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Profile: Alberto Voltolini (Università degli Studi di Torino)
  1. Alberto Voltolini, Internalism and Externalism. Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
  2. Alberto Voltolini (2014). Fiction and Indexinames. Journal of Literary Theory 8:293–322.
    In this paper, I will first of all claim that once one takes proper names as indexicals of a particular sort, indexinames for short, one may account for some tensions that affect our desiderata regarding the use of such names in sentences directly or indirectly involving fiction. According to my proposal, a proper name “N.N.” is an indexical whose character is roughly expressed by the description “the individual called ‘N.N.’ (in context)”, where this description means “the individual one’s interlocutor’s attention (...)
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  3. Alberto Voltolini (2014). Why, as Responsible for Figurativity, Seeing-in Can Only Be Inflected Seeing-In. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation (...)
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  4. Alberto Voltolini (2013). A Syncretistic Ontology of Fictional Beings. In T. Koblizek, P. Kot'atko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Text + Work: The Menard Case. Litteraria Pragensia. 89-108.
    In the camp of the believers in fictional entities, two main paradigms nowadays face each other: the neo-Meinongian and the artifactualist.1 Both parties agree on the idea that ficta are abstract entities, i.e. things that exist (at least in the actual world) even though in a non-spatiotemporal way. Yet according to the former paradigm, ficta are entities of a Platonic sort: either sets of properties (or at least ‘one-one’ correlates of such sets) or generic objects. According to the latter paradigm (...)
     
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  5. Alberto Voltolini (2013). Contexts, Fiction and Truth. In A. Capone, M. Carapezza & F. Lo Piparo (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Springer. 489-500.
    In this paper I want to hold that contextualism – the position according to which wide context, i.e., the concrete situation of discourse, may well have the semantic role of assigning truth-conditions to sentences – may well accommodate (along with some nowadays established theses about the semantics of proper names) three data about fiction, namely, the facts that as far as discourse involving fiction is concerned, i) sentences about nothing are meaningful ii) they may be true in fiction iii) yet (...)
     
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  6. Alberto Voltolini (2013). Defiction? In C. Barbero, M. Ferraris & A. Voltolini (eds.), From Fictionalism to Realism. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    On various occasions, Kendall Walton has put forward a theory of depiction based on the notion of make-believe: P depicts something only if in virtue of having a perception of P, one makes believe that that very experience is the perception of P’s subject. As a consequence, if an individual is not able to make believe, whatever they face in their perception does not count as a depiction for her. Yet there are many evidences from developmental psychology that show that (...)
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  7. Alberto Voltolini (2013). Immagine. Il Mulino.
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  8. Alberto Voltolini (2013). Probably the Charterhouse of Parma Does Not Exist, Possibly Not Even That Parma. Humana.Mente 25:235-261.
    In this paper, I will claim that fictional works apparently about utterly immigrant objects, i.e., real individuals imported in fiction from reality, are instead about fictional individuals that intentionally resemble those real individuals in a significant manner: fictional surrogates of such individuals. Since I also share the realists’ conviction that the remaining fictional works concern native characters, i.e., full-fledged fictional individuals that originate in fiction itself, I will here defend a hyperrealist position according to which fictional works only concern fictional (...)
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  9. Alberto Voltolini (2013). There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.
    According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a (...)
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  10. Alberto Voltolini (2013). The Content of a Seeing-As Experience. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):215-237.
    In this paper I will claim that the different phenomenology of seeing-as experiences of ambiguous figures matches a difference in their intentional content. Such a content is non-conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is just an experience of organizational seeing-as. It is partially conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is an overall experience of seeing something as a picture that is identical with Wollheim’s seeing-in experience and is constituted by an experience of organizational seeing-as (its configurational fold) and by an (...)
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  11. Alberto Voltolini (2013). The Mark of the Mental. Phenomenology and Mind 4:124-136.
    In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered (...)
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  12. Alberto Voltolini (2012). All the Existences That There Are. Disputatio 32 (32):361-383.
    In this paper, I will defend the claim that there are three existence properties: the second-order property of being instantiated, a substantive first-order property (or better a group of such properties) and a formal, hence universal, first-order property. I will first try to show what these properties are and why we need all of them for ontological purposes. Moreover, I will try to show why a Meinong-like option that positively endorses both the former and the latter first-order property is the (...)
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  13. Alberto Voltolini (2012). Che Cosa Socialmente C'e'. Rivista di Estetica 52 (50):377-389.
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  14. Alberto Voltolini (2012). Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 66:561-576.
    In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which fictional characters arise (...)
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  15. Alberto Voltolini (2012). Towards a Syncretistic Theory of Depiction. In C. Calabi (ed.), Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Palgrave.
    In this paper I argue for a syncretistic theory of depiction, which combines the merits of the main paradigms which have hitherto faced themselves on this issue, namely the perceptualist and semioticist approaches. The syncretistic theory indeed takes from the former its stress on experiential factors and from the latter its stress on conventional factors. But the theory is even more syncretistic than this, for the way it accounts for the experiential factor vindicates several claims defended by different perceptualist theories. (...)
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  16. Alberto Voltolini (2012). Il nulla nulleggia ancora. Rivista di Estetica 49 (1):99-113.
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  17. Alberto Voltolini (2012). How to Reconcile Seeing-As with Seeing-In (with Mimetic Purposes in Mind). In G. Currie, P. Kot'atko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications. 99-113.
    I will try to show that seeing-as doubly grounds seeing-in. First, I will urge that a seeing-as of a certain kind, what I will call illusory seeing-as, partially constitutes the twofold experience of seeing-in, by being what the proper ‘seeing-in’- fold of that experience really amounts to: the experience of illusorily yet awarely seeing the picture’s image as the picture’s subject, in other terms, an experience of aware misrecognition of that image as that subject. Secondly, I will argue that such (...)
     
