Search results for 'Akrasia' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Richard Holton, Inverse Akrasia and Weakness of Will.score: 24.0
    The standard account of weakness of will identifies it with akrasia, that is, with action against one's best judgment. Elsewhere I have argued that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. Many cases of weak willed action will not be akratic: in over-readily abandoning a resolution an agent may well do something that they judge at the time to be best. Indeed, in so far as temptation typically gives rise to judgment shift -- (...)
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  2. David Owens (2002). Epistemic Akrasia. The Monist 85 (3):381-397.score: 24.0
    One way of discerning what sort of control we have over our mental lives is to look at cases where that control is not exercised. This is one reason why philosophers have taken an interest in the phenomenon of akrasia, in an agent's ability to do, freely and deliberately, something that they judge they ought not to do. Akrasia constitutes a failure of control but not an absence of control. The akratic agent is not a compulsive; an akratic (...)
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  3. Allen Coates (2012). Rational Epistemic Akrasia. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.score: 24.0
    Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. The paper will show that it can. More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically (...)
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  4. Devin Henry (2002). Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):255-270.score: 24.0
    The focus of this paper is Aristotle's solution to the problem inherited from Socrates: How could a man fail to restrain himself when he believes that what he desires is wrong? In NE 7 Aristotle attempts to reconcile the Socratic denial of akrasia with the commonly held opinion that people act in ways they know to be bad, even when it is in their power to act otherwise. This project turns out to be largely successful, for what Aristotle shows (...)
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  5. Edward Hinchman (2013). Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.score: 24.0
    On one conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of avoiding incoherent combinations of attitudes. This conception construes the norms of rationality as codified by rational requirements, and one plausible rational requirement is that you not be akratic: that you not judge, all things considered, that you ought to ϕ while failing to choose or intend to ϕ. On another conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of thinking or acting in a (...)
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  6. Brian Ribeiro (2011). Epistemic Akrasia. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.score: 24.0
    Though it seems rather surprising in retrospect, until about twenty-five years ago no philosopher in the Western tradition had explicitly formulated the question whether there could be an epistemic analogue to practical akrasia. Also surprisingly, despite the prima facie analogue with practical akrasia (the possibility of which is not much disputed), much of the recent work on this question has defended the rather bold view that epistemic akrasia is impossible. While the arguments purporting to show the impossibility (...)
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  7. Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.score: 24.0
    In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem (...)
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  8. Neil Levy (2004). Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):149-156.score: 24.0
    According to one influential view, advanced by Jonathan Adler, David Owens and Susan Hurley, epistemic akrasia is impossible because when we form a full belief, any apparent evidence against that belief loses its power over us. Thus theoretical reasoning is quite unlike practical reasoning, in that in the latter our desires continue to exert a pull, even when they are outweighed by countervailing considerations. I call this argument against the possibility of epistemic akrasia the subsumption view. The subsumption (...)
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  9. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1997). The Social and Political Sources of Akrasia. Ethics 107 (4):644-657.score: 24.0
    Akrasia is not always --or only-- a solitary failure to act on a person's judgment of what is, all things considered, best. Nor is it always a species of moral or ethical failure prompted by a form of irrationality. It is often prompted by social support and sustained by structuring political institutions.
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  10. Martin Lin (2006). Spinoza's Account of Akrasia. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3):395-414.score: 24.0
    : Perhaps the central problem which preoccupies Spinoza as a moral philosopher is the conflict between reason and passion. He belongs to a long tradition that sees the key to happiness and virtue as mastery and control by reason over the passions. This mastery, however, is hard won, as the passions often overwhelm its power and subvert its rule. When reason succumbs to passion, we act against our better judgment. Such action is often termed 'akratic'. Many commentators have complained that (...)
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  11. Byron J. Stoyles (2007). Aristotle, Akrasia, and the Place of Desire in Moral Reasoning. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):195 - 207.score: 24.0
    This paper serves both as a discussion of Henry’s (Ethical Theory Moral Practice, 5:255–270, 2002) interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of akrasia – knowing something is wrong and doing it anyway – and an indication of the importance of desire in Aristotle’s account of moral reasoning. As I will explain, Henry’s interpretation is advantageous for the reason that it makes clear how Aristotle could have made good sense of genuine akrasia, a phenomenon that we seem to observe (...)
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  12. Christopher Bobonich & Pierre Destrée (eds.) (2007). Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus. Brill.score: 24.0
    The 13 contributions of this collective offer new and challenging ways of reading well-known and more neglected texts on akrasia (lack of control, or weakness ...
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  13. Joshua Wilburn (2012). Akrasia and Self-Rule in Plato's Laws. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43:25-53.score: 24.0
    In this paper I challenge the commonly held view that Plato acknowledges and accepts the possibility of akrasia in the Laws. I offer a new interpretation of the image of the divine puppet in Book 1 - the passage often read as an account of akratic action -- and I show that it is not intended as an illustration of akrasia at all. Rather, it provides the moral psychological background for the text by illustrating a broader notion of (...)
