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Alex Chavez [3]Alex K. Chavez [1]
  1.  10
    Cristina Bicchieri & Alex Chavez, Behaving as Expected: Public Information and Fairness Norms.
    What is considered to be fair depends on context-dependent expectations. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and perceptions of fairness depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in a situation—that is, upon normative expectations. We manipulate such expectations by creating informational asymmetries about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find that behavior varies accordingly. Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree of agreement in their beliefs about which choices (...)
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  2.  24
    Cristina Bicchieri & Alex K. Chavez (2013). Norm Manipulation, Norm Evasion: Experimental Evidence. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):175-198.
    Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what constituted normatively acceptable behaviour, so that an individual who made an uneven bargaining offer not only genuinely believed it was fair, but also believed that recipients found it fair, (...)
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  3.  40
    Cristina Bicchieri, Azi Lev-On & Alex Chavez (2010). The Medium or the Message? Communication Relevance and Richness in Trust Games. Synthese 176 (1):125 - 147.
    Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the topics of conversation were manipulated. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments. However, the topics of conversation made a significant difference: the amounts sent were considerably higher in the unrestricted communication conditions than in the restricted communication and no-communication conditions. Most importantly, we find that first-movers' expectations of second-movers' reciprocation are influenced by communication and strongly predict their levels of investment.
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  4. Cristina Bicchieri, Azi Lev-on & Alex Chavez (2010). The Medium or the Message? Communication Relevance and Richness in Trust Games. Synthese 176 (1):125-147.
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