In this book, Roslyn Weiss contends that, contrary to prevailing notions, Plato's Crito does not show an allegiance between Socrates and the state that condemned him. Denying that the speech of the Laws represents the views of Socrates, Weiss deftly brings to light numerous indications that Socrates provides to the attentive reader that he and the Laws are not partners but antagonists in the argument and that he is singularly unimpressed by the case against escaping prison presented by (...) the Laws. Weiss's greatest innovation is her contention that the Laws are very much like the judges who preside at Socrates' trail--interested not in justice and truth but in being shown deference and submission. If Weiss's argument is correct, then the standard conception of the history of political thought is in error--political philosophy begins not with the primacy of the state over the citizen but with the affirmation of the individual's duty to act in accordance with his own careful determination of what justice demands. (shrink)
In this radical new interpretation of Plato's Meno, Roslyn Weiss exposes the farcical nature of the slave-boy-demonstration and challenges the widely held assumption that the Meno introduces "Platonic" metaphysical and epistemological innovations into an otherwise "Socratic" dialogue. She shows that the Meno is intended as a defense not of all inquiry but of moral inquiry alone, and that it locates the validity of Socratic method in its ability to arrive not at moral knowledge but at the far (...) more modest moral true belief. Virtue in the Cave will appeal not only to students of ancient philosophy and the classics, but also to anyone who is interested in how to live right in a world of moral uncertainty. (shrink)
Using three paradigm cases of persons living with Parkinson's Disease (PD) the authors make a case for augmenting and enriching a Cartesian medical account of the pathophysiology of PD with an enriched understanding of the lived body experience of PD, the lived implications of PD for a particular person's concerns and coping with the illness. Linking and adding a thick description of the lived experience of PD can enrich caregiving imagination and attunement to the patient's possibilities, concerns and constraints. The (...) work of Merleau-Ponty is used to articulate the middle terms of the lived experience of dwelling in a lifeworld. Examining lived experience of embodied intentionality, skilled bodily capacities as highlighted in Merleau-Ponty's non-mechanistic physiology opens new therapeutic, coping and caregiving possibilities. Matching temporal rhythms can decrease the stress of being assisted with activities of daily living. For example, caregivers and patients alike can be taught strategies for extending their lived bodily capacities by altering rhythms, by shifting hyperactivity to different parts of the body and other strategies that change the perceptual experience associated with walking in different environment. A medical account of the pathophysiology of PD is nessessary and useful, but not sufficient for designing caregiving in ways that enrich and extend the existential skills of dwelling of persons with PD. The dominance of mechanistic physiology makes caregivers assume that it is the 'real discourse' about the disease, causing researchers and caregivers alike to overlook the equally real lived experience of the patient which requires different descriptive discourses and different sources of understanding. Lack of dialogue between the two discourses is tragic for patients because caregivers need both in order to provide attuned, effective caregiving. (shrink)
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) has exerted a more powerful influence on contemporary philosophy than any other twentieth-century thinker. But what is the nature of this influence and why has it proved so enduring? In Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance , twelve contemporary philosophers explore the issues surrounding Wittgenstein's importance and relevance to modern thought. Their articles, ten of which are published here for the first time, cover all of Wittgenstein's major publications: the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , Philosophical Investigations , On Certainty , and Remarks (...) on the Foundations of Mathematics . They discuss how much originality and continuity can be found in Wittgenstein's thought, how he relates to current traditions and movements within philosophy, and what we can learn from his conceptions of language, knowledge, mathematics and logic. The international set of contributors are renowned for their work in both Wittgenstein studies andother fields of philosophy, making Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance an important collection for anyone interested in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)
In this book Raymond L. Weiss examines how a seminal Jewish thinker negotiates the philosophical conflict between Athens and Jerusalem in the crucial area of ethics. Maimonides, a master of both the classical and the biblical-rabbinic traditions, reconciled their differing views of morality primarily in the context of Jewish jurisprudence. Taking into consideration the entire corpus of Maimonides' writings, Weiss focuses on the ethical sections of the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah , but also discusses (...) the Guide of the Perplexed , the letters of Maimonides, and his medical works. The gulf between classical philosophy and the Torah made the task of Maimonides extraordinarily difficult. Weiss shows that Maimonides subtly preserves the tension between those traditions while producing a practical accommodation between them. To explain how Maimonides was able to accomplish this twofold goal, Weiss takes seriously the multilevel character of Maimonides' works. Weiss interrupts Maimonides as a heterodox thinker who, with utter integrity, faces the Law's encounter with philosophy and gives both the Torah and philosophy their due. (shrink)
We argue that Rousseau's defense of the sex-roled family is not based on biological determinism or simple misogyny. Rather, his advocacy of sexual differentiation is based on his understanding of its ability to bring individuals outside of themselves into interdependent communities, and thus to counter natural independence, self-absorption and asociality, as well as social competitiveness and egoism. This political defense of the sex-roled family needs more critique by feminists.
