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Profile: Allan Hazlett
  1. Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett, In Defense of Ambivalence.
    Harry Frankfurt (1988, 1998, 2004) defends an ethical ideal of wholeheartedness. We follow Frankfurt in distinguishing between ambivalence (a species of incoherence in desire) and wholeheartedness (the absence of ambivalence), but part ways with him by arguing against the idea that wholeheartedness is an ethical ideal. Our argument is based on cases of ethically valuable ambivalence – cases in which ambivalence contributes to the wellbeing of the ambivalent person.
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  2. Allan Hazlett, Limning Structure as an Epistemic Goal.
    In the Phaedrus, Socreates sympathetically describes the ability “to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.” (265e) In contemporary philosophy, Ted Sider (2009, 2011) defends the same idea. As I shall put it, Plato and Sider’s idea is that limning structure is an epistemic goal. My aim in this paper is to articulate and defend this idea. First, I’ll articulate the notion (...)
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  3. Allan Hazlett, Preferring Non-Testimonial Belief is a Social Virtue.
  4. Allan Hazlett, Belief and Truth, Desire and Goodness.
    There seems to be a special relationship between belief and truth that can be metaphorically expressed by saying that belief “aims” at truth or that belief’s “direction of fit” is “to fit the world.” There is an Aristotelian thesis, according to which the special relationship between belief and truth is the same as the special relationship between desire and goodness. Assuming that belief “aims” at truth, then, desire “aims” at goodness. This contrasts with a Humean thesis, on which, while belief (...)
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  5. Allan Hazlett, Truthfulness Without Truth.
    What is the relationship between the value of sincerity and the value of truth? You might assume that the value of sincerity and the value of truth (more exactly: true belief) are part of an evaluative package, such that they stand or fall together. In this spirit, Bernard Williams (2002) offers an account of the “virtues of truth,” which include sincerity and accuracy. My goal in this paper is to undermine the assumption that the value of sincerity is tied to (...)
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  6. Allan Hazlett, A Gricean Approach to the Gettier Problem.
    David Lewis maintained that epistemological contextualism (on which the truth-conditions for utterances of “S knows p” change in different contexts depending on the salient “alternative possibilities”) could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem. Contextualist approaches to skepticism have become commonplace, if not orthodox, in epistemology. But not so for contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem: the standard approach to this has been to add an “anti-luck” condition to the analysis of knowledge.
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  7. Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). Expressivism and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse. In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.
    Consider the claim that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, the claim that true belief is epistemically valuable, and the claim that one epistemically ought to cleave to one’s evidence. These are examples of what I’ll call “epistemic discourse.” In this paper I’ll propose and defend a view called “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse.” In particular, I’ll argue that convention-relativismis superior to its main rival, expressivism about epistemic discourse. Expressivism and conventionalism both jibe with anti-realism about epistemic normativity, which is motivated by (...)
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  8. Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). The Maturation of the Gettier Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-6.
    Edmund Gettier’s paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” first appeared in an issue of Analysis (Vol. 23, No. 6), dated June of 1963, and although it’s tempting (and common) to wax hyperbolic when discussing the paper’s importance and influence, it is fair to say that its impact on contemporary philosophy has been substantial and wide-ranging. Epistemology has benefited from 50 years of sincere and rigorous discussion of issues arising from the paper, and Gettier’s conclusion that knowledge is not justified true (...)
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  9. Allan Hazlett, Robin McKenna & Joey Pollock (forthcoming). Review of Brown and Cappelen, Assertion (Oxford University Press). Mind.
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  10. Kenneth Boyce & Allan Hazlett (2014). Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox. Ratio 27 (3):n/a-n/a.
    The problem of multi-peer disagreement concerns the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe P1 … Pn and disagree with a group of ‘epistemic peers’ of yours, who believe ∼P1 … ∼Pn, respectively. However, the problem of multi-peer disagreement is a variant on the preface paradox; because of this the problem poses no challenge to the so-called ‘steadfast view’ in the epistemology of disagreement, on which it is sometimes reasonable to believe P in the face of peer disagreement (...)
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  11. Allan Hazlett (2014). Book Review: In Praise of Reason. By Michael P. Lynch. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):75-79.
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  12. Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett (2013). Authenticity and Self‐Knowledge. Dialectica 67 (2):157-181.
