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  1. Alison Hills (2013). Faultless Moral Disagreement. Ratio 26 (4):410-427.
    Faultless disagreements are disagreements between two people, neither of whom has made a mistake or is at fault. It has been argued that there are faultless moral disagreements, that they cannot be accommodated by moral realism, and that in order to account for them, a form of relativism must be accepted. I argue that moral realism can accommodate faultless moral disagreement, provided that the phenomena is understood epistemically, and I give a brief defence of the relevant moral epistemology.
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  2. Alison Hills (2013). Moral Testimony. Philosophy Compass 8 (6):552-559.
    Testimony is an important source of our knowledge about the world. But to some, there seems something odd, perhaps even wrong, about trusting testimony about specifically moral matters. In this paper, I discuss several different explanations of what might be wrong with trusting moral testimony. These include the possibility that there is no moral knowledge; that moral knowledge cannot be transmitted by moral testimony; that there are reasons not to trust moral testimony either because you should try to gain and (...)
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  3. Alison Hills (2011). Moral Epistemology. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  4. Alison Hills (2010/2012). The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge From Egoism. Oxford University Press.
    The Beloved Self is about the holy grail of moral philosophy, an argument against egoism that proves that we all have reasons to be moral. Part One introduces three different versions of egoism. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that egoism is false, and shows that even the more modest arguments that do not try to answer the egoist in her own terms seem to fail. But in part Three, Hills defends morality and develops a new problem for egoism, (...)
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  5. Alison Hills (2010). Utilitarianism, Contractualism and Demandingness. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):225-242.
    One familiar criticism of utilitarianism is that it is too demanding. It requires us to promote the happiness of others, even at the expense of our own projects, our integrity, or the welfare of our friends and family. Recently Ashford has defended utilitarianism, arguing that it provides compelling reasons for demanding duties to help the needy, and that other moral theories, notably contractualism, are committed to comparably stringent duties. In response, I argue that utilitarianism is even more demanding than is (...)
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  6. Alison Hills (2009). Book Reviews Scanlon, Thomas M. Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 2008. Pp. Xii+247. $29.95 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 119 (4):792-796.
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  7. Alison Hills (2009). Happiness in the Groundwork. In Jens Timmermann (ed.), Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
  8. Alison Hills (2009). Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. Ethics 120 (1):94-127.
  9. Alison Hills (2009). Supervenience and Moral Realism. In Hieke Alexander & Leitgeb Hannes (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Ontos Verlag. 11--163.
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  10. Henry S. Richardson, Cécile Fabre, Joshua Glasgow, Alison Hills, Kieran Setiya & Hallie Rose Liberto (2009). 10. Neil MacCormick, Practical Reason in Law and Morality Neil MacCormick, Practical Reason in Law and Morality (Pp. 192-196). In John Hawthorne (ed.), Ethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
     
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  11. Alison Hills (2008). Kantian Value Realism. Ratio 21 (2):182–200.
    Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not (...)
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  12. Alison Hills (2008). Value, Reason and Hedonism. Utilitas 20 (1):50-58.
    It is widely believed that we always have reason to maximize the good. Utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories depend on this conception of value. Scanlon has argued that this view of value is not generally correct, but that it is most plausible with regard to the value of pleasure, and may even be true at least of that. But there are reasons to think that even the value of pleasure is not teleological.
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  13. Alison Hills (2007). Intentions, Foreseen Consequences and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):257 - 283.
    The difficulty of distinguishing between the intended and the merely foreseen consequences of actions seems to many to be the most serious problem for the doctrine of double effect. It has led some to reject the doctrine altogether, and has left some of its defenders recasting it in entirely different terms. I argue that these responses are unnecessary. Using Bratman’s conception of intention, I distinguish the intended consequences of an action from the merely foreseen in a way that can be (...)
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  14. Alison Hills (2007). Practical Reason, Value and Action. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):375-392.
    How should we decide which theory of practical reason is correct? One possibility is to link each conception of practical reason with a theory of value, and to assess the first in combination with the second. Recently some philosophers have taken a different approach. They have tried to link theories of practical reason with theories of action instead. I try to show that it can be illuminating to think of practical reason in terms of the success conditions of action, but (...)
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  15. Alison Hills (2007). The Principle of Right: Practical Reason and Justification in Kant's Ethical and Political Philosophy. Politics and Ethics Review 3 (1):24-36.
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  16. Alison Hills (2006). Kant on Happiness and Reason. History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (3):243 - 261.
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  17. Alison Hills (2006). Review of Elijah Millgram, Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning As a Foundation for Moral Theory. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).
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  18. Alison Hills (2005). Rational Nature as the Source of Value. Kantian Review 10 (1):60-81.
  19. Alison Hills (2004). Is Ethics Rationally Required? Inquiry 47 (1):1 – 19.
    Sidgwick argued that utilitarianism was not rationally required because it could not be shown that a utilitarian theory of practical reason was better justified than a rival egoist theory of practical reason: there is a 'dualism of practical reason' between utilitarianism and egoism. In this paper, it is demonstrated that the dualism argument also applies to Kant's moral theory, the moral law. A prudential theory that is parallel to the moral law is devised, and it is argued that the moral (...)
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  20. Alison Hills (2003). The Significance of the Dualism of Practical Reason. Utilitas 15 (03):315-.
    Sidgwick argued that utilitarianism and egoism were in conflict, that neither theory was better justified than the other, and concluded that there was a and all that remained to him was . The dualism argument introduced by Sidgwick is an extremely powerful sceptical argument that no theory of ethics is rationally required: it cannot be shown that a moral sceptic or an egoist ought to accept the moral theory, otherwise she is unreasonable. I explain two ways in which the significance (...)
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  21. Alison Hills (2003). Duties and Duties to the Self. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2):131 - 142.
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  22. Alison Hills (2003). Defending Double Effect. Philosophical Studies 116 (2):133-152.
    According to the doctrine of double effect(DDE), there is a morally significantdifference between harm that is intended andharm that is merely foreseen and not intended.It is not difficult to explain why it is bad tointend harm as an end (you have a ``badattitude'' toward that harm) but it is hard toexplain why it is bad to intend harm as a meansto some good end. If you intend harm as a meansto some good end, you need not have a ``badattitude'' toward (...)
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  23. Alison Hills, Christopher Mcmahon & Once More Friends (2003). Knowledge and Psychological Explanation 37–52 Sanford C. Goldberg/Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism 53–78 Steven Wall/Just Savings and the Difference Principle 79–102. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 116:325-326.
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