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Profile: Amelie Rorty (Boston University, Harvard University)
  1.  96
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1976). The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
    In this volume, thirteen philosophers contribute new essays analyzing the criteria for personal identity and their import on ethics and the theory of action: it ...
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  2.  6
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1992). Essays on Aristotle's Poetics. Princeton University Press.
    Aimed at deepening our understanding of the Poetics, this collection places Aristotle's analysis of tragedy in its larger philosophical context.
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  3.  84
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1987). The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):399-412.
  4.  57
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1980). Explaining Emotions. University of California Press.
    The philosopher must inform himself of the relevant empirical investigation to arrive at a definition, and the scientist cannot afford to be naive about the..
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  5.  60
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1978). Explaining Emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (March):139-161.
    The challenge of explaining the emotions has engaged the attention of the best minds in philosophy and science throughout history. Part of the fascination has been that the emotions resist classification. As adequate account therefore requires receptivity to knowledge from a variety of sources. The philosopher must inform himself of the relevant empirical investigation to arrive at a definition, and the scientist cannot afford to be naive about the assumptions built into his conceptual apparatus. The contributors to this volume have (...)
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  6.  73
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1982). From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments. Philosophy 57 (220):159 - 172.
    During the period from Descartes to Rousseau, the mind changed. Its domain was redefined; its activities were redescribed; and its various powers were redistributed. Once a part of cosmic Nous, its various functions delimited by its embodied condition, the individual mind now becomes a field of forces with desires impinging on one another, their forces resolved according to their strengths and directions. Of course since there is no such thing as The Mind Itself, it was not the mind that changed. (...)
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  7. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1980). Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):333 – 346.
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  8.  86
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1980). Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. University of California Press.
    This compilation will mark a high point of excellence in its genre."--Gregory Vlastos, University of California, Berkeley.
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  9.  31
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1972). Belief and Self-Deception. Inquiry 15 (1-4):387-410.
    In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part II, I (...)
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  10.  39
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1980). Vi. Akrasia and Conflict. Inquiry 23 (2):193 – 212.
    As Elster suggests in his chapter 'Contradictions of the Mind', in Logic and Society, akrasia and self-deception represent the most common psychological functions for a person in conflict and contradiction. This article develops the theme of akrasia and conflict. Section I says what akrasia is not. Section II describes the character of the akrates, analyzing the sorts of conflicts to which he is subject and describing the sources of his debilities. A brief account is then given of the attractions of (...)
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  11. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (2008). The Dramatic Sources of Philosophy. Philosophy and Literature 32 (1):pp. 11-30.