Em boa parte do Artigo 68 do Livro Primeiro de seu Estado e Pranto da Igreja, Álvaro Pais, O. Min. (c. 1270-1349) refuta 5 proposições com implicações políticas atribuídas a Marsílio de Pádua (1280-1342). Neste artigo, analisamos a refutação dessas proposições feitas pelo Menorita galego, comparando-as, de um lado, com os textos, efetivamente escritos pelo Médico paduano, que se encontram em sua obra Defensor da Paz (1324) e, de outro, cotejando-o com uma Epistula ad quosdam cardinales, de autoria do mencionado (...) Frade, escrita pelo menos dois anos antes. Desse estudo resultaram as seguintes conclusões: 1 – Frei Álvaro, sem fazer nenhuma alusão, apoiou-se basicamente na mencionada Epistula. 2 – Sob o aspecto doutrinal, essencialmente, não há diferença entre ambos os textos alvarinos. 3 – Nos dois textos, o Franciscano galego não compulsou o Defensor da Paz, tendo utilizado as teses que os censores dessa obra imputaram ao seu autor; em 1327, quando o Papa João XXII condenou-a como herética. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Álvaro Pais. Marsílio de Pádua. Plenitude do poder. Filosofia política. ABSTRACT In a large part of the Article 68 of the Book one of his Status et Planctus Ecclesiae, Alvarus Pelagius O. Min. (c. 1270-1349) refutes five propositions, having political implications, attributed to Marsilius Patavinus (1280-1342). In this study, we analyze the refutation of these propositions made by Alvarus, comparing, on the one hand, with the texts, really, written by Marsilius, which are in his book entitled Defensor pacis (1324), and on the other hand, quoting Alvarus’ text with the Epistula ad quosdam cardinales, also written by the mentioned Franciscan friar two years before. From this study, resulted the following conclusions: 1 – Without to do any mention in the Article 68, the principal Alvarus’ source was the referred Epistula. 2 – Considering the two texts written by Fr. Alvarus, according the doctrinal aspect, they are essentially equal. 3 – In both texts we could see that Alvarus not had in his hands the Defensor Pacis, having used the thesis which the censors of this book imputed to Marsilius in 1327, when this book was condemned as heretic by the Pope John XXII. KEY WORDS – Alvarus Pelagius. Marsilius of Padua. Plentitude of power. Political philosophy. (shrink)
In 1909, Einstein derived a formula for the mean square energy fluctuation in blackbody radiation. This formula is the sum of a wave term and a particle term. In a key contribution to the 1926 Dreim¨.
Using neoPiagetian theory of mental attention (or working memory), I task-analyze two complex performances of great apes and one symbolic performance (funeral burials) of early Homo sapiens. Relating results to brain size growth data, I derive estimates of mental attention for great apes, Homo erectus, Neanderthals, and modern Homo sapiens, and use children's cognitive development as reference. This heuristic model seems consistent with research.
The authors' results support a functionalist conception of working memory: a manifold repertoire of schemes/schemas (long-term memory) and a small set of general-purpose “hidden operators.” Using some of these operators I define mental (i.e., endogenous) attention. Then, analyzing two of the authors' unexplained important findings, I illustrate the mental-attention model's explanatory power. Multivariate methodology that varies developmental, task differences, and individual differences is recommended.
Cowan fails to obtain a magical number of 7 because his analysis is faulty. This is revealed by an alternative analysis of Cowan's own tasks. The analysis assumes a number 7 for adults, and neoPiagetian mental- capacity values for children. Data patterns and proportions of success (reported in Cowan's Figs. 2 and 3) are thus quantitatively explained in detail for the first time.
In this commentaryI evaluate the claim made byKeenan, Nelson, OÕConnor, and Pascual-Leone (2001) that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity, self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere. This reasoning is based on the assumption that self-recognition represents a valid operationalization of self-awareness; I present two views that challenge this rationale. Keenan et al. also support their claim with published evidence relating brain activityand self-awareness; I closelyexamine their analysis of one specific review of (...) literature and conclude that it appears to be biased. Finally, recent research suggests that inner speech (which is associated with left hemispheric activity) is linked to self-awareness—an observation that further casts doubt on the existence of a right hemispheric self-awareness. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. (shrink)
Two assertions of Halford et al. are critiqued: their claim of priority in relational complexity analysis and the sufficiency for cognitive development of their relational-complexity analysis of tasks. Critical discussion of concrete task analyses (i.e., the relational complexity of proportionality problems, of balance scale problems, and the Tower of Hanoi) serves, by way of counterexamples, to highlight problems in their method.
