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Profile: Alberto Voltolini (Università degli Studi di Torino)
  1.  66
    Alberto Voltolini (2015). A Suitable Metaphysics for Fictional Entities. In S. Brock & A. Everett (eds.), Fictional Objects. Oxford University Press 129-146.
    There is a list of desiderata that any good metaphysics of fictional entities should be able to fulfill. These desiderata are: 1) the nonexistence of fictional entities; 2) the causal inefficacy of suchentities;3)the incompleteness of such entities;4)the created character of such entities; 5) the actual possession by ficta of the narrated properties; 6) the unrevisable ascription to ficta of such properties; and 7) the necessary possession by ficta of such properties. (Im)possibilist metaphysics uncontroversially satisfy 1) and 2); Neo-Meinongian metaphysics satisfy (...)
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  2.  8
    Alberto Voltolini (2006). How Ficta Follow Fiction. Springer.
    This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these This This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these entities, according to which a fictional entity is a compound entity built up from (...)
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  3.  49
    Alberto Voltolini (2015). Heidegger's Logico-Semantic Strikeback. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22:19-38.
    In (1959), Carnap famously attacked Heidegger for having constructed an insane metaphysics based on a misconception of both the logical form and the semantics of ordinary language. In what follows, it will be argued that, once one appropriately (i.e., in a Russellian fashion) reads Heidegger’s famous sentence that should paradigmatically exemplify such a misconception, i.e., “the nothing nothings”, there is nothing either logically or semantically wrong with it. The real controversy as to how that sentence has to be evaluated—not as (...)
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  4. Clotilde Calabi & Alberto Voltolini (2005). Should Pride of Place Be Given to the Norms? Intentionality and Normativity. Facta Philosophica 7 (1):85-98.
    Reasons motivate our intentions and thus our actions, justify our beliefs, ground our hopes and connect our feelings of shame and pride to our thoughts. Given that intentions, beliefs and emotions are intentional states, intentionality is strongly connected with normativity. Yet what is more precisely their relationship? Some philosophers, notably Brandom and McDowell, contend at places that intentionality is intrinsically normative. In this paper, we discuss Brandom and McDowell’s thesis and the arguments they provide for its defence. In contrast to (...)
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  5.  41
    Alberto Voltolini (2006). Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts. Synthese 153 (1):23--47.
    In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has to (...)
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  6.  68
    Alberto Voltolini (2013). Probably the Charterhouse of Parma Does Not Exist, Possibly Not Even That Parma. Humana.Mente 25:235-261.
    In this paper, I will claim that fictional works apparently about utterly immigrant objects, i.e., real individuals imported in fiction from reality, are instead about fictional individuals that intentionally resemble those real individuals in a significant manner: fictional surrogates of such individuals. Since I also share the realists’ conviction that the remaining fictional works concern native characters, i.e., full-fledged fictional individuals that originate in fiction itself, I will here defend a hyperrealist position according to which fictional works only concern fictional (...)
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  7. Alberto Voltolini (2013). There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.
    According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a (...)
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  8. Alberto Voltolini (2012). Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 66:561-576.
    In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which fictional characters arise (...)
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  9. Alberto Voltolini (2012). Towards a Syncretistic Theory of Depiction. In C. Calabi (ed.), Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Palgrave
    In this paper I argue for a syncretistic theory of depiction, which combines the merits of the main paradigms which have hitherto faced themselves on this issue, namely the perceptualist and semioticist approaches. The syncretistic theory indeed takes from the former its stress on experiential factors and from the latter its stress on conventional factors. But the theory is even more syncretistic than this, for the way it accounts for the experiential factor vindicates several claims defended by different perceptualist theories. (...)
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  10.  64
    Alberto Voltolini (2012). All the Existences That There Are. Disputatio 32 (32):361-383.
    In this paper, I will defend the claim that there are three existence properties: the second-order property of being instantiated, a substantive first-order property (or better a group of such properties) and a formal, hence universal, first-order property. I will first try to show what these properties are and why we need all of them for ontological purposes. Moreover, I will try to show why a Meinong-like option that positively endorses both the former and the latter first-order property is the (...)
