Search results for 'Akrasia' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sophie Horowitz (2014). Epistemic Akrasia. Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
    Many views rely on the idea that it can never be rational to have high confidence in something like, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P.” Call this idea the “Non-Akrasia Constraint”. Just as an akratic agent acts in a way she believes she ought not act, an epistemically akratic agent believes something that she believes is unsupported by her evidence. The Non-Akrasia Constraint says that ideally rational agents will never be epistemically akratic. In a number of recent (...)
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  2. Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
    In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem (...)
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  3. Allen Coates (2012). Rational Epistemic Akrasia. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.
    Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. The paper will show that it can. More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically (...)
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  4. David Owens (2002). Epistemic Akrasia. The Monist 85 (3):381-397.
    One way of discerning what sort of control we have over our mental lives is to look at cases where that control is not exercised. This is one reason why philosophers have taken an interest in the phenomenon of akrasia, in an agent's ability to do, freely and deliberately, something that they judge they ought not to do. Akrasia constitutes a failure of control but not an absence of control. The akratic agent is not a compulsive; an akratic (...)
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  5.  40
    John Brunero (2013). Rational Akrasia. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):546-566.
    It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases (...)
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  6.  63
    Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Self-Control and Akrasia. In Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge
    Akratic actions are often being thought to instantiate a paradigmatic self-control failure. . If we suppose that akrasia is opposed to self-control, the question is how akratic actions could be free and intentional. After all, it would seem that it is only if an action manifests self-control that it can count as free. My plan is to explore the relation between akrasia and self-control. The first section presents what I shall call the standard conception, according to which (...) and self-control are contraries, and introduces the puzzle that this conception raises. The second section turns to the arguments for and against the possibility of free and intentional akratic actions. The third section questions the claim that akratic actions are necessarily opposed to actions manifesting self-control. (shrink)
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  7. Edward Hinchman (2013). Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
    On one conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of avoiding incoherent combinations of attitudes. This conception construes the norms of rationality as codified by rational requirements, and one plausible rational requirement is that you not be akratic: that you not judge, all things considered, that you ought to ϕ while failing to choose or intend to ϕ. On another conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of thinking or acting in a (...)
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  8.  36
    Christopher Evan Franklin (2015). Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.
    I offer a brief review of, and critical response to, Neil Levy’s fascinating recent book Hard Luck, where he argues that no one is ever free or morally responsible not because of determinism or indeterminism, but because of luck. Two of Levy’s central arguments in defending his free will nihilism concern the nature and role of explanation in a theory of moral responsibility and the nature of akrasia. With respect to explanation, Levy argues that an adequate theory of (...)
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  9.  24
    Dylan Murray (2015). Situationism, Going Mental, and Modal Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 172 (3):711-736.
    Virtue ethics prescribes cultivating global and behaviorally efficacious character traits, but John Doris and others argue that situationist social psychology shows this to be infeasible. Here, I show how certain versions of virtue ethics that ‘go mental’ can withstand this challenge as well as Doris’ further objections. The defense turns on an account of which psychological materials constitute character traits and which the situationist research shows to be problematically variable. Many situationist results may be driven by impulsive akrasia produced (...)
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  10. Joshua Wilburn (2012). Akrasia and Self-Rule in Plato's Laws. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43:25-53.
    In this paper I challenge the commonly held view that Plato acknowledges and accepts the possibility of akrasia in the Laws. I offer a new interpretation of the image of the divine puppet in Book 1 - the passage often read as an account of akratic action -- and I show that it is not intended as an illustration of akrasia at all. Rather, it provides the moral psychological background for the text by illustrating a broader notion (...)
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  11. Eugene Marshall (2010). Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):41-59.
    : Two common ways of explaining akrasia will be presented, one which focuses on strength of desire and the other which focuses on action issuing from practical judgment. Though each is intuitive in a certain way, they both fail as explanations of the most interesting cases of akrasia. Spinoza 's own thoughts on bondage and the affects follow, from which a Spinozist explanation of akrasia is constructed. This account is based in Spinoza 's mechanistic psychology of cognitive (...)
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  12.  90
    Ralph Wedgwood (2013). Akrasia and Uncertainty. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):483–505.
    According to John Broome, akrasia consists in a failure to intend to do something that one believes one ought to do, and such akrasia is necessarily irrational. In fact, however, failing to intend something that one believes one ought to do is only guaranteed to be irrational if one is certain of a maximally detailed proposition about what one ought to do; if one is uncertain about any part of the full story about what one ought to do, (...)
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  13. Richard Holton, Inverse Akrasia and Weakness of Will.
