Search results for 'Alice Kyburg' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  61
    Alice Kyburg & Michael Morreau (2000). Fitting Words: Vague Language in Context. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (6):577-597.
  2.  18
    Alice Kyburg (2000). When Vague Sentences Inform: A Model of Assertability. Synthese 124 (2):175-191.
    A speaker often decides whether or not to saysomething based on his assessment of the impact itwould have on his hearer's beliefs. If he thinks itwould bring them more in line with the truth, he saysit; otherwise he does not. In this paper, I developa model of these judgments, focusing specifically onthose of vague sentences. Under the simplifyingassumption that an utterance only conveys a speaker'sapplicability judgments, I present a Bayesian model ofan utterance's impact on a hearer's beliefs. Fromthis model I (...)
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  3. Alice I. Kyburg (1994). Belief, Assertability, and Truth: Pragmatic and Semantic Accounts of Vagueness. Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    This dissertation explores several accounts of the intuitions speakers have concerning the truth values of utterances of sentences containing vague nouns and adjectives. While some semanticists have attempted to account for these intuitions with multi-valued logics and supervaluation theories of truth, I focus on how utterances of vague sentences affect hearers' beliefs. ;Following a critique of the major semantical accounts of vagueness, I propose a formal theory of how beliefs are revised following utterances of sentences of the form X is (...)
     
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  4.  14
    Henry E. Kyburg (ed.) (1984). Theory and Measurement. Cambridge University Press.
    Measurement is fundamental to all the sciences, the behavioural and social as well as the physical and in the latter its results provide our paradigms of 'objective fact'. But the basis and justification of measurement is not well understood and is often simply taken for granted. Henry Kyburg Jr proposes here an original, carefully worked out theory of the foundations of measurement, to show how quantities can be defined, why certain mathematical structures are appropriate to them and what meaning (...)
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  5. Ken Knisely, Natasha Kyburg & Farzad Mahootian (2001). Cosmology: Dvd. Milk Bottle Productions.
    Do the results of scientific study of the physical world give us any inkling about the value of doing metaphysics? Or is the construction of a philosophy of everything upon the insights of science building on sinking sand? With Matt Hunter, Natasha Kyburg, and Farzad Mahootian.
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  6. Ken Knisely, Matt Hunter, Natasha Kyburg & Farzad Mahootian (forthcoming). Cosmology: No Dogs or Philosophers Allowed. DVD.
    Do the results of scientific study of the physical world give us any inkling about the value of doing metaphysics? Or is the construction of a philosophy of everything upon the insights of science building on sinking sand? With Matt Hunter, Natasha Kyburg, and Farzad Mahootian.
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  7. Ken Knisely, Bruce Umbaugh, Natasha Kyburg & Floyd Tesmer (forthcoming). Rationality: No Dogs or Philosophers Allowed. DVD.
    Reason and rationality are thought to be the paradigmatic tools of the philosopher. But just what are they? What is the relationship of language to rational thinking? How good a tool is rationality in the search for truth? With Bruce Umbaugh, Natasha Kyburg, and Floyd Tesmer.
     
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  8.  12
    Henry Ely Kyburg (1990). Science & Reason. Oxford University Press.
    In this work Henry Kyburg presents his views on a wide range of philosophical problems associated with the study and practice of science and mathematics. The main structure of the book consists of a presentation of Kyburg's notions of epistemic probability and its use in the scientific enterprise i.e., the effort to modify previously adopted beliefs in the light of experience. Intended for cognitive scientists and people in artificial intelligence as well as for technically oriented philosophers, the book (...)
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  9.  17
    Henry Kyburg (1974). The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference. Reidel.
    At least one of these conceptions of probability underlies any theory of statistical inference (or, to use Neyman's phrase, 'inductive behavior'). ...
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  10.  5
    Henry Ely Kyburg (1961). Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Middletown, Conn.,Wesleyan University Press.
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  11.  12
    Henry E. Kyburg (1983). Rational Belief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231.
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  12.  51
    Gregory Wheeler, Henry E. Kyburg & Choh Man Teng (2007). Conditionals and Consequences. Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):638-650.
    We examine the notion of conditionals and the role of conditionals in inductive logics and arguments. We identify three mistakes commonly made in the study of, or motivation for, non-classical logics. A nonmonotonic consequence relation based on evidential probability is formulated. With respect to this acceptance relation some rules of inference of System P are unsound, and we propose refinements that hold in our framework.
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  13.  45
    F. Bacchus, Mariam Thalos & H. E. Kyburg (1990). Against Conditionalization. Synthese 85 (3):475 - 506.
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  14.  27
    H. Kyburg (1978). Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections, and Problems. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):157 - 180.
  15.  7
    Henry E. Kyburg (1980). Acts and Conditional Probabilities. Theory and Decision 12 (2):149-171.
  16. Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.) (1980). Studies in Subjective Probability. Krieger.
     
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  17.  4
    Henry E. Kyburg (1981). Intuition, Competence, and Performance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):341.
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  18. William L. Harper & Henry E. Kyburg (1968). The Jones Case. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):247-251.
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  19. Henry Ely Kyburg (1970). Probability and Inductive Logic. [New York]Macmillan.
     