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  11.  33
    Alberto Voltolini (2013). The Content of a Seeing-As Experience. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):215-237.
    In this paper I will claim that the different phenomenology of seeing-as experiences of ambiguous figures matches a difference in their intentional content. Such a content is non-conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is just an experience of organizational seeing-as. It is partially conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is an overall experience of seeing something as a picture that is identical with Wollheim’s seeing-in experience and is constituted by an experience of organizational seeing-as (its configurational fold) and by an (...)
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  12.  45
    Alberto Voltolini (2014). Fiction and Indexinames. Journal of Literary Theory 8:293–322.
    In this paper, I will first of all claim that once one takes proper names as indexicals of a particular sort, indexinames for short, one may account for some tensions that affect our desiderata regarding the use of such names in sentences directly or indirectly involving fiction. According to my proposal, a proper name “N.N.” is an indexical whose character is roughly expressed by the description “the individual called ‘N.N.’ (in context)”, where this description means “the individual one’s interlocutor’s attention (...)
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  13.  6
    Alberto Voltolini (2015). Anthony Everett, The Nonexistent, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, Viii + 246 Pp., £40 , ISBN 9780199674794. [REVIEW] Dialectica 69 (4):611-620.
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  14.  13
    Alberto Voltolini (2015). What's in a (Mental) Picture. In A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer 389-406.
    In this paper, I will present several interpretations of Brentano’s notion of the intentional inexistence of a mental state’s intentional object, i.e., what that state is about. I will moreover hold that, while all the interpretations from Section 1 to Section 4 are wrong, the penultimate interpretation that I focus in Section 5, the one according to which intentional inexistence amounts to the individuation of a mental state by means of its intentional object, is correct provided that it is nested (...)
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  15.  74
    Alberto Voltolini (2011). How Creationism Supports for Kripke’s Vichianism on Fiction. In F. Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag 38--93.
    In this paper, I want to show that a reasonable thesis on truth in fiction, Fictional Vichianism (FV)—according to which fictional truths are true because they are stipulated to be true—can be positively endorsed if one grounds Kripke’s justification for (FV), that traces back to the idea that names used in fiction never refer to concrete real individuals, into a creationist position on fictional entities that allows for a distinction between the pretending and the characterizing use of fiction-involving sentences. Thus, (...)
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  16.  52
    Alberto Voltolini (2009). Consequences of Schematism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
    In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach (...)
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  17.  72
    Alberto Voltolini (2012). Puns for Contextualists. Humana.Mente 23:113-140.
    In this paper, I will first try to provide a new argument in favour of the contextualist position on the semantics/pragmatics divide. I will argue that many puns, notably multi-stable ones, cannot be dealt with in the non-contextualist way, i.e., as displaying a phenomenon that effectively involves wide context, the concrete situation of discourse, yet only in a pre-, or at least inter-, semantic sense. For, insofar as they involve ambiguous utterances rather than ambiguous sentences, these puns show that the (...)
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  18.  78
    Alberto Voltolini (2006). Are There Non-Existent Intentionalia? Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):436-441.
    In his recent book on the philosophy of mind, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. I take this metaphysical thesis as fundamentally correct. Yet in this paper I want to cast some doubts on whether this thesis prevents intentionalia, especially nonexistent ones, from belonging to the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think. If my doubts are grounded, Crane’s treatment of intentionalia may further (...)
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  19.  65
    Alberto Voltolini (2013). Defiction? In C. Barbero, M. Ferraris & A. Voltolini (eds.), From Fictionalism to Realism. Cambridge Scholars Publishing
    On various occasions, Kendall Walton has put forward a theory of depiction based on the notion of make-believe: P depicts something only if in virtue of having a perception of P, one makes believe that that very experience is the perception of P’s subject. As a consequence, if an individual is not able to make believe, whatever they face in their perception does not count as a depiction for her. Yet there are many evidences from developmental psychology that show that (...)