    The standard account of weakness of will identifies it with akrasia, that is, with action against one's best judgment. Elsewhere I have argued that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. Many cases of weak willed action will not be akratic: in over-readily abandoning a resolution an agent may well do something that they judge at the time to be best. Indeed, in so far as temptation typically gives rise to judgment shift -- (...)
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  14. Neil Levy (2004). Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):149-156.
    According to one influential view, advanced by Jonathan Adler, David Owens and Susan Hurley, epistemic akrasia is impossible because when we form a full belief, any apparent evidence against that belief loses its power over us. Thus theoretical reasoning is quite unlike practical reasoning, in that in the latter our desires continue to exert a pull, even when they are outweighed by countervailing considerations. I call this argument against the possibility of epistemic akrasia the subsumption view. The subsumption (...)
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  15.  90
    Brian Ribeiro (2011). Epistemic Akrasia. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.
    Though it seems rather surprising in retrospect, until about twenty-five years ago no philosopher in the Western tradition had explicitly formulated the question whether there could be an epistemic analogue to practical akrasia. Also surprisingly, despite the prima facie analogue with practical akrasia (the possibility of which is not much disputed), much of the recent work on this question has defended the rather bold view that epistemic akrasia is impossible. While the arguments purporting to show the impossibility (...)
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  16. Devin Henry (2002). Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):255-270.
    The focus of this paper is Aristotle's solution to the problem inherited from Socrates: How could a man fail to restrain himself when he believes that what he desires is wrong? In NE 7 Aristotle attempts to reconcile the Socratic denial of akrasia with the commonly held opinion that people act in ways they know to be bad, even when it is in their power to act otherwise. This project turns out to be largely successful, for what Aristotle shows (...)
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  17. Martin Lin (2006). Spinoza's Account of Akrasia. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3):395-414.
    : Perhaps the central problem which preoccupies Spinoza as a moral philosopher is the conflict between reason and passion. He belongs to a long tradition that sees the key to happiness and virtue as mastery and control by reason over the passions. This mastery, however, is hard won, as the passions often overwhelm its power and subvert its rule. When reason succumbs to passion, we act against our better judgment. Such action is often termed 'akratic'. Many commentators have complained that (...)
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  18.  44
    Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will. Tópicos 43:25-50.
    In this article, I develop an Aristotelian account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a phenomenon I refer to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’: I argue that ordinary weakness of will is best understood as a secondary failure of intentional agency, that to tackle akrasia.
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  19.  8
    Hamid Vahid (forthcoming). Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-Order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 19 Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order (...)
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  20.  75
    Byron J. Stoyles (2007). Aristotle, Akrasia, and the Place of Desire in Moral Reasoning. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):195 - 207.
    This paper serves both as a discussion of Henry’s (Ethical Theory Moral Practice, 5:255–270, 2002) interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of akrasia – knowing something is wrong and doing it anyway – and an indication of the importance of desire in Aristotle’s account of moral reasoning. As I will explain, Henry’s interpretation is advantageous for the reason that it makes clear how Aristotle could have made good sense of genuine akrasia, a phenomenon that we seem to observe (...)
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  21.  64
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1997). The Social and Political Sources of Akrasia. Ethics 107 (4):644-657.
    Akrasia is not always --or only-- a solitary failure to act on a person's judgment of what is, all things considered, best. Nor is it always a species of moral or ethical failure prompted by a form of irrationality. It is often prompted by social support and sustained by structuring political institutions.
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  22.  3
    Hamid Vahid (forthcoming). Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-Order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 19 Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order (...)
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  23.  35
    Daniel Guevara (2009). The Will as Practical Reason and the Problem of Akrasia. Review of Metaphysics 62 (3):525-550.
    This article argues for the possibility of aggressive akrasia, or the akrasia rooted in “unqualified knowingness.” The aggressive akratic acts knowledgeably and voluntarily for a bad end. Many philosophers reject the very possibility of aggressive akrasia given a prior commitment to closely identifying the will with practical reason, thereby effectively dismissing the possibility of an agent’s full responsibility for a morally evil act. Hence, these philosophers try to explain akrasia by challenging the voluntariness of the akratic’s (...)
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  24.  17
    Gregory Strom (2014). Deviant Causal Chains, Knowledge of Reasons, and Akrasia. Topoi 33 (1):67-76.
    I begin by refuting Davidson’s classic account of akrasia, which turns on a purported distinction between judging p and judging p “all things considered.” The upshot of this refutation is that an adequate account of akrasia must turn on a distinction between different ways in which the agent can make judgments about her practical reasons. On the account I propose, an akratic agent makes an existential judgment that there is some decisive practical reason to act in a certain (...)