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  20.  10
    Henry Kyburg (1983). Recent Work in Inductive Logic. In Kenneth G. Lucey & Tibor R. Machan (eds.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Rowman & Allanheld 87--150.
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  21. Henry E. Kyburg (1976). Chance. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):355-393.
  22.  19
    Henry E. Kyburg (1988). Review. [REVIEW] Synthese 76 (1):179-182.
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  23.  16
    Henry E. Kyburg (2002). Don't Take Unnecessary Chances! Synthese 132 (1-2):9-26.
    The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the``single case'' application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. ``Propensities'' are needed only intheoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly.
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  24.  67
    William L. Harper & Henry E. Kyburg (1968). Discussions: The Jones Case. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):247-251.
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  25.  22
    Henry E. Kyburg (1979). Tyche and Athena. Synthese 40 (3):415 - 438.
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  26.  35
    Henry E. Kyburg (1963). Probability and Randomness. Theoria 29 (1):27-55.
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  27. Henry Ely Kyburg (1968). Philosophy of Science. New York, Macmillan.
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  28.  16
    Henry E. Kyburg (1977). Decisions, Conclusions, and Utilities. Synthese 36 (1):87-96.
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  29.  12
    Henry E. Kyburg (1971). Reviews. [REVIEW] Synthese 22 (3-4):482-493.
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  30.  29
    Henry E. Kyburg (1992). Getting Fancy with Probability. Synthese 90 (2):189-203.
    There are a number of reasons for being interested in uncertainty, and there are also a number of uncertainty formalisms. These formalisms are not unrelated. It is argued that they can all be reflected as special cases of the approach of taking probabilities to be determined by sets of probability functions defined on an algebra of statements. Thus, interval probabilities should be construed as maximum and minimum probabilities within a set of distributions, Glenn Shafer's belief functions should be construed as (...)
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  31. E. Kyburg, Henry (1987). Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Evidential Updating. Artificial Intelligence 31:271--294.
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  32.  10
    Henry E. Kyburg & David A. Nelson (1994). Discussion Reviews. Minds and Machines 4 (1):81-101.
  33.  20
    Stephen Leeds, John L. Pollock & Henry E. Kyburg (1985). A Problem About Frequencies in Direct Inference. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):137 - 140.
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  34.  12
    Henry E. Kyburg (1991). A Two-Level System of Knowledge Representation Based on Evidential Probability. Philosophical Studies 64 (1):105 - 114.
  35.  33
    Henry E. Kyburg (1997). Thinking About Reasoning About Knowledge. Minds and Machines 7 (1):103-112.
  36.  18
    Henry E. Kyburg (1971). Epistemological Probability. Synthese 23 (2-3):309-326.
  37.  17
    Henry Kyburg (1992). The Scope of Bayesian Reasoning. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:139 - 152.
    The Bayesian view of inference has become popular in philosophy in recent years. Scientific Reasoning: a Bayesian Approach, by Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, represents an articulate and persuasive defense of the Bayesian view. We focus on the theme of that book, and argue that there are difficulties with Bayesianism, and alternatives worth considering. One of the most serious drawbacks to Bayesianism is the subjectivity that pervades most versions of it. We argue that this is an instance of a more (...)
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  38.  26
    Henry E. Kyburg (1993). The Evidence of Your Own Eyes. Minds and Machines 3 (2):201-218.
    The evidence of your own eyes has often been regarded as unproblematic. But we know that people make mistaken observations. This can be looked on as unimportant if there issome class of statements that can serve as evidence for others, or if every statement in our corpus of knowledge is allowed to be no more than probable. Neither of these alternatives is plausible when it comes to machine or robotic observation. Then we must take the possibility of error seriously, and (...)
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  39.  6
    Henry E. Kyburg (1975). Review: Jaakko Hintikka, Imre Lakatos, Induction by Enumeration and Induction by Elimination; J. R. Lucas, R. Carnap, M. B. Hesse, J. Hintikka, Discussion. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (3):448-449.
  40.  6
    Rose Alice (1964). Flannery O'Connor. Renascence 16 (3):126-132.
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  41.  6
    Henry E. Kyburg (1972). Randomness. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:137 - 149.
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  42.  6
    Henry E. Kyburg (1986). Induction and Probability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):660.
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  43.  6
    Henry E. Kyburg (1983). The Role of Logic in Reason, Inference, and Decision. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):263.
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  44.  22
    Henry E. Kyburg (2001). Real Logic is Nonmonotonic. Minds and Machines 11 (4):577-595.
    Charles Morgan has argued that nonmonotonic logic is ``impossible''. We show here that those arguments are mistaken, and that Morgan's preferred alternative, the representation of nonmonotonic reasoning by ``presuppositions'' fails to provide a framework in which nonmonotonic reasoning can be constructively criticised. We argue that an inductive logic, based on probabilistic acceptance, offers more than Morgan's approach through presuppositions.
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  45. H. E. Kyburg (2005). D. Christensen, Putting Logic in its Place. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (4).
     
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  46.  2
    Henry E. Kyburg (1977). All Acceptable Generalizations Are Analytic. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (3):201 - 210.
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  47.  2
    Henry E. Kyburg (1983). Knowledge and the Absolute. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):72.
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  48.  2
    Henry E. Kyburg (1970). On a Certain Form of Philosophical Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (3):229-237.
    There is a certain form of philosophical argument that characteristically begins, "we have no reason to suppose that..." and goes on to deny some proposition we took to be well supported. The claim that there is no inductive argument takes the form: the sample on which such an argument would be based is taken from a special part of the population; but we have no reason to suppose that this special part of the population is not very different from the (...)
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  49.  13
    Henry E. Kyburg (1977). Reply to Professor Freudenthal. Synthese 36 (4):493-498.
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  50.  11
    Henry E. Kyburg (1958). The Justification of Deduction. Review of Metaphysics 12 (1):19-25.
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