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  20.  18
    Alberto Voltolini (2010). Against Against Fictional Realism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):47-63.
    In a recent paper, Anthony Everett has mounted a very serious attack against realism with respect to fictional entities. According to Everett, ficta raise deep logico-ontological worries, for they violate some basic logical laws and are problematically indeterminate with respect to both their existence and identity. Since an antirealist account for sentences apparently committing us to ficta is available, no such committment is really needed. In this paper I will try to show, first, that the antirealist account Everett proposes for (...)
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  21. Alberto Voltolini (1995). Indexinames. In J. Hill & P. Kot'attko (eds.), Karlovy Vary Studies in Reference and Meaning. Filosofia 258-285.
    Insofar as the so-called new theory of reference has come to be acknowleged as the leading theoretical paradigm in semantic research, it has been widely accepted that proper names directly refer to their designation. In advancing some of the most convincing arguments in favour of this view of names, S. Kripke has however left somehow undecided what the role of context is in determining which is the direct referent for a name. According to one interpretation of his thought, context has (...)
     
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  22. Alberto Voltolini, Internalism and Externalism. Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
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  23. Alberto Voltolini (2007). How to Allow for Intentionalia in the Jungle. Russell 27 (1):86-105.
    In this paper I will Wrst contend that semantically based arguments in favour of or against problematic entitiesz—zlike those provided, respectively, in a realist Meinongian and in an antirealist Russellian campz—zare ultimately inconclusive. Indeed, only genuinely ontological arguments, speciWcally addressed to prove (or to reject) the existence of entities of a deWnite kind, suit the purpose. Thus, I will sketch an argument intended to show that there really are entities of an apparently speciWc kind, i.e. intentionalia, broadly conceived as things (...)
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  24.  66
    Alberto Voltolini (2005). On the Metaphysics of Internalism and Externalism. Disputatio 18 (2):1 - 24.
    In this paper, I explore the consequences of the thesis that externalism and internalism are (possibly, but as we will see not necessarily, opposite) metaphysical doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought. If I am right, this thesis primarily entails that at least some naturalist positions on the ontology of the mind, namely the reductionistic ones, are hardly compatible with both externalism and a version of internalism so conceived, namely relational internalism. Indeed, according to both externalism and relational internalism, (...)
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  25.  7
    Alberto Voltolini (2010). Is Wittgenstein a Contextualist? Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):3.
    There is definitely a family resemblance between what contemporary contextualism maintains in philosophy of language and some of the claims about meaning put forward by the later Wittgenstein. Yet the main contextualist thesis, namely that linguistic meaning undermines truth-conditions, was not defended by Wittgenstein. If a claim in this regard can be retrieved in Wittgenstein despite his manifest antitheoretical attitude, it is instead that truth-conditions trivially supervene on linguistic meaning. There is, however, another Wittgensteinian claim that truly has a contextualist (...)
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  26.  35
    Alberto Voltolini (1991). Objects as Intentional and as Real. Grazer Philosophische Studien 41:1-32.
    A theory of intentionality is outlined, in which the desideratum that the intentional be the same as the real object is argued for in terms of an anti-realist ontology. According to such an ontology, an ordinary object is in itself an object of discourse taken as intentional when posited phenomenologically and as possible when posited naturalistically, i.e. as not existing in some possible worlds but as existing in others. If the actual world is included among the latter, the object deserves (...)
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  27.  38
    Alberto Voltolini (2004). Can There Be a Uniform Application of Direct Reference? Erkenntnis 61 (1):75-98.
    There are two interpretations of what it means for a singular term to be referentially direct, one truth-conditional and the other cognitive. It has been argued that on the former interpretation, both proper names and indexicals refer directly, whereas on the latter only proper names are directly referential. However, these interpretations in fact apply to the same singular terms. This paper argues that, if conceived in purely normative terms, the linguistic meaning of indexicals can no longer be held to make (...)