: Writing in the seventeenth century, Mary Astell offers some splendid models of what it can mean to include women in determining the purposes of politics, in marking the boundaries of issues on the political agenda, and in analyzing particular political concepts. A contending voice in early modern philosophy, Astell's contributions to political thought are made more visible here by contrast with Thomas Hobbes, with whom she was familiar and somewhat sympathetic.
Russell takes his paper ?On denoting? to have achieved the repudiation of the theory of denoting concepts and Frege?s theory of sense, and the invention of the notion of incomplete symbols.This means that Russell attempts to solve the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes without making use of a theory of sense.Instead, his strategy is to revise his logical ontology by arguing that certain symbols should be treated as incomplete.In constructing such arguments Russell, at various points, makes use of epistemological and (...) metaphysical considerations.These arguments do not form themselves into a systemic set of considerations to be used in appraising a logical system.Finally, the vicious circle principle is argued for on the basis of considerations, which are presumed evident, about the nature of propositional functions.The stringency of this principle is a basic problem for the system of Principia mathematica.However, even given the terms of the argument, ?On denoting? does not offer a complete repudiation of the notion of sense.This allows the possibility of retaining some of the insights of Principia mathematica whilst rejecting the stringency of the vicious circle principle.The basis of such a system is the theory of sense. (shrink)
Technology has provided state and federal governments with huge collections of DNA samples and identifying profiles stored in databanks. That information can be used to solve crimes by matching samples from convicted felons to unsolved crimes, and has aided law enforcement in investigating and convicting suspects, and exonerating innocent felons, even after lengthy incarceration. Rights surrounding the provision of DNA samples, however, remain unclear in light of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and privacy concerns. The courts have (...) just begun to consider this issue, and have provided little guidance. It is unclear whether the laws governing protected health information are applicable to the instant situation, and if so, the degree to which they apply. DNA databanks are not uniformly regulated, and it is possible that DNA samples contained in them may be used for purposes unintended by donors of the samples. As people live their lives, they leave bits of their DNA behind. They cannot be assured that these tiny specimens will not be taken or used against their will or without their knowledge for activities such as profiling to measure tendencies such as thrill-seeking, aggressiveness, or crimes with threatening behavior. Existing racial or ethnic discrimination and profiling may also encompass genetic discrimination and profiling, creating societal class distinctions. This article will explore the constitutionality of collecting genetic materials, the ethics of such activities, and balance the social good in solving crime and deterrence against the individual's security, liberty, and privacy. (shrink)
Nietzsche sees westem philosophy and culture as dorninated by the metaphysical belief in opposites. The first and second sections of this paper spell out the basic assumptions underlying this belief and discuss the distinction between the “true” and the “apparent” world as the primary opposite by reference to which all opposites are determined. Section three employs Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power to analyze the belief in opposites as an expression of a weak and sickly type of Iife seeking (...) to revenge itself upon the natural world. Section four tums to Nietzsche’s denial of the belief in opposites and examines how he dissolves the distinction between the “true” and “apparent” world. The final section ofthe paper presents Nietzsche’s counter-analysis of metaphysical opposites within epistemology, religion, aesthetics, and morality. He regards “opposites” as contraries which exist along a continuum of natural phenomena, and he introduces the notion of sublimation to explain how one contrary can eventually give rise to its extreme. (shrink)
