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  1. Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):181-239.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere, is a kind of (...)synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve. (shrink)
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  2. Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen Part Three: Einstein, Aim-Oriented Empiricism and the Discovery of Special and General Relativity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):275-305.score: 18.0
    In this paper I show that Einstein made essential use of aim-oriented empiricism in scientific practice in developing special and general relativity. I conclude by considering (...)to what extent Einstein came explicitly to advocate aim-oriented empiricism in his later years. (shrink)
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  3. Daniel Whiting (2014). Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action. In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerationsthe kind (...)of considerations which might speak in favour of or justify an action or decisionto speak in favour of or justify believing. This is puzzling; after all, practical considerations often seem far more important than matters of truth and falsity. In this paper, I suggest that one cannot explain this, as many have tried, merely by appeal to the idea that belief aims only at the truth. I appeal instead to the idea that the aim of belief is to provide only practical reasons which might form the basis on which to act and to make decisions, an aim which is in turn dictated by the aim of action. This, I argue, explains why subjects take only evidential considerations to favour of or justify believing. Surprisingly, then, it turns out that it is practical reason itself which demands that there be no practical reasons for belief. (shrink)
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  4. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Evolutionary Epistemology and the Aim of Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):209-225.score: 18.0
    Both Popper and van Fraassen have used evolutionary analogies to defend their views on the aim of science, although these are diametrically opposed. By employing Price's (...)equation in an illustrative capacity, this paper considers which view is better supported. It shows that even if our observations and experimental results are reliable, an evolutionary analogy fails to demonstrate why conjecture and refutation should result in: (1) the isolation of true theories; (2) successive generations of theories of increasing truth-likeness; (3) empirically adequate theories; or (4) successive generations of theories of increasing proximity to empirical adequacy. Furthermore, it illustrates that appeals to induction do not appear to help. It concludes that an evolutionary analogy is only sufficient to defend the notion that the aim of science is to isolate a particular class of false theories, namely those that are empirically inadequate. (shrink)
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  5. Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.score: 18.0
    It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief's aim (...)explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief's standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative. (shrink)
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  6. Masahiro Yamada (2012). Taking Aim at the Truth. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.score: 18.0
    One prominent feature of belief is that a belief cannot be formed at will. This paper argues that the best explanation of this fact is that belief (...)
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  7. Nicholas Maxwell, Aim-Oriented Empiricism: David Miller's Critique. PhilSci Archive.score: 18.0
    For three decades I have expounded and defended aim-oriented empiricism, a view of science which, l claim, solves a number of problems in the philosophy of (...)science and has important implications for science itself and, when generalized, for the whole of academic inquiry, and for our capacity to solve our current global problems. Despite these claims, the view has received scant attention from philosophers of science. Recently, however, David Miller has criticized the view. Millers criticisms are, however, not valid. (shrink)
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  8. Nicholas Maxwell (2009). Muller's Critique of the Argument for Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):103-114.score: 18.0
    For over 30 years I have argued that we need to construe science as accepting a metaphysical proposition concerning the comprehensibility of the universe. In a recent (...)
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  9. Timothy Chan (ed.) (2013). The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    What is belief? "Beliefs aim at truth" is the commonly accepted starting point for philosophers who want to give an adequate account of this fundamental state (...) of mind, but it raises as many questions as it answers. For example, in what sense can beliefs be said to have an aim of their own? If belief aims at truth, does it mean that reasons to believe must also be based on truth? Must beliefs be formed on the basis of evidence alone? Is truth the constitutive norm of belief? Does aiming at truth bring in a normative dimension to the nature of belief? How can the aim of truth guide the formation of our beliefs? In what ways do partial beliefs aim at truth? Is truth the aim of epistemic justification? Last but not least, is it knowledge rather than truth which is the fundamental aim of belief? -/- In recent years, pursuing these questions has proved extremely fertile for our understanding of a wide range of current issues in philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, and meta-ethics. The Aim of Belief is the first book to be devoted to this fast-growing topic. It brings together eleven newly commissioned essays by leading authors on the aim of belief. -/- Contributors: Jonathan Adler, Krister Bykvist, Timothy Chan, Pascal Engel, Kathrin Glüer, Anandi Hattiangadi, Michael Hicks, Paul Horwich, David Papineau, Andrew Reisner, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Ralph Wedgwood, Åsa Wikforss, Daniel Whiting. (shrink)
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  10. Ralph Wedgwood (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):267-97.score: 16.0
    It is often said, metaphorically, that belief "aims" at the truth. This paper proposes a normative interpretation of this metaphor. First, the notion of "epistemic (...)