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  28.  54
    Alberto Voltolini (2009). The Seven Consequences of Creationism. Metaphysica 10 (1):27-48.
    Creationism with respect to fictional entities, i.e., the position according to which ficta are creations of human practices, has recently become the most popular realist account of fictional entities. For it allows one to hold that there are fictional entities while simultaneously giving such entities a respectable metaphysical status, that of abstract artifacts. In this paper, I will draw what are the ontological and semantical consequences of this position, or at least of all its forms that are genuinely creationist. For (...)
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  29. Alberto Voltolini (2007). Intenzionalita, normativita e riferimento. Rivista di Estetica 47 (34-36):163.
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  30.  17
    Carola Barbero, Mario De Caro & Alberto Voltolini (2010). È naturale essere naturalisti? Rivista di Estetica 50 (44):3-6.
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  31.  34
    Alberto Voltolini (2001). Why the Computational Account of Rule-Following Cannot Rule Out the Grammatical Account. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):82-104.
    In recent works, Chomsky has once more endorsed a computational view of rulefollowing, whereby to follow a rule is to operate certain computations on a subject’s mental representations. As is well known, this picture does not conform to what we may call the grammatical conception of rule-following outlined by Wittgenstein, whereby an elucidation of the concept of rule-following is aimed at by isolating grammatical statements regarding the phrase ‘to follow a rule’. As a result, Chomskyan and Wittgensteinian treatments of topics (...)
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  32.  24
    Alberto Voltolini (2013). The Mark of the Mental. Phenomenology and Mind 4:124-136.
    In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered (...)
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  33.  24
    Alberto Voltolini (2014). Why, as Responsible for Figurativity, Seeing-in Can Only Be Inflected Seeing-In. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):651-667.
    In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation (...)
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  34.  62
    Alberto Voltolini (2003). How Fictional Works Are Related to Fictional Entities. Dialectica 57 (2):225–238.
    The paper attempts at yielding a language-independent argument in favour of fictional entities, that is, an argument providing genuinely ontological reasons in favour of such entities. According to this argument, ficta are indispensable insofar as they are involved in the identity conditions of semantically-based entities we ordinarily accept, i.e. fictional works. It will also be evaluated to what extent this argument is close to other arguments recently provided to the same purpose.
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  35. Mario De Caro & Alberto Voltolini (2010). Il migliore dei naturalismi possibili. Rivista di Estetica 50 (44):157-169.
    In this paper, we first set out three requirements that each e-theory – a theory whose task is to explain data – must fulfill in order to be one such good theory: i) an ontological requirement, i.e. adequate simplicity, ii) a methological requirement, i.e. plurality of research procedures, iii) an epistemological requirement, i.e. compatibility with the best available epistemical procedures. Moreover, we will claim that from the metaphilosophical point of view, unlike scientific naturalism on the one hand and supernaturalism on (...)
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  36.  55
    Alberto Voltolini & Elisabetta Sacchi (2012). To Think is to Have Something in One’s Thought. Quaestio 12 (1):395-422.
    Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the thought (...)
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  37.  7
    Alberto Voltolini (1995). Is Meaning Without Actually Existing Reference Naturalizable? Grazer Philosophische Studien 50:397-414.
    According to Jerry Fodor, meaningful expressions denoting no actual entity, like „unicom", do not constitute an exception to his project of semantic naturalization based on the notion of asymmetrical dependence between causal relations. But Fodor does not give any principled reason in order to show that, say, a non-unicom caused "unicom"-token means UNICORN, as he on the contrary does regarding a non-X caused "X"-token for any existing X. Nevertheless, his claim that one such expression has a mere denotational meaning can (...)
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  38. Alberto Voltolini (2006). Reference Intentionality is an Internal Relation. In S. Miguens, J. A. Pinto & C. E. Mauro (eds.), Analyses. Facultade de Letras da Universidade Do Porto 66-78.