Cicero’s De Finibus contains a debate about whether practical knowledge should be compared to theoretical knowledge (theôreia/sapientia), or to technical knowledge (technê/ars). The way in which practical knowledge is conceived by the Stoics on the one hand, and Peripatetics on the other, lies behind and explains, for Cicero, the tendency of Peripatetics to place greater priority upon harmony with the external world, and that of the Stoics to seek inner harmony at the cost of harmony with that external world. The (...) dialogue ends in aporia because, for Cicero, practical knowledge either comes to bear an excessive resemblance to technê, as in the case of the Peripatetics, or to theoretical knowledge, as in the case of the Stoics; for him, it must fall neither to one nor the other extreme. (shrink)
An internationally renowned philosopher propounds a way to advance beyond appearance to ultimate realities and a final ideal. “One of philosophy’s main functions is to arouse thought, to awaken and redirect. It asks others to think through, to assess, and at the same time to be flexible and steady. Author and reader must, despite the printed page, despite differences in age and experience, training and knowledge, philosophize together,” writes Paul Weiss in his brilliant new book. And this is exactly (...) what the reader will find himself doing as the eminent speculative philosopher directs his attention to that which is beyond appearance—beyond daily living and, ultimately, beyond life itself. In this perhaps richest and finest of Mr. Weiss’s books, the average reader who daily confronts the various aspects of our complicated lives will find an enlivening answer to persisting fundamental questions. Mr. Weiss’s searching analysis of matter and his thought-provoking answers to questions raised provide a thoroughly enlightened examination of the realities of man’s inalienable rights, his identity over the course of a changing career, and his possible immortality. (shrink)
Context: Josef Mitterer has become known for criticizing the main exponents of analytic and constructivist philosophy for their blind adoption of a dualistic epistemology based on an alleged ontological difference between world and words. Judith Butler, who has developed an influential model of (de)constructivist feminism and has been labeled a linguistic constructivist, has been criticized for sustaining exactly what, according to Mitterer, most modern philosophy fails to acknowledge: namely that there is no ontological difference between objective facts beyond language and (...) the discourse about these facts. Problem: In the scholarly discussion on non-dualism, two main questions have been raised: Where does Mitterer’s basic consensus, i.e., the starting-point description, come from? and: What does it mean, to say that further descriptions change their object? Method: Comparative analysis of the core concepts of Mitterer’s and Butler’s work in the context of the history of ideas. Results: Butler’s conception of a performative production of objectivity through discursive and non-discursive iterated practices can be interpreted as an illustration of Mitterer’s claim that descriptions change their object. The problem of where Mitterer’s starting-point descriptions come from can be solved by adopting Butler’s concept of culturally inherited practices. (shrink)
Culture is shaped by a handful of people who are guardians of the vision and the shapers of the corporate conscience. It is especially the role of the chief executive to define the character of the business and to establish the corporate culture.A corporation can instill within its basic policy structure and patterns of behavior a corporate culture, a corporate conscience that can prevail.
Victorian poets Elizabeth Barrett (1806-1861) and Robert Browning (1812-1889) first fell in love through letters, which they began to write to each other in 1845 (Figures 1 and 2). Their growing relationship, slowly progressing from letter to first encounter and eventual secret marriage in 1846, is documented in two volumes of letters, with a plot that unfolds as warmly and compellingly as the best page-turner invented by a novelist. Both were master wordsmiths, so the beauty of their letters is no (...) surprise. But one reason Barrett Browning was such a prolific correspondent is that she spent much of her life housebound, due to an illness whose nature was never truly explained when she was alive and that has been .. (shrink)
Introduction : two paradigms -- Philosophers by nature -- Philosophers by design I : the making of a philosopher -- Philosophers by design II : the making of a ruler -- Socratic piety : the fifth cardinal virtue -- Justice as moderation -- Conclusion : "in a healthy way.".