Recent research shows that research programmes (quantitative, qualitative and mixed) in education are not displaced (as suggested by Kuhn) but rather lead to integration. The objective of this study is to present a rationale for mixed methods (integrative) research programs based on contemporary philosophy of science (Lakatos, Giere, Cartwright, Holton, Laudan). This historical reconstruction of episodes from physical science (spanning a period of almost 300 years, 17 th to 20 th century) does not agree with the positivist image of science. (...) Quantitative data (empirical evidence) by itself, does not facilitate progress (despite widespread belief to the contrary), neither in the physical sciences nor in the social sciences (education) A historical reconstruction shows that both Piaget and Pascual-Leone's research programs in cognitive psychology, follow the Galilean idealisation quite closely, similar to the research programs of Newton, Mendeleev, Einstein, Thomson, Rutherford, Millikan and Perl in the physical sciences. This relationship does not imply that researchers in education have to emulate research in the physical sciences. A major argument in favor of mixed methods (integrative) research programs is that it provides a rationale for hypotheses, theories, guiding assumptions and presuppositions to compete and provide alternatives. Similar to the physical sciences, this proliferation of hypotheses leads to controversies and rivalries, and thus facilitates the decision making process of the scientific community. It is concluded that mixed methods research programs (not paradigms) in education can facilitate the construction of robust strategies, provided we let the problem situation (as studied by practicing researchers) decide the methodology. (shrink)
Léon Walras (1834-1910), a French-born economist working in Switzerland, was one of the founders of mathematical economics (and of marginal utility theory and equilibrium analysis in particular). He here defends self-ownership and collective ownership of the rent from natural resources.
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This study will deal with interpreting the moral, social and spiritual views of the famous Spanish theologian and poet, Luis de Leon. ...
Leon Chwistek's 1924 paper ?The Theory of Constructive Types? is cited in the list of recent ?contributions to mathematical logic? in the second edition of Principia Mathematica, yet its prefatory criticisms of the no-classes theory have been seldom noticed. This paper presents a transcription of the relevant section of Chwistek's paper, comments on the significance of his arguments, and traces the reception of the paper. It is suggested that while Russell was aware of Chwistek's points, they were not important in (...) leading him to the adoption of extensionality that marks the second edition of PM. Rudolf Carnap seems to have independently rediscovered Chwistek's issue about the scope of class expressions in identity contexts in his Meaning and Necessity in 1947. (shrink)
?The Principles of the Pure Type Theory? is a translation of Leon Chwistek's 1922 paper ?Zasady czystej teorii typów?. It summarizes Chwistek's results from a series of studies of the logic of Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica which were published between 1912 and 1924. Chwistek's main argument involves a criticism of the axiom of reducibility. Moreover, ?The Principles of the Pure Type Theory? is a source for Chwistek's views on an issue in Whitehead and Russell's ?no-class theory of classes? involving (...) the notion of ?scope? (shrink)
This paper argues the distinctiveness of the President’s Council on Bioethics, as chaired by Leon Kass. The argument proceeds by seeking to place the Council in proper historical and philosophical perspective and considering the implications of some of its work. Sections one and two provide simplified descriptions of the historical background against which the Council emerged and the character of the Council itself, respectively. Section three then considers three basic issues raised by the work of the Council that are of (...) relevance to philosophy and technology as a whole: the role of professionalism, the relation between piecemeal and holistic analyses of technology, and the appeal to human nature as a norm. (shrink)
This paper focuses on the theory of plurality of realities introduced by Leon Chwistek. A critical analysis of this theory and an extensional interpretation of Chwistek’s axiomatic descriptions of four realities lead to an epistemological interpretation of this theory. The word “plurality” in the title is a result of different waysof understanding the same original set of sense-data. This interpretation is contrasted with Kazimierz Pasenkiewicz’s ontological version of this theory. In the final parts of the paper the most important consequences (...) of this theory are discussed. First, the ethical relativism postulated by Chwistek is criticized. Second, an attempt to illustrate the plurality of realities with an example of different styles of painting is discussed. Third, a critical rationalism in the form of a kind of practical attitude toward social reality, which results from the theory of plurality of realities, is outlined. (shrink)
The platonic ideas attribution into God’s mind creates a problem, namely: how to speak about “divine attributes” without put multiplicity into the divine simple substance? From this problem, this paper aims to show how Luis de Léon is between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus.
