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  1. Alvin I. Goldman, Jacob on Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading.
    Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or imagination). Jacob (...)
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  2. Alvin I. Goldman, Mirroring, Mindreading, and Simulation.
    What is the connection between mirror processes and mindreading? The paper begins with definitions of mindreading and of mirroring processes. It then advances four theses: (T1) mirroring processes in themselves do not constitute mindreading; (T2) some types of mindreading (“low-level” mindreading) are based on mirroring processes; (T3) not all types of mindreading are based on mirroring (“high-level” mindreading); and (T4) simulation-based mindreading includes but is broader than mirroring-based mindreading. Evidence for the causal role of mirroring in mindreading is drawn from (...)
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  3. Alvin I. Goldman, Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package.
    For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” He tries to show how each theory can (...)
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  4. Alvin Goldman (forthcoming). 2006. Social Epistemology. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Available From Http://Plato. Stanford. Edu/Entries/Epistemology-Social.
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  5. Alvin Goldman (forthcoming). Education and Social Epistemology. Philosophy of Education.
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  6. Alvin I. Goldman (forthcoming). Analytical Table of Contents. Social Epistemology.
     
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  7. Alvin I. Goldman (forthcoming). Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.
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  8. Miranda Fricker Frances, Richard Fumerton, Alvin Goldman, Nick Leonard, Christian List & Peter Ludlow (2013). Sanford Goldberg. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  9. Alvin I. Goldman (2013). Joint Ventures: Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition. Oup Usa.
    This collection of essays by Alvin Goldman explores an array of topics in the philosophy of cognitive science, ranging from embodied cognition to the metaphysics of actions and events.
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  10. Alvin I. Goldman (2013). The Bodily Formats Approach to Embodied Cognition. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. 91.
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  11. Alvin I. Goldman & Lucy C. Jordan (2013). Mindreading by Simulation: The Roles of Imagination and Mirroring. In Simon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo & Helen Tager-Flusberg (eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives From Developmental Social Neuroscience. Oup Oxford. 448.
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  12. Alvin I. Goldman (2012). A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):71-88.
    Many current programs for cognitive science sail under the banner of “embodied cognition.” These programs typically seek to distance themselves from standard cognitive science. The present proposal for a conception of embodied cognition is less radical than most, indeed, quite compatible with many versions of traditional cognitive science. Its rationale is based on two elements, each of which is theoretically plausible and empirically well-founded. The first element invokes the idea of “bodily formats,” i.e., representational codes primarily utilized in forming interoceptive (...)
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  13. Alvin I. Goldman (2012). Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays. Oup Usa.
    This is the most up-to-date collection of essays by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, refining and clarifying that theory and critiquing its rivals. The volume features important essays on the internalism/externalism debate, epistemic value, the intuitional methodology of philosophy, and social epistemology.
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  14. Alvin Goldman (2011). Two Routes to Empathy. In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 31.
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  15. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). And Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 254.
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  16. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). Commentary on Jack Lyons's Perception and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):457 - 466.
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  17. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
  18. Alvin Goldman (2010). Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press, Usa. 1--29.
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  19. Alvin I. Goldman (2010). A Guide to Social Epistemology. In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.
     
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  20. Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.) (2010/2011). Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.
    This volume will be of great interest to scholars and students in epistemology.
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  21. Alvin Goldman (2009). Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement. In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oup.
    I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try to guide or regulate their members’ credence-forming habits in a variety of different, i.e., incompatible, ways. Although there may be considerable overlap across cultures in certain types of (...)
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  22. Alvin Goldman (2009). Simulation Theory and Cognitive Neuroscience. In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
  23. Alvin Goldman (2009). Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence. In Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 73-91.
    Timothy Williamson’s project in Knowledge and Its Limits (Williamson, 2000)1 includes proposals for substantial revisions in the received approach to epistemology. One received view is that knowledge is conceptualized in terms of a conjunction of factors that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowing. A central aim of epistemology is to state such necessary and sufficient conditions. Against this received view, Williamson argues that a necessary but insufficient condition need not be a conjunct of a non-circular necessary and sufficient (...)
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  24. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification. Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):309-338.
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  25. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.
    Abstract: Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or (...)
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  26. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Précis of "Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading". Philosophical Studies 144 (3):431 - 434.
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  27. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Replies to Discussants. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):245-288.
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  28. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Replies to Perner and Brandl, Saxe, Vignemont, and Carruthers. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):477 - 491.
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  29. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Recursive Tracking Versus Process Reliabilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):223-230.
    Sherrilyn Roush’s Tracking Truth (2005) is an impressive, precisioncrafted work. Although it sets out to rehabilitate the epistemological theory of Robert Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (1981), its departures from Nozick’s line are extensive and original enough that it should be regarded as a distinct form of epistemological externalism. Roush’s mission is to develop an externalism that averts the problems and counterexamples encountered not only by Nozick’s theory but by other varieties of externalism as well. Roush advances both a theory of knowledge (...)
