the same goals to pool their resources by forming ?groups?. The framework is fully described and its effectiveness illustrated using a number of (...)
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  8. Denis Phan & Franck Varenne (2010). Agent-Based Models and Simulations in Economics and Social Sciences: From Conceptual Exploration to Distinct Ways of Experimenting. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 13 (1).score: 58.0
    Now that complex Agent-Based Models and computer simulations spread over economics and social sciences - as in most sciences of complex systems -, epistemological puzzles (re)emerge. We introduce new epistemological concepts so as to show to what extent authors are right when they focus on some empirical, instrumental or conceptual significance of their model or simulation. By distinguishing between models and simulations, between types of models, between types of computer simulations and between types of empiricity obtained through a simulation, section (...)
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  9. Jeff Buechner & Herman T. Tavani (2011). Trust and Multi-Agent Systems: Applying the Diffuse, Default Model of Trust to Experiments Involving Artificial Agents. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 13 (1):39-51.score: 52.0
    We argue that the notion of trust, as it figures in an ethical context, can be illuminated by examining research in artificial intelligence on multi-agent systems in which commitment and trust are modeled. We begin with an analysis of a philosophical model of trust based on Richard Holton’s interpretation of P. F. Strawson’s writings on freedom and resentment, and we show why this account of trust is difficult to extend to artificial agents (AAs) as well as to other non-human entities. (...)
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  10. Timothy Bayne (2010). Agentive Experiences as Pushmi-Pullyu Representations. In A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 219--36.score: 50.0
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  11. Ida Hallgren (2012). Seeing Agents When We Need to, Attributing Experience When We Feel Like It. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):369-382.score: 42.0
    Mind attribution may be divided into the subcategories of attribution of agency, associated with moral agency, and attribution of experience and emotion, associated with moral concern and moral patiency (Gray et al. Science 315(5812):619, 2007; Gray et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108(2):477–479, 2011b; Robbins and Jack Philosophical Studies 127(1):59–85, 2006). In this paper I attend to social context and the different psychological needs influencing the different types of mind attribution. (...)
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  12. Terry Horgan (2007). Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem. Erkenntnis 67 (2):183 - 200.score: 40.0
    The hypothesis of the mental state-causation of behavior (the MSC hypothesis) asserts that the behaviors we classify as actions are caused by certain mental states. A principal reason often given for trying to secure the truth of the MSC hypothesis is that doing so is allegedly required to vindicate our belief in our own agency. I argue that the project of vindicating agency needs to be seriously reconceived, as does the relation between this project and the MSC hypothesis. Vindication requires (...)
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  13. Myrto I. Mylopoulos (forthcoming). Agentive Awareness is Not Sensory Awareness. Philosophical Studies:1-20.score: 40.0
    In this paper, I argue that the conscious awareness one has of oneself as acting, i.e., agentive awareness, is not a type of sensory awareness. After providing some set up in Sect. 1, I move on in Sect. 2 to sketch a profile of sensory agentive experiences (SAEs) as representational states with sensory qualities by which we come to be aware of ourselves as performing actions. In Sect. 3, I critique two leading arguments in favor of positing such (...)
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  14. G. I. Demiryol (2012). Film as a Mobilizing Agent? Adorno and Benjamin on Aesthetic Experience. Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (9):939-954.score: 40.0
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  15. Roger N. Shepard (1995). What is an Agent That It Experiences P-Consciousness? And What is P-Consciousness That It Moves an Agent? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267.score: 40.0
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  16. Florian Schmaltz (2006). Otto Bickenbach's Human Experiments with Chemical Warfare Agents and the Concentration Camp Natzweiler. In Wolfgang Uwe Eckart (ed.), Man, Medicine, and the State: The Human Body As an Object of Government Sponsored Medical Research in the 20th Century. Steiner.score: 40.0
     
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  17. P. Sylvie & C. Sayettat-Fau (forthcoming). Systemes multi-agents, JFIADSMA'OO: méthodologie, technologie et expériences. Hermes.score: 40.0
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  18. Anne-Marie S. Christensen (2009). Getting It Right in Ethical Experience: John McDowell and Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):493–506.score: 38.0
    Most forms of virtue ethics are characterized by two attractive features. The first is that proponents of virtue ethics acknowledge the need to describe how moral agents acquire or develop the traits and abilities necessary to become morally able agents. The second attractive feature of most forms of virtue ethics is that they are forms of moral realism. The two features come together in the attempt to describe virtue as a personal ability to distinguish morally good reasons for action. It (...)
