118 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
  1. Alex Byrne, Knowing Right and Wrong: Is Morality a Natural Phenomenon?
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Alex Byrne, McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism Etc..
    On the assumption that we may learn from our elders and betters, this paper approaches some fundamental questions in perceptual epistemology through a dispute between McDowell and Wright about external world scepticism. As explained in section 2, the dispute turns on what McDowell means by claiming that we have “direct perceptual access to environmental facts”. On the interpretation offered in section 3 (and further elaborated in section 7), if we do have “direct perceptual access” then the relevant sceptical argument—in each (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Alex Byrne, Knowing What I Want.
    Vendler, Res Cogitans Knowing that one wants to go to the movies is an example of self-knowledge, knowledge of one’s mental states. It may be foolish to ask the man on the Clapham Omnibus how he knows what he wants, but the question is nonetheless important — albeit neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer. Before getting to that, the familiar claim that we enjoy “privileged access” to our mental states needs untwining (section 1). A sketch of a theory (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert, Urban Light and Color.
    In Colour for Architecture, published in 1976, the editors, Tom Porter and Byron Mikellides, explain that their book was “produced out of an awareness that colour, as a basic and vital force, is lacking from the built environment and that our knowledge of it is isolated and limited.”1 Lack of urban color was then especially salient in Britain—where the book was published—which had just begun to recoil at the Brutalist legacy of angular stained gray concrete strewn across the postwar landscape. (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Alex Byrne, Authors' Response Continuing Commentary on Color Realism and Color Science ".
    Our reply is in four parts. The first part addresses objections to our claim that there might be "unknowable" color facts. The second part discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience. Our target article had three aims: (a) to explain clearly the structure of the debate about color realism; (b) to introduce an interdisciplinary audience (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Alex Byrne, Boston Review.
    There’s also plenty of controversy about moral law. Should we give much more to charity than we actually do? Is torture permissible under extreme circumstances? Is eating meat wrong? Could it ever be permissible to kill one innocent person in order to save five? But, again we know a lot. Throwing good taste out with the bathwater for the sake of a clear example, everyone knows that boiling babies for fun is wrong. Boiling lobsters is a matter that reasonable people (...)
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Alex Byrne, Colour Vision, Philosophical Issues About.
    The primary issues concern whether objects have colours, and what sorts of properties the colours are. Some philosophers hold that nothing is coloured, others that colour are powers to affect perceivers, and others that colours are physical properties.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Alex Byrne, Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? A Reply to Langsam Et Al.
    Dispositionalism says that the colours are dispositions to produce certain sorts of experiences in perceivers—that colours are secondary qualities, on one use of that term. Recently dispositionalism has been under attack on the ground that “colours do not look like dispositions” (Dancy 1986, Boghossian and Velleman 1989, McGinn 1996; see also McGinn 1983, 132-6, and Johnston 19921). In response, Langsam has argued that, on the contrary, “colours d o look like dispositions” (2000, 74).2 This note makes three claims. First, neither (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Alex Byrne, Gert on the Shifted Spectrum.
    As Gert says, the basic claim of representationism is that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Restricted to color experience, representationism may be put as follows.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Alex Byrne, Necessary Truths.
    analytic tradition, from its early 20th-century roots in the work of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell through Saul Kripke’s pioneering advances in..
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Alex Byrne, Private Language Problem [Addendum].
    Although the proper formulation and assessment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's argument (or arguments) against the possibility of a private language continues to be disputed, the issue has lost none of its urgency. At stake is a broadly Cartesian conception of experiences that is found today in much philosophy of mind.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Alex Byrne (forthcoming). Intentionality. In J. Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
    Some things are _about_, or are _directed on_ , or _represent_, other things. For example, the sentence 'Cats are animals' is about cats (and about animals), this article is about intentionality, Emanuel Leutze's most famous painting is about Washington's crossing of the Delaware, lanterns hung in Boston's North Church were about the British, and a map of Boston is about Boston. In contrast, '#a$b', a blank slate, and the city of Boston are not about anything. Many mental states and events (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Alex Byrne (2013). Perception and Evidence. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):1-13.
    Perception is a source of knowledge: by looking at a white cup on a desk, one can come to know that there is a white cup on a desk. Schellenberg’s character Percy is in such an agreeable situation, the “good case”. Her hapless Hallie, on the other hand, is in the “bad case”: she is hallucinating a white cup on a desk. (For maximum contrast we may take Hallie to be a lifelong victim of hallucination, waiving the usual externalist worries (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Alex Byrne (2012). Hmm… Hill on the Paradox of Pain. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):489-496.
    Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9811-5 Authors Alex Byrne, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, 32-d808, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Alex Byrne (2012). Knowing What I See. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 183.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Alex Byrne (2011). Review Essay of Dorit Bar-On's "Speaking My Mind". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):705 - 717.
    “Avowals” are utterances that “ascribe [current] states of mind”; for instance utterances of ‘I have a terrible headache’ and ‘I’m finding this painting utterly puzzling’ (Bar-On 2004: 1). And avowals, “when compared to ordinary empirical reports…appear to enjoy distinctive security” (1), which Bar-On elaborates as follows: A subject who avows being tired, or scared of something, or thinking that p, is normally presumed to have the last word on the relevant matters; we would not presume to criticize her self-ascription or (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Alex Byrne (2011). Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
    This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2011). Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Alex Byrne (2010). Recollection, Perception, Imagination. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):15 - 26.
