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Profile: Alvin Goldman (Rutgers University)
  1. Alvin I. Goldman, Jacob on Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading.
    Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or imagination). Jacob (...)
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  2. Alvin I. Goldman, Mirroring, Mindreading, and Simulation.
    What is the connection between mirror processes and mindreading? The paper begins with definitions of mindreading and of mirroring processes. It then advances four theses: (T1) mirroring processes in themselves do not constitute mindreading; (T2) some types of mindreading (“low-level” mindreading) are based on mirroring processes; (T3) not all types of mindreading are based on mirroring (“high-level” mindreading); and (T4) simulation-based mindreading includes but is broader than mirroring-based mindreading. Evidence for the causal role of mirroring in mindreading is drawn from (...)
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  3. Alvin I. Goldman, Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package.
    For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” He tries to show how each theory can (...)
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  4. Alvin I. Goldman (forthcoming). Analytical Table of Contents. Social Epistemology.
     
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  5. Alvin I. Goldman (forthcoming). Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.
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  6. Alvin I. Goldman (2013). Joint Ventures: Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition. Oup Usa.
    This collection of essays by Alvin Goldman explores an array of topics in the philosophy of cognitive science, ranging from embodied cognition to the metaphysics of actions and events.
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  7. Alvin I. Goldman (2013). The Bodily Formats Approach to Embodied Cognition. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. 91.
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  8. Alvin I. Goldman & Lucy C. Jordan (2013). Mindreading by Simulation: The Roles of Imagination and Mirroring. In Simon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo & Helen Tager-Flusberg (eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives From Developmental Social Neuroscience. Oup Oxford. 448.
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  9. Alvin I. Goldman (2012). A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):71-88.
    Many current programs for cognitive science sail under the banner of “embodied cognition.” These programs typically seek to distance themselves from standard cognitive science. The present proposal for a conception of embodied cognition is less radical than most, indeed, quite compatible with many versions of traditional cognitive science. Its rationale is based on two elements, each of which is theoretically plausible and empirically well-founded. The first element invokes the idea of “bodily formats,” i.e., representational codes primarily utilized in forming interoceptive (...)
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  10. Alvin I. Goldman (2012). Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays. Oup Usa.
    This is the most up-to-date collection of essays by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, refining and clarifying that theory and critiquing its rivals. The volume features important essays on the internalism/externalism debate, epistemic value, the intuitional methodology of philosophy, and social epistemology.
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  11. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). And Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 254.
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  12. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). Commentary on Jack Lyons's Perception and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):457 - 466.
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  13. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
  14. Alvin I. Goldman (2010). A Guide to Social Epistemology. In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.
     
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  15. Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.) (2010/2011). Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.
    This volume will be of great interest to scholars and students in epistemology.
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  16. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification. Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):309-338.
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  17. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.
    Abstract: Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or (...)
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  18. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Précis of "Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading". Philosophical Studies 144 (3):431 - 434.
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  19. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Replies to Discussants. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):245-288.
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  20. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Replies to Perner and Brandl, Saxe, Vignemont, and Carruthers. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):477 - 491.
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  21. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Recursive Tracking Versus Process Reliabilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):223-230.
    Sherrilyn Roush’s Tracking Truth (2005) is an impressive, precisioncrafted work. Although it sets out to rehabilitate the epistemological theory of Robert Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (1981), its departures from Nozick’s line are extensive and original enough that it should be regarded as a distinct form of epistemological externalism. Roush’s mission is to develop an externalism that averts the problems and counterexamples encountered not only by Nozick’s theory but by other varieties of externalism as well. Roush advances both a theory of knowledge (...)
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  22. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Social Epistemology: Theory and Applications. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84 (64):1-.
    1. Mainstream Epistemology and Social Epistemology Epistemology has had a strongly individualist orientation, at least since Descartes. Knowledge, for Descartes, starts with the fact of one’s own thinking and with oneself as subject of that thinking. Whatever else can be known, it must be known by inference from one’s own mental contents. Achieving such knowledge is an individual, rather than a collective, enterprise. Descartes’s successors largely followed this lead, so the history of epistemology, down to our own time, has been (...)
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  23. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Systems-Oriented Social Epistemology. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:189-214.
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  24. Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson (2009). ``Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. H. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 19--41.
    It is a widely accepted doctrine in epistemology that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. But although epistemologists regularly pay homage to this doctrine, evidence for it is shaky. Is it based on evidence that ordinary people on the street make evaluative comparisons of knowledge and true belief, and consistently rate the former ahead of the latter? Do they reveal such a preference by some sort of persistent choice behavior? Neither of these scenarios is observed. Rather, epistemologists come (...)
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  25. Raphael M. Goldman & Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Review of Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology, by Larry Laudan. [REVIEW] Legal Theory 15 (1):55.