    In this paper, I will focus on the basic form of intentionality, reference intentionality (from now on, RI), the property an intentional state has of being ‘directed upon’ a certain object, its intentional object. I will try to prove that (as Husserl, Wittgenstein and others originally envisaged) RI is not only a state - intentional object relation, but it also is an internal, i.e., a necessary, relation between that state and that object, at least in the sense that the state (...)
     
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  39.  44
    Alberto Voltolini (2009). How Demonstrative Pictorial Reference Grounds Contextualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):402-418.
    In a very recent paper (2010), Dominic McIver Lopes has claimed that pictures perceptually ground demonstrative reference to depicted objects. If as I think Lopes is right, this has important consequences for the debate on the semantics/pragmatics divide. For one can exploit Lopes' claim in order to provide one more argument in favour of the well-known contextualist thesis that wide context has not only both a pre- and a post-semantic role, but also a semantic role – to put it in (...)
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  40. Alberto Voltolini (1994). The Nameability of Possible Objects. From a Logical Point of View 3:14-33.
    Within the general framework of the theory of direct reference, there is no agreement as to whether unactualised possible objects (from now on, possibilia) can be referred to by means of directly referential singular terms (from now on, DR terms). While some have maintained that such a direct reference can be established e.g. via some fixing-reference description (Kaplan, Salmon, and perhaps Kripke himself), others have denied any such possibility. In what follows, I will scrutinise such denials by attempting at the (...)
     
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  41. Alberto Voltolini (2012). Il nulla nulleggia ancora. Rivista di Estetica 49 (1):99-113.
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  42.  7
    Alberto Voltolini (2009). In che cosa consiste far finta. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 2 (2).
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  43.  41
    Alberto Voltolini (1987). Belief and Intentionality. Topoi 6 (September):121-131.
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  44.  18
    Alberto Voltolini (1994). Ficta Versus Possibilia. Grazer Philosophische Studien 48:75-104.
    Although both belong to the domain of the nonexistent, there is an ontological distinction between ficta and possibilia. Ficta are a particular kind of abstract objects, namely constructed abstract objects which generically depend on authors for their subsistence. Moreover, they are essentially incomplete entities, in that they are correlates of finite sets of properties. - On the other hand, possibilia are concrete objects. Being a possible object is indeed being an entity that might have existed, that is, that might have (...)
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  45.  13
    Stefano di Bella, Mauro Mariani, Giuseppe Varnier & Alberto Voltolini (2000). From the Unity of the Object to the Unity of the Subject (and Back Again). Topoi 19 (1).
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  46.  37
    Alberto Voltolini (2009). How Ficta Follow Fiction: Replies to Commentators. Dialectica 63 (1):75-84.
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  47.  37
    Alberto Voltolini (2009). Précis of How Ficta Follow Fiction. Dialectica 63 (1):51-55.
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  48.  25
    Cristina Meini & Alberto Voltolini (2010). How Pretence Can Really Be Metarepresentational. Mind and Society 9 (1):31-58.
    Our lives are commonly involved with fictionality, an activity that adults share with children. After providing a brief reconstruction of the most important cognitive theories on pretence, we will argue that pretence has to do with metarepresentations, albeit in a rather weakened sense. In our view, pretending entails being aware that a certain representation does not fit in the very same representational model as another representation. This is a minimal metarepresentationalism, for normally metarepresentationalism on pretense claims that pretending is or (...)
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  49.  32
    Alberto Voltolini (2008). Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality – by G. Priest. Dialectica 62 (4):557-561.
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  50.  5
    Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini (2012). To Think Is to Literally Have Something in One’s Thought. Quaestio 12:395-422.
    In this paper, we first want to defend the idea that reference intentionality is the relation of constitution holding between an intentional state, a thought, and the object it is about, its intentional object. As such, reference intentionality is for a thought an essential property, whose predication to that thought is true in virtue of the nature of such a thought. We will take this to be one of the main lessons of serious externalism, according to which the intentional object (...)
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