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  19. Kevin Magill (1997). Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions. St. Martin's Press/Palgrave Macmillan.score: 38.0
    Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and those of others, that we have choices about how to do so and that we are responsible for what we do. But are we really justified in believing this? For centuries philosophers have argued about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism or natural causation, and they seem no closer to agreeing about (...)
     
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  20. Elisabeth Pacherie (2014). How Does It Feel to Act Together? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.score: 36.0
    This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint (...)
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  21. Santiago Echeverri (2011). Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience. In David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.), Expérience et réflexivité: perspectives au-delà de l’empirisme et de l’idéalisme. L'Harmattan.score: 34.0
    Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper to responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function of perception (...)
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  22. A. -C. Leiviskä Deland, G. Karlsson & H. Fatouros-Bergman (2011). A Phenomenological Analysis of the Psychotic Experience. Human Studies 34 (1):23-42.score: 34.0
    Six individuals with experience of psychosis were interviewed about their psychotic experiences. The material was analyzed using the empirical phenomenological psychological method. The results consist of a whole meaning structure, a gestalt, entailing the following characteristics: The feeling of estrangement in relationship to the world; the dissolution of time; the loss of intuitive social knowledge; the alienation of oneself, and finally; the loss of intentionality/loss of agency. In brief, the results show that an altered perception of the self and (...)
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  23. Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness. [REVIEW] Synthese 159 (3):475 - 491.score: 32.0
    This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
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  24. Marya Schechtman (2005). Experience, Agency, and Personal Identity. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):1-24.score: 30.0
    Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit argues that if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness throughout the life of a person, and no such unity is possible. In response, many philosophers have switched to a view of persons as essentially agents, arguing that the importance of identity depends upon agential unity rather (...)
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  25. Gregory Nixon (ed.) (2011). Self-Transcendent Experience: Narrative & Analysis. QuantumDream, Inc..score: 30.0
    How one transcends the self depends on the self that experiences it. Is it instigated or sought, does it happen by accident, or by an act of Grace? Is it common or rare? Is it brought on by the ingestion of psychedelic agents or by meditation or by being overcome by fear or merely by caring more about the welfare of others than oneself? Is it transcendence to experience a shift of perspective or dissolution of the self? In the (...)
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  26. Gregg Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books.score: 30.0
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. In this book I examine both the traditional philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will, as well as recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to consciousness (...)
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  27. Tim Bayne (2011). The Sense of Agency. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives.score: 30.0
    Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of (...)
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  28. Evan Thompson (2005). Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.score: 30.0
    The enactive approach offers a distinctive view of how mental life relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective in- teraction. This paper concentrates on the second level of sensorimotor coupling. An account is given of how the subjectively lived body and the living body of the organism are related (the body-body problem) via dynamic sensorimotor activity, and it is shown how this account helps to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain. Arguments (...)
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  29. Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark (2011). Knowing What We Can Do: Actions, Intentions, and the Construction of Phenomenal Experience. Synthese 181 (3):375-394.score: 30.0
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities (...)
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  30. Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore (2007). Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.score: 30.0
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: (...)
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  31. Marga Reimer (2009). Is the Impostor Hypothesis Really so Preposterous? Understanding the Capgras Experience. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):669 – 686.score: 30.0
    In his classic paper, “Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder,” Brendan Maher (1974) argues that psychiatric delusions are hypotheses designed to explain anomalous experiences, and are “developed through the operation of normal cognitive processes.” Consider, for instance, the Capgras delusion. Patients suffering from this particular delusion believe that someone close to them—such as a spouse, a sibling, a parent, or a child—has been replaced by an impostor: by someone who bears a striking resemblance to the “original” and who (for reasons unknown) (...)