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  14. Alvaro Sandroni (2011). Akrasia, Instincts and Revealed Preferences. Synthese 181 (1):1 - 17.score: 24.0
    The standard economic theory of choice is extended to accommodate a particular form of akratic choice. The empirical content of the new theory is fully characterized. A characterization of revealed akratic choice, in terms of observable choice only, is also provided. These results are consistent with the viewpoint that akrasia is a concept that can be empirically substantiated.
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  15. Daniel Guevara (2009). The Will as Practical Reason and the Problem of Akrasia. Review of Metaphysics 62 (3):525-550.score: 24.0
    This article argues for the possibility of aggressive akrasia, or the akrasia rooted in “unqualified knowingness.” The aggressive akratic acts knowledgeably and voluntarily for a bad end. Many philosophers reject the very possibility of aggressive akrasia given a prior commitment to closely identifying the will with practical reason, thereby effectively dismissing the possibility of an agent’s full responsibility for a morally evil act. Hence, these philosophers try to explain akrasia by challenging the voluntariness of the akratic’s (...)
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  16. Christopher Evan Franklin (2013). Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy's Hard Luck. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-18.score: 24.0
    I offer a brief review of, and critical response to, Neil Levy’s fascinating recent book Hard Luck, where he argues that no one is ever free or morally responsible not because of determinism or indeterminism, but because of luck. Two of Levy’s central arguments in defending his free will nihilism concern the nature and role of explanation in a theory of moral responsibility and the nature of akrasia. With respect to explanation, Levy argues that an adequate theory of moral (...)
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  17. Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will. Tópicos 43:25-50.score: 24.0
    In this article, I develop an Aristotelian account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a phenomenon I refer to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’: I argue that ordinary weakness of will is best understood as a secondary failure of intentional agency, that to tackle akrasia.
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  18. Gregory Strom (2014). Deviant Causal Chains, Knowledge of Reasons, and Akrasia. Topoi 33 (1):67-76.score: 24.0
    I begin by refuting Davidson’s classic account of akrasia, which turns on a purported distinction between judging p and judging p “all things considered.” The upshot of this refutation is that an adequate account of akrasia must turn on a distinction between different ways in which the agent can make judgments about her practical reasons. On the account I propose, an akratic agent makes an existential judgment that there is some decisive practical reason to act in a certain (...)
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  19. Alfred R. Mele (2004). Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and Self-Control. In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press. 262.score: 24.0
    Practical conflicts include conflicts in agents who judge, from the perspective of their own values, desires, beliefs, and the like, that one prospective course of action is superior to another but are tempted by what they judge to be the inferior course of action. A man who wants a late-night snack, even though he judges it best, from the identified perspective, to abide by his recent New Year's resolution against eating such snacks until he has lost ten pounds, is the (...)
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  20. Ricardo Salles (2010). Platonismo y akrasía en Crisipo. La interpretación de Marcelo Boeri. Ideas Y Valores 59 (144):53-68.score: 24.0
    Se formulan dos preguntas en torno a la interpretación que ofrece Marcelo Boeri en Apariencia y realidad en el pensamiento griego acerca del problema de la akrasía en el estoicismo: ¿puede la adaptación monista que hizo Crisipo del modelo platónico del alma dividida en República iv ofrecer una expli..
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  21. Tom J. F. Tillemans (2008). Reason, Irrationality and Akrasia (Weakness of the Will) in Buddhism: Reflections Upon Śāntideva's Arguments with Himself. [REVIEW] Argumentation 22 (1):149-163.score: 24.0
    Let it be granted that Buddhism has, e.g., in its logical literature, detailed canons and explicit rules of right reason that, amongst other things, ban inconsistency as irrational. This is the normative dimension of how people should think according to many major Buddhist authors. But do important Buddhist writers ever recognize any interesting or substantive role for inconsistency and forms of irrationality in their account of how people actually do think and act? The article takes as its point of departure (...)
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  22. Carlos E. Caorsi (2005). La Teoría Davidsoniana de la Akrasia. Signos Filosóficos 7 (13):9-30.score: 24.0
    Davidson’s treatment of akrasia resorts to the introduction of a type of operator, the prima facie connector. This operator should yield conditional judgments in which the affirmation of the antecedent does not admit to obtain the consequent as a separate conclusion; and it must allow to separate ..
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  23. Alfred Mele (2010). Weakness of Will and Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.score: 21.0
    Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions. Holton reports that he is "trying to give an account of our ordinary notion of weakness of will" (1999, p. 262). One (...)