    We argue that the value of authenticity does not explain the value of self-knowledge. There are a plurality of species of authenticity; in this paper we consider four species: avoiding pretense (section 2), Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (section 3), existential self-knowledge (section 4), and spontaneity (section 5). Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value of (that species of) authenticity does not (partially) explain the value of self-knowledge. Moreover, when it comes to spontaneity, the value of (that species of) (...)
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  13. Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett (2013). What's Bad About Bad Faith? European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):50-73.
    : Contemporary common sense holds that authenticity is an ethical ideal: that there is something bad about inauthenticity, and something good about authenticity. Here we criticize the view that authenticity is bad because it detracts from the wellbeing of the inauthentic person, and propose an alternative moral account of the badness of inauthenticity, based on the idea that inauthentic behaviour is potentially misleading.
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  14. Allan Hazlett (2013). A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief. OUP Oxford.
    Allan Hazlett challenges the philosophical assumption of the value of true belief. He critiques the view that true belief is better for us than false belief, and the view that truth is "the aim of belief". An alternative picture is provided, on which the fact that some people love truth is all there is to "the value of true belief".
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  15. Allan Hazlett (2013). Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement. Episteme:1-25.
    Most people not only think that it is possible for reasonable people to disagree, but that it is possible for people to recognize that they are parties to a reasonable disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explain how such mutually recognized reasonable disagreements are possible. I appeal to an which implies a form of relativism about reasonable belief, based on the idea that whether a belief is reasonable for a person can depend on the fact that she has (...)
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  16. Allan Hazlett (2013). Knowledge AscriptionsBy Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken. Analysis 73 (4):807-809.
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  17. Allan Hazlett (2013). Realism and Relativism. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. 33--53.
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  18. Allan Hazlett (2012). Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge. Acta Analytica 27 (4):461-478.
    In “The Myth of Factive Verbs” (Hazlett 2010), I had four closely related goals. The first (pp. 497-99, p. 522) was to criticize appeals to ordinary language in epistemology. The second (p. 499) was to criticize the argument that truth is a necessary condition on knowledge because “knows” is factive. The third (pp. 507-19) – which was the intended means of achieving the first two – was to defend a semantics for “knows” on which <S knows p> can be true (...)
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  19. Allan Hazlett (2012). Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility. Episteme 9 (3):205-223.
    This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or , and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. (...)
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  20. Allan Hazlett (2012). Non-Moral Evil. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):18-34.
    There is, I shall assume, such a thing as moral evil (more on which below). My question is whether is also such a thing as non-moral evil, and in particular whether there are such things as aesthetic evil and epistemic evil. More exactly, my question is whether there is such a thing as moral evil but not such a thing as non-moral evil, in some sense that reveals something special about the moral, as opposed to such would-be non-moral domains as (...)
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  21. Allan Hazlett (2012). Pragmatic Reasons: A Defense of Morality and Epistemology. By Jeremy Randel Koons. (Hampshire: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009. Pp. 304. Price £62.00.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):408-410.
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  22. Allan Hazlett (2012). Reasons for Action. Edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall. (Cambridge UP, 2009. Pp. 288. Price £53 (Hardcover), £21.99 (Paperback).). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):413-415.
  23. Allan Hazlett, Robin Mckenna & Joey Pollock (2012). The Unity of Linguistic Meaning, by John Collins. Oxford: Oxford. Mind 121:483.
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  24. Edward Wilson Averill & Allan Hazlett (2011). Color Objectivism and Color Projectivism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):751 - 765.
    Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception.
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  25. Allan Hazlett (2011). How the Past Depends on the Future. Ratio 24 (2):167-175.
    It is often said that, according to common sense, there is a fundamental asymmetry between the past and future; namely, that the past is closed and the future is open. Eternalism in the ontology of time is often seen as conflicting with common sense on this point. Here I argue against the claim that common sense is committed to this fundamental asymmetry between the past and the future, on the grounds that facts about the past often depend on facts about (...)
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  26. Allan Hazlett (2011). Review of Joseph Keim Campbell and Michael O'Rourke, Harry S. Silverstein (Eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (1).
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  27. Allan Hazlett & Christy Mag Uidhir (2011). Unrealistic Fictions. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):33--46.