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  32. Steve Torrance (2005). In Search of the Enactive: Introduction to Special Issue on Enactive Experience. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):357-368.score: 30.0
    In the decade and a half since the appearance of Varela, Thompson and Rosch's workThe Embodied Mind,enactivism has helped to put experience and consciousness, conceived of in a distinctive way, at the forefront of cognitive science. There are at least two major strands within the enactive perspective: a broad view of what it is to be an agent with a mind; and a more focused account of the nature of perception and perceptual experience. The relation between these two (...)
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  33. Axel Seemann (2011). The Role of Joint Experience in Historical Narratives. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):201-229.score: 30.0
    There are historical events which cannot easily be made sense of by reference to the actions of single individuals. I suggest that one way to understand such events is by building on the involved agents' joint experience, or reports thereof. The phenomenology of joint involvement, so my suggestion, is of use in a particular kind of sense making that combines hermeneutical and explanatory elements. Such sense making, I argue, is narrative in character. I suggest a particular conception of historical (...)
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  34. David Mittelberg & Lilach Lev Ari (1995). Jewish Identity, Jewish Education and Experience of the Kibbutz in Israel. Journal of Moral Education 24 (3):327-344.score: 30.0
    Abstract In this paper we examine the role of the Israeli kibbutz experience as an agent of informal education in cross?cultural settings, acting as a transformative agent of ethnic identity. The study presents, through comparative longitudinal analysis, the changes in Jewish identity and values of young North American Jews between their arrival in Israel and the conclusion of the kibbutz programme, as well as after they have returned to their home country. The analysis utilises data gathered from 238 Oren (...)
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  35. Bo Mou (2001). Moral Rules and Moral Experience: A Comparative Analysis of Dewey and Laozi on Morality. Asian Philosophy 11 (3):161 – 178.score: 30.0
    In this article, through a comparative analysis of Dewey's and Laozi's relevant accounts, I examine a pragmatic insight concerning moral rules and moral experience to the effect that (i) fixed and formulated moral rules should not be taken as the final absolute moral authority, and (ii) attention needs to be paid to the moral agent's own moral experience that responds to the felt demands in concrete situations. The purpose of this paper is to enhance understanding the crucial points (...)
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  36. S. J. Michael D. Barber (2007). Ethical Experience and the Motives for Practical Rationality: A Kantian/Levinasian Criticism of McDowell's Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):425-441.score: 30.0
    John McDowell’s ethical writings interpret ethical experience as intentional, socially-conditioned, virtuous responsiveness to situations and develop a modest account of practical rationality. His work converges with investigations of ethical experience by recent Kant scholars (Sherman, Brewer, Herman) and Emmanuel Levinas. The Kantian interpreters and Levinas locate the categorical demands of ethical experience in rational agents’ demands for respect, while McDowell finds it in noble adherence to the demands of virtuous living. For McDowell, moral-practical rational efforts to justify (...)
     
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  37. D. C. Gooding & T. R. Addis (2008). Modelling Experiments as Mediating Models. Foundations of Science 13 (1):17-35.score: 28.0
    Syntactic and structural models specify relationships between their constituents but cannot show what outcomes their interaction would produce over time in the world. Simulation consists in iterating the states of a model, so as to produce behaviour over a period of simulated time. Iteration enables us to trace the implications and outcomes of inference rules and other assumptions implemented in the models that make up a theory. We apply this method to experiments which we treat as models of the particular (...)
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  38. C. M. Fausey, B. L. Long, A. Inamori & L. Boroditsky (2009). Constructing Agency: The Role of Language. Frontiers in Psychology 1:162-162.score: 28.0
    Is agency a straightforward and universal feature of human experience? Or is the construction of agency (including attention to and memory for people involved in events) guided by patterns in culture? In this paper we focus on one aspect of cultural experience: patterns in language. We examined English and Japanese speakers’ descriptions of intentional and accidental events. English and Japanese speakers described intentional events similarly, using mostly agentive language (e.g., “She broke the vase”). However, when it came (...)
