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Profile: Alvin Goldman (Rutgers University - New Brunswick)
  1.  84
    Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
    So argues a leading epistemologist in this work of fundamental importance to philosophical thinking.
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  2. Alvin I. Goldman (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge in a Social World offers a philosophy for the information age. Alvin Goldman explores new frontiers by creating a thoroughgoing social epistemology, moving beyond the traditional focus on solitary knowers. Against the tides of postmodernism and social constructionism Goldman defends the integrity of truth and shows how to promote it by well-designed forms of social interaction. From science to education, from law to democracy, he shows why and how public institutions should seek knowledge-enhancing practices. The result is a bold, (...)
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  3.  64
    Vittorio Gallese & Alvin Goldman (1998). Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (12):493-501.
  4. Alvin I. Goldman (1970). A Theory of Human Action. Princeton University Press.
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  5.  17
    Alvin Goldman (1992). Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  6. Alvin Goldman (1979). ``What is Justified Belief?". In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel 1-25.
     
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  7. Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
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  8. Alvin I. Goldman (2007). Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):1-26.
    Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.
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  9.  37
    Alvin I. Goldman (1992). Empathy, Mind, and Morals. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):17 - 41.
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  10. Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson (2009). ``Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. H. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 19--41.
    It is a widely accepted doctrine in epistemology that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. But although epistemologists regularly pay homage to this doctrine, evidence for it is shaky. Is it based on evidence that ordinary people on the street make evaluative comparisons of knowledge and true belief, and consistently rate the former ahead of the latter? Do they reveal such a preference by some sort of persistent choice behavior? Neither of these scenarios is observed. Rather, epistemologists come (...)
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  11.  55
    Alvin I. Goldman & Chandra S. Sripada (2005). Simulationist Models of Face-Based Emotion Recognition. Cognition 94 (3):193-213.
    Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion (...)
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  12. Alvin I. Goldman (2001). Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
  13.  45
    Alvin I. Goldman (2002). Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public. Oxford University Press.
    How can we know? How can we attain justified belief? These traditional questions in epistemology have inspired philosophers for centuries. Now, in this exceptional work, Alvin Goldman, distinguished scholar and leader in the fields of epistemology and mind, approaches such inquiries as legitimate methods or "pathways" to knowledge. He examines the notion of private and public knowledge, arguing for the epistemic legitimacy of private and introspective methods of gaining knowledge, yet acknowledging the equal importance of social and public mechanisms in (...)
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  14. Alvin Goldman & Frederique de Vignemont (2009). Is Social Cognition Embodied? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (10):154-159.
    Theories of embodied cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear how to understand them. We offer several interpretations of embodiment, the most interesting being the thesis that mental representations in bodily formats (B-formats) have an important role in cognition. Potential B-formats include motoric, somatosensory, affective and interoceptive formats. The literature on mirroring and related phenomena provides support for a limited-scope version of embodied social cognition under the B-format interpretation. It is questionable, however, whether such a thesis can (...)
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  15. Alvin I. Goldman (1999). Internalism Exposed. Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):271-293.
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  16.  82
    Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.) (2010/2011). Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.
    This volume will be of great interest to scholars and students in epistemology.
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  17. Alvin I. Goldman (1967). A Causal Theory of Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
  18. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification. Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):309-338.
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  19. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.
    Abstract: Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or (...)
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  20.  21
    Alvin I. Goldman (2012). Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays. OUP Usa.
    This is the most up-to-date collection of essays by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, refining and clarifying that theory and critiquing its rivals. The volume features important essays on the internalism/externalism debate, epistemic value, the intuitional methodology of philosophy, and social epistemology.
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  21. Alvin Goldman (2009). Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence. In Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press 73-91.
    Timothy Williamson’s project in Knowledge and Its Limits (Williamson, 2000)1 includes proposals for substantial revisions in the received approach to epistemology. One received view is that knowledge is conceptualized in terms of a conjunction of factors that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowing. A central aim of epistemology is to state such necessary and sufficient conditions. Against this received view, Williamson argues that a necessary but insufficient condition need not be a conjunct of a non-circular necessary and sufficient (...)
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  22. Alvin I. Goldman (2012). A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):71-88.
    Many current programs for cognitive science sail under the banner of “embodied cognition.” These programs typically seek to distance themselves from standard cognitive science. The present proposal for a conception of embodied cognition is less radical than most, indeed, quite compatible with many versions of traditional cognitive science. Its rationale is based on two elements, each of which is theoretically plausible and empirically well-founded. The first element invokes the idea of “bodily formats,” i.e., representational codes primarily utilized in forming interoceptive (...)
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  23.  37
    Alvin I. Goldman (1993). Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science. Westview Press.
    One of the most fruitful interdisciplinary boundaries in contemporary scholarship is that between philosophy and cognitive science. Now that solid empirical results about the activities of the human mind are available, it is no longer necessary for philosophers to practice armchair psychology.In this short, accessible, and entertaining book, Alvin Goldman presents a masterly survey of recent work in cognitive science that has particular relevance to philosophy. Besides providing a valuable review of the most suggestive work in (...)
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  24. Alvin I. Goldman (1988). Strong and Weak Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.
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  25.  48
    Alvin I. Goldman (2008). Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press 63--82.
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  26. Alvin I. Goldman (1979/2000). What is Justified Belief? In Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Epistemology. An Anthology. Blackwell 340-353.
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  27. Alvin I. Goldman (2004). Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology. Episteme 1 (1):11-22.
