Search results for 'Aiming, Belief, Metaethics, Dissertation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
    Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...)
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  2. Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman (2005). Doxastic Deliberation. Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
    Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...)
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  3. Allan Gibbard (2005). Truth and Correct Belief. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.
  4. Peter Railton (1994). Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief. Philosophical Issues 5:71-93.
  5. Hamid Vahid (2006). Aiming at Truth: Doxastic Vs. Epistemic Goals. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):303-335.
    Belief is generally thought to be the primary cognitive state representing the world as being a certain way, regulating our behavior and guiding us around the world. It is thus regarded as being constitutively linked with the truth of its content. This feature of belief has been famously captured in the thesis that believing is a purposive state aiming at truth. It has however proved to be notoriously difficult to explain what the thesis really involves. In this paper, I begin (...)
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    Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss (2013). Aiming at Truth: On The Role of Belief. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):137-162.
    We explore the possibility of characterizing belief wholly in terms of its first-order functional role, its input (evidence) and output (further beliefs and actions), by addressing some common challenges to the view. One challenge concerns the fact that not all belief is evidence-sensitive. In response to this, normativists and teleo-functionalists have concluded that something over and above functional role is needed, a norm or a telos. We argue that both allow for implausibly much divergence between belief and evidence. Others have (...)
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  7.  81
    Jeff Kasser & Nishi Shah (2006). The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of "the Will to Believe". Social Epistemology 20 (1):1 – 17.
    We argue that an expressivist interpretation of "The Will to Believe" provides a fruitful way of understanding this widely-read but perplexing document. James approaches questions about our intellectual obligations from two quite different standpoints. He first defends an expressivist interpretation of judgments of intellectual obligation; they are "only expressions of our passional life". Only then does James argue against evidentialism, and both his criticisms of Clifford and his defense of a more flexible ethics of belief presuppose this independently-defended expressivism. James (...)
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  8. Veli Mitova (2011). Epistemic Motivation: Towards a Metaethics of Belief. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press
     
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  9. Nishi Shah & Jeffrey Kasser (2006). The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of “The Will to Believe”. Social Epistemology 20 (1):1-17.
  10.  2
    Osiris Rising (2008). Basing Itself on Alfred North Whitehead's Process Philosophy, the Existentialism of Martin Buber, African Philosophy, and African Belief Systems, This Dissertation Examines the Development of a Healer and Healing Community in Ayi Kwei Armah's The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born, Fragments, Why Are We So Blest, Two Thousand Seasons, The Healers. Process Studies 37:228.
  11.  62
    Brad Majors (2008). Cognitivist Expressivism and the Nature of Belief. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):279 - 293.
    The paper is a critical examination of the metaethical position taken up recently by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, called ‘cognitivist expressivism’. The key component of the position is their insistence that some beliefs are nondescriptive. The paper argues against this thesis in two ways: First by sketching an independently plausible account of belief, on which belief is essentially a certain kind of descriptive representational state; and second by rebutting Horgan and Timmons’ positive arguments in favor of their account. The (...)
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  12.  47
    Ragnar Francén (2007). Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption. Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    This dissertation investigates the plausibility of metaethical relativism, or more specifically, what I call “moral truth-value relativism”: the idea that the truth of a moral statement or belief depends on who utters or has it, or who assesses it. According to the most prevalent variants of this view in philosophical literature – “standard relativism” – the truth-values are relative to people’s moralities, often understood as some subset of their affective or desirelike attitudes. Standard relativism has two main contenders: absolutism (...)
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  13.  75
    Graham Harman (2011). Meillassoux's Virtual Future. Continent 1 (2):78-91.
    continent. 1.2 (2011): 78-91. This article consists of three parts. First, I will review the major themes of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude . Since some of my readers will have read this book and others not, I will try to strike a balance between clear summary and fresh critique. Second, I discuss an unpublished book by Meillassoux unfamiliar to all readers of this article, except those scant few that may have gone digging in the microfilm archives of the École normale (...)
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  14.  99
    Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri (forthcoming). In the Thick of Moral Motivation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we provide evidence that the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology could be a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.
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  15. Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri (2015). Belief Through Thick and Thin. Noûs 49 (4):748-775.
    We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the (...)
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  16. Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
    Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395–405, 2009), who claims that exclusivity is in (...)
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  17. Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting (2014). The Normativity of Belief. Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
    This is a survey of recent debates concerning the normativity of belief. We explain what the thesis that belief is normative involves, consider arguments for and against that thesis, and explore its bearing on debates in metaethics.
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  18. Guy Kahane (2016). If Nothing Matters. Noûs 50 (2):n/a-n/a.
    The possibility that nothing really matters can cause much anxiety, but what would it mean for that to be true? Since it couldn’t be bad that nothing matters, fearing nihilism makes little sense. However, the consequences of belief in nihilism will be far more dramatic than often thought. Many metaethicists assume that even if nothing matters, we should, and would, go on more or less as before. But if nihilism is true in an unqualified way, it can’t be the case (...)
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  19.  95
    Kay Mathiesen (2006). The Epistemic Features of Group Belief. Episteme 2 (3):161-175.
    Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifi cally, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features (...)
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  20.  90
    M. Gilbert (2002). Belief and Acceptance as Features of Groups. Protosociology 16:35-69.
    In everyday discourse groups or collectives are often said to believe this or that. The author has previously developed an account of the phenomenon to which such collective belief statements refer. According to this account, in terms that are explained, a group believes that p if its members are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. Those who fulfill these conditions are referred to here as collectively believing* that p. Some philosophers – here labeled rejectionists – have argued (...)
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  21. John Danaher (2014). Necessary Moral Truths and Theistic Metaethics. Sophia 53 (3):309-330.
    Theistic metaethics usually places one key restriction on the explanation of moral facts, namely: every moral fact must ultimately be explained by some fact about God. But the widely held belief that moral truths are necessary truths seems to undermine this claim. If a moral truth is necessary, then it seems like it neither needs nor has an explanation. Or so the objection typically goes. Recently, two proponents of theistic metaethics — William Lane Craig and Mark Murphy — have argued (...)
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  22.  90
    Timothy Chan (ed.) (2013). The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    What is belief? "Beliefs aim at truth" is the commonly accepted starting point for philosophers who want to give an adequate account of this fundamental state of mind, but it raises as many questions as it answers. For example, in what sense can beliefs be said to have an aim of their own? If belief aims at truth, does it mean that reasons to believe must also be based on truth? Must beliefs be formed on the basis of evidence alone? (...)
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  23. Gustavo Cevolani (2013). Truth Approximation Via Abductive Belief Change. Logic Journal of the Igpl 21 (6):999-1016.
    We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some recent discussions concerning (...)
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  24. Andrés Páez (2006). Explanations in K: An Analysis of Explanation as a Belief Revision Operation. Athena Verlag.
    Explanation and understanding are intimately connected notions, but the nature of that connection has generally not been considered a topic worthy of serious philosophical investigation. Most authors have avoided making reference to the notion of understanding in their accounts of explanation because they fear that any mention of the epistemic states of the individuals involved compromises the objectivity of explanation. Understanding is a pragmatic notion, they argue, and pragmatics should be kept at a safe distance from the universal features of (...)
     
