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Profile: Alexander B. Miller (Catholic University of America)
  1. Alexander Miller (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Distributed in the Usa by Blackwell Publishers.
     
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  2. Alexander Miller (2007). Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    Frege : semantic value and reference -- Frege and Russell : sense and definite descriptions -- Sense and verificationism : logical positivism -- Scepticism about sense : Quine on analyticity and translation -- Scepticism about sense : Kripke's Wittgenstein -- Saving sense : responses to the sceptical paradox -- Sense, intention, and speech acts : Grice's programme -- Sense and truth : Tarski and Davidson -- Sense, world, and metaphysics.
     
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  3. Alexander Miller (2010). Kripke's Wittgenstein, Factualism and Meaning. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan
     
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  4.  35
    Alexander Miller (2013). Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction. Polity.
    1. Introduction. In this chapter, I provide a brief account of the territory covered in metaethics, and of the main philosophical positions in metaethics to be covered in detail in the course of the book.
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  5. Alexander Miller & C. J. G. Wright (eds.) (2002). Rule-Following and Meaning. Acumen.
    A selection of readings on a central topic in contemporary philosophy of language, mind, and metaphysics.
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  6. John Divers & Alexander Miller (1994). Why Expressivists About Value Should Not Love Minimalism About Truth. Analysis 54 (1):12 - 19.
  7.  19
    Alexander Miller (2015). Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):323-336.
    In this paper, I argue for three main claims. First, that there are two broad sorts of error theory about a particular region of thought and talk, eliminativist error theories and non-eliminativist error theories. Second, that an error theory about rule following can only be an eliminativist view of rule following, and therefore an eliminativist view of meaning and content on a par with Paul Churchland’s prima facie implausible eliminativism about the propositional attitudes. Third, that despite some superficial appearances to (...)
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  8. Alexander Miller (2001). The Missing-Explanation Argument Revisited. Analysis 61 (1):76-86.
  9.  22
    Alexander Miller (2014). Tacit Knowledge. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):630-635.
  10.  57
    Alexander Miller (2008). Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  11.  15
    Alexander Miller (2006). Meaning Scepticism. In Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell Pub. 19--91.
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  12.  18
    Alexander Miller (forthcoming). Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv089.
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  13.  31
    John Divers & Alexander Miller (1999). Arithmaetical Platonism: Reliability and Judgement-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 95 (3):277-310.
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  14.  43
    John Divers & Alexander Miller (1995). Platitudes and Attitudes: A Minimalist Conception of Belief. Analysis 55 (1):37 - 44.
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  15.  94
    Alexander Miller (1996). An Objection to Smith's Argument for Internalism. Analysis 56 (3):169–174.
    In Chapter 3 of _The Moral Problem, Michael Smith develops a novel and interesting argument in favour of internalism about moral motivation. In this paper I argue that Smith's argument is unsuccessful.
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  16. Alexander Miller (2004). Rule-Following and Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140.
    John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.
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  17.  30
    Alexander Miller (2000). Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174.
    Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical (...)
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  18.  71
    Alexander Miller (1999). Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophical Quarterly 49 (199):161-174.
    Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical (...)
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  19.  34
    Alexander Miller (2009). Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):337-341.
    In chapter 8 of Miller 2003, I argued against the idea that Jackson and Pettit's notion of program explanation might help Sturgeon's non-reductive naturalist version of moral realism respond to the explanatory challenge posed by Harman. In a recent paper in the AJP[Nelson 2006, Mark Nelson has attempted to defend the idea that program explanation might prove useful to Sturgeon in replying to Harman. In this note, I suggest that Nelson's argument fails.
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  20.  45
    Alexander Miller (2008). Thoughts, Oughts and the Conceptual Primacy of Belief. Analysis 68 (299):234–238.
  21.  37
    Alexander Miller (1997). Boghossian on Reductive Dispositionalism About Content: The Case Strengthened. Mind and Language 12 (1):1-10.
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  22.  40
    Alexander Miller (2006). Russell, Multiple Relations, and the Correspondence Theory of Truth. The Monist 89 (1):85-101.
  23.  20
    Alexander Miller (2015). Blind Rule-Following and the ‘Antinomy of Pure Reason’. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):396-416.
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  24. Alexander Miller, The Argument From Queerness and the Normativity of Meaning.
    In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or “ Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non- factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not purport to (...)
     
