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Profile: Ken Aizawa (Rutgers University - Newark)
Profile: Ken, Kenneth Aizawa (Rutgers University - Newark)
  1. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell Pub..
  2.  34
    Adams, Frederick & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell.
  3. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark.
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  4.  54
    Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (2001). The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):43-64.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  5. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (2010). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press 67--80.
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  6. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett (2009). The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences. Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.
    Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival account ( Shapiro, 2000 and (...)
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  7. Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2009). Why the Mind is Still in the Head. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge 78--95.
     
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  8. Kenneth Aizawa (2014). The Enactivist Revolution. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):19-42.
    Among the many ideas that go by the name of “enactivism” there is the idea that by “cognition” we should understand what is more commonly taken to be behavior. For clarity, label such forms of enactivism “enactivismb.” This terminology requires some care in evaluating enactivistb claims. There is a genuine risk of enactivist and non-enactivist cognitive scientists talking past one another. So, for example, when enactivistsb write that “cognition does not require representations” they are not necessarily denying what cognitivists claim (...)
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  9.  89
    Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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  10. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa, Causal Theories of Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are about dogs because dogs (...)
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  11. Kenneth Aizawa (2007). Understanding the Embodiment of Perception. Journal of Philosophy 104 (1):5-25.
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  12. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
  13. Ken Aizawa, Clark Missed the Mark: Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
     
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  14. Ken Aizawa & Carl Gillett (2011). The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience. In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press 202--223.
  15. Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  16. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa, Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
     
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  17. Kenneth Aizawa, Clark's Conditions on Extended Cognition Are Too Strong.
     
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  18. Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Bounds of Cognition. Wiley-Blackwell.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  19.  24
    Kenneth Aizawa (2012). Distinguishing Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):91 - 106.
    This paper pursues two lines of thought that help characterize the differences between some versions of virtue epistemology and the hypothesis that cognitive processes are realized by brain, body, and world.
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  20. Kenneth Aizawa (2007). The Biochemistry of Memory Consolidation: A Model System for the Philosophy of Mind. Synthese 155 (1):65-98.
    This paper argues that the biochemistry of memory consolidation provides valuable model systems for exploring the multiple realization of psychological states.
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  21. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (forthcoming). Why the Mind is Still in the Head. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press
    Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, (...)
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  22. Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Wiley-Blackwell.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  23.  46
    Kenneth Aizawa (2003). The Systematicity Arguments. Kluwer.
    The Systematicity Arguments is the only book-length treatment of the systematicity and productivity arguments.
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  24. Kenneth Aizawa (2006). Understanding the Embodiment of Perception. APA Proceedings and Addresses 79 (3):5-25.
    Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Nos (2004) theory of enactive perception provides one proposal. Where it is commonly thought that.
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  25. Ken Aizawa, Another Look at McCulloch and Pitts's “Logical Calculus”.
    To date, almost every historical examination of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts’s, “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity” has focused its attention on one dimension of their paper, namely, the attempt to relate neuronal action potentials to formulae in (an extension of) Boolean logic.[1] The implicit justification for this focus begins with the observation that this constitutes the most substantial conceptual innovation of the paper. Earlier work in theoretical neurophysiology had provided mathematical descriptions of neural networks (...)
     
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  26. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett (2009). Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology. In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press 539--582.
     
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  27. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Challenges to Active Externalism. In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge
     