In this paper, we develop an organizational account that defines biological functions as causal relations subject to closure in living systems, interpreted as the most typical example of organizationally closed and differentiated self-maintaining systems. We argue that this account adequately grounds the teleological and normative dimensions of functions in the current organization of a system, insofar as it provides an explanation for the existence of the function bearer and, at the same time, identifies in a non-arbitrary way the norms that (...) functions are supposed to obey. Accordingly, we suggest that the organizational account combines the etiological and dispositional perspectives in an integrated theoretical framework. (shrink)
Trotsky’s contribution to historical materialism has been subject to two broadly defined critical assessments. Detractors have tended to dismiss his interpretation of Marxism as a form of productive force determinism, while admirers have tended to defend his Marxism as a voluntarist negation of the same. In this essay I argue that both of these opinions share an equally caricatured interpretation of Second International Marxism against which Trotsky is compared. By contrast, I argue that Trotsky’s Marxism can best be understood as (...) a powerful application and deepening of the strongest elements of Second International methodology to a novel set of problems. Thus, against Trotsky’s admirers, I locate his Marxism as both emerging out of, in addition to breaking with, Second International Marxism; while, against his critics, I argue that it was precisely the strengths of this earlier interpretation of Marxism that informed Trotsky’s powerful contributions to historical materialism: his concept of combined and uneven development and his discussion of the role of individual agents within the Marxist interpretation of history. (shrink)
Since Darwin it is widely accepted that natural selection (NS) is the most important mechanism to explain how biological organisms—in their amazing variety—evolve and, therefore, also how the complexity of certain natural systems can increase over time, creating ever new functions or functional structures/relationships. Nevertheless, the way in which NS is conceived within Darwinian Theory already requires an open, wide enough, functional domain where selective forces may act. And, as the present paper will try to show, this becomes even more (...) evident if one looks into the problem of origins. If there was a time when NS was not operating (as it is quite reasonable to assume), where did that initial functional diversity, necessary to trigger off the process, come from? Self-organization processes may be part of the answer, as many authors have claimed in recent years, but surely not the complete one. We will argue here that a special type of self-maintaining organization, arising from the interplay among a set of different endogenously produced constraints (pre-enzymatic catalysts and primitive compartments included), is required for the appearance of functional diversity in the first place. Starting from that point, NS can progressively lead to new (and, at times, also more complex) organizations that, in turn, provide wider functional variety to be selected for, enlarging in this way the range of action and consequences of the mechanism of NS, in a kind of mutually enhancing effect. (shrink)
The standard economic theory of choice is extended to accommodate a particular form of akratic choice. The empirical content of the new theory is fully characterized. A characterization of revealed akratic choice, in terms of observable choice only, is also provided. These results are consistent with the viewpoint that akrasia is a concept that can be empirically substantiated.
Our aim in the present paper is to approach the nature of life from the perspective of autonomy, showing that this perspective can be helpful for overcoming the traditional Cartesian gap between the physical and cognitive domains. We first argue that, although the phenomenon of life manifests itself as highly complex and multidimensional, requiring various levels of description, individual organisms constitute the core of this multifarious phenomenology. Thereafter, our discussion focuses on the nature of the organization of individual living entities, (...) proposing autonomy as the main concept to grasp it. In the second part of the article we show how autonomy is also fundamental to explaining major evolutionary transitions, in an attempt to rethink evolution from the point of view of the organizational structure of the entities/organisms involved. This gives further support to the idea of autonomy not only as a key to understanding life in general but also the complex expressions of it that we observe on our planet. Finally, we suggest a possible general principle that underlies those evolutionary transitions, which allow for the open-ended redefinition of autonomous systems: namely, the relative dynamic decoupling that must be articulated among distinct parts, modules or modes of operation in these systems. (shrink)
Dynamicism has provided cognitive science with important tools to understand some aspects of “how cognitive agents work” but the issue of “what makes something cognitive” has not been sufficiently addressed yet and, we argue, the former will never be complete without the latter. Behavioristic characterizations of cognitive properties are criticized in favor of an organizational approach focused on the internal dynamic relationships that constitute cognitive systems. A definition of cognition as adaptive-autonomy in the embodied and situated neurodynamic domain is provided: (...) the compensatory regulation of a web of stability dependencies between sensorimotor structures is created and preserved during a historical/developmental process. We highlight the functional role of emotional embodiment: internal bioregulatory processes coupled to the formation and adaptive regulation of neurodynamic autonomy. Finally, we discuss a “minimally cognitive behavior program” in evolutionary simulation modeling suggesting that much is to be learned from a complementary “minimally cognitive organization program”. (shrink)
In this article, we propose some fundamental requirements for the appearance of adaptivity. We argue that a basic metabolic organization, taken in its minimal sense, may provide the conceptual framework for naturalizing the origin of teleology and normative functionality as it appears in living systems. However, adaptivity also requires the emergence of a regulatory subsystem, which implies a certain form of dynamic decoupling within a globally integrated, autonomous system. Thus, we analyze several forms of minimal adaptivity, including the special case (...) of motility. We go on to explain how an open-ended complexity growth of motility-based adaptive agency, namely, behavior, requires the appearance of the nervous system. Finally, we discuss some implications of these ideas for embodied robotics. (shrink)