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  26. Gerhard Schurz, Markus Werning & Alvin I. Goldman (eds.) (2009). Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman. Rodopi.
    The volume contains the written versions of all papers given at the workshop, divided into five chapters and followed by Alvin Goldman¿s replies in the sixth ...
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  27. Alvin I. Goldman (2008). Does One Size Fit All? Hurley on Shared Circuits. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):27-28.
    Hurley's high level of generality suggests that a control-theoretic framework underpins all of the phenomena in question, but this is problematic. In contrast to the action-perception domain, where the control-theoretic framework certainly applies, there is no evidence that this framework equally applies to feelings and emotions, such as pain, touch, and disgust, where mirroring and simulational mindreading are also found.
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  28. Alvin I. Goldman (2008). Hurley on Simulation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):775-788.
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  29. Alvin I. Goldman (2008). Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 63--82.
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  30. Alvin I. Goldman (2007). A Program for “Naturalizing” Metaphysics, with Application to the Ontology of Events. The Monist 90 (3):457-479.
    I wish to advance a certain program for doing metaphysics, a program in which cognitive science would play an important role.1 This proposed ingredient is absent from most contemporary metaphysics. There are one or two local parts of metaphysics where a role for cognitive science is commonly accepted, but I advocate a wider range of application. I begin by laying out the general program and its rationale, with selected illustrations. Then I explore in some detail a single application: the ontology (...)
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  31. Alvin I. Goldman (2007). Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):1-26.
    Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.
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  32. Alvin I. Goldman (2006). The Need for Social Epistemology. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Clarendon Press.
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  33. William P. Alston, Laurence Bonjour, Carl Ginet, Alvin I. Goldman, John Greco, George I. Mavrodes, Philip L. Quinn, Alessandra Tanesini, Nicholas Wolterstorff & Linda Zagzebski (2005). Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  34. Alvin I. Goldman (2005). Legal Evidence. In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell Pub.. 163--175.
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  35. Alvin I. Goldman & Chandra S. Sripada (2005). Simulationist Models of Face-Based Emotion Recognition. Cognition 94 (3):193-213.
    Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion (...)
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  36. Alvin I. Goldman (2004). An Epistemological Approach to Argumentation. Informal Logic 23 (1).
    The evaluation of arguments and argumentation is best understood epistemologically. Epistemic circularity is not formally defective but it may be epistemologically objectionable. Sorenson's doubts about the syntactic approach to circularity are endorsed with qualifications. One explanation of an argument's goodness is its ability to produce justified belief in its conclusion by means of justified belief in its premises, but matters are not so simple for interpersonal argumentation. Even when an argument's premises and conclusion are justified for a speaker, this justifiedness (...)
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  37. Alvin I. Goldman (2004). Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology. Episteme 1 (1):11-22.
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  38. Alvin I. Goldman (2003). 19. What is Justified Belief? In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. 178.
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  39. Alvin I. Goldman (2002). Précis of Knowledge in a Social World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):185–190.
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  40. Alvin I. Goldman (2002). Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public. Oxford University Press.
    How can we know? How can we attain justified belief? These traditional questions in epistemology have inspired philosophers for centuries. Now, in this exceptional work, Alvin Goldman, distinguished scholar and leader in the fields of epistemology and mind, approaches such inquiries as legitimate methods or "pathways" to knowledge. He examines the notion of private and public knowledge, arguing for the epistemic legitimacy of private and introspective methods of gaining knowledge, yet acknowledging the equal importance of social and public mechanisms in (...)
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  41. Alvin I. Goldman (2002). Review: Précis of Knowledge in a Social World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):185 - 190.
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  42. Alvin I. Goldman (2002). Review: Reply to Commentators. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):215 - 227.
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  43. Alvin I. Goldman (2002). Reply to Commentators. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):215–227.
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  44. Alvin I. Goldman (2001). Desire, Intention, and the Simulation Theory. In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. Mit Press. 207--225.
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  45. Alvin I. Goldman (2001). Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
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  46. Alvin I. Goldman (2001). Social Routes to Belief and Knowledge. The Monist 84 (3):346-367.
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  47. Alvin I. Goldman (2000). Can Science Know When Youre Conscious? Epistemological Foundations of Consciousness Research. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):3-22.
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  48. Alvin I. Goldman (2000). Is Less Knowledge Better Than More? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):751-752.
    When a distinction is drawn between “total” knowledge and “problem-specific” knowledge, it is seen that successful users of the recognition heuristic have more problem-specific knowledge than people unable to exploit this heuristic. So it is not ignorance that makes them smart, but knowledge.
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  49. Alvin I. Goldman (2000). Replies to Reviews of Knowledge in a Social World. Social Epistemology 14 (4):317 – 333.
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