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  25.  36
    Alvaro Sandroni (2011). Akrasia, Instincts and Revealed Preferences. Synthese 181 (1):1 - 17.
    The standard economic theory of choice is extended to accommodate a particular form of akratic choice. The empirical content of the new theory is fully characterized. A characterization of revealed akratic choice, in terms of observable choice only, is also provided. These results are consistent with the viewpoint that akrasia is a concept that can be empirically substantiated.
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  26.  10
    Tom J. F. Tillemans (2008). Reason, Irrationality and Akrasia (Weakness of the Will) in Buddhism: Reflections Upon Śāntideva's Arguments with Himself. [REVIEW] Argumentation 22 (1):149-163.
    Let it be granted that Buddhism has, e.g., in its logical literature, detailed canons and explicit rules of right reason that, amongst other things, ban inconsistency as irrational. This is the normative dimension of how people should think according to many major Buddhist authors. But do important Buddhist writers ever recognize any interesting or substantive role for inconsistency and forms of irrationality in their account of how people actually do think and act? The article takes as its point of departure (...)
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  27.  8
    Carlos E. Caorsi (2005). La Teoría Davidsoniana de la Akrasia. Signos Filosóficos 7 (13):9-30.
    Davidson’s treatment of akrasia resorts to the introduction of a type of operator, the prima facie connector. This operator should yield conditional judgments in which the affirmation of the antecedent does not admit to obtain the consequent as a separate conclusion; and it must allow to separate ..
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  28.  10
    Alfred R. Mele (2004). Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and Self-Control. In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press 262.
    Practical conflicts include conflicts in agents who judge, from the perspective of their own values, desires, beliefs, and the like, that one prospective course of action is superior to another but are tempted by what they judge to be the inferior course of action. A man who wants a late-night snack, even though he judges it best, from the identified perspective, to abide by his recent New Year's resolution against eating such snacks until he has lost ten pounds, is the (...)
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  29.  5
    Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich (2009). El problema de la akrasia en las Disertaciones de Epicteto. Logos: Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 41 (2):109-130.
    La argumentación en contra de la posibilidad de akrasia que encontramos en las Disertaciones de Epicteto ha sido frecuentemente desatendida en los desarrollos modernos y contemporáneos de la problemática de la incontinencia. Esto se ha debido fundamentalmente al hecho de que las reflexiones de Epicteto suelen ser reducidas a una mera reelaboración de motivos socráticos bajo ejes dogmáticos estoicos. Por el contrario, será nuestro objetivo poner de manifiesto la singular riqueza teórica que subyace bajo la argumentación de nuestro esclavo (...)
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  30.  3
    Diego Romaioli, Elena Faccio & Alessandro Salvini (2008). On Acting Against One's Best Judgement: A Social Constructionist Interpretation for the Akrasia Problem. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (2):179-192.
    Akrasia is a philosophical concept meaning the possibility to perform actions against one's best judgement. This contribution aims to clarify this phenomenon in terms of a social construction, stating it as a narrative configuration generated by an observer. The latter finds himself engaged in justifying a “problematic” line of action with regard to specific cultural beliefs referring to the self, the others and the behaviour. This paper intends to make explicit the assumptions underlying the traditional definitions of akrasia (...)
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  31.  3
    Ricardo Salles (2010). Platonismo y akrasía en Crisipo. La interpretación de Marcelo Boeri. Ideas Y Valores 59 (144):53-68.
    Se formulan dos preguntas en torno a la interpretación que ofrece Marcelo Boeri en Apariencia y realidad en el pensamiento griego acerca del problema de la akrasía en el estoicismo: ¿puede la adaptación monista que hizo Crisipo del modelo platónico del alma dividida en República iv ofrecer una expli..
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  32.  47
    Christopher Bobonich & Pierre Destrée (eds.) (2007). Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus. Brill.
    The 13 contributions of this collective offer new and challenging ways of reading well-known and more neglected texts on akrasia (lack of control, or weakness ...
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  33. Alfred R. Mele (1987). Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press.
    Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In (...)
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  34. Derek Baker (2015). Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason. Ratio 28 (1):65-80.
    Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.
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  35.  67
    David Christensen (forthcoming). Disagreement, Drugs, Etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia. Episteme.
    We often get evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter. This can come from the disagreement of others, or from information about our being subject to the effects of drugs, fatigue, emotional ties, implicit biases, etc. Accounts that make rational belief sensitive to such evidence depend on reliability-assessments of the agent’s thinking about the matter in question. But specific proposals about how such assessments rationally constrain agents’ credences seem to yield unintuitive results—especially in cases where (...)
