Search results for 'Aim' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Daniel Whiting (2014). Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action. In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press
    Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerationsthe kind (...)of considerations which might speak in favour of or justify an action or decisionto speak in favour of or justify believing. This is puzzling; after all, practical considerations often seem far more important than matters of truth and falsity. In this paper, I suggest that one cannot explain this, as many have tried, merely by appeal to the idea that belief aims only at the truth. I appeal instead to the idea that the aim of belief is to provide only practical reasons which might form the basis on which to act and to make decisions, an aim which is in turn dictated by the aim of action. This, I argue, explains why subjects take only evidential considerations to favour of or justify believing. Surprisingly, then, it turns out that it is practical reason itself which demands that there be no practical reasons for belief. (shrink)
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  2. Luca Tambolo (2015). A Tale of Three Theories: Feyerabend and Popper on Progress and the Aim of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51:33-41.
    In this paper, three theories of progress and the aim of science are discussed: the theory of progress as increasing explanatory power, advocated by Popper in The (...)
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  3.  31
    Charles Côté-Bouchard (forthcoming). Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity? Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According (...)
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  4. Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
    It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief 's aim (...)
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  5. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Evolutionary Epistemology and the Aim of Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):209-225.
    Both Popper and van Fraassen have used evolutionary analogies to defend their views on the aim of science, although these are diametrically opposed. By employing Price's (...)equation in an illustrative capacity, this paper considers which view is better supported. It shows that even if our observations and experimental results are reliable, an evolutionary analogy fails to demonstrate why conjecture and refutation should result in: (1) the isolation of true theories; (2) successive generations of theories of increasing truth-likeness; (3) empirically adequate theories; or (4) successive generations of theories of increasing proximity to empirical adequacy. Furthermore, it illustrates that appeals to induction do not appear to help. It concludes that an evolutionary analogy is only sufficient to defend the notion that the aim of science is to isolate a particular class of false theories, namely those that are empirically inadequate. (shrink)
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  6. Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen Part Three: Einstein, Aim-Oriented Empiricism and the Discovery of Special and General Relativity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):275-305.
    In this paper I show that Einstein made essential use of aim-oriented empiricism in scientific practice in developing special and general relativity. I conclude by considering (...)to what extent Einstein came explicitly to advocate aim-oriented empiricism in his later years. (shrink)
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  7. Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):181-239.
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere[1], is a kind of (...) synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve. [Back to Top]. (shrink)
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  8. Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):181-239.
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere, is a kind of (...)synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve. (shrink)
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  9.  95
    Timothy Chan (ed.) (2013). The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    What is belief? "Beliefs aim at truth" is the commonly accepted starting point for philosophers who want to give an adequate account of this fundamental state (...) of mind, but it raises as many questions as it answers. For example, in what sense can beliefs be said to have an aim of their own? If belief aims at truth, does it mean that reasons to believe must also be based on truth? Must beliefs be formed on the basis of evidence alone? Is truth the constitutive norm of belief? Does aiming at truth bring in a normative dimension to the nature of belief? How can the aim of truth guide the formation of our beliefs? In what ways do partial beliefs aim at truth? Is truth the aim of epistemic justification? Last but not least, is it knowledge rather than truth which is the fundamental aim of belief? -/- In recent years, pursuing these questions has proved extremely fertile for our understanding of a wide range of current issues in philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, and meta-ethics. The Aim of Belief is the first book to be devoted to this fast-growing topic. It brings together eleven newly commissioned essays by leading authors on the aim of belief. -/- Contributors: Jonathan Adler, Krister Bykvist, Timothy Chan, Pascal Engel, Kathrin Glüer, Anandi Hattiangadi, Michael Hicks, Paul Horwich, David Papineau, Andrew Reisner, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Ralph Wedgwood, Åsa Wikforss, Daniel Whiting. (shrink)
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  10. Masahiro Yamada (2012). Taking Aim at the Truth. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.
