57 found
Sort by:
  1.  395 DLs
    Alva Noe, Perception, Action, and Nonconceptual Content.
    profile deforms as we move about it. As perceivers we are masters of the patterns of sensorimotor contingency that shape our perceptual interaction with the world. We expect changes in such things as apparent size, shape and color to occur as we actively explore the environment. In encountering perspective-dependent changes of this sort, we learn how things are quite apart form our particular perspective. Our possession of these skills is constitutive of our ability to see . This is confirmed by (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2.  254 DLs
    Alva Noë (2005). Against Intellectualism. Analysis 65 (288):278–290.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3.  253 DLs
    Alva Noë (2007). The Critique of Pure Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):231-245.
    The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4.  244 DLs
    J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë (2001). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
    Direct download (21 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5.  231 DLs
    Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (2004). Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.
    In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6.  203 DLs
    Alva Noë (2009). Conscious Reference. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):470-482.
    The world shows up to perceptual consciousness in virtue of the deployment of distinct sensorimotor and also conceptual skills. The availability of the world to thought is, in contrast, to be explained in connection with the different sorts of skills put to work in thought. I show that thought and experience are varieties of skilful access to the world. The aim of the paper is to present the outlines of a general theory of access.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7.  192 DLs
    Alva Noë (2006). Précis of Action in Perception. Psyche 12 (1).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8.  189 DLs
    Alva Noë (2008). Précis of Action in Perception: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):660–665.
    The main idea of this book is that perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do. Think of a blind person taptapping his or her way around a cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world makes itself available to (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9.  188 DLs
    Alva Noë (2006). Experience Without the Head. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 411--433.
    Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10.  165 DLs
    Susan L. Hurley & Alva Noe (2003). Neural Plasticity and Consciousness: Reply to Block. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):342.
    Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley1111 andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë2222.
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11.  151 DLs
    Alva Noe (2003). Causation and Perception: The Puzzle Unravelled. Analysis 63 (2):93-100.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12.  148 DLs
    Alva Noë (2005). Real Presence. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):235-264.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13.  135 DLs
    Alva Noe (1999). Thought and Experience. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):257-65.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14.  132 DLs
    Susan Hurley & Alva Noë (2007). Can Hunter-Gatherers Hear Color? In Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.), Common Minds. Oxford 55--83.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15.  111 DLs
    Alva Noë (2007). Understanding Action in Perception: Replies to Hickerson and Keijzer. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):531 – 538.
    In this short essay I respond to the criticism of Action in Perception (2004) advanced by Ryan Hickerson and Fred Keijzer. In particular, I provide a brief precis of the main argument of Action in Perception. I seek to clarify the claims made in the book about the relation between perception and action, the importance of sensorimotor knowledge. I discuss the problem of "sensorimotor chauvinism," that of the "ping-pong playing robot," and the problem of perceptual presence.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16.  110 DLs
    Alva Noë (2005). Action in Perception. The MIT Press.
    "Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17.  106 DLs
    Alva Noe & Evan Thompson (2004). Sorting Out the Neural Basis of Consciousness: Authors' Reply to Commentators. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):87-98.
    Correspondence: Alva Noë, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-2390, USA. _Email: noe@socrates.berkeley.edu_ Evan Thompson, Philosophy Department, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. _Email: evant@yorku.ca_.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18.  103 DLs
    Alva Noë (2007). Magic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility: What Makes Us Conscious. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):457–474.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19.  93 DLs
    Alva Noë, Luis Pessoa & Evan Thompson (2000). Beyond the Grand Illusion: What Change Blindness Really Teaches Us About Vision. Visual Cognition 7 (1-3):93-106.
    Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion rests on (1) a problematic “reconstructionist” conception (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20.  92 DLs
    Alva Noë (2008). Reply to Campbell, Martin, and Kelly. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):691–706.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21.  88 DLs
    Alva Noë (2002). Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):1-12.
    In this paper I explore a brand of scepticism about perceptual experience that takes its start from recent work in psychology and philosophy of mind on change blindness and related phenomena. I argue that the new scepticism rests on a problematic phenomenology of perceptual experience. I then consider a strengthened version of the sceptical challenge that seems to be immune to this criticism. This strengthened sceptical challenge formulates what I call the problem of perceptual presence. I show how this problem (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22.  86 DLs
    Luiz Pessoa, Evan Thompson & Alva Noë (1998). Finding Out About Filling-In: A Guide to Perceptual Completion for Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (21):723–802.
    In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neuralignoring an absencejumping to a conclusionanalytic isomorphismCartesian materialism, a particular (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23.  86 DLs
    Alva Noë & Kevin J. O'Regan (2000). Perception, Attention, and the Grand Illusion. Psyche 6 (15).