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  18. Alberto Voltolini (2012). Puns for Contextualists. Humana.Mente 23:113-140.
    In this paper, I will first try to provide a new argument in favour of the contextualist position on the semantics/pragmatics divide. I will argue that many puns, notably multi-stable ones, cannot be dealt with in the non-contextualist way, i.e., as displaying a phenomenon that effectively involves wide context, the concrete situation of discourse, yet only in a pre-, or at least inter-, semantic sense. For, insofar as they involve ambiguous utterances rather than ambiguous sentences, these puns show that the (...)
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  19. Alberto Voltolini & Elisabetta Sacchi (2012). To Think is to Have Something in One’s Thought. Quaestio 12:395-422.
    Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the thought (...)
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  20. Alberto Voltolini (2011). A che titolo titoliamo immagini? Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 4 (2).
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  21. Alberto Voltolini (2011). How Creationism Supports for Kripke’s Vichianism on Fiction. In F. Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag. 38--93.
    In this paper, I want to show that a reasonable thesis on truth in fiction, Fictional Vichianism (FV)—according to which fictional truths are true because they are stipulated to be true—can be positively endorsed if one grounds Kripke’s justification for (FV), that traces back to the idea that names used in fiction never refer to concrete real individuals, into a creationist position on fictional entities that allows for a distinction between the pretending and the characterizing use of fiction-involving sentences. Thus, (...)
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  22. Alberto Voltolini & Fred Kroon, Fiction. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  23. Carola Barbero, Mario De Caro & Alberto Voltolini (2010). È naturale essere naturalisti? Rivista di Estetica 50 (44):3-6.
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  24. Mario de Caro & Alberto Voltolini (2010). Is Liberal Naturalism Possible? In Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism and Normativity. Columbia University Press. 69-86.
     
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  25. Mario De Caro & Alberto Voltolini (2010). Il migliore dei naturalismi possibili. Rivista di Estetica 50 (44):157-169.
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  26. Pasquale Frascolla, Diego Marconi & Alberto Voltolini (eds.) (2010). Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy. Palgrave Macmillan.
  27. Cristina Meini & Alberto Voltolini (2010). How Pretence Can Really Be Metarepresentational. Mind and Society 9 (1):31-58.
    Our lives are commonly involved with fictionality, an activity that adults share with children. After providing a brief reconstruction of the most important cognitive theories on pretence, we will argue that pretence has to do with metarepresentations, albeit in a rather weakened sense. In our view, pretending entails being aware that a certain representation does not fit in the very same representational model as another representation. This is a minimal metarepresentationalism, for normally metarepresentationalism on pretense claims that pretending is or (...)
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  28. Alberto Voltolini (2010). Against Against Fictional Realism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):47-63.
    In a recent paper, Anthony Everett has mounted a very serious attack against realism with respect to fictional entities. According to Everett, ficta raise deep logico-ontological worries, for they violate some basic logical laws and are problematically indeterminate with respect to both their existence and identity. Since an antirealist account for sentences apparently committing us to ficta is available, no such committment is really needed. In this paper I will try to show, first, that the antirealist account Everett proposes for (...)
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  29. Alberto Voltolini (2010). Finzioni: Il Far Finta E I Suoi Oggetti. Laterza.
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  30. Alberto Voltolini (2010). Is Wittgenstein a Contextualist? Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):3.
    There is definitely a family resemblance between what contemporary contextualism maintains in philosophy of language and some of the claims about meaning put forward by the later Wittgenstein. Yet the main contextualist thesis, namely that linguistic meaning undermines truth-conditions, was not defended by Wittgenstein. If a claim in this regard can be retrieved in Wittgenstein despite his manifest antitheoretical attitude, it is instead that truth-conditions trivially supervene on linguistic meaning. There is, however, another Wittgensteinian claim that truly has a contextualist (...)
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  31. Alberto Voltolini (2010). Was Wittgenstein Wrong About Intentionality? In P. Frascolla, D. Marconi & A. Voltolini (eds.), Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy. Palgrave. 67-81.
    At least prima facie, there is no doubt that the later Wittgenstein conceived intentionality as a normative notion, where the normativity in question is of a linguistic kind. As he repeatedly says, the (internal) agreement between thought and reality that makes a particular subsisting state of affairs be the fulfilment of a certain intentional state is to be found in language, and language is intrinsically normative. Or, to put it more precisely, it is a rule of grammar that the intentional (...)
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  32. Mario De Caro & Alberto Voltolini (2009). The Best of Possible Naturalism. Etica E Politica 11:179-191.
     