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  24. Eugene Marshall (2010). Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):41-59.score: 21.0
  25. Alfred R. Mele (1987). Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In (...)
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  26. Alfred R. Mele (1992). Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires. Noûs 26 (3):281-302.score: 21.0
    Pristine belief/desire psychology has its limitations. Recognizing this, some have attempted to fill various gaps by adding more of the same, but at higher levels. Thus, for example, second-order desires have been imported into a more stream- lined view to explicate such important notions as freedom of the will, personhood, and valuing. I believe that we need to branch out as well as up, augmenting a familiar 'philosophical psychology' with psychological items that are irreducible to beliefs and desires (for support, (...)
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  27. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2008). Akrasia and the Emotions. In Nafsika Athanassoulis & Samantha Vice (eds.), The moral life: essays in honour of John Cottingham. Palgrave Macmillan. 87.score: 21.0
  28. Sophie Horowitz (2014). Epistemic Akrasia. Noûs 48 (4):718-744.score: 21.0
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  29. Ralph Wedgwood, Akrasia and Uncertainty.score: 21.0
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  30. Mark Sultana (2006). Self-Deception and Akrasia: A Comparative Conceptual Analysis. Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana.score: 21.0
    Chapter The Method of Conceptual Analysis To say that this investigation is situated within the stream of the tradition of analytic philosophy is less ...
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  31. Derek Baker (2014). Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason. Ratio 27 (2).score: 21.0
    Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.
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  32. Dion Scott-Kakures (1997). Self-Knowledge, Akrasia, and Self-Criticism. Philosophia 25 (1-4):267-295.score: 21.0
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  33. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2000). Akrasia, Dispositions and Degrees. Erkenntnis 53 (3):285-308.score: 21.0
    It is argued that the recent revival of theakrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is adirect, albeit unforeseen result of the debate onaction explanation in the philosophy of science. Asolution of the problem is put forward that takesaccount of the intimate links between the problem ofakrasia and this debate. This solution is basedon the idea that beliefs and desires have degrees ofstrength, and it suggests a way of giving a precisemeaning to that idea. Finally, it is pointed out thatthe (...)
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  34. Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich (2009). El problema de la akrasia en las Disertaciones de Epicteto. Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 41 (2):109-130.score: 21.0
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  35. Diego Romaioli, Elena Faccio & Alessandro Salvini (2008). On Acting Against One's Best Judgement: A Social Constructionist Interpretation for the Akrasia Problem. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (2):179-192.score: 21.0
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  36. Eunice Belgum (1990). Knowing Better: An Account of Akrasia. Garland Pub..score: 21.0
     
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  37. T. D. J. Chappell (1995). Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action, and Akrasia. St. Martin's Press.score: 21.0
  38. Jessica Moss (2009). Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):119-156.score: 18.0
    de Anima III.10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia (“imagination”) on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis , I use this parallel to illuminate the (...)
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  39. Michael Morris (2006). Akrasia in the "Protagoras" and the "Republic&Quot;. Phronesis 51 (3):195 - 229.score: 18.0
    Although it is a commonplace that the "Protagoras" and the "Republic" present diffent views of akrasia, the nature of the difference is not well understood. I argue that the logic of the famous argument in the "Protagoras" turns just on two crucial assumptions: that desiring is having evaluative beliefs (or that valuing is desiring), and that no one can have contradictory preferences at the same time; hedonism is not essential to the logic of the argument. And the logic of (...)
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  40. David Wall (2009). Akrasia and Self-Control. Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):69 – 78.score: 18.0
    According to Gary Watson (1977), if we choose not to implement a judgment about what it is best to do then we must have changed that judgment. On those grounds he rejects an otherwise plausible account of akrasia, or weakness of will, that explains it in terms of the relative strengths of the agent's desires to act against and in accordance with their evaluative judgment. However, Watson seems to assume what I call a 'principle of closure of evaluation', a (...)
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  41. Alfred R. Mele (1983). Akrasia, Reasons, and Causes. Philosophical Studies 44 (3):345-368.score: 18.0
    The occurrence or apparent occurrence of incontinent actions challenges several influential views in ethics and the philosophy of mind, e.g., Hare's prescriptivism and the Socratic idea that we always act in the light of the imagined greatest good. It also raises, as I shall explain, an interesting and instructive problem for proponents of causal theories of action. But whereas Socrates and Hare attempt to avoid the difficulties with which akrasia confronts them by denying - wrongly, I shall argue - (...)
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  42. Raphael Woolf (2002). Consistency and Akrasia in Plato's Protagoras. Phronesis 47 (3):224-252.score: 18.0
    Relatively little attention has been paid to Socrates' argument against akrasia in Plato's "Protagoras" as an example of Socratic method. Yet seen from this perspective the argument has some rather unusual features: in particular, the presence of an impersonal interlocutor ("the many") and the absence of the crisp and explicit argumentation that is typical of Socratic elenchus. I want to suggest that these features are problematic, considerably more so than has sometimes been supposed, and to offer a reading of (...)