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  11. David J. Owens (2003). Does Belief Have an Aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.score: 16.0
    The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) (...)
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  12. Nick Treanor (2012). Trivial Truths and the Aim of Inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.score: 15.0
  13. Timothy Chan (2013). Introduction: Aiming at Truth. In , The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. 1-16.score: 15.0
    In this introductory chapter to the volume The Aim of Belief, the editor surveys the fundamental questions in current debates surrounding the aim of belief, and identifies (...)
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  14. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2009). Weighing the Aim of Belief. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395 - 405.score: 14.0
    The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised (...)
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  15. Nicholas Maxwell (2007). Aim-Oriented Empiricism Since 1984. In , From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities. Pentire Press.score: 14.0
    This chapter outlines improvements and developments made to aim-oriented empiricism since "From Knowledge to Wisdom" was first published in 1984. It argues that aim-oriented (...)empiricism enables us to solve three fundamental problems in the philosophy of science: the problems of induction and verisimilitude, and the problem of what it means to say of a physical theory that it is unified. (shrink)
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  16. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013). Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 13.0
    A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to (...)
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  17. Peter J. Graham (2011). Does Justification Aim at Truth? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.score: 12.0
    Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer 'Yes'; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. (...)In 'The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism' they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. 'Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding' of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no 'connection to the truth.' A 'truth-aimed ... epistemology is not entitled to carry the day' (C&P 2004, 138, emphasis added).Pollock and Cruz's argument for this surprising conclusion is of general interest for it is 'out of step with a very common view on the .. (shrink)
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  18. Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen: Part Two: Aim-Oriented Empiricism and Scientific Essentialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101.score: 12.0
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism provides decisive grounds for accepting scientific realism and rejecting instrumentalism. But it goes further than this. Aim-oriented empiricism (...) implies that physicalism is a central part of current (conjectural) scientific knowledge. Furthermore, we can and need, I argue, to interpret fundamental physical theories as attributing necessitating physical properties to fundamental physical entities. (shrink)
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  19. Andrew Reisner (2013). Leaps of Knowledge. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. OUP. 167-183.score: 12.0
    This paper argues that both a limited doxastic voluntarism and anti-evidentialism are consistent with the views that the aim of belief is truth or knowledge and (...)that this aim plays an important role in norm-setting for beliefs. More cautiously, it argues that limited doxastic voluntarism is (or would be) a useful capacity for agents concerned with truth tracking to possess, and that having it would confer some straightforward benefits of both an epistemic and non-epistemic variety to an agent concerned with truth tracking. (shrink)
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  20. Nicholas Maxwell (2012). Wisdom: Object of Study or Basic Aim of Inquiry?,. In Michel Ferrari & N. Weststrate (eds.), The Scientific Study of Personal Wisdom. Springer.score: 12.0
    We face severe global problems, many that we have inadvertently created ourselves. It is clear that there is an urgent need for more wisdom. One response is (...)
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  21. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming). Transparency, Doxastic Norms, and the Aim of Belief. Teorema.score: 12.0
    Many philosophers have sought to account for doxastic and epistemic norms by supposing that beliefaims at truth.’ A central challenge for this approach is to articulate (...)
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  22. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2006). No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.score: 12.0
    Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between (...)
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  23. Matthew Chrisman (2010). The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth. In James O.’Shea Eric Rubenstein (ed.), elf, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co..score: 12.0
    Davidson, Rorty, and Rosenberg each reject, for similar reasons, the idea that truth is the aim of belief and the goal of inquiry. Rosenberg provides the most (...)