    Social epistemology is a many-splendored subject. Different theorists adopt different approaches and the options are quite diverse, often orthogonal to one another. The approach I favor is to examine social practices in terms of their impact on knowledge acquisition . This has at least two virtues: it displays continuity with traditional epistemology, which historically focuses on knowledge, and it intersects with the concerns of practical life, which are pervasively affected by what people know or don't know. (...)
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  28.  46
    Alvin I. Goldman (2015). Reliabilism, Veritism, and Epistemic Consequentialism. Episteme 12 (2):131-143.
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  29. Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Reliabilism is a general approach to epistemology that emphasizes the truth conduciveness of a belief forming process, method, or other epistemologically relevant factor. The reliability theme appears both in theories of knowledge and theories of justification. ‘Reliabilism’ is sometimes used broadly to refer to any theory of knowledge or justification that emphasizes truth getting or truth indicating properties. These include theories originally proposed under different labels, such as ‘trackingtheories. More commonly, ‘reliabilism’ is used narrowly (...)
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  30. Alvin I. Goldman (forthcoming). Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.
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  31.  57
    Alvin I. Goldman (1993). Ethics and Cognitive Science. Ethics 103 (2):337-360.
  32.  19
    Alvin Goldman (2011). Two Routes to Empathy. In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press 31.
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  33. Alvin I. Goldman (1978). Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition. Journal of Philosophy 75 (10):509-523.
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  34.  10
    Alvin I. Goldman (2011). And Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press 254.
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  35. Alvin Goldman, Ernest Sosa, Hilary Kornblith, John Greco, Jonathan Dancy, Laurence Bonjour, Linda Zagrebsky, Julia Driver, James Montmarquet, Chirstopher Hookway, Ricard Paul, Guy Axtell & Casey Swank (eds.) (2000). Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Contemporary Virtue Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This is a unique collection of new and recently-published articles which debate the merits of virtue-theoretic approaches to the core epistemological issues of knowledge and justified belief. The readings all contribute to our understanding of the relative importance, for a theory of justified belief, of the reliability of our cognitive faculties and of the individuals responsibility in gathering and weighing evidence. Highlights of the readings include direct exchanges between leading exponents of this approach and their critics.
     
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  36. Alvin Goldman (1993). Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
    This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness (...)
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  37. Alvin I. Goldman & Joel Pust (1998). Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence. In Michael Depaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman and Littlefield
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  38. Alvin Goldman (2009). Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement. In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. OUP
    I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try to guide or regulate their members’ credence-forming habits in a variety of different, i.e., incompatible, ways. Although there may be considerable overlap across cultures in certain types of (...)
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  39. Alvin I. Goldman (1993). Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology. Philosophical Issues 3:271-285.
  40.  18
    Alvin I. Goldman (2013). Joint Ventures: Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition. OUP Usa.
    This collection of essays by Alvin Goldman explores an array of topics in the philosophy of cognitive science, ranging from embodied cognition to the metaphysics of actions and events.
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  41.  99
    Alvin I. Goldman (2007). A Program for “Naturalizing” Metaphysics, with Application to the Ontology of Events. The Monist 90 (3):457-479.
    I wish to advance a certain program for doing metaphysics, a program in which cognitive science would play an important role.1 This proposed ingredient is absent from most contemporary metaphysics. There are one or two local parts of metaphysics where a role for cognitive science is commonly accepted, but I advocate a wider range of application. I begin by laying out the general program and its rationale, with selected illustrations. Then I explore in some detail a single application: the ontology (...)
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  42.  28
    Alvin I. Goldman & Moshe Shaked (1991). An Economic Model of Scientific Activity and Truth Acquisition. Philosophical Studies 63 (1):31 - 55.
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  43. Alvin I. Goldman, Mirroring, Mindreading, and Simulation.
    What is the connection between mirror processes and mindreading? The paper begins with definitions of mindreading and of mirroring processes. It then advances four theses: (T1) mirroring processes in themselves do not constitute mindreading; (T2) some types of mindreading (“low-level” mindreading) are based on mirroring processes; (T3) not all types of mindreading are based on mirroring (“high-level” mindreading); and (T4) simulation-based mindreading includes but is broader than mirroring-based mindreading. Evidence for the causal role of mirroring in mindreading is drawn from (...)
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  44. Alvin I. Goldman (1980). The Internalist Conception of Justification. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 5 (1):27-51.
  45.  57
    Alvin I. Goldman (1987). Foundations of Social Epistemics. Synthese 73 (1):109 - 144.
    A conception of social epistemology is articulated with links to studies of science and opinion in such disciplines as history, sociology, and political science. The conception is evaluative, though, rather than purely descriptive. Three types of evaluative approaches are examined but rejected: relativism, consensualism, and expertism. A fourth, truth-linked, approach to intellectual evaluation is then advocated: social procedures should be appraised by their propensity to foster true belief. Standards of evaluation in social epistemics would be much the same as those (...)
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  46.  23
    Alvin I. Goldman (1995). Simulation and Interpersonal Utility. Ethics 105 (4):709-726.
  47. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Systems-Oriented Social Epistemology. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:189-214.
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  48.  50
    Alvin Goldman, Social Epistemology. Critica.
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  49. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press
  50. Alvin Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.) (2011). Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press Usa.
    What if anything justifies us in believing the testimony of others? How should we react to disagreement between ourselves and our peers, and to disagreement among the experts when we ourselves are novices? Can beliefs be held by groups of people in addition to the people composing those groups? And if so, how should groups go about forming their beliefs? How should we design social systems, such as legal juries and scientific research-sharing schemes, to promote knowledge among the people who (...)
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