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  25.  66
    John Divers & Alexander Miller (1995). Minimalism and the Unbearable Lightness of Being. Philosophical Papers 24 (2):127-139.
  26.  38
    Alexander Miller (2014). Wittgenstein, Quine and Dummett on Conventionalism About Logic. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):292-301.
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  27. Alexander Miller (2002). Wright’s Argument Against Error-Theories. Analysis 62 (274):98–103.
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  28.  60
    Alexander Miller (2002). What is the Manifestation Argument? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):352–383.
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  29.  9
    Alexander Miller (forthcoming). Wittgenstein: Opening Investigations. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv119.
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  30.  19
    Alexander Miller (1995). Objectivity Disfigured: Mark Johnston's Missing-Explanation Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):857-868.
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  31. Alexander Miller, Semantic Realism and the Argument From Motivational Internalism.
    In his 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non-factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not purport to state (...)
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  32.  65
    Brian Leiter & Alexander Miller (1994). Mind Doesn't Matter Yet. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):220-28.
  33.  43
    Alexander Miller (2007). Another Objection to Wright's Treatment of Intention. Analysis 67 (295):257–263.
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  34.  2
    Alexander Miller (2006). Realism and Antirealism. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press 983.
    This article questions whether, once the conception of metaphysics as grounded in the philosophy of language has been jettisoned, Dummett's arguments against semantic realism can retain any relevance to the realist/antirealist debate. By focussing on realism about the external world as an example, it reaches the conclusion that even without Dummett's conception of philosophy as grounded in the theory of meaning, his arguments against semantic realism do retain a limited but nevertheless genuine significance for the metaphysical debate. It emerges, though, (...)
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  35.  66
    Alexander Miller (2000). Disjunctions, Programming, and the Australian View of Colour. Analysis 60 (266):209-212.
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  36.  41
    Alexander Miller (1989). An Objection to Wright's Treatment of Intention. Analysis 49 (4):169 - 173.
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  37.  56
    Alexander Miller (1998). Emotivism and the Verification Principle. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):103–124.
    In chapter VI of Language, Truth, and Logic, A.J. Ayer argues that ethical statements are not literally significant. Unlike metaphysical statements, however, ethical statements are not nonsensical: even though they are not literally significant, Ayer thinks that they possess some other sort of significance. This raises the question: by what principle or criterion can we distinguish, among the class of statements that are not literally significant, between those which are genuinely meaningless and those which possess some other, non-literal form of (...)
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  38.  77
    Duncan McFarland & Alexander Miller (1998). Jackson on Colour as a Primary Quality. Analysis 58 (2):76-85.
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  39.  83
    Alexander Miller (2003). The Significance of Semantic Realism. Synthese 136 (2):191 - 217.
    This paper is concerned with the relationship between the metaphysical doctrine of realism about the external world and semantic realism, as characterised by Michael Dummett. I argue that Dummett's conception of the relationship is flawed, and that Crispin Wright's account of the relationship, although designed to avoid the problems which beset Dummett's, nevertheless fails for similar reasons. I then aim to show that despite the fact that Dummett and Wright both fail to give a plausible account of the relationship between (...)
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  40.  23
    Alexander Miller & Ali Saboohi (2015). Rule-Following and Consciousness: Old Problem or New? Acta Analytica 30 (2):171-178.
    It has recently been claimed that there is a “new hard problem” for physicalism. The new hard problem, according to Goff, is based on “semantic phenomenology”, the view that conscious perceptual experience represents linguistic expressions as having determinate meanings. Goff argues that Kripke’s rule-following argument demonstrates that it is particularly difficult for a physicalist to account for semantic phenomenology. In this paper, we argue that Goff’s discussion of semantic phenomenology fails to uncover a “new” hard problem for physicalism and there (...)
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  41.  76
    Alexander Miller (1997). Lenin's Anticipation of Bernard Williams's Integrity Objection to Utilitarianism. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (4):503-510.
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  42.  16
    Alexander Miller (1997). More Responses to the Missing-Explanation Argument. Philosophia 25 (1-4):331-349.
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  43.  12
    Alexander Miller (2007). Critical Notice. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):125 – 140.
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  44.  29
    Alexander Miller (2003). Objective Content. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):73–90.
    [Alan Weir] This paper addresses the problem of how to account for objective content-for the distinction between how we actually apply terms and the conditions in which we ought to apply them-from within a naturalistic framework. Though behaviourist or dispositionalist approaches are generally held to be unsuccessful in naturalising objective content or 'normativity', I attempt to restore the credibility of such approaches by sketching a behaviouristic programme for explicating objective content. /// [Alexander Miller] Paul Boghossian (1989, 1990) has argued, on (...)
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  45.  25
    Brian Leiter & Alexander Miller (1998). Closet Dualism and Mental Causation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):161-181.
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  46.  60
    Review author[S.]: John Divers & Alexander Miller (1994). Critical Notice. Mind 103 (412):519-533.
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  47.  44
    Alexander Miller, Bare Functional Desire.
    But this changes nothing. The decisive claim is that in assessing the counterfactuals implicit in (A) we do not have to take sceptical worlds into the reckoning, whereas we must do that in assessing (B) because (B) explicitly speaks of them. Accept, provisionally, what is here said about (B) and focus on the claim about (A). Nobody should make it unless they are already in a position to assert that the actual world is not a sceptical world. And with that (...)
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  48.  23
    Alexander Miller (2001). On Wright's Argument Against Deflationism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):527-531.
  49.  8
    Alexander Miller (2004). Review: Differences with Wright. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):595 - 603.
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  50.  54
    Alexander Miller (2003). Review: An Identity Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (445):112-119.
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