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  25.  49
    Vasilis Tsompanidis (2011). Tensed Belief. Dissertation, University of California Santa Barbara
    Human beings seem to capture time and the temporal properties of events and things in thought by having beliefs usually expressed with statements using tense, or notions such as ‘now’, ‘past’ or ‘future’. Tensed beliefs like these seem indispensable for correct reasoning and timely action. For instance, my belief that my root canal is over seems inexpressible with a statement that does not use tense or a temporal indexical. However, the dominant view on the nature of time is that it (...)
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  26. Shaun Nichols (2006). Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing. Mind and Language 21 (4):459–474.
    According to recent accounts of the imagination, mental mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (pretense representations) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. That is, such a mechanism should produce similar outputs whether its input is the belief that p or the pretense representation that p. Unfortunately, there seem to be clear counterexamples to this hypothesis, for in many cases, imagining that p and believing that p have quite different psychological (...)
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  27. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.
    In a series of publications, Tamar Gendler has argued for a distinction between belief and what she calls ?alief?. Gendler's argument for the distinction is a serviceability argument: the distinction is indispensable for explaining a whole slew of phenomena, typically involving ?belief-behaviour mismatch?. After embedding Gendler's distinction in a dual-process model of moral cognition, I argue here that the distinction also suggests a possible (dis)solution of what is perhaps the organizing problem of contemporary moral psychology: the apparent tension between the (...)
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  28. Timothy Lane (2010). The Ethics of False Belief. EurAmerica 40 (3):591-633.
    According to Allen Wood’s “procedural principle” we should believe only that which can be justified by evidence, and nothing more. He argues that holding beliefs which are not justified by evidence diminishes our self-respect and corrupts us, both individually and collectively. Wood’s normative and descriptive views as regards belief are of a piece with the received view which holds that beliefs aim at the truth. This view I refer to as the Truth-Tracking View (TTV). I first present a modest version (...)
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  29.  6
    Katja Maria Vogt (2012). Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato. OUP Usa.
    Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato explores a Socratic intuition about belief, doxa -- belief is "shameful." In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Vogt shows how deeply this proposal differs from contemporary views, but that it nevertheless speaks to intuitions we are likely to share with Plato, ancient skeptics, and Stoic epistemologists.
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  30. Timothy Chan (2013). Introduction: Aiming at Truth. In The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press 1-16.
    In this introductory chapter to the volume The Aim of Belief, the editor surveys the fundamental questions in current debates surrounding the aim of belief, and identifies the major theoretical approaches. The main arguments of the ten contributions to the volume are outlined and located in the context of the existing literature.
     