    One prominent feature of belief is that a belief cannot be formed at will. This paper argues that the best explanation of this fact is that belief (...)
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  11. Nicholas Maxwell (2009). Muller's Critique of the Argument for Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):103-114.
    For over 30 years I have argued that we need to construe science as accepting a metaphysical proposition concerning the comprehensibility of the universe. In a recent (...)
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  12. Nicholas Maxwell, Aim-Oriented Empiricism: David Miller's Critique. PhilSci Archive.
    For three decades I have expounded and defended aim-oriented empiricism, a view of science which, l claim, solves a number of problems in the philosophy of (...)science and has important implications for science itself and, when generalized, for the whole of academic inquiry, and for our capacity to solve our current global problems. Despite these claims, the view has received scant attention from philosophers of science. Recently, however, David Miller has criticized the view. Millers criticisms are, however, not valid. (shrink)
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  13. Ralph Wedgwood (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.
    It is often said, metaphorically, that belief "aims" at the truth. This paper proposes a normative interpretation of this metaphor. First, the notion of "epistemic norms" is (...)
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  14. David J. Owens (2003). Does Belief Have an Aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
    The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) (...)
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  15. NicK Treanor (2014). Trivial Truths and the Aim of Inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):552-559.
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  16.  41
    N. Maxwell, Whats Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?
    For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions (...) for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, the conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for aim-oriented empiricism are subjected to critical scrutiny. (shrink)
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  17. Daniel Whiting (2013). Truth: the Aim and Norm of Belief. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):121-136.
    Invited contribution to The Aim of Belief, a special issue of Teorema, guest-edited by J. Zalabardo.
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  18. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013). Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press
    A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to (...)
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  19. David Plunkett (2013). Legal Positivism and the Moral Aim Thesis. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (3):563-605.
    According to Scott Shapiros Moral Aim Thesis, it is an essential feature of the law that it has a moral aim. In short, for Shapiro, this (...)means that the law has the constitutive aim of providing morally good solutions to morally significant social problems in cases where other, less formal ways of guiding the activity of agents wont work. In this article, I argue that legal positivists should reject the Moral Aim Thesis. In short, I argue that although there are versions of the Moral Aim Thesis that are arguably compatible with legal positivism, all of the different ways of making it compatible face serious philosophical difficulties. Following a discussion of what these difficulties are, I provide an alternative to the Moral Aim Thesis, a thesis that I call theRepresented-as-Moral Thesis’. This thesis avoids the problems that I raise for the Moral Aim Thesis and better resonates with some of the core intuitions behind legal positivism. Furthermore, a version of Shapiros Planning Theory of Law that is developed with the Represented-as-Moral Thesis (as opposed to the Moral Aim Thesis) can explain all of the things that Shapiro uses the Moral Aim Thesis to explain. (shrink)
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  20. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013). Transparency, Doxastic Norms, and the Aim of Belief. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32.
    Many philosophers have sought to account for doxastic and epistemic norms by supposing that beliefaims at truth.’ A central challenge for this approach is to articulate (...)
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  21. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2006). No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
    Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between (...)
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  22. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2009). Weighing the Aim of Belief. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.
    The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised (...)
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  23. Peter J. Graham (2011). Does Justification Aim at Truth? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.
    Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer 'Yes'; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. (...)In 'The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism' they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. 'Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding' of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no 'connection to the truth.' A 'truth-aimed ... epistemology is not entitled to carry the day' (C&P 2004, 138, emphasis added).Pollock and Cruz's argument for this surprising conclusion is of general interest for it is 'out of step with a very common view on the .. (shrink)
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  24.  94
    Conor Mchugh (2011). What Do We Aim At When We Believe? Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.
    It is often said that belief aims at truth. I argue that if belief has an aim then that aim is knowledge rather than merely truth. My (...)
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  25.  55
    Agnes Bolinska (2013). Epistemic Representation, Informativeness and the Aim of Faithful Representation. Synthese 190 (2):219-234.