In this paper we review and argue for the relevance of the concept of open-ended evolution in biological theory. Defining it as a process in which a set of chemical systems bring about an unlimited variety of equivalent systems that are not subject to any pre-determined upper bound of organizational complexity, we explain why only a special type of self-constructing, autonomous systems can actually implement it. We further argue that this capacity derives from the ‘dynamic decoupling’ (in its minimal or (...) most basic sense: the phenotype–genotype decoupling) by means of which a radically new way of material organization (minimal living organization) is achieved, allowing for the long-term sustenance of systems whose individual-metabolic and collective-historical pathways become thereafter deeply intertwined. (shrink)
Both the irreducible complexity of biological phenomena and the aim of a universalized biology (life-as-it-could-be) have lead to a deep methodological shift in the study of life; represented by the appearance of ALife, with its claim that computational modelling is the main tool for studying the general principles of biological phenomenology. However this methodological shift implies important questions concerning the aesthetic, engineering and specially the epistemological status of computational models in scientific research: halfway between the well established categories of theory (...) and experiment. ALife models become powerful epistemic artefacts allowing the simulation of emergent phenomena, the interaction between different levels of organization and the integration of different causal factors in the very same manipulable object. The use of computational models in ALife can be classified in four main categories depending on their position between theoretical and empirical practices: generic, conceptual, functional and mechanistic. For each of these categories we analyse their epistemic value and select paradigmatic examples that illustrate how ALife models can be fruitfully inserted in the study of life. (shrink)
We attempt to distinguish, in a biological frame, ontogenetical adaptation from learning. Ontogenetical adaptation arises as a second order (sensorimotor) loop on the ground of the operational closure that provides autonomy and reproductive identity to the living system. Adaptation ensures, through perception, the functional correlation between metabolicmotor states and the states of the environment. Learning brings about a qualitative change in regard to adaptation, the most generic and simple form of optimization at an individual scale. It implies the idea of (...) new knowledge, in the sense that the organism links what formerly appeared as an undistinguished whole. In other words, it means the capability to change its own codes of meaning. Finally, we outline some basic ideas for modelling an adaptive sensor embedded in a (partially) autonomous system, which implies the former distinction between adaptation and learning. (shrink)
In this article, we empirically assess the impact of corporate ethical identity (CEI) on a firm's financial performance. Drawing on formulations of normative and instrumental stakeholder theory, we argue that firms with a strong ethical identity achieve a greater degree of stakeholder satisfaction (SS), which, in turn, positively influences a firm's financial performance. We analyze two dimensions of the CEI of firms: corporate revealed ethics and corporate applied ethics. Our results indicate that revealed ethics has informational worth and enhances shareholder (...) value, whereas applied ethics has a positive impact through the improvement of SS. However, revealed ethics by itself (i.e. decoupled from ethical initiatives) is not sufficient to boost economic performance. (shrink)
According to the traditional nomological-deductive methodology of physics and chemistry [Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948], explaining a phenomenon means subsuming it under a law. Logic becomes then the glue of explanation and laws the primary explainers. Thus, the scientific study of a system would consist in the development of a logically sound model of it, once the relevant observables (state variables) are identified and the general laws governing their change (expressed as differential equations, state transition rules, maximization/minimization principles,. . . ) (...) are well determined, together with the initial or boundary conditions for each particular case. Often this also involves making a set of assumptions about the elementary components of the system (e.g., their structural and dynamic properties) and modes of local interaction. In this framework, predictability becomes the main goal and that is why research is carried out through the construction of accurate mathematical models. Thus, physics and chemistry have made most progress so far by focusing on systems that, either due to their intrinsic properties or to the conditions in which they are investigated, allow for very strong simplifying assumptions, under which, nevertheless, those highly idealized models of reality are deemed to be in good correspondence with reality itself. Despite the enormous success that this methodology has had, the study of living and cognitive phenomena had to follow a very different road, because these phenomena are produced by systems whose underlying material structure and organization do not permit such crude approximations. Seen from the perspective of physics or chemistry, biological and cognitive systems are made of an enormous number of parts or elements interacting in non-linear and selective ways, which makes very difficult their tractability through mathematical models. In addition, many of those interacting elements are hierarchically organized, in a way that the “macroscopic” (observable) parts behave according to rules that cannot be, in practice, derived from simple principles at the level of their “microscopic” dynamics.. (shrink)
Fodor (1975) proposed that word meanings were atomic, and that meaning relations between words could be captured by inference rules, or 'meaning postulates', linking atomic concepts. In his recent work, however, Fodor has rejected meaning postulates as a way of capturing meaning relations, because he sees no principled way of distinguishing meaning postulates from empirical knowledge. In this paper, I argue that Fodor is wrong to reject meaning postulates.