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  31.  39
    Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting (2014). The Normativity of Belief. Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
    This is a survey of recent debates concerning the normativity of belief. We explain what the thesis that belief is normative involves, consider arguments for and against that thesis, and explore its bearing on debates in metaethics.
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  32.  19
    Jessica Moss (2014). Plato's Appearance‐Assent Account of Belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):213-238.
    Stoics and Sceptics distinguish belief (doxa) from a representationally and functionally similar but sub-doxastic state: passive yielding to appearance. Belief requires active assent to appearances, that is, affirmation of the appearances as true. I trace the roots of this view to Plato's accounts of doxa in the Republic and Theaetetus. In the Republic, eikasia and pistis (imaging and conviction) are distinguished by their objects, appearances versus ordinary objects; in the Theaetetus, perception and doxa are distinguished by their objects, proper perceptibles (...)
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  33. Eric Schwitzgebel (1997). Words About Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology. Dissertation, University of California Berkeley
    In this dissertation, I examine three philosophically important concepts that play a foundational role in developmental psychology: theory, representation, and belief. I describe different ways in which the concepts have been understood and present reasons why a developmental psychologist, or a philosopher attuned to cognitive development, should prefer one understanding of these concepts over another.
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  34.  15
    David Rocheleau-Houle (2016). Michael Ridge, Impassioned Belief. Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):261-265.
    Michael Ridge’s Impassioned Belief is part of an important new wave in metaethics: hybrid theories. Ridge is a pioneer of hybrid expressivism; his own version is called “ecumenical expressivism.” His book is not only a collection of papers published in the last ten years. It covers more topics, and he also proposes some important improvements to his theory. Ridge’s work is an expansive one; in this review I shall limit myself to present what I consider to be the most important (...)
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  35. Jonathan Berg (1983). Pragmatics and the Semantics of Belief. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    It is shown how the discussion of the semantics of sentences attributing belief, central to the philosophy of language since Frege, may benefit from consideration of pragmatic features of the context of utterance. ;The dissertation begins with a historical introduction to the problem of substitutivity in belief contexts. Traditional solutions advanced by Frege, Russell, and Carnap are reviewed, along with traditional objections to such solutions. It is then suggested that the traditional Quinian approach of declaring belief ascriptions semantically (...)
     
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  36.  16
    Byeong Lee (1998). The Paradox of Belief Instability and a Revision Theory of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):314–328.
    The epistemic paradox of 'belief instability' has recently received notable attention from many philosophers. Understanding this paradox is very important because belief is a central notion of psychologically motivated semantic theories in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science, and this paradox poses serious problems for these theories. In this dissertation I criticize previous proposals and offer a new proposal, which I call a 'revision theory of belief'. ;My revision theory of belief is in many respects an application of Gupta's and (...)
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  37. Paul Artin Boghossian (1987). Essays on Meaning and Belief. Dissertation, Princeton University
    The dissertation is in two parts. ;The first part consists of an extended essay on Saul Kripke's recent reflections on Wittgenstein's discussion of the concepts of meaning and following a rule. It is principally concerned to argue for the following claims: That Kripke is correct in claiming that there is an important sense in which any content property is a normative property. That, contrary to Kripke, recognition of this fact need not lead us to conclude that content properties are (...)
     
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  38. Andrew Chignell (2004). Kant's Ethics of Assent: Knowledge and Belief in the Critical Philosophy. Dissertation, Yale University
    Most accounts of Kant's epistemology focus narrowly on cognition and knowledge . Kant himself, however, thought that there are many other important species of assent : opinion, persuasion, conviction, belief, acceptance, and assent to the deliverances of common sense. ;My goal in this dissertation is to isolate and motivate the principles of rational acceptability which, for Kant, govern each of these kinds of assent, instead of focusing merely on cognition and knowledge. Some of the principles apply in the context (...)
     
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  39. John Dufour (2000). Ethics of Belief: Morality and the Will to Believe. Dissertation, Yale University
    The Ethics of Belief: Morality and the Will to Believe describes, investigates, and provides a resolution to a conceptual dilemma at the foundation of most ethics of belief. In the first part of the dissertation this dilemma is thoroughly explored. The following claims are addressed in the first part: that every ethic of belief presupposes that beliefs are appropriate objects of moral 'ought' judgments; that nearly all ethics of belief presuppose that we have control over the voluntary acts of (...)
     
