Search results for 'Alan H.´ajek' (try it on Scholar)

  1. Alan H.´ajek (2008). Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793 - 819.score: 29.0
    Four important arguments for probabilism--the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments--have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned. Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities. I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem and (...)
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  2. Alan H'ajek (2003). What Conditional Probability Could Not Be. Synthese 137:273-323.score: 29.0
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  3. J. Robert G. Williams, Counterfactual Desire as Belief.score: 14.0
    Bryne & H´ajek (1997) argue that Lewis’s (1988; 1996) objections to identifying desire with belief do not go through if our notion of desire is ‘causalized’ (characterized by causal, rather than evidential, decision theory). I argue that versions of the argument go through on certain assumptions about the formulation of decision theory. There is one version of causal decision theory where the original arguments cannot be formulated—the ‘imaging’ formulation that Joyce (1999) advocates. But I argue this formulation is independently objectionable. (...)
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