Quantum electrodynamics (QED) is the theory of electrons and other elementary charged particles, interacting through the exchange of light quanta. Albert Einstein introduced the light quantum (now called photon) in 1905, but for about three decades physicists applied quantum ideas mainly in theories of the structure and behavior of matter, not to electromagnetic radiation itself, which was always treated semi-classically. This began to change after 1923 with the discovery of the Compton effect and its kinematic description by Arthur Compton and (...) Peter Debye, based on the light quantum. In this paper we review the study of high-energy radiation that led to Compton's discovery. We discuss the analysis of the intensity distribution of Compton-scattered radiation that together with the ''new'' quantum theory beginning in 1925, resulted in the development, especially by Pascual Jordan and Paul Dirac, of a quantum theory of electromagnetic radiation in interaction with matter. (shrink)
This Dover edition, first published in 1968, is an unabridged and unaltered republication of the work originally published in 1959 under the title Science for ...
We study the appearance of genetic information starting from a system where self-reproductive and enzymatic functions are supported by the same sort of molecules. In a first phase, the information must have arisen in the form of rate independent sequences as records of enzymatic functions. Although this stage must have played an important role in evolution, it will be shown how its evolutive capacities were blocked by the impossibility of appearance of geno/phenotype duality. Finally, a logical scheme is proposed for (...) a transition process toward a system with a code offering a simplification of the conditions required from the assumption of a maximum use of the double RNA capacity, both reproductive and enzymatic. (shrink)
In agreement with Behrendt & Young (B&Y), we considered the role of perception disturbances in schizophrenia in our first clinical approaches, using the Bender test with schizophrenic patients. Following this, we reproduced nuclear symptoms of schizophrenia in animal models, showing that perceptual disturbances, acquisition disturbances, and decrease in affective levels can be induced by glutamatergic blockade within the nucleus accumbens septi. Our results link the proposed corticostriatal dysfunction with the thalamocortical disturbances underlying perceptual problems reviewed by B&Y.
In our talk we will explore the theoretical role of constraints in the debate about emergence in biological systems. We will first advocate the view according to which a sound account of biological organisation implies the appeal to emergent levels of causation, and we will propose a theoretical justification against existing philosophical criticisms by interpreting emergent causal powers in terms of constraints. In particular, it will be our contention that the concept of constraint, interpreted as the causal power stemming from (...) the relational properties of material configurations, offers a solid ground for the theoretical defence of emergence. Our main thesis will then be that biological systems crucially differ from other natural systems in the causal role of constitutive constraints. The first relevant transition from Physics to Biology occurs when a constraint is able to exert a causal action on some dynamics in such a way that, in turn, the constrained dynamics maintain (at least some of) the boundary conditions enabling the constraint to exist. When this occurs, the whole system is then, even if in a minimal sense, self-maintaining. Self-maintenance is a widespread phenomenon in nature, its most common example being the so-called 'self-organizing' or 'dissipative' structures. The peculiar characteristic of these phenomena is that, in different degrees, they produce the same constraints which act upon their generative dynamics (or dynamical configurations). In biological systems, self-maintenance assumes the more complex form of a mutual dependence between a set of constraints such that for each constraint Ci, (at least some of) the boundary conditions required for its maintenance are determined by the immediate action of another constraint Cj, whose maintenance depend in turn on Ci as an immediate constraint. We label this emerging causal regime organizational closure. The concept of organisational closure has two important theoretical implications for the debate on emergence and reduction. The first derives from the acknowledgment that those components which are relevant in order to describe the dynamics of biological systems, and which can be considered as constrained structures, exist only as far as they are involved in the organization. As a consequence, organizational closure entails a limitation in the possible operations of fractioning of the system and, therefore, in the attempt to provide reductionist descriptions of it. The second implication concerns the problem of downward causation. As we will argue, configurations of mutually dependent constraints do not involve inter-level causation, which would then constitute a heuristic, rather than theoretical, tool for biological explanation. (shrink)