Since its disc overy by Fitch, the paradox of knowability has been a thorn in the anti-realist's side. Recently both Dummett and Tennant have sought to relieve the anti-realist by restricting the applicability of the knowability principle -- the principle that all truths are knowable -- which has been viewed as both a cardinal doctrine of anti-realism and the assumption for reductio of Fitch's argument. In this paper it is argued that the paradox of knowability is a peculiarly acute manifestation (...) of a syndrome affecting anti-realism, against which Dummett's and Tennant's manoeuvres are not finally efficacious. The anti-realist can only cope with the syndrome by being much clearer about her notion of knowability. In fact, she'll have to offer an account which relativises the notion of knowability both to the world at which knowability is assessed and to the content of the proposition to which it is applied. This is not, however, merely an ad hoc manoeuvre to counter the problematic syndrome; rather it is just what we should expect from the anti-realist's intuitive use of the notion. A preliminary investigation indicates that there is no way of providing a general, systematic explanation of such a notion of knowability and thus an inherent restriction on the principle of knowability -- but one differing from those offered by either Dummett or Tennant -- is developed. (shrink)
The paper examines Wright’s attempt to inflate deflationism about truth. It accepts the details of Wright’s argument but contends that it should best be seen as posing a dilemma for the deflationist: either truth is independent of norms of warranted assertibility—in which case it is substantial—or it is not—in which case epistemicism about truth is a consequence. Some concerns about epistemicism are raised in avoiding the second horn. The first is avoided by distinguishing between independence and substantiality and arguing that (...) only the first applies to truth and only the second is worrisome to deflationism. So, despite its sub-title, the following is not a diatribe against Home Rule but a modest defence of deflationism. (shrink)
Certain anti-realisms about mathematics are distinguished by their taking proof rather than truth as the central concept in the account of the meaning of mathematical statements. This notion of proof which is meaning determining or canonical must be distinguished from a notion of demonstration as more generally conceived. This paper raises a set of objections to Dummett's characterisation of the notion via the notion of a normalised natural deduction proof. The main complaint is that Dummett's use of normalised natural deduction (...) proofs relies on formalisation playing a role for which it is unfit. Instead I offer an alternative account which does not rely on formalisation and go on to examine the relation of proof to canonical proof, arguing that rather than requiring an explicit characterisation of canonical proofs we need to be more aware of the complexities of that relation. (shrink)
Little attention has been given in medical ethics literature to issues relating to the truthfulness of patients. Beginning with an actual medical case, this paper first explores truth-telling by doctors and patients as related to two prominent models of the physician-patient relationship. Utilizing this discussion and the literature on the truthfulness and accuracy of the information patients convey to doctors, these models are then critically assessed. It is argued that the patient agency (patient autonomy or contractual) model is inherently and (...) seriously flawed in numerous circumstances, even those involving informed and competent adult patients. Keywords: truth-telling, doctor-patient relationship, medical ethics, paternalism, autonomy, patient compliance, patients as agents, informed consent CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
In Guide 2.32 Maimonides notes that just as there are three opinions concerning prophecy (as discussed earlier in 2:13), so are there three opinions concerning cosmogony. Scholars have tended to assume that Maimonides, despite what he says, must have seen some more important correspondence between the two sets of opinions than their number. I argue that although for Maimonides what the two sets of opinions have in common is indeed their number, what he wishes to direct the careful reader's attention (...) to is that the number of opinions in both cases is actually two rather than three. (shrink)
A critical application of Ruddick's model of maternal thinking is the best way to grapple with the ethical dilemmas posed by sex-selectiveabortion which I view as a "moral mistake." Chief among these is the need to be sensitive to local cultural practices in countries where sex-selectiveabortion is prevalent, while simultaneously developing consistent international standards to deal with the dangers posed by the use of sex-selectiveabortion to eliminate female fetuses.
What are some of the most useful tools and techniques for teaching about suicide? How can this topic be used to deepen students’ understanding of Socrates and existentialism? Which concepts, skills, and exercises can facilitate student interest and insight? This essay will explore Socrates’ Apology as a means to teach analytical issues on suicide, Camus’s The Myth of Sisyphus to teach existentialist issues, and finally the cases of Kurt Cobain and Ludwig van Beethoven to teach the application of existentialist issues.