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  36. Alfred Mele (2010). Weakness of Will and Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.
    Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions. Holton reports that he is "trying to give an account of our ordinary notion of weakness of will" (1999, p. 262). One (...)
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  37.  38
    Sergio Tenenbaum (2010). Akrasia and Irrationality. In Sandis O'Connor (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell 274-282.
  38. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2008). Akrasia and the Emotions. In Nafsika Athanassoulis & Samantha Vice (eds.), The moral life: essays in honour of John Cottingham. Palgrave Macmillan 87.
  39. Alfred R. Mele (1992). Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires. Noûs 26 (3):281-302.
    Pristine belief/desire psychology has its limitations. Recognizing this, some have attempted to fill various gaps by adding more of the same, but at higher levels. Thus, for example, second-order desires have been imported into a more stream- lined view to explicate such important notions as freedom of the will, personhood, and valuing. I believe that we need to branch out as well as up, augmenting a familiar 'philosophical psychology' with psychological items that are irreducible to beliefs and desires (for support, (...)
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  40.  28
    Jeanne Peijnenburg (2000). Akrasia, Dispositions and Degrees. Erkenntnis 53 (3):285-308.
    It is argued that the recent revival of theakrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is adirect, albeit unforeseen result of the debate onaction explanation in the philosophy of science. Asolution of the problem is put forward that takesaccount of the intimate links between the problem ofakrasia and this debate. This solution is basedon the idea that beliefs and desires have degrees ofstrength, and it suggests a way of giving a precisemeaning to that idea. Finally, it is pointed out thatthe (...)
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  41.  41
    Dion Scott-Kakures (1997). Self-Knowledge, Akrasia, and Self-Criticism. Philosophia 25 (1-4):267-295.
  42. Eunice Belgum (1990). Knowing Better: An Account of Akrasia. Garland Pub..
     
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  43. T. D. J. Chappell (1995). Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action, and Akrasia. St. Martin's Press.
  44.  42
    Mark Sultana (2006). Self-Deception and Akrasia: A Comparative Conceptual Analysis. Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana.
    Chapter The Method of Conceptual Analysis To say that this investigation is situated within the stream of the tradition of analytic philosophy is less ...
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  45.  74
    Kieran Setiya, Akrasia and the Constitution of Agency.
    Argues that we do not act intentionally ‘under the guise of the good.’ This makes it hard to explain why akrasia is distinctively irrational; but this is no objection, since it is just as hard to explain on the opposing view. Ends with a problem of akrasia for ethical rationalists.
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  46. Jonathan Way (2013). Intentions, Akrasia, and Mere Permissibility. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):588-611.
    Something is wrong with akrasia, means-end incoherence, and intention inconsistency. This observation has lead many philosophers to postulate 'wide-scope' requirements against these combinations of attitudes. But some philosophers have argued that this is unwarranted. They claim that we can explain what is wrong with these combinations of attitudes by appealing only to plausible independent claims about reasons for particular beliefs and intentions. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers may well be right about akrasia but that they (...)
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  47. Jessica Moss (2009). Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):119-156.
    de Anima III.10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia (“imagination”) on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis , I use this parallel to illuminate the (...)
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  48.  33
    Philip Robichaud (2014). On Culpable Ignorance and Akrasia. Ethics 125 (1):137-151,.
    A point of contention in recent discussions of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility is whether culpable ignorance must trace to akratic belief mismanagement. Neil Levy has recently defended an akrasia requirement by arguing that only an akratic agent has the capacity rationally to comply with epistemic expectations the violation of which contributes to her ignorance. In this paper I show that Levy’s argument is unsound. It is possible to have the relevant rational capacity in the absence of (...). I also argue that the internalist account of rationality that does much of the work in his argument is problematic. (shrink)
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  49.  47
    Cristina Borgoni (2015). Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.
    In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. (...)
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  50.  19
    Annemarie Kalis, Andreas Mojzisch, Sophie Schweizer & Stefan Kaiser (2008). Weakness of Will, Akrasia and the Neuropsychiatry of Decision-Making: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience 8 (4):402-17.
    This article focuses on both daily forms of weakness of will as discussed in the philosophical debate (usually referred to as akrasia) and psychopathological phenomena as impairments of decision making. We argue that both descriptions of dysfunctional decision making can be organized within a common theoretical framework that divides the decision making process in three different stages: option generation, option selection, and action initiation. We first discuss our theoretical framework (building on existing models of decision-making stages), focusing (...)
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