Search results for 'Agnosia*' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Austen Clark, Review of Martha Farah, Visual Agnosia. [REVIEW]score: 12.0
    Common sense says that visual agnosia is impossible. It ought not exist. If an object like a safety pin or a bar of white soap is in full view, you see it, and you know what a "safety pin" or a "bar of soap" is, then you cannot fail to recognize what you see. If you identify the safety pin as "something silver and shiny like a watch or a nail clipper," or you identify the bar of white soap as (...)
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  2. Ferdinand Binkofski, Kathrin Reetz & Annabelle Blangero (2007). Tactile Agnosia and Tactile Apraxia: Cross Talk Between the Action and Perception Streams in the Anterior Intraparietal Area. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):201-202.score: 12.0
    In the haptic domain, a double dissociation can be proposed on the basis of neurological deficits between tactile information for action, represented by tactile apraxia, and tactile information for perception, represented by tactile agnosia. We suggest that this dissociation comes from different networks, both involving the anterior intraparietal area of the posterior parietal cortex.
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  3. Daniel Bub & Cindy Bukach (2001). Limitations on Current Explanations of Category-Specific Agnosia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):479-480.score: 12.0
    The HIT framework accepts a number of assumptions that are widely held as plausible or even well established in the literature on category-specific agnosia. We point out that a number of these elementary conjectures, now almost taken for granted, have received little in the way of convincing empirical support.
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  4. Martha J. Farah (1990). Visual Agnosia: Disorders of Object Recognition and What They Tell Us About Normal Vision. MIT Press.score: 9.0
  5. Garry Young (2009). Case Study Evidence for an Irreducible Form of Knowing How To: An Argument Against a Reductive Epistemology. Philosophia 37 (2):341-360.score: 9.0
    Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished (...)
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  6. Rocco J. Gennaro, Visual Agnosia and Higher- Order Thought Theory.score: 9.0
    In general, the idea is that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation (HOR). A mental state M becomes conscious when there is a HOR of M. A HOR is a “meta-psychological” state, i.e. a mental state directed at another mental state. So, for example, my desire to do a good powerpoint presentation becomes conscious when I am (non-inferentially) “aware” of the desire. Intuitively, it seems that conscious states, as (...)
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  7. H. Chris Dijkerman, A. David Milner & D. P. Carey (1998). Grasping Spatial Relationships: Failure to Demonstrate Allocentric Visual Coding in a Patient with Visual Form Agnosia. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):424-437.score: 9.0
    The cortical visual mechanisms involved in processing spatial relationships remain subject to debate. According to one current view, the ''dorsal stream'' of visual areas, emanating from primary visual cortex and culminating in the posterior parietal cortex, mediates this aspect of visual processing. More recently, others have argued that while the dorsal stream provides egocentric coding of visual location for motor control, the separate ''ventral'' stream is needed for allocentric spatial coding. We have assessed the visual form agnosic patient DF, whose (...)
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  8. Shaun P. Vecera & K. S. Gilds (1997). What is It Like to Be a Patient with Apperceptive Agnosia? Consciousness and Cognition 6 (2-3):237-66.score: 9.0
  9. Martha J. Farah & Todd E. Feinberg (2000). Visual Object Agnosia. In Martha J. Farah & Todd E. Feinberg (eds.), Patient-Based Approaches to Cognitive Neuroscience. Mit Press. 117--122.score: 9.0
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  10. Russell M. Bauer & Tricia Zawacki (2000). Audit6rv Agnosia. In Martha J. Farah & Todd E. Feinberg (eds.), Patient-Based Approaches to Cognitive Neuroscience. Mit Press. 97.score: 9.0
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  11. J. A. M. Frederiks (1969). The Agnosias. In P. Vinken & G. Bruyn (eds.), Handbook of Clinical Neurology. North Holland. 4.score: 9.0
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  12. Glyn W. Humphreys, M. Jane Riddoch, N. Donnelly, T. Freeman, M. Boucart & H. M. Muller (1994). Intermediate Visual Processing and Visual Agnosia. In Martha J. Farah & G. Ratcliff (eds.), The Neuropsychology of High-Level Vision. Lawrence Erlbaum.score: 9.0
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  13. L. Roberts (1969). Aphasia, Apraxia and Agnosia in Abnormal States of Cerebral Dominance. In P. Vinken & G. Bruyn (eds.), Handbook of Clinical Neurology. North Holland. 4--312.score: 9.0
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  14. Christopher Mole (2013). Embodied Demonstratives: A Reply to Wu. Mind 122 (485):231-239.score: 6.0
    Although Wayne Wu correctly identifies a flaw in the way in which my 2009 article frames the debate about ‘zombie action’, he fails in his attempts to strengthen the case for thinking that our actions are under less conscious control than we usually imagine. His argument, like the arguments that my earlier paper addressed, can be blocked by allowing that an embodied demonstrative concept can contribute contents to a visual experience.