    This paper looks at two puzzles raised by the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. First, how can we see at all if, in order to see, we must first perceptually attend to that which we see? Second, if attention is required for perception, why does it seem to us as if we are perceptually aware of the whole detailed visual field when it is quite clear that we do not attend to all that detail? We offer a general framework for thinking (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24.  86 DLs
    Alva Noë (2006). Experience of the World in Time. Analysis 66 (289):26–32.
  25.  83 DLs
    Alva Noë (2002). Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual? Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185 - 194.
    As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (e.g., on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self-consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self-consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26.  81 DLs
    Alva Noë & Susan L. Hurley (2003). The Deferential Brain in Action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (5):195-196.
    binding of colour and alphanumeric form in synaesthesia. Nature 410.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27.  68 DLs
    Evan Thompson, Alva Noë & Luiz Pessoa (1999). Perceptual Completion: A Case Study in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press 161--195.
  28.  66 DLs
    Alva Noë (2001). Experience and the Active Mind. Synthese 61 (1):41-60.
    This paper investigates a new species of skeptical reasoning about visual experience that takes its start from developments in perceptual science (especially recent work on change blindness and inattentional blindness). According to this skepticism, the impression of visual awareness of the environment in full detail and high resolution is illusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends on misguided assumptions about the character of perceptual experience, about whether perceptual experiences are 'internal' states, and about how best to understand the relationship (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29.  60 DLs
    Alva Noë (2003). Causation and Perception: The Puzzle Unravelled. Analysis 63 (2):93 - 100.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30.  51 DLs
    Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (eds.) (2002). Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. MIT Press.
  31.  50 DLs
    J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë (2001). Acting Out Our Sensory Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1011-1021.
    The most important clarification we bring in our reply to commentators concerns the problem of the “explanatory gap”: that is, the gulf that separates physical processes in the brain from the experienced quality of sensations. By adding two concepts (bodiliness and grabbiness) that were not stressed in the target article, we strengthen our claim and clarify why we think we have solved the explanatory gap problem, – not by dismissing qualia, but, on the contrary, by explaining why sensations have a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32.  49 DLs
    J. Kevin O'Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë (2006). Skill, Corporality and Alerting Capacity in an Account of Sensory Consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33.  46 DLs
    J. O’Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë (2005). Sensory Consciousness Explained in Terms of 'Corporality' and 'Alerting Capacity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.
    How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34.  46 DLs
    Alva Noe (2006). Experience of the World in Time. Analysis 66 (289):26-32.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35.  43 DLs
    Alva Noë (1997). Perception and Content. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):154-155.
    It is argued that to have an experience is to be in a phenomenal state with A-conscious content. Perceptual contents are always both P-conscious and A-conscious.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36.  36 DLs
    Alva Noë (2007). The Problem with the Picture Picture of Visual Experience: A Comment on Jacob and Jeannerod's Ways of Seeing. Dialogue 46 (2):347-351.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37.  28 DLs
    Luiz Pessoa, Evan Thompson & Alva Noë (2001). Filling-In: One or Many? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1137-1139.
    (1) The main issue with regard to modal and amodal completion is not which phenomena are cognitive, and which perceptual. At the level of the animal, both are visuo-cognitive. At the level of visual processing, however, we need to dissect the different functional effects of these kinds of completion. (2) Resonant binding between distributed cortical areas may play a role in perceptual completion, but evidence is needed.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38.  27 DLs
    Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (1999). Seeing Beyond the Modules Toward the Subject of Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):386-387.
    Pylyshyn's model of visual perception leads to problems in understanding the nature of perceptual experience. The cause of the problems is an underlying lack of clarity about the relation between the operation of the subpersonal vision module and visual perception at the level of the subject or person.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39.  22 DLs
    Luiz Pessoa, Evan Thompson & Alva Noë (1998). Filling-in is for Finding Out. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):781-796.
    The following points are discussed in response to the commentaries: (1) A taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena should rely on both phenomenological and mechanistic criteria. (2) Certain forms of perceptual completion are caused by topographically organized neural processes the view that there must be a pictorial or spatial neural-perceptual isomorphism at the bridge locus – should be rejected. Although more abstract kinds of isomorphism are central to the neural-perceptual mapping, the perceptual cannot be exhaustively explained in terms of the neural, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40.  20 DLs
    Alva Noë (2011). Ideology and the Third Realm (Or, a Short Essay on Knowing How to Philosophize). In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, Usa 196.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41.  15 DLs
    Alva Noë (2000). Experience and Experiment in Art. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):123-135.
    A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42.  14 DLs
    Alva Noë (1997). Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds. Philosophical Review 106 (3):434-436.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43.  13 DLs
    Alva Noë (2009). Extending Our View of Mind. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (6):237-238.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44.  12 DLs
    Alva Noë (2011). Doświadczenie i eksperyment w sztuce. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (1):259 - 273.
    A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45.  9 DLs
    Alva Noë (2005). What Does Change Blindness Teach Us About Consciousness? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):218.
  46.  8 DLs
    Alva Noë (2002). On What We See. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):57--80.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 57