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  30. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Social Epistemology: Theory and Applications. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84 (64):1-.
    1. Mainstream Epistemology and Social Epistemology Epistemology has had a strongly individualist orientation, at least since Descartes. Knowledge, for Descartes, starts with the fact of one’s own thinking and with oneself as subject of that thinking. Whatever else can be known, it must be known by inference from one’s own mental contents. Achieving such knowledge is an individual, rather than a collective, enterprise. Descartes’s successors largely followed this lead, so the history of epistemology, down to our own time, has been (...)
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  31. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Systems-Oriented Social Epistemology. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:189-214.
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  32. Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson (2009). ``Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. H. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 19--41.
    It is a widely accepted doctrine in epistemology that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. But although epistemologists regularly pay homage to this doctrine, evidence for it is shaky. Is it based on evidence that ordinary people on the street make evaluative comparisons of knowledge and true belief, and consistently rate the former ahead of the latter? Do they reveal such a preference by some sort of persistent choice behavior? Neither of these scenarios is observed. Rather, epistemologists come (...)
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  33. Alvin Goldman & Frederique de Vignemont (2009). Is Social Cognition Embodied? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (10):154-159.
    Theories of embodied cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear how to understand them. We offer several interpretations of embodiment, the most interesting being the thesis that mental representations in bodily formats (B-formats) have an important role in cognition. Potential B-formats include motoric, somatosensory, affective and interoceptive formats. The literature on mirroring and related phenomena provides support for a limited-scope version of embodied social cognition under the B-format interpretation. It is questionable, however, whether such a thesis can (...)
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  34. Raphael M. Goldman & Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Review of Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology, by Larry Laudan. [REVIEW] Legal Theory 15 (1):55.
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  35. Gerhard Schurz, Markus Werning & Alvin I. Goldman (eds.) (2009). Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman. Rodopi.
    The volume contains the written versions of all papers given at the workshop, divided into five chapters and followed by Alvin Goldman¿s replies in the sixth ...
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  36. Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Reliabilism is a general approach to epistemology that emphasizes the truth conduciveness of a belief forming process, method, or other epistemologically relevant factor. The reliability theme appears both in theories of knowledge and theories of justification. ‘Reliabilism’ is sometimes used broadly to refer to any theory of knowledge or justification that emphasizes truth getting or truth indicating properties. These include theories originally proposed under different labels, such as ‘tracking’ theories. More commonly, ‘reliabilism’ is used narrowly to refer to process reliabilism (...)
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  37. Alvin Goldman, Social Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  38. Alvin Goldman (2008). The Real Thing? The Philosophers' Magazine 43 (43):88-93.
    A central group of questions are questions of an evaluative nature having to do with beliefs. What I want to say is, what we should focus on is; what are good ways of organising social practices and social institutions that are good from the point of view of what people believe, and help them get true beliefs or be informed, and then avoid making mistakes.
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  39. Alvin Goldman (2008). The Social Epistemology of Blogging. In M. J. van den Joven & J. Weckert (eds.), Information Technology and Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 111--122.
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  40. Alvin I. Goldman (2008). Does One Size Fit All? Hurley on Shared Circuits. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):27-28.
    Hurley's high level of generality suggests that a control-theoretic framework underpins all of the phenomena in question, but this is problematic. In contrast to the action-perception domain, where the control-theoretic framework certainly applies, there is no evidence that this framework equally applies to feelings and emotions, such as pain, touch, and disgust, where mirroring and simulational mindreading are also found.
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  41. Alvin I. Goldman (2008). Hurley on Simulation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):775-788.
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  42. Alvin I. Goldman (2008). Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 63--82.
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  43. Alvin I. Goldman (2007). A Program for “Naturalizing” Metaphysics, with Application to the Ontology of Events. The Monist 90 (3):457-479.
    I wish to advance a certain program for doing metaphysics, a program in which cognitive science would play an important role.1 This proposed ingredient is absent from most contemporary metaphysics. There are one or two local parts of metaphysics where a role for cognitive science is commonly accepted, but I advocate a wider range of application. I begin by laying out the general program and its rationale, with selected illustrations. Then I explore in some detail a single application: the ontology (...)
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  44. Alvin I. Goldman (2007). Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):1-26.
    Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.
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  45. Alvin Goldman (2006). Imagination and Simulation in Audience Responses to Fiction. In Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Clarendon Press.
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  46. Alvin Goldman (2006). Social Epistemology, Theory of Evidence, and Intelligent Design: Deciding What to Teach. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):1-22.
  47. Alvin I. Goldman (2006). The Need for Social Epistemology. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Clarendon Press.
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  48. William P. Alston, Laurence Bonjour, Carl Ginet, Alvin I. Goldman, John Greco, George I. Mavrodes, Philip L. Quinn, Alessandra Tanesini, Nicholas Wolterstorff & Linda Zagzebski (2005). Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  49. Alvin Goldman (2005). Kornblith's Naturalistic Epistemology. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):403–410.
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