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  24. Nicholas Maxwell, Whats Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?score: 12.0
    For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions (...) for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for aim-oriented empiricism are subjected to critical scrutiny. (shrink)
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  25. Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.score: 12.0
    Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue (...) that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395405, 2009), who claims that exclusivity is in fact compatible with beliefs genuinely having an aim. I argue, based on consideration of what is involved in pursuing an aim, that Steglich-Petersens reply fails. I suggest that the defender of the idea that belief has an aim should instead reject the claim of exclusivity, and I sketch how this can be done. (shrink)
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  26. Martijn Boot (2012). The Aim of a Theory of Justice. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):7-21.score: 12.0
    Amartya Sen argues that for the advancement of justice identification ofperfectjustice is neither necessary nor sufficient. He replacesperfectjustice with comparative justice. Comparative justice (...)
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  27. Anastasios Brenner, Paul Needham, David Stump & Robert Deltete (2011). New Perspectives on Pierre Duhem's The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Metascience 20 (1):1-25.score: 12.0
    New perspectives on Pierre Duhems The aim and structure of physical theory Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9467-3 Authors Anastasios Brenner, Department of (...)
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  28. Daniel Whiting (2013). Truth: the Aim and Norm of Belief. Teorema 32 (3):121-136.score: 12.0
    Invited contribution to The Aim of Belief, a special issue of Teorema, guest-edited by J. Zalabardo.
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  29. Conor Mchugh (2011). What Do We Aim At When We Believe? Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.score: 12.0
    It is often said that belief aims at truth. I argue that if belief has an aim then that aim is knowledge rather than merely truth. My (...)
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  30. Nicholas Maxwell (1974). The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part II: An Aim Oriented Theory of Scientific Discovery. Philosophy of Science 41 (3):247-295.score: 12.0
    In Part I (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41 No.2, June, 1974) it was argued that in order to rebut Humean sceptical arguments, and thus show that (...)it is possible for pure science to be rational, we need to reject standard empiricism and adopt in its stead aim oriented empiricism. Part II seeks to articulate in more detail a theory of rational scientific discovery within the general framework of aim oriented empiricism. It is argued that this theory (a) exhibits pure science as a rational enterprise (b) enables us to resolve problems associated with the key notions of simplicity and intelligibility (c) has important implications both for philosophy of science and for scientific practice itself. (shrink)
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  31. Howard Sankey (2000). Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science. In Howard Sankey & Robert Nola (eds.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method.score: 12.0
    There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for (...)
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  32. Bart Streumer (2013). Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World? Ratio 26 (4):450-470.score: 12.0
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that (...)
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  33. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2005). Hurley on Egalitarianism and the Luck-Neutralizing Aim. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2):249-265.score: 12.0
    s admirable new book, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge , brings together recent developments in the fields of responsibility and egalitarian justice. This article focuses on Hurley’s (...)critique of luck-neutralizing egalitarianism. The article concludes that the bad-luck-neutralizing aim serves better as a justificatory basis for egalitarianism than the more general luck-neutralizing aim. Since the former does not simply assume that we should aim for equality, Hurley has not demonstrated (nor indeed does she claim to have shown) that this concern cannot form the justificatory basis of egalitarianism in a non-question-begging way. This, however, does not detract from the fact that Hurley’s book provides a very insightful discussion of the relationship between luck and justice. Key Words: Hurley • Dworkin • Cohen • luck • justice • egalitarianism. (shrink)
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  34. Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof (2013). A Defence of Owens' Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457.score: 12.0
    In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersens response to OwensExclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to (...)