    In this paper, we develop an analysis of unrealistic fiction that captures the everyday sense of ‘unrealistic’. On our view, unrealistic fictions are a species of inconsistent fictions, but fictions for which such inconsistency, given the supporting role we claim played by genre, needn’t be a critical defect. We first consider and reject an analysis of unrealistic fiction as fiction that depicts or describes unlikely events; we then develop our own account and make an initial statement of it: unrealistic fictions (...)
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  28. Allan Hazlett (ed.) (2010). New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  29. Allan Hazlett (2010). Brutal Individuation. In , New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  30. Allan Hazlett (2010). Review of S. Soames, _Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. [REVIEW] International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):131-136.
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  31. Allan Hazlett (2010). Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):131-136.
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  32. Allan Hazlett (2010). The Myth of Factive Verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):497 - 522.
  33. Allan Hazlett & Edward Wilson Averill (2010). A Problem For Relational Theories of Color. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):140-145.
    We argue that relationalism entails an unacceptable claim about the content of visual experience: that ordinary ‘red’ objects look like they look like they look like they’re red, etc.
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  34. Allan Hazlett (2009). How to Defend Response Moralism. British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (3):241-255.
    Here I defend response moralism, the view that some emotional responses to fi ctions are morally right, and others morally wrong, from the objection that responses to merely fi ctional characters and events cannot be morally evaluated. I defend the view that emotional responses to fi ctions can be morally evaluated only to the extent that said responses are responses to real people and events.
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  35. Allan Hazlett (2009). Knowledge and Conversation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):591 - 620.
    You are clever, Thrasymachus, I said, for you know very well that if you asked anyone how much is twelve, and as you asked him you warned him: "Do not, my man, say that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, for I will not accept such nonsense," it would be quite clear to you that no one can answer a question asked in those terms. (Republic 337b).
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  36. Allan Hazlett (2009). Review of J. David Velleman, How We Get Along. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (11).
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  37. Allan Hazlett (2009). Things and Places. International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):544-546.
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  38. Allan Hazlett (2008). Review: Models, Truth, and Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 117 (4):630-633.
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  39. Allan Hazlett (2008). Review of Pylyshyn, Things and Places. [REVIEW] International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):544-546.
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  40. Allan Hazlett (2007). Grice's Razor. Metaphilosophy 38 (5):669-690.
    Grice’s Razor is a principle of parsimony which states a preference for linguistic explanations in terms of conversational implicature, to explanations in terms of semantic context-dependence. Here I propose a Gricean theory of knowledge attributions, and contend on the basis of Grice’s Razor that it is superior to contextualism about ‘knows’.
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  41. Allan Hazlett (2006). Disassembly and Destruction. The Monist 89 (3):418-433.
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  42. Allan Hazlett (2006). Epistemic Conceptions of Begging the Question. Erkenntnis 65 (3):343 - 363.
    A number of epistemologists have recently concluded that a piece of reasoning may be epistemically permissible even when it is impossible for the reasoning subject to present her reasoning as an argument without begging the question. I agree with these epistemologists, but argue that none has sufficiently divorced the notion of begging the question from epistemic notions. I present a proposal for a characterization of begging the question in purely pragmatic terms.
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  43. Allan Hazlett (2006). How to Defeat Belief in the External World. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):198–212.
    I defend the view that there is a privileged class of propositions – that there is an external world, among other such 'hinge propositions'– that possess a special epistemic status: justified belief in these propositions is not defeated unless one has sufficient reason to believe their negation. Two arguments are given for this conclusion. Finally, three proposals are offered as morals of the preceding story: first, our justification for hinge propositions must be understood as defeatable, second, antiskeptics must explain our (...)
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  44. Allan Hazlett (2006). Possible Evils. Ratio 19 (2):191–198.
    I consider an objection to Lewisian modal realism: the view entails that there are a great many real evils that we ought to care about, but in fact we shouldn’t care about these evils. I reply on behalf of the modal realist – we should and do care about possible evils, and this is shown in our reactions to fictions about evils, which (plausibly, for the modal realist) are understood as making certain possible evils salient.
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  45. Allan Hazlett (2006). Review of Christoper Grau (Ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (1).
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  46. Allan Hazlett, Wishful Thinking as Responding to Non-Epistemic Theoretical Reasons.