    In this paper, I take scientific models to be epistemic representations of their target systems. I define an epistemic representation to be a tool for gaining information (...)
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  26. Nicholas Maxwell (2015). Whats Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism? Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 3 (2):5-31.
    For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions (...) for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for aim-oriented empiricism are subjected to critical scrutiny. (shrink)
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  27. Nicholas Maxwell (2012). Wisdom: Object of Study or Basic Aim of Inquiry?,. In Michel Ferrari & N. Weststrate (eds.), The Scientific Study of Personal Wisdom. Springer
    We face severe global problems, many that we have inadvertently created ourselves. It is clear that there is an urgent need for more wisdom. One response is (...)
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  28.  88
    Bart Streumer (2013). Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World? Ratio 26 (4):450-470.
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that (...)
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  29. Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen: Part Two: Aim-Oriented Empiricism and Scientific Essentialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101.
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism provides decisive grounds for accepting scientific realism and rejecting instrumentalism. But it goes further than this. Aim-oriented empiricism (...) implies that physicalism is a central part of current (conjectural) scientific knowledge. Furthermore, we can and need, I argue, to interpret fundamental physical theories as attributing necessitating physical properties to fundamental physical entities. (shrink)
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  30.  35
    Thaddeus Metz (2016). The Proper Aim of Therapy: Subjective Well-Being, Objective Goodness, or a Meaningful Life? In Alexander Batthyany, Pninit Russo-Netzer & Stefan Schulenberg (eds.), Clinical Perspectives on Meaning: Positive and Existential Psychotherapy. Springer
    Therapists and related theorists and practitioners of mental health tend to hold one of two broad views about how to help patients. On the one hand, some (...)
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  31.  11
    Yann Allard‐Tremblay (2016). Divide and Rule Better: On Subsidiarity, Legitimacy and the Epistemic Aim of Political DecisionMaking. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (2):n/a-n/a.
    How should a political society be structured so as to legitimately distribute political power? One principle advanced to answer this question is the principle of subsidiarity. According (...)
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  32.  99
    Nicholas Maxwell (2007). Aim-Oriented Empiricism Since 1984. In From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities. Pentire Press
    This chapter outlines improvements and developments made to aim-oriented empiricism since "From Knowledge to Wisdom" was first published in 1984. It argues that aim-oriented (...)empiricism enables us to solve three fundamental problems in the philosophy of science: the problems of induction and verisimilitude, and the problem of what it means to say of a physical theory that it is unified. (shrink)
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  33. Martijn Boot (2012). The Aim of a Theory of Justice. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):7-21.
    Amartya Sen argues that for the advancement of justice identification ofperfectjustice is neither necessary nor sufficient. He replacesperfectjustice with comparative justice. Comparative justice (...)
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  34. Matthew Chrisman (2010). The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth. In James O.’Shea Eric Rubenstein (ed.), elf, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co.
    Davidson, Rorty, and Rosenberg each reject, for similar reasons, the idea that truth is the aim of belief and the goal of inquiry. Rosenberg provides the most (...)
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  35. Nicholas Maxwell (1974). The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part II: An Aim Oriented Theory of Scientific Discovery. Philosophy of Science 41 (3):247-295.
    In Part I (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41 No.2, June, 1974) it was argued that in order to rebut Humean sceptical arguments, and thus show that (...)it is possible for pure science to be rational, we need to reject standard empiricism and adopt in its stead aim oriented empiricism. Part II seeks to articulate in more detail a theory of rational scientific discovery within the general framework of aim oriented empiricism. It is argued that this theory (a) exhibits pure science as a rational enterprise (b) enables us to resolve problems associated with the key notions of simplicity and intelligibility (c) has important implications both for philosophy of science and for scientific practice itself. (shrink)
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  36.  13
    Lynne S. Wolbert, Doret J. De Ruyter & Anders Schinkel (2015). Formal Criteria for the Concept of Human Flourishing: the First Step in Defending Flourishing as an Ideal Aim of Education. Ethics and Education 10 (1):118-129.