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  39. Tim Crane (1992). The Nonconceptual Content of Experience. In , The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.score: 27.0
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. (...)
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  40. Eugene Taylor & Robert H. Wozniak (1996). Pure Experience: The Response to William James. In E. I. Taylor & R. H. Wozniak (eds.), Pure Experience: The Response to William James. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.score: 27.0
    The radical empiricism of William James was first formally presented in his seminal papers of 1904, 'Does Consciousness Exist?' and 'A World of Pure Experience'. In James's view, pure experience was to serve as the source for psychology's primary data and radical empiricism was to launch an effective critique of experimentalism in psychology, a critique from which the problem of experimentalism within science could be addressed more broadly. This collection of papers presents James's formal statements on radical empiricism (...)
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  41. Fiona Macpherson (ed.) (2011). The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 27.0
    Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. -/- The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael Tye (University of Texas, Austin), Richard Price (All Souls College, Oxford) and Susanna Siegel (Harvard (...)
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  42. Jerome J. Valberg (1992). The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford University Press.score: 27.0
    In examining the puzzle of experience, and its possible solutions, Valberg discusses relevant views of Hume, Kant, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Strawson, as well as ideas from the recent philosophy of perception. Finally, he describes and analyzes a manifestation of the puzzle outside philosophy, in everyday experience.
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  43. Eran Guter (2004). Wittgenstein on Musical Experience and Knowledge. In J. C. Marek & E. M. Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis, Contributions to the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.score: 27.0
    Wittgenstein’s thinking on music is intimately linked to core issues in his work on the philosophy of psychology. I argue that inasmuch musical experience exemplifies the kind of grammatical complexity that is indigenous to aspect perception and, in general, to concepts that are based on physiognomy, it is rendered by Wittgenstein as a form of knowledge, namely, knowledge of mankind.
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  44. David J. Chalmers (2004). The Representational Character of Experience. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 153--181.score: 24.0
    Consciousness and intentionality are perhaps the two central phenomena in the philosophy of mind. Human beings are conscious beings: there is something it is like to be us. Human beings are intentional beings: we represent what is going on in the world.Correspondingly, our specific mental states, such as perceptions and thoughts, very often have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like to be in them. And these mental states very often have intentional content: they serve to represent the (...)
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  45. J. Kevin O'Regan (2001). What It is Like to See: A Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience. Synthese 129 (1):79-103.score: 24.0
    The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We (...)
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  46. Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.score: 24.0
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational (...)
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  47. Michael Tye (2002). Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience. Noûs 36 (1):137-51.score: 24.0
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  48. Michael G. F. Martin (2002). The Transparency of Experience. Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425.score: 24.0
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  49. Sharon Hewitt (2010). What Do Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine Really Tell Us About Hedonism? Philosophical Studies 151 (3):331 - 349.score: 24.0
    Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment is often considered a decisive refutation of hedonism. I argue that the conclusions we draw from Nozick's thought experiment ought to be informed by considerations concerning the operation of our intuitions about value. First, I argue that, in order to show that practical hedonistic reasons are not causing our negative reaction to the experience machine, we must not merely stipulate their irrelevance (since our intuitions are not always responsive to stipulation) but fill (...)
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  50. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2004). Seeing the Unobservable: Van Fraassen and the Limits of Experience. [REVIEW] Synthese 140 (3):331-353.score: 24.0
    I. Introduction “We can and do see the truth about many things: ourselves, others, trees and animals, clouds and rivers—in the immediacy of experience.”1 Absent from Bas van Fraassen’s list of those things we see are paramecia and mitochondria. We do not see such things, van Fraassen has long maintained, because they are unobservable, that is, they are undetectable by means of the unaided senses.2 But notice that these two notions—what we can see in the “immediacy” of experience (...)
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