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  35. David Bronstein (2012). The Origin and Aim of Posterior Analytics II.19. Phronesis 57 (1):29-62.score: 12.0
    Abstract In Posterior Analytics II.19 Aristotle raises and answers the question, how do first principles become known? The usual view is that the question asks about (...)the process or method by which we learn principles and that his answer is induction. I argue that the question asks about the original prior knowledge from which principles become known and that his answer is perception. Hence the aim of II.19 is not to explain how we get all the way to principles but to defend the claim that our knowledge of them originates in perception. Aristotle explains how we learn principles earlier in book II, in his account of definitional inquiry. In II.19 he explains how we reach by induction the preliminary accounts necessary for such inquiries. (shrink)
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  36. Thaddeus Metz (2013). Meaning in Life as the Aim of Psychotherapy: A Hypothesis. In Joshua Hicks & Clay Routledge (eds.), The Experience of Meaning in Life: Classical Perspectives, Emerging Themes, and Controversies. Springer. 405-17.score: 12.0
    The point of psychotherapy has occasionally been associated with talk oflifes meaning’. However, the literature on meaning in life written by contemporary philosophers has yet (...)to be systematically applied to literature on the point of psychotherapy. My broad aim in this chapter is to indicate some plausible ways to merge these two tracks of material that have run in parallel up to now. More specifically, my hunch is that the connection between meaning as philosophers understand it and therapy as psychotherapists ought to practice it is much closer than is suggested by the field of existential psychotherapy, which expressly addresses the topic of lifes meaning and appeals to ideas from classic philosophers such Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and the like. I instead proffer the claim that psychodynamic and humanistic therapy, clinical psychology, and counselling psychology as such, not a particular branch of them, are best understood as enterprises in search of meaning in life, in the way many present-day philosophers understand this phrase. In this chapter, I spell out what I mean by this bold hypothesis and provide some good reason to take it seriously. (shrink)
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  37. Anna Edmonds, Abandoning the Truth Aim a Reevaluation of the Aim of Belief and the Goal of Cognition.score: 12.0
    Part 2 Truth and the Aim of the Cognitive System: The Sub-personal Level 36 2.1 Truth and Justification: Externalist Truth-Conducive Accounts 40 2.2 Are (...)cognizers better off having true beliefs? (shrink)
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  38. Agnes Bolinska (2013). Epistemic Representation, Informativeness and the Aim of Faithful Representation. Synthese 190 (2):219-234.score: 12.0
    In this paper, I take scientific models to be epistemic representations of their target systems. I define an epistemic representation to be a tool for gaining information (...)
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  39. I. A. Kieseppä (1996). On the Aim of the Theory of Verisimilitude. Synthese 107 (3):421 - 438.score: 12.0
    J. P. Z. Bonilla's methodological approach to truthlikeness is evaluated critically. On a more general level, various senses in which the theory of truthlikeness could be (...)seen as a theory concerned with methodology are distinguished, and it is argued that providing speical sciences with methodological tools is unrealistic as an aim of the theory of verisimilitude. Rather, when developing this theory, one should rest contnet with the more modest aim of conceptual analysis, or of providing explications for the relational concept of being closer to the truth. In addition, some remarks will be made on the difficulties which the similarity approach to truthlikeness has in realizing this aim and which are caused by the important role that Hintikka's constituents have in it. (shrink)
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  40. Jochen Briesen (2014). Pictorial Art and Epistemic Aims. In Harald Klinke (ed.), Art Theory as Visual Epistemology. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 11-28.score: 12.0
    The question whether art is of any epistemic value is an old question in the philosophy of art. Whereas many contemporary artists, art-critics, and art-historians answer (...) this question affirmatively, many contemporary philosophers remain skeptical. If art is of epistemic significance, they maintain, then it has to contribute to our quest of achieving our most basic epistemic aim, namely knowledge.Unfortunately, recent and widely accepted analyses of knowledge make it very hard to see how art might significantly contribute to the quest of achieving this aim. Hence, by the lights of recent epistemology, it is questionable whether art is of any epistemic value. In order to hold on to the epistemic value of art, one has three options: (a) reject the recent analyses of knowledge that make the epistemic value of art questionable, (b) accept the recent analyses of knowledge but argue that they are compatible with the epistemic value of art, or (c) find another epistemic aim (besides knowledge) and show that art is of significant help in achieving this aim. In this paper I will argue that, at least with respect to pictorial art, option (c) seems promising. By reconsidering some basic insights and ideas from Nelson Goodman we can identify (objective) understanding as an epistemic aim to which pictorial art makes a significant contribution. (shrink)
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  41. Brad Hooker (1992). Parfit's Arguments for the Present-Aim Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):61 – 75.score: 12.0
    This paper has been about the question of what there is most reason to doin situations in which either there are no moral considerations to be takeninto (...)