Despite the ubiquity and critical importance of science and technology in international affairs, their role receives insufficient attention in traditional international relations curricula. There is little literature on how the relations between science, technology, economics, politics, law and culture should be taught in an international context. Since it is impossible even for scientists to master all the branches of natural science and engineering that affect public policy, the learning goals of students whose primary training is in the social sciences should (...) be to get some grounding in the natural sciences or engineering, to master basic policy skills, to understand the basic concepts that link science and technology to their broader context, and to gain a respect for the scientific and technological dimensions of the broader issues they are addressing. They also need to cultivate a fearless determination to master what they need to know in order to address policy issues, an open-minded but skeptical attitude towards the views of dueling experts, regardless of whether they agree with their politics, and (for American students) a world-view that goes beyond a strictly U.S. perspective on international events. The Georgetown University program in Science, Technology and International Affairs (STIA) is a unique, multi-disciplinary undergraduate liberal arts program that embodies this approach and could be an example that other institutions of higher learning might adapt to their own requirements. (shrink)
This paper critically examines the practices of reading and writing through the differing perspectives offered by Kierkegaard, Sartre, Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida. Although Kierkegaard''s and Sartre''s respective views on reading and writing do not receive much attention today, I argue that both articulate (albeit in different ways) a notion of shared responsibility between reader and writer that is compatible with their respective emphases on absolute responsibility for oneself, for others, and for the situation. An advantage to both Sartre''s and Kierkegaard''s (...) accounts from a postmodern perspective, is that they affirm the simultaneity of individual and co-responsibility without appealing to a fixed or unitary self. (shrink)
: This review offers a critical analysis of Shannon Sullivan's "feminist pragmatist standpoint theory" as a framework for thinking about issues of identity and truth. Sullivan claims that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on an anonymous or pre-personal quality to bodily experience commits him to a false universality and that his understanding of bodily intentionality traps him in a subjectivist philosophy that is incapable of doing justice to difference. She suggests that phenomenology in general is theoretically limited because of its alleged subjectivism (...) and universalism, and she turns to Dewey's pragmatism to develop a "transactional model" of identity and truth. In response, I argue that Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of anonymity and intentionality do not entail either subjectivism or a false universality. I also challenge Sullivan's conception of truth as transactional flourishing by appealing to the "terrible truths" of violence and oppression. (shrink)
We prove the following theorems: (1) If X has strong measure zero and if Y has strong first category, then their algebraic sum has property s 0 . (2) If X has Hurewicz's covering property, then it has strong measure zero if, and only if, its algebraic sum with any first category set is a first category set. (3) If X has strong measure zero and Hurewicz's covering property then its algebraic sum with any set in APC ' is a (...) set in APC '. (APC ' is included in the class of sets always of first category, and includes the class of strong first category sets.) These results extend: Fremlin and Miller's theorem that strong measure zero sets having Hurewicz's property have Rothberger's property, Galvin and Miller's theorem that the algebraic sum of a set with the γ-property and of a first category set is a first category set, and Bartoszynski and Judah's characterization of SR M -sets. They also characterize the property (*) introduced by Gerlits and Nagy in terms of older concepts. (shrink)
Fine (2007) argues that Frege’s puzzle and its relatives demonstrate a need for a basic reorientation of the field of semantics. According to this reorientation, the domain of semantic facts would be closed not under the classical consequence relation but only under a stronger relation Fine calls “manifest consequence.” I examine Fine’s informally sketched analyses of manifest consequence, showing that each can be amended to determine a class of strong consequence relations. A best candidate relation emerges from each of the (...) two classes, and I prove that the two candidates extensionally coincide. The resulting consequence relation is of independent interest, for it might be held to constitute a cogent standard of reasoning that proceeds under a deficient grasp on the identity of objects. (shrink)
Despite claims of pure pragmatism, Hertwig and Ortmann's negative perspective on deception suggests a selfish psychologist willing to sacrifice the reputation of the discipline in order to expedite the research. Although questions that appear to have correct answers may be investigated with complete openness, research that delves into personal secrets often requires deception as a tool to counter self-presentation bias.