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  33. Alberto Voltolini (2009). Consequences of Schematism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
    In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach (...)
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  34. Alberto Voltolini (2009). How Demonstrative Pictorial Reference Grounds Contextualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):402-418.
    In a very recent paper (2010), Dominic McIver Lopes has claimed that pictures perceptually ground demonstrative reference to depicted objects. If as I think Lopes is right, this has important consequences for the debate on the semantics/pragmatics divide. For one can exploit Lopes' claim in order to provide one more argument in favour of the well-known contextualist thesis that wide context has not only both a pre- and a post-semantic role, but also a semantic role – to put it in (...)
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  35. Alberto Voltolini (2009). How Ficta Follow Fiction: Replies to Commentators. Dialectica 63 (1):75-84.
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  36. Alberto Voltolini (2009). In che cosa consiste far finta. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 2 (2).
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  37. Alberto Voltolini (2009). Précis of How Ficta Follow Fiction. Dialectica 63 (1):51-55.
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  38. Alberto Voltolini (2009). Raffigurazioni senza finzioni. Rivista di Estetica 49 (40):71-83.
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  39. Alberto Voltolini & Clotilde Calabi (2009). I problemi dell'intenzionalita'. Einaudi.
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  40. Alberto Voltolini (2008). Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality – by G. Priest. Dialectica 62 (4):557-561.
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  41. Alberto Voltolini (2008). The Seven Consequences of Creationism. Metaphysica 10 (1):27-48.
    Creationism with respect to fictional entities, i.e., the position according to which ficta are creations of human practices, has recently become the most popular realist account of fictional entities. For it allows one to hold that there are fictional entities while simultaneously giving such entities a respectable metaphysical status, that of abstract artifacts. In this paper, I will draw what are the ontological and semantical consequences of this position, or at least of all its forms that are genuinely creationist. For (...)
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  42. Alberto Voltolini (2007). How to Allow for Intentionalia in the Jungle. Russell 27:86-105.
    In this paper I will Wrst contend that semantically based arguments in favour of or against problematic entitiesz—zlike those provided, respectively, in a realist Meinongian and in an antirealist Russellian campz—zare ultimately inconclusive. Indeed, only genuinely ontological arguments, speciWcally addressed to prove (or to reject) the existence of entities of a deWnite kind, suit the purpose. Thus, I will sketch an argument intended to show that there really are entities of an apparently speciWc kind, i.e. intentionalia, broadly conceived as things (...)
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  43. Alberto Voltolini (2007). Intenzionalita, normativita e riferimento. Rivista di Estetica 47 (34-36):163.
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  44. Alberto Voltolini (2007). Names for Ficta, for Intentionalia, and for Nothing. In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan. 183-197.
    In his Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta, Recanati maintains two main theses regarding meta-representational sentences embedding allegedly empty proper names. The first thesis concerns both belief sentences embedding allegedly empty names and (internal) meta-fictional sentences (i.e., sentences of the form “in the story S, p”) embedding fictional, hence again allegedly empty, names. It says that such sentences primarily have fictive truth-conditions: that is, conditions for their fictional truth. The second thesis is that a fictive ascription of a singular belief, assigning to (...)
     
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  45. Alberto Voltolini (2006). Are There Non-Existent Intentionalia? Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):436-441.
    In his recent book on the philosophy of mind, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. I take this metaphysical thesis as fundamentally correct. Yet in this paper I want to cast some doubts on whether this thesis prevents intentionalia, especially nonexistent ones, from belonging to the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think. If my doubts are grounded, Crane’s treatment of intentionalia may further (...)
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  46. Alberto Voltolini (2006). Being, Existence, and Having Instances. In Venanzio Raspa (ed.), Meinongian Issues in Contemporary Italian Philosophy. Ontos. 2--161.
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  47. Alberto Voltolini (2006). Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts. Synthese 153 (1):23--47.
    In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has to (...)
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  48. Alberto Voltolini (2006). How Ficta Follow Fiction. Springer.
    This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these This This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these entities, according to which a fictional entity is a compound entity built up from (...)
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  49. Alberto Voltolini (2006). How to Get a Non-Intensionalist, Propositional, Moderately Realist Truthconditional Account of Internal Metafictional Sentences. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):179-199.
    In what follows, I will first try to show that both anti-realist and realist intensionalist truthconditional accounts of internal metafictional sentences (i.e., sentences of the form "in the story S, p") are unsatisfactory. Moreover, I will claim that this does not mean that propositional truthconditional accounts of those sentences are to be dispensed with; simply, one has to provide a non-intensionalist propositional truthconditional account of those sentences. Finally, I will show that this account is fully compatible with a realist interpretation (...)
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  50. Alberto Voltolini (2006). Russell e l'abbandono del suo meinonghianesimo nascosto. Rivista di Estetica 46 (32):93-107.
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