1.  8
    Allan F. Gibbard (2014). Social Choice and the Arrow Conditions. Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):269-284.
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  2. Allan F. Gibbard (2003). Thoughts and Norms. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):83-98.
  3.  83
    Allan F. Gibbard (1996). Thoughts, Norms, and Discursive Practices: Commentary on Brandom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):699-717.
  4.  64
    Allan F. Gibbard (1965). Rule-Utilitarianism: Merely an Illusory Alternative? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):211 – 220.
  5.  75
    Allan F. Gibbard (2002). Normative Explanations: Invoking Rationality to Explain Happenings. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon
  6.  21
    Allan F. Gibbard (1996). Visible Properties of Human Interest Only. Philosophical Issues 7:199-208.
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    Allan F. Gibbard (1978). Preference Strength and Two Kinds of Ordinalism. Philosophia 7 (2):255-264.
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  8.  11
    John A. Weymark, Aanund Hylland & Allan F. Gibbard, Arrow's Theorem with a Fixed Feasible Alternative.
    Arrow's Theorem, in its social choice function formulation, assumes that all nonempty finite subsets of the universal set of alternatives is potentially a feasible set. We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if it is assumed that there is a prespecified alternative which is in every feasible set. We further show that if the collection of feasible sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing a prespecified list of alternatives and (...)
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