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  15. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.score: 6.0
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, (...)
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  16. Chris Tucker (2010). Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.score: 6.0
    Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemologists also object that dogmatism is absurdly permissive because it allows a seeming to (...)
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  17. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2000). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.score: 6.0
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to cognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, perceptual learning, and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, corresponding to what some people have called early vision, (...)
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  18. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Reasoning About the Mark of the Cognitive: A Response to Adams and Garrison. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines (2):1-11.score: 6.0
    I critically examine Adams and Garrison’s proposed necessary condition for the mark of the cognitive (Adams and Garrison in Minds Mach 23(3):339–352, 2013). After a brief presentation of their position, I argue not only that their proposal is in need of additional support, but also that it is too restrictive.
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  19. J. Campion, R. Latto & Y. Smith (1983). Is Blindsight an Effect of Scattered Light, Spared Cortex, and Near-Threshold Vision? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):423-86.score: 6.0
    Blindsight is the term commonly used to describe visually guided behaviour elicited by a stimulus falling within the scotoma (blind area) caused by a lesion of the striate cortex. Such is normally held to be unconscious and to be mediated by subcortical pathways involving the superior colliculus. Blindsight is of considerable theoretical importance since it suggests that destriate man is more like destriate monkey than had been previously believed and also because it supports the classical notion of two visual systems. (...)
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  20. Guido Gainotti & Camillo Marra (2011). Differential Contribution of Right and Left Temporo-Occipital and Anterior Temporal Lesions to Face Recognition Disorders. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 5.score: 6.0
  21. W. Alexander Escobar (2013). Quantized Visual Awareness. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 6.0
    The proposed model holds that, at its most fundamental level, visual awareness is quantized. That is to say that visual awareness arises as individual bits of awareness through the action of neural circuits with hundreds to thousands of neurons in at least the human striate cortex. Circuits with specific topologies will reproducibly result in visual awareness that correspond to basic aspects of vision like color, motion and depth. These quanta of awareness (qualia) are produced by the feedforward sweep that occurs (...)
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  22. Martha J. Farah & Todd E. Feinberg (2000). Disorders of Perception and Awareness. In Martha J. Farah & Todd E. Feinberg (eds.), Patient-Based Approaches to Cognitive Neuroscience. MIT Press.score: 6.0
     
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  23. Georgina M. Jackson, Tracy Shepherd, Sven C. Mueller, Masid Husain & Stephen R. Jackson (2006). Dorsal Simultanagnosia: An Impairment of Visual Processing or Visual Awareness? Cortex 42 (5):740-749.score: 6.0
     
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  24. David Poeppel (2001). Pure Word Deafness and the Bilateral Processing of the Speech Code. Cognitive Science 25 (5):679-693.score: 6.0
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  25. Wu-xia Yang, Jie Feng, Wan-Ting Huang, Cheng-Xiang Zhang & Yun Nan (2014). Perceptual Pitch Deficits Coexist with Pitch Production Difficulties in Music but Not Mandarin Speech. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 6.0
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  26. Berit Brogaard (2013). Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties? Philosophical Studies 162 (1):35 - 42.score: 3.0
    I respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. I conclude with a simple argument against the view that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience.
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  27. Christopher Mole (2009). Illusions, Demonstratives and the Zombie Action Hypothesis. Mind 118 (472):995-1011.score: 3.0
    David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, and the many psychologists and philosophers who have been influenced by their work, claim that ‘the visual system that gives us our visual experience of the world is not the same system that guides our movements in the world’. The arguments that have been offered for this surprising claim place considerable weight on two sources of evidence — visual form agnosia and the reaching behaviour of normal subjects when picking up objects that induce visual illusions. (...)
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  28. J. Smythies (1999). Consciousness: Some Basic Issues- a Neurophilosophical Perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):164-172.score: 3.0
    This paper concentrates on the basic properties of ''consciousness'' that temporal coding is postulated to relate to. A description of phenomenal consciousness based on what introspection tells us about its contents is offered. This includes a consideration of the effect of various brain lesions that result in cortical blindness, apperceptive and associative agnosia, and blindsight, together with an account of the manner in which sight is regained after cortical injuries. I then discuss two therories of perception-Direct Realism and the Representative (...)
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  29. Andrew Apter (1992). Depersonalization, the Experience of Prosthesis, and Our Cosmic Insignificance: The Experimental Phenomenology of an Altered State. Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):257-285.score: 3.0
    Psychogenic depersonalization is an altered mental state consisting of an unusual discontinuity in the phenomenological perception of personal being; the individual is engulfed by feelings of unreality, self-detachment and unfamiliarity in which the self is felt to lack subjective perspective and the intuitive feeling of personal embodiment. A new sub-feature of depersonalization is delineated. 'Prosthesis' consists in the thought that the thinker is a 'mere thing'. It is a subjectively realized sense of the specific and objective 'thingness' of the particular (...)
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