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Profile: Aidan McGlynn (University of Edinburgh)
  1. Aidan McGlynn (2014). Knowledge FIrst? Palgrave Macmillian.
    According to a tradition reaching back to Plato, questions about the nature of knowledge are to be answered by offering an analysis in terms of truth, belief, justification, and other factors presumed to be in some sense more basic than knowledge itself. In light of the apparent failure of this approach, knowledge first philosophy instead takes knowledge as the starting point in epistemology and related areas of the philosophies of language and mind. Knowledge cannot be analyzed in the traditional sense, (...)
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  2. Aidan McGlynn (2014). On Epistemic Alchemy. In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. 173-189.
    Crispin Wright has proposed that one has entitlements to accept certain propositions that play a foundational role within one’s body of belief. Such an entitlement is a kind of warrant that does not require the possessor to have acquired evidence speaking in favor of the proposition in question. The proposal allows Wright to concede much of the force of the most powerful arguments for scepticism, while avoiding the truly sceptical conclusion that one lacks warrant for most of one’s beliefs. Here (...)
     
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  3. Aidan McGlynn (2013). Believing Things Unknown. Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
  4. Aidan McGlynn (2013). Simon Prosser and François Recanati, Eds. , Immunity to Error Through Misidentification . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (4):318-321.
  5. Aidan McGlynn (2013). The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):72-75.
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  6. Aidan McGlynn (2012). Interpretation and Knowledge Maximization. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):391-405.
    Timothy Williamson has proposed that we should give a ‘knowledge first’ twist to David Lewis’s account of content, maintaining that for P to be the content of one’s belief is for P to be the content that would be attributed by an idealized interpreter working under certain constraints, and that the fundamental constraint on interpretation is a principle of knowledge maximization. According to this principle, an interpretation is correct to the extent that it maximizes the number of knowledgeable judgments the (...)
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  7. Aidan McGlynn (2012). Justification as 'Would-Be' Knowledge. Episteme 9 (4):361-376.
    In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. (...)
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  8. Aidan McGlynn (2012). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. By Peter Carruthers. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 456. Price £30.00.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):635-637.
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  9. Aidan McGlynn (2012). The Problem of True-True Counterfactuals. Analysis 72 (2):276-285.
    Early commentators on David Lewis's account of counterfactuals noted that certain examples suggest that some counterfactuals with true antecedents and true consequents are false. Lewis's account has the consequence that all such counterfactuals are true, leaving us to choose between explaining away our intuitions about the examples in question or offering an alternative to Lewis's account. Here I argue that a simple modification of the familiar Lewisian truth conditions yields the intuitively correct verdicts about these examples, and so we can (...)
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  10. Aidan McGlynn (2011). Review of Anthony Hatzimoysis (Ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.