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  42. Itay Shani (2011). Aim That Bow! An Interactivist Gaze at the Problem of Intentional Tracking. Axiomathes 21 (1):67-97.score: 12.0
    In this essay I offer a theory of the outward directedness of intentional states, namely, an account of what makes intentional states directed at their respective intentional (...)
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  43. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2008). Discrimination and the Aim of Proportional Representation. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (2):159-182.score: 12.0
    Many organizations, companies, and so on are committed to certain representational aims as regards the composition of their workforce. One motivation for such aims is the assumption (...)
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  44. Adi Ophir (2001). How to Take Aim at the Heart of the Present and Remain Analytic. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (3):401 – 415.score: 12.0
    In his famous lecture on Kant's essay 'An Answer to the Question What is Enlightenment' Foucault distinguished between two traditions in modern philosophy coming out of (...)Kant's work: 'an analytic of truth' and 'an ontology of present reality [ actualité ]' or 'a genealogy of ourselves'. The paper presents this distinction as a fruitful displacement of the distinction between 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophy,which gives the latter precise cultural and philosophical meaning. The paper clarifies the distinction and argues that almost without exception, analytic philosophers are not interested -in their capacity as philosophers - in interpreting and understanding their historical present. Some possible reasons and some possible consequences of this lack of interest are examined briefly. Within the continental tradition itself, two major contemporary forms of 'an ontology of present reality' are distinguished, one exemplified by Habermas and the other by Foucault. The difference between these two forms of 'taking aim at the heart of the present' (to use Habermas' phrase) is explicated as a difference between distinct genres of critical discourse, or forms of critique. The difference is presented in respect to two major aspects: historical time and historicity, and critique's mode of engagement with 'an analytic of truth'. The last point, namely the presence of a crucial analytic moment in the philosophical interpretation of present reality, suggests a possible modification of the initial distinction between the two philosophical traditions. (shrink)
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  45. Francesco Tomasoni (2003). Modernity and the Final Aim of History: The Debate Over Judaism From Kant to the Young Hegelians. Kluwer Academic Publishers.score: 12.0
    This book is intended not only for scholars and students in humanities, history (esp. the history of ideas), Jewish studies, philosophy (esp. the history of philosophy), and (...)
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  46. Hamid Vahid (2003). Truth and the Aim of Epistemic Justification. Teorema 20 (3):83-91.score: 12.0
    Any theory of epistemic justification must address the question of what its aim is and why we value it. The almost general consensus among epistemologists is that (...)
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  47. Giridhari Lal Pandit (2010). How Simple is It for Science to Acquire Wisdom According to its Choicest Aims? Philosophia 38 (4):649-666.score: 12.0
    Focusing on Nicholas Maxwells thesis thatscience, properly understood, provides us the methodological key to the salvation of humanity”, the article discusses Maxwells aim oriented empiricism (...) and his conception of Wisdom Inquiry as advocated in Maxwells (2009b, pp.156) essay entitledHow Can Life of Value Best Flourish in the Real World?” (in Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell 2009, edited by Leemon McHenry) and in Maxwell (2004 & 2009a). (shrink)
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  48. Ynhui Park (1997). Retionality and Human Dignity €“ Confucius, Kant and Scheffler on the Ultimate Aim of Education. Studies in Philosophy and Education 16 (1/2):7-18.score: 12.0
    This paper argues that certain influential views to the contrary, without an overall aim of education no philosophy of education is neither complete nor intelligible. On this (...)
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