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  28.  56
    Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett (forthcoming). Multiple Realization and Methodology in Neuroscience and Psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  29. Ken Aizawa (2009). Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale. Synthese 167 (3):493 - 510.
    One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challenges that argument.
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  30.  38
    Ken Aizawa (2014). What is This Cognition That is Supposed to Be Embodied? Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):755-775.
    Many cognitive scientists have recently championed the thesis that cognition is embodied. In principle, explicating this thesis should be relatively simple. There are, essentially, only two concepts involved: cognition and embodiment. After articulating what will here be meant by ‘embodiment’, this paper will draw attention to cases in which some advocates of embodied cognition apparently do not mean by ‘cognition’ what has typically been meant by ‘cognition’. Some advocates apparently mean to use ‘cognition’ not as a term for one, among (...)
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  31. Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Computation in Cognitive Science: It is Not All About Turing-Equivalent Computation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):227-236.
    One account of the history of computation might begin in the 1930's with some of the work of Alonzo Church, Alan Turing, and Emil Post. One might say that this is where something like the core concept of computation was first formally articulated. Here were the first attempts to formalize an informal notion of an algorithm or effective procedure by which a mathematician might decide one or another logico-mathematical question. As each of these formalisms was shown to compute the same (...)
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  32.  66
    Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (1997). Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back. Analysis 57 (4):273 - 281.
  33.  52
    Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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  34.  47
    Atsushi Asai, Yasuhiro Kadooka & Kuniko Aizawa (2012). Arguments Against Promoting Organ Transplants From Brain-Dead Donors, and Views of Contemporary Japanese on Life and Death. Bioethics 26 (4):215-223.
    As of 2009, the number of donors in Japan is the lowest among developed countries. On July 13, 2009, Japan's Organ Transplant Law was revised for the first time in 12 years. The revised and old laws differ greatly on four primary points: the definition of death, age requirements for donors, requirements for brain- death determination and organ extraction, and the appropriateness of priority transplants for relatives.In the four months of deliberations in the National Diet before the new law was (...)
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  35.  51
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1992). 'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his (...)
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  36. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett, Multiple Realization and Methodology.
    ABSRACT: An increasing number of writers (for example, Kim ((1992), (1999)), Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Keeley (2000), Bickle (2003), Polger (2004), and Shapiro ((2000), (2004))) have attacked the existence of multiple realization and wider views of the special sciences built upon it. We examine the two most important arguments against multiple realization and show that neither is successful. Furthermore, we also defend an alternative, positive view of the ontology, and methodology, of the special science. In contrast to the claims of (...)
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  37.  29
    Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Consciousness: Don't Give Up on the Brain. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):263-284.
    In the extended mind literature, one sometimes finds the claim that there is no neural correlate of consciousness. Instead, there is a biological or ecological correlate of consciousness. Consciousness, it is claimed, supervenes on an entire organism in action. Alva No's view. First, it challenges the evidence he offers from neuroplasticity. Second, it presses a problem with paralysis. Third, it draws attention to a challenge from the existence of metamers and visual illusions.
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  38.  30
    Ken Aizawa (forthcoming). Cognition and Behavior. Synthese:1-20.
    An important question in the debate over embodied, enactive, and extended cognition has been what has been meant by “cognition”. What is this cognition that is supposed to be embodied, enactive, or extended? Rather than undertake a frontal assault on this question, however, this paper will take a different approach. In particular, we may ask how cognition is supposed to be related to behavior. First, we could ask whether cognition is supposed to be behavior. Second, we could ask whether we (...)
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  39.  10
    Ken Aizawa & Fred Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
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  40.  44
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
  41.  19
    Mark Schlatter & Ken Aizawa (2008). Walter Pitts and “a Logical Calculus”. Synthese 162 (2):235-250.
    Many years after the publication of “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity,” Warren McCulloch gave Walter Pitts credit for contributing his knowledge of modular mathematics to their joint project. In 1941 I presented my notions on the flow of information through ranks of neurons to Rashevsky’s seminar in the Committee on Mathematical Biology of the University of Chicago and met Walter Pitts, who then was about seventeen years old. He was working on a mathematical theory of (...)
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  42.  55
    Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Explaining Systematicity. Mind and Language 12 (2):115-36.
  43.  51
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1993). Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies, and "Block's Problem". Minds and Machines 3 (1):97-104.
    In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathologies Problem does.
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  44. Adams, Frederick & Kenneth Aizawa (1994). Fodorian Semantics. In Steven Stich & Ted Warfield (eds.), Mental Representation. Blackwell
  45.  28
    Kenneth Aizawa (2003). Cognitive Architecture: The Structure of Cognitive Representations. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell 172--189.
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  46.  86
    Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension – Andy Clark. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):662-664.
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  47.  49
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back. Analysis 57 (4):273-81.
  48.  53
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1994). 'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  49.  41
    Kenneth Aizawa (2013). Multiple Realization by Compensatory Differences. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):69-86.
    One way that scientifically recognized properties are multiply realized is by “compensatory differences” among realizing properties. If a property G is jointly realized by two properties F1 and F2, then G can be multiply realized by having changes in the property F1 offset changes in the property F2. In some cases, there are scientific laws that articulate how distinct combinations of physical quantities can determine one and the same value of some other physical quantity. One moral to draw is that (...)
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  50.  4
    F. Adams & K. Aizawa (1997). Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back. Analysis 57 (4):273-281.
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