    Human flourishing is the topic of an increasing number of books and articles in educational philosophy. Flourishing should be regarded as an ideal aim of education. If (...)
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  37. Howard Sankey (2000). Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science. In Howard Sankey & Robert Nola (eds.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method.
    There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for (...)
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  38.  59
    Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2005). Hurley on Egalitarianism and the Luck-Neutralizing Aim. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2):249-265.
    s admirable new book, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge , brings together recent developments in the fields of responsibility and egalitarian justice. This article focuses on Hurley’s (...)critique of luck-neutralizing egalitarianism. The article concludes that the bad-luck-neutralizing aim serves better as a justificatory basis for egalitarianism than the more general luck-neutralizing aim. Since the former does not simply assume that we should aim for equality, Hurley has not demonstrated (nor indeed does she claim to have shown) that this concern cannot form the justificatory basis of egalitarianism in a non-question-begging way. This, however, does not detract from the fact that Hurley’s book provides a very insightful discussion of the relationship between luck and justice. Key Words: Hurley • Dworkin • Cohen • luck • justice • egalitarianism. (shrink)
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  39.  11
    Ward E. Jones (2015). Wisdom as an Aim of Higher Education. Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):1-15.
    IntroductionA central concern of theoretical speculation about education is the kind of epistemic states that education can and should aim to achieve. One such epistemic state, long (...)
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  40.  81
    David Bronstein (2012). The Origin and Aim of Posterior Analytics II.19. Phronesis 57 (1):29-62.
    Abstract In Posterior Analytics II.19 Aristotle raises and answers the question, how do first principles become known? The usual view is that the question asks about (...)the process or method by which we learn principles and that his answer is induction. I argue that the question asks about the original prior knowledge from which principles become known and that his answer is perception. Hence the aim of II.19 is not to explain how we get all the way to principles but to defend the claim that our knowledge of them originates in perception. Aristotle explains how we learn principles earlier in book II, in his account of definitional inquiry. In II.19 he explains how we reach by induction the preliminary accounts necessary for such inquiries. (shrink)
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  41. Anastasios Brenner, Paul Needham, David Stump & Robert Deltete (2011). New Perspectives on Pierre Duhem's The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Metascience 20 (1):1-25.
    New perspectives on Pierre Duhems The aim and structure of physical theory Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9467-3 Authors Anastasios Brenner, Department of (...)
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  42.  14
    Hamid Vahid (2016). The Aim of Justification and Epistemic Difference-Making Principles. Acta Analytica 31 (1):11-29.
    The idea that truth is the aim of justification is one that is often defended by theorists who uphold different views about the nature of epistemic justification. (...)
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  43.  9
    Simon D'Alfonso (forthcoming). Belief Merging with the Aim of Truthlikeness. Synthese:1-22.
    The merging/fusion of belief/data collections in propositional logic form is a topic that has received due attention within the domains of database and AI research. A (...) distinction can be made between two types of scenarios to which the process of merging can be applied. In the first type, the collections represent preferences, such as the voting choices of a group of people, that need to be aggregated so as to give a consistent result that in some way best represents the collective judgement of the group. In the second type, the collections represent factual data that is to be aggregated with an aim of obtaining a result that maximises factual correctness. After introducing a general framework for belief merging via some prominent literature on the topic, this paper then introduces and considers a method for belief merging with the second type of scenario in mind. Its suitability is corroborated by demonstrating how it can be seen as a special case of a merging procedure that combines aggregation of probabilities and maximisation of expected truthlikeness. (shrink)
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  44.  21
    Itay Shani (2011). Aim That Bow! An Interactivist Gaze at the Problem of Intentional Tracking. Axiomathes 21 (1):67-97.
    In this essay I offer a theory of the outward directedness of intentional states, namely, an account of what makes intentional states directed at their respective intentional (...)