This essay examines Don Ihde’s postphenomological philosophy of technology through the lens of philosophical anthropology, that sub-discipline of philosophy concerned with the nature and place of the human being. While Ihde’s philosophical corpus and its reception in Postphenomenology: A Critical Companion to Ihde indicate rich resources for thinking about human nature, several themes receive too little attention in both, including the nature of the human being, the emergence of the posthuman, and the place of the human being in our contemporary (...) pluriculture. (shrink)
At stake in Adorno’s aesthetics in general, and his analysis of musical development in particular, is the manner in which artworks resist the formal, subjective characteristics of the death drive’s play. In order to win back control, as it were, of a mastery that has hardened nature’s particularity, Adorno conceives of a transformed, critical mimesis. Ultimately the work of the contemporary Finish composer, Kaija Saariaho, is revealed as an exemplary instance of a transformed mimetic play which critiques the menacing elements (...) of the death drive, but does not altogether discard it. (shrink)
Five faculty members in the College of Business at Northern Illinois University received a grant from the James S. Kemper Foundation to integrate ethics into the graduate business curriculum. This was the second phase of a comprehensive program to integrate ethics into the business curriculum. Each faculty member taught a required course in the MBA program. The faculty members represented each of the five functional departments in the College of Business.This paper describes the ethics content, materials, and approaches that were (...) used to cover ethics by each of the five faculty members. Hopefully, this description will help other faculty and universities integrate ethics more effectively into the business curriculum. (shrink)
In United States v. Hensley, a unanimous Court set forth the rule that, "if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion." By expanding the scope of the Terry doctrine, Hensley strengthened the power of law enforcement officials to "stop and frisk" individuals who they believe may pose a threat (...) to the themselves and/or the public. Prior to Hensley, the Court's decisions merely sanctioned Terry stops of individuals that law enforcement officers reasonably suspected were about to commit a crime, or were committing a crime at the time of the stop. Thus, by authorizing Terry stops based on an officer's reasonable suspicion that an individual was involved in an already-completed felony, Hensley extended the types of situations under which law enforcement officers may engage in Terry stops. While explicitly expanding the scope of Terry v. Ohio in the context of completed felonies, the Hensley decision left open one major issue-whether the balancing test set forth in Hensley applies to investigatory stops based on an officer's reasonable suspicion that an individual was involved in a completed misdemeanor. With no answer from the Court, lower federal and state courts have attempted to answer this question on their own; in doing so, they have diverged on the issue. Most recently, in United States v. Grigg, the Ninth Circuit expanded the scope of Hensley and applied its balancing approach to Terry stops for completed misdemeanors. This Note argues against the Ninth Circuit's approach and rather for a per se rule against Terry stops for completed misdemeanors. This Note proposes that, in light of the inherent differences between misdemeanors and felonies, Hensley's balancing test should not extend to completed misdemeanors. Furthermore, the use of Terry stops for completed misdemeanors does not further the government and public interest in crime prevention and solving past crimes to an extent great enough to outweigh the great intrusion on privacy rights that Terry stops cause. Additionally, a per se rule provides for efficiency and guidance to police enforcement on routine patrols. Under such an approach, it is easier for private citizens to comprehend and appreciate their rights and understand when those rights are being violated. (shrink)
1. In this paper have done what Niklas Luhmann always recommended us to do: I have drawn a distinction – or to be more precise, I have some distinctions. I have done so because I think, and you all know, that in the ongoing debates on so-called “globalization” there is not enough of distinction, and no distinction at all very often. And that is particularly unsatisfactory if the critique, or even the rejection, of globalization is at stake. 2. The first (...) of my distinctions is between Europeanization (in Heidegger’s sense) and Americanization, as this term is meant usually today. These two concepts, and the processes they refer to, seem to be quite similar in so far as what is meant that a particular part of mankind at a given period of history has succeeded in becoming a hegemonic power on a global scale – economically, politically (and militarily) and/or culturally. One could think, and Heidegger himself really does, that those two processes have also in common that they are historically contingent: Nothing of this sort could have happened as well; other powers could have, and have indeed, played a similar role at other times; it could have come out completely different etc. etc. In my view, though, there should be made a distinction here because the world-wide success-story of modern science and technology has to be accounted for by causes and dynamics which are not only gradually, but qualitatively different from what we need to explain the globalization of, let’s say, American blue jeans, or T‐Shirts etc. 3. This brings me to the distinction between globalization and Americanization, which are identified nowadays very often, and that particularly so in order to attack and reject globalization as being nothing but Americanization. At this point, then, it seems to me necessary to draw distinction between (a) globalization as such – regarded to be a factual, complex and heterogeneous process that has to be analyzed in all its aspects by econonomists, sociologists etc and (b) universalization. (shrink)
