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Profile: Alexis Burgess (Stanford University)
  1.  8
    Alexis G. Burgess & John P. Burgess (2011). Truth. Princeton University Press.
    This is a concise, advanced introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. A blend of philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the tendency known as deflationism, according to which there is not much to say about the nature of truth. In clear language, Burgess and Burgess cover a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth-value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about truth, and (...)
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  2. Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett (2013). Conceptual Ethics I. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
    Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosophy. In (...)
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  3.  29
    Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (eds.) (2014). Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. OUP Oxford.
    Metasemantics presents new work on the philosophical foundations of linguistic semantics. Experts in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and the theory of content provide new perspectives on old problems about linguistic meaning, pose questions that suggest novel research projects, and sharpen our understanding of linguistic representation.
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  4.  30
    David E. Taylor & Alexis Burgess (2015). What in the World Is Semantic Indeterminacy? Analytic Philosophy 56 (4):298-317.
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  5.  50
    Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett (2013). Conceptual Ethics II. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1102-1110.
    Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosophy. In (...)
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  6.  67
    Alexis Burgess (2012). A Puzzle About Identity. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):90-99.
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  7.  60
    Alexis Burgess (2010). How to Reconcile Deflationism and Nonfactualism. Noûs 44 (3):433-450.
    There are three general ways to approach reconciliation: from the side of nonfactualism, from the side of deflationism, or from both sides at once. To approach reconciliation from a given side, as I will use the expression, just means to attend in the first instance to the details of that side’s position. (It will be important to keep in mind that the success of an approach from one side may ultimately require concessions from the other side.) The only attempts at (...)
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  8.  88
    Alexis Burgess (2011). Mainstream Semantics + Deflationary Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (5):397-410.
    Recent philosophy of language has been profoundly impacted by the idea that mainstream, model-theoretic semantics is somehow incompatible with deflationary accounts of truth and reference. The present article systematizes the case for incompatibilism, debunks circularity and “modal confusion” arguments familiar in the literature, and reconstructs the popular thought that truth-conditional semantics somehow “presupposes” a correspondence theory of truth as an inference to the best explanation. The case for compatibilism is closed by showing that this IBE argument fails to rule out (...)
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  9.  73
    Alexis Burgess (2013). Metalinguistic Descriptivism for Millians. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):443-457.
    Metalinguistic descriptivism is the view that proper names are semantically equivalent to descriptions featuring their own quotations (e.g., ?Socrates? means ?the bearer of ?Socrates??). The present paper shows that Millians can actually accept an inferential version of this equivalence thesis without running afoul of the modal argument. Indeed, they should: for it preserves the explanatory virtues of more familiar forms of descriptivism while avoiding objections (old and new) to Kent Bach's nominal description theory. We can make significant progress on Frege's (...)
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  10.  34
    Alexis Burgess (2013). Keeping ‘True’: A Case Study in Conceptual Ethics. Inquiry 57 (5-6):580-606.
    Suppose our ordinary notion of truth is ‘inconsistent’ in the sense that its meaning is partly given by principles that classically entail a logical contradiction. Should we replace the notion with a consistent surrogate? This paper begins by defusing various arguments in favor of this revisionary proposal, including Kevin Scharp’s contention that we need to replace truth for the purposes of semantic theorizing . Borrowing a certain conservative metasemantic principle from Matti Eklund, the article goes on to build a positive (...)
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  11.  49
    Alexis Burgess (2012). Negative Existentials in Metaphysical Debate. Metaphilosophy 43 (3):221-234.
    There are statements of the form “There are no Fs” that we would like to count as true, yet it is hard to see how they could be true (at least, operating within the semantic framework of structured propositions). The relevant Fs are general terms that we take to be semantically fundamental or primitive, especially those native to <span class='Hi'>metaphysical</span> discourse. A case can be made the problem is no less difficult than the corresponding problem for singular terms.
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  12. Alexis Burgess (forthcoming). Truth in Fictionalism. In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford
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  13.  4
    Alexis Burgess (2014). Fiction and Narrative by Derek Matravers, 2014 Oxford, Oxford University Press192 Pp., £30. [REVIEW] Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (4):434-436.
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  14.  1
    John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Chapter Seven. Kripke. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press 102-115.
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  15.  1
    John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Chapter Three. Deflationism. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press 33-51.
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  16.  1
    John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Chapter Two. Tarski. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press 16-32.
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  17. Alexis Burgess (2015). An Inferential Account of Referential Success. In Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation. Oxford
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  18. Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (2014). A Plea for the Metaphysics of Meaning. In Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. Oxford
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  19. John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Bibliography. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press 143-152.
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  20. John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Contents. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press
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  21. John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Chapter Eight. Insolubility? In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press 116-134.
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  22. John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Chapter Four. Indeterminacy. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press 52-67.
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  23. John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Chapter Five. Realism. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press 68-82.
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  24. John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Chapter One. Introduction. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press 1-15.
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  25. John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Chapter Six. Antirealism. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press 83-101.
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  26. John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Further Reading. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press 135-142.
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  27. Alexis Burgess (2014). How We Ought to Do Things with Words. In Robert Bolger & Scott Korb (eds.), Gesturing Toward Reality. Bloomsbury
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  28. Alexis Burgess (2010). Metaphysics as Make-Believe. In John Woods (ed.), Fictions and Models. Philosophia
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  29. John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (2014). Preface. In John P. Burgess & Alexis G. Burgess (eds.), Truth. Princeton University Press
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  30. Alexis Burgess (2012). Saul Kripke. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  31. Alexis Burgess (2015). Singular Ontology: How To. In Christopher Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave 77-111.
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  32. Alexis Burgess (2011). Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics.
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  33. Alexis Burgess (2014). The Construction of Logical Space. [REVIEW] Critica 46 (136).
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  34. Alexis G. Burgess–John P. Burgess (2012). University Press, 2011, Pp. 176; Leon Horsten, The Tarskian Turn. Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, Cambridge (MA), The MIT Press, 2011, Pp. XII-165; Volker Halbach, Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, Pp. 376. [REVIEW] Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2).
  35. Alexis Burgess (2014). What is It Like to Be Asleep? Harvard Review of Philosophy 21:18-22.
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