    Remembering a cat sleeping (specifically, recollecting the way the cat looked), perceiving (specifically, seeing) a cat sleeping, and imagining (specifically, visualizing) a cat sleeping are of course importantly different. Nonetheless, from the first-person perspective they are palpably alike. Our first question is.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (2010). How Do Things Look to the Color-Blind? In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press. 259.
    Our question is: how do things look to the color-blind? But what does that mean? Who are the “color-blind”? Approximately 7% of males and fewer than 1% of females (of European descent1) have some form of inherited defect of color vision, and as a result are unable to discriminate some colored stimuli that most of us can tell apart. (‘Color defective’ is an alternative term that is often used; we will continue to speak with the vulgar.) Color vision defects constitute (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2010). How Do Things Look to the Color-Blind? In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press. 259.
    forthcoming in Color Ontology and Color Science, ed. J. Cohen and M. Matthen (MIT).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Alex Byrne (2009). Experience and Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
    The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.) (2009). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.
    Classic texts that define the disjunctivist theory of perception.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (2009). Introduction. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Josip Balabanić, Damir Barbarić, Boran Berčić, Giovanni Boniolo, Branka Brujić, Alex Byrne, Erik Carlson, Maudemarie Clark, Nadežda Čačinovič & Zvonimir Čuljak (2008). Elvio Baccarini. Prolegomena 7:1.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Alex Byrne (2008). Knowing That I Am Thinking. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Soc. …I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken,—I mean, to oneself and in silence, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2008). Basic Sensible Qualities and the Structure of Appearance. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):385-405.
    A sensible quality is a perceptible property, a property that physical objects (or events) perceptually appear to have. Thus smells, tastes, colors and shapes are sensible qualities. An egg, for example, may smell rotten, taste sour, and look cream and round.1,2 The sensible qualities are not a miscellanous jumble—they form complex structures. Crimson, magenta, and chartreuse are not merely three different shades of color: the first two are more similar than either is to the third. Familiar color spaces or color (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (2008). Either/Or. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 314-19.
    This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main flavours, metaphysical and epistemological.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2008). Basic Sensible Qualities and the Structure of Appearance. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):385-405.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Alex Byrne (2007). Possibility and Imagination. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):125–144.
    forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Alex Byrne (2007). Review: Soames on Quine and Davidson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 135 (3):439 - 449.
    A discussion of Quine and Davidson, as interpreted and criticized in Scott Soames' "Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume II".
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Alex Byrne (2007). Soames on Quine and Davidson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 135 (3):439 - 449.
    A discussion of Quine and Davidson, as interpreted and criticized in Scott Soames’ Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume II.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Alex Byrne (2007). Truest Blue. Analysis 67 (293):87-92.
    1. The “puzzle” Physical objects are coloured: roses are red, violets are blue, and so forth. In particular, physical objects have fine-grained shades of colour: a certain chip, we can suppose, is true blue (unique, or pure blue). The following sort of scenario is commonplace. The chip looks true blue to John; in the same (ordinary) viewing conditions it looks (slightly) greenish-blue to Jane. Both John and Jane are “normal” perceivers. Now, nothing can be both true blue and greenish-blue; since (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2007). Truest Blue. Analysis 67 (1):87-92.
    Physical objects are coloured: roses are red, violets are blue, and so forth. In particular, physical objects have fine-grained shades of colour: a certain chip, we can suppose, is true blue (unique, or pure blue). The following sort of scenario is commonplace. The chip looks true blue to John; in the same (ordinary) viewing conditions it looks (slightly) greenish-blue to Jane. Both John and Jane are “normal” perceivers. Now, nothing can be both true blue and greenish-blue; since the chip is (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Alex Byrne, David Hilbert & Susanna Siegel (2007). Do We See More Than We Can Access? Behavioral and Brain Sciences (5-6):501-502.
    Short commentary on a paper by Ned Block.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2007). Color Primitivism. Erkenntnis 66 (1/2):73 - 105.
    The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with properties specified in other terms (as ways of altering light, for instance). If no reductive analysis is available — if the colors are primitive sui generis properties — this is often taken to be a convincing argument for eliminativism. That is, realist primitivism is usually thought to be untenable. The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Alex Byrne (2006). Comments. Dialectica 60 (3):337–340.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Alex Byrne (2006). Color and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.
    b>: there is no “mind-body problem”, or “hard problem of consciousness”; if there is a hard problem of something, it is the problem of reconciling the manifest and scientific images.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Alex Byrne (2006). Comments on Cohen, Mizrahi, Maund, and Levine. Dialectica 60:223-44.
  41. Alex Byrne (2006). Review of Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, Daniel Stoljar (Eds.), There's Something About Mary. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (1).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Alex Byrne (2006). Review of There's Something About Mary. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 21.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Alex Byrne (2006). What Mind-Body Problem? Boston Review:27-30.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2006). Color Primitivism. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer. 73 - 105.
    The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light of the generally anti-reductionist mood of recent philosophy of mind. The parallels between the mind-body problem and the case of color are substantial enough that the difference in trajectory is surprising. While dualism and non-.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2006). Hoffman's "Proof" of the Possibility of Spectrum Inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):48-50.
    Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Alex Byrne & James Pryor (2006). Bad Intensions. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Maci (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press. 38--54.
    _the a priori role_ (for word T). For instance, perhaps anyone who understands the word _water_ is able to know, without appeal to any further a posteriori information, that _water_ refers to the clear, drinkable natural kind whose instances are predominant in our oceans and lakes (if _water_ refers at all.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head.1 Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different metaphysically (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 118