S. Adams, W. Ambrose, A. Andretta, H. Becker, R. Camerlo, C. Champetier, J.P.R. Christensen, D.E. Cohen, A. Connes. C. Dellacherie, R. Dougherty, R.H. Farrell, F. Feldman, A. Furman, D. Gaboriau, S. Gao, V. Ya. Golodets, P. Hahn, P. de la Harpe, G. Hjorth, S. Jackson, S. Kahane, A.S. Kechris, A. Louveau,, R. Lyons, P.-A. Meyer, C.C. Moore, M.G. Nadkarni, C. Nebbia, A.L.T. Patterson, U. Krengel, A.J. Kuntz, J.-P. Serre, S.D. Sinel'shchikov, T. Slaman, Solecki, R. Spatzier, J. Steel, D. Sullivan, S. (...) Thomas, A. Valette, V.S. Varadarajan, B. Velickovic, B. Weiss, J.D.M. Wright, R.J. Zimmer. (shrink)
Using the 1991 police beating of Rodney King as case study, this paper draws on Husserlian phenomenology to establish a coherentist account of knowledge as situated with respect to its concrete circumstances of production (e.g., social, cultural, historical, political). I take as my point of departure Gail Weiss's phenomenological investigation into the jury's assessment of evidence in the "Rodney King incident," and in particular, her interest in Husserl's conception of the "horizon" as a structure of consciousness that mediates what (...) is present in perceptual awareness. Making use of Anthony Steinbock's work on Husserlian phenomenological method — drawn from his extensive study of Husserl's unpublished manuscripts — I develop an epistemological framework that treats knowledge claims as inextricably bound to the horizons of meaning from which they arise, and provides standards of epistemic responsibility pertaining to an agent's "framing" of evidence. (shrink)
Scientific anomalies are observations and facts that contradict current scientific theories and they are instrumental in scientific theory change. Philosophers of science have approached scientific theory change from different perspectives as Darden (Theory change in science: Strategies from Mendelian genetics, 1991) observes: Lakatos (In: Lakatos, Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the growth of knowledge, 1970) approaches it as a progressive “research programmes” consisting of incremental improvements (“monster barring” in Lakatos, Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery, 1976), Kuhn (The structure (...) of scientific revolutions, 1996) observes that changes in “paradigms” are instigated by a crisis from some anomaly, and Hanson (In: Feigl, Maxwell (eds) Current issues in the philosophy of science, 1961) proposes that discovery does not begin with hypothesis but with some “problematic phenomena requiring explanation”. Even though anomalies are important in all of these approaches to scientific theory change, there have been only few investigations into the specific role anomalies play in scientific theory change. Furthermore, much of these approaches focus on the theories themselves and not on how the scientists and their experiments bring about scientific change (Gooding, Experiment and the making of meaning: Human agency in scientific observation and experiment, 1990). To address these issues, this paper approaches scientific anomaly resolution from a meaning construction point of view. Conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier and Turner, Cogn Sci 22:133–187, 1996; The way we think: Conceptual blending and mind’s hidden complexities, 2002) from cognitive linguistics describes how one constructs meaning from various stimuli, such as text and diagrams, through conceptual integration or blending. The conceptual integration networks that describe the conceptual integration process characterize cognition that occurs unconsciously during meaning construction. These same networks are used to describe some of the cognition while resolving an anomaly in molecular genetics called RNA interference (RNAi) in a case study. The RNAi case study is a cognitive-historical reconstruction (Nersessian, In: Giere (ed) Cognitive models of science, 1992) that reconstructs how the RNAi anomaly was resolved. This reconstruction traces four relevant molecular genetics publications in describing the cognition necessary in accounting for how RNAi was resolved through strategies (Darden 1991), abductive reasoning (Peirce, In: Hartshorne, Weiss (eds) Collected papers, 1958), and experimental reasoning (Gooding 1990). The results of the case study show that experiments play a crucial role in formulating an explanation of the RNAi anomaly and the integration networks describe the experiments’ role. Furthermore, these results suggest that RNAi anomaly resolution is embodied. It is embodied in a sense that cognition described in the cognitive-historical reconstruction is experientially based. (shrink)
Recently some results have been presented which show that certain kinds of deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions are observationally equivalent (Werndl 2009a, 2010). This paper focuses on some philosophical questions prompted by these results. More specifically, first, I will discuss the philosophical comments made by mathematicians about observational equivalence, in particular Ornstein and Weiss (1991). Their comments are vague, and I will argue that, according to a reasonable interpretation, they are misguided. Second, the results on observational equivalence raise the (...) question of whether the deterministic or indeterministic description is preferable relative to all evidence. If none of them is preferable, there is underdetermination. I will criticize Winnie's (1998) argument that, by appealing to different observations, one finds that the deterministic description is preferable. In particular, I will clarify a confusion in this argument. Furthermore, I will argue that if the concern is a strong kind of underdetermination, the argument delivers the desired conclusion but this conclusion is trivial; and for other kinds of underdetermination of interest the argument fails. (shrink)