1. Alan Penczek (1997). Counterfactuals with True Components. Erkenntnis 46 (1):79-85.
    One criticism of David Lewis's account of counterfactuals is that it sometimes assigns the wrong truth-value to a counterfactual when both antecedent and consequent happen to be true. Lewis has suggested a possible remedy to this situation, but commentators have found this to be unsatisfactory. I suggest an alternative solution which involves a modification of Lewis's truth conditions, but which confines itself to the resources already present in his account. This modification involves the device of embedding one counterfactual within another. (...)
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  2. Alan Penczek (1997). Disjunctive Properties and Causal Efficacy. Philosophical Studies 86 (2):203-219.
    A pigeon has been conditioned to peck at red objects and has also been conditioned to peck at triangular objects. The pigeon is now presented with a red triangle and pecks. In virtue of which of the object's properties did the pigeon peck? I argue that the disjunctive property "red or triangular" best answers this question and that this in turn gives us reason to admit such disjunctive properties to our ontology. I also show how the criterion for causal efficacy (...)
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  3. Alan Penczek (1996). Introductory Logic. Teaching Philosophy 19 (2):121-125.
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