Search results for 'Aiming, Belief, Metaethics, Dissertation' (try it on Scholar)

4 found
  1. Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
    Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...)
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  2. Allan Gibbard (2005). Truth and Correct Belief. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.
  3. Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman (2005). Doxastic Deliberation. Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
    Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...)
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  4. Peter Railton (1994). Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief. Philosophical Issues 5:71-93.