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  45.  38
    Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):181-239.
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere, is a kind of (...)synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve. (shrink)
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  46.  55
    Thaddeus Metz (2013). Meaning in Life as the Aim of Psychotherapy: A Hypothesis. In Joshua Hicks & Clay Routledge (eds.), The Experience of Meaning in Life: Classical Perspectives, Emerging Themes, and Controversies. Springer 405-17.
    The point of psychotherapy has occasionally been associated with talk oflifes meaning’. However, the literature on meaning in life written by contemporary philosophers has yet (...)to be systematically applied to literature on the point of psychotherapy. My broad aim in this chapter is to indicate some plausible ways to merge these two tracks of material that have run in parallel up to now. More specifically, my hunch is that the connection between meaning as philosophers understand it and therapy as psychotherapists ought to practice it is much closer than is suggested by the field of existential psychotherapy, which expressly addresses the topic of lifes meaning and appeals to ideas from classic philosophers such Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and the like. I instead proffer the claim that psychodynamic and humanistic therapy, clinical psychology, and counselling psychology as such, not a particular branch of them, are best understood as enterprises in search of meaning in life, in the way many present-day philosophers understand this phrase. In this chapter, I spell out what I mean by this bold hypothesis and provide some good reason to take it seriously. (shrink)
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  47.  65
    I. A. Kieseppä (1996). On the Aim of the Theory of Verisimilitude. Synthese 107 (3):421 - 438.
    J. P. Z. Bonilla's methodological approach to truthlikeness is evaluated critically. On a more general level, various senses in which the theory of truthlikeness could be (...)seen as a theory concerned with methodology are distinguished, and it is argued that providing speical sciences with methodological tools is unrealistic as an aim of the theory of verisimilitude. Rather, when developing this theory, one should rest contnet with the more modest aim of conceptual analysis, or of providing explications for the relational concept of being closer to the truth. In addition, some remarks will be made on the difficulties which the similarity approach to truthlikeness has in realizing this aim and which are caused by the important role that Hintikka's constituents have in it. (shrink)
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  48.  51
    Karl Popper (1992). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery. Routledge.
    Realism and the Aim of Science is one of the three volumes of Karl Poppers Postscript to the Logic of scientific Discovery. The Postscript is the (...)culmination of Poppers work in the philosophy of physics and a new famous attack on subjectivist approaches to philosophy of science. Realism and the Aim of Science is the first volume of the Postcript . Popper here formulates and explains his non-justificationist theory of knowledge: science aims at true explanatory theories, yet it can never prove, or justify, any theory to be true, not even if is a true theory. Science must continue to question and criticise all its theories, even those that happen to be true. Realism and the Aim of Science presents Poppers mature statement on scientific knowledge and offers important insights into his thinking on problems of method within science. (shrink)
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  49.  27
    Hamid Vahid (2003). Truth and the Aim of Epistemic Justification. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):83-91.
    Any theory of epistemic justification must address the question of what its aim is and why we value it. The almost general consensus among epistemologists is that (...)
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  50.  11
    Anders Kraal (2013). Anglicanism, Scottish Presbyterianism, and the Irreligious Aim of Humes Treatise. Hume Studies 39 (2):169-196.
    According to Paul Russells irreligious interpretation of Humes Treatise, the aim of the Treatise is to discreditChristian theologygenerically construed. In this paper, I argue (...) that in seeking to discredit Christian theology in the Treatise, Hume uses an early eighteenth-century Anglican version of Christian theology rather thanChristian theologyin a generic sense as his theological paradigm. Taking Humes attacks onhidden powersandthe liberty of indifferenceas test-cases, I show that whereas Humes views on these topics are subversive of the Anglican theology of his day, they are not subversive of other major forms of Christian theology that were current at the time, including the Calvinist theology of the Kirk of Scotland. If this is right, then the immediate theological target of Humes Treatise should be deemed narrower than Russells irreligious interpretation takes it to be. (shrink)
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