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Alicia Finch [7]Alicia Marie Finch [1]
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Profile: Alicia Finch (Northern Illinois University)
  1. Alicia Finch & Ted A. Warfield (1998). The Mind Argument and Libertarianism. Mind 107 (427):515-28.
    Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom.
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  2. Alicia Finch & Michael C. Rea (2008). Presentism and Ockham's Way Out. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 1:1-17.
    We lay out the fatalist’s argument, making sure to clarify which dialectical moves are available to the libertarian. We then offer a more robust presentation of Ockhamism, responding to obvious objections and teasing out the implications of the view. At this point, we discuss presentism and eternalism in more detail. We then present our argument for the claim that the libertarian cannot take Ockham’s way out of the fatalism argument unless she rejects presentism. Finally, we consider and dispense with objections (...)
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  3. Alicia Finch (2013). On Behalf of the Consequence Argument: Time, Modality, and the Nature of Free Action. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):151-170.
    The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis (...)
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  4.  51
    Alicia Finch (2013). Against Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493.
    The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is true. The soundness of this argument entails the falsity of libertarianism, the two-part thesis that agents act freely, and free action and determinism are incompatible. In this paper, I offer a new formulation of the Mind argument. I argue that it is true by definition that if an agent acts freely, either (i) nothing nomologically grounds an agent’s acting freely, or (ii) the consequence argument (...)
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  5.  43
    Alicia Finch (2011). Experimental Philosophy and the Concept of Moral Responsibility. Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):146-160.
    In recent years, so-called experimental philosophers have argued that participants in the moral responsibility debate ought to adopt a new methodology. In particular, they argue, the results of experimental surveys ought to be introduced into the debate.According to the experimental philosophers, these surveys are philosophically rel- evant because they provide information about the moral responsibility judgments that ordinary people make. Moreover, they argue, an account of moral responsibility is satisfactory only if it is tightly con- nected to ordinary judgments. The (...)
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  6.  27
    Ted A. Warfield & Alicia Finch (1999). Fatalism: Logical and Theological. Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):233-238.
    The logical fatalist holds that the past truth of future tense propositions is incompatible with libertarian freedom. The theological fatalist holds that the combination of God’s past beliefs with His essential omniscience is incompatible with libertarian freedom. There is an ongoing dispute over the relation between these two kinds of fatalism: some philosophers believe that the problems are equivalent while others believe that the theological problem is more difficult. We offer a diagnosis of this dispute showing that one’s view of (...)
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  7.  22
    Alicia Finch (2003). The Empirical Stance. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2):302-307.
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