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  40.  10
    Davide Fassio (2012). Belief and Correctness. Dissertation,
    The overall objective of this dissertation is to provide an analysis of the standard of correctness of belief. According to this standard, a belief is correct if and only if the believed proposition is true. My analysis consists in the investigation of a set of aspects and properties of the correctness standard of belief. The main point argued in this dissertation is that the correctness standard of belief is a standard of conformity to the satisfaction conditions of a (...)
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  41. Davide Fassio, Belief and Correctness.
    The overall objective of this dissertation is to provide an analysis of the standard of correctness of belief. According to this standard, a belief is correct if and only if the believed proposition is true. My analysis consists in the investigation of a set of aspects and properties of the correctness standard of belief. The main point argued in this dissertation is that the correctness standard of belief is a standard of conformity to the satisfaction conditions of a (...)
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  42. Anthony S. Gillies (2001). Rational Belief Change. Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    We must change our beliefs, and change them in particular ways, in response to new information. But not all changes are created equal: some are rational changes, some not. The Problem of Epistemic Change is the problem of specifying the rational constraints on how the epistemic state of an agent ought to change in the face of new information. This dissertation is about the philosophical and logical investigation of rational belief change. I start by arguing that the familiar foundations---coherence (...)
     
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  43. Richard A. Leson (2012). The Devout Belief of the Imagination. The Paris Meditationes Vitae Christi and Female Franciscan Spirituality in Trecento Italy. Disciplina Monastica 6 (Review). Franciscan Studies 69 (1):509-511.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Holly Flora’s published dissertation is a critical contribution to scholarship of the origins of the Meditationes Vitae Christi, a text strongly associated with the preaching and prayer habits of the early Franciscan order and perhaps the most representative example of the late-Medieval devotional and pictorial phenomenon often summarized as the “Vita Christi tradition.” For almost a century, art historians have invoked the MVC to explain iconographic innovations in (...)
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  44. Gerhard F. Nuffer (2004). Information, Belief, and Possibility. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    According to a plausible picture of information, to acquire information is to rule out possibilities. What is the nature of these possibilities? The most natural answer---that they are possible states of the world---seems to be refuted by the existence of informative truths that are necessary, and so don't rule out any real possibilities. This seems to show that informational contents cannot be identified with the real possibilities they eliminate. Real possibilities, it seems, are too coarse-grained to do the work of (...)
     
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  45. J. Paul Reddam (1982). Pragmatics and the Language of Belief. Dissertation, University of Southern California
    The analysis of belief ascriptions has been a central problem in philosophy for the past one hundred years. Working within a direct reference framework, the dissertation begins with a look at several of the most influential analyses of belief ascriptions over this period of time. It is argued that they all suffer from a common defect; they ignore important contextual factors which affect how belief ascriptions are interpreted. To repair this defect it is necessary to enter the realm of (...)
     
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  46. Cara Spencer (1998). On the Metaphysics of Belief. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    There is a traditional picture of belief, according to which someone's having a belief is that person's standing in a certain relation to an abstract object, a proposition. My dissertation examines the metaphysical demands that two problems for this picture of belief make on these abstract objects. The first problem comes to us from Frege's "On Sense and Reference," and the second concerns a certain sort of one's beliefs about oneself, which I call "indexical beliefs." ;Frege notes that someone (...)
     
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  47. Michael Alan Thau (1998). Belief and Perception: A Unified Account. Dissertation, Princeton University
    Most philosophers agree that beliefs and perceptions represent the world to us and that a particular belief or perception is sometimes distinct from another particular belief or perception because what they represent is different; for example, one thing that distinguishes the belief that snow is white from the belief that grass is green is that the former represents snow while the latter represents grass. However, most philosophers of mind hold that a particular belief or perception is sometimes distinct from another (...)
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  48.  79
    Neil Levy (2005). Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):231 – 241.
    Children, even very young children, distinguish moral from conventional transgressions, inasmuch as they hold that the former, but not the latter, would still be wrong if there was no rule prohibiting them. Many people have taken this finding as evidence that morality is objective, and therefore universal. I argue that reflection on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance will lead us to question these claims. If a concept applies in virtue of the obtaining of a set of more basic facts, then (...)
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  49. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2006). Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics. Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
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  50. Julia Driver (2008). Imaginative Resistance and Psychological Necessity. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):301-313.
    Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psychological necessity, and how the phenomenon of imaginative resistance (...)
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