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  43. Jonathan Way (forthcoming). Intentions, Akrasia, and Mere Permissibility. Organon F.score: 18.0
    Something is wrong with akrasia, means-end incoherence, and intention inconsistency. This observation has lead many philosophers to postulate 'wide-scope' requirements against these combinations of attitudes. But some philosophers have argued that this is unwarranted. They claim that we can explain what is wrong with these combinations of attitudes by appealing only to plausible independent claims about reasons for particular beliefs and intentions. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers may well be right about akrasia but that they (...)
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  44. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1980). Vi. Akrasia and Conflict. Inquiry 23 (2):193 – 212.score: 18.0
    As Elster suggests in his chapter 'Contradictions of the Mind', in Logic and Society, akrasia and self-deception represent the most common psychological functions for a person in conflict and contradiction. This article develops the theme of akrasia and conflict. Section I says what akrasia is not. Section II describes the character of the akrates, analyzing the sorts of conflicts to which he is subject and describing the sources of his debilities. A brief account is then given of (...)
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  45. Louis-André Dorion (2003). Akrasia Et Enkrateia Dans les Mémorables de Xénophon. Dialogue 42 (04):645-.score: 18.0
    This article aims to shed light on both the foundations and the consistency of the position regarding akrasia Xenophon attributes to Socrates in the Memorabilia. As does Plato's Socrates, Xenophon's Socrates maintains that akrasia is impossible in the presence of knowledge. On the other hand, he differs from the platonic Socrates by granting to enkrateia, instead of knowledge, the role of foundation for virtue. If enkrateia is the very condition for acquiring knowledge and virtue, consequently the responsibility for (...)
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  46. Michael Barnwell (2010). Aquinas's Two Different Accounts of Akrasia. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):49-67.score: 18.0
    Aquinas’s analyses of akrasia can be divided into two: the discussions in his theological works and his Ethics commentary. The latter has sometimes been regarded as merely repetitive of Aristotle and unrepresentative of Aquinas’s own thoughts. As such, little attention has been paid to the specific, and sometimes significant, differences between the two treatments and to what those differences might mean. This paper remedies this situation by focusing on four such differences. I ultimately provide rationales for these differences, thereby (...)
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  47. Ann A. Pang-White (2003). Augustine, Akrasia, and Manichaeism. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2):151-169.score: 18.0
    This paper examines Augustine’s analysis of the possible causes of akrasia and suggests that an implicit two-phased consent process takes place in an akratic decision. This two-phased consent theory revolves around Augustine’s theory of the two wills, one carnal and the other spiritual. Without the help of grace, the fallen will dominated by the carnal will can only choose to sin. After exploration of this two-phased consent theory, the paper turns to examine the accusation made by Julian of Eclanum, (...)
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  48. Yujian Zheng (2001). Akrasia, Picoeconomics, and a Rational Reconstruction of Judgment Formation in Dynamic Choice. Philosophical Studies 104 (3):227-251.score: 18.0
    This paper contrasts a picoeconomic approach to theexplanation of akrasia with Davidson's divided-mind approach and defends theformer in a wider context. The distinctive merits of a picoeconomic model of mindlie in the following aspects: First, it relies on a scientifically well-groundeddiscovery about motivational dynamics of animals for its explanation of preference change,which elucidates or materializes some philosophers' speculations both about thepossible mismatch between valuation and motivation and about the relevance of temporalfactors to akrasia. Second, it grounds the necessity (...)
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  49. Annemarie Kalis, Andreas Mojzisch, Sophie Schweizer & Stefan Kaiser (2008). Weakness of Will, Akrasia and the Neuropsychiatry of Decision-Making: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience 8 (4):402-17.score: 18.0
    This article focuses on both daily forms of weakness of will as discussed in the philosophical debate (usually referred to as akrasia) and psychopathological phenomena as impairments of decision making. We argue that both descriptions of dysfunctional decision making can be organized within a common theoretical framework that divides the decision making process in three different stages: option generation, option selection, and action initiation. We first discuss our theoretical framework (building on existing models of decision-making stages), focusing on option (...)
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  50. Michael Morris (2006). Akrasia in the Protagoras and the Republic. Phronesis 51 (3):195-229.score: 18.0
    Although it is a commonplace that the "Protagoras" and the "Republic" present diffent views of akrasia, the nature of the difference is not well understood. I argue that the logic of the famous argument in the "Protagoras" turns just on two crucial assumptions: that desiring is having evaluative beliefs (or that valuing is desiring), and that no one can have contradictory preferences at the same time; hedonism is not essential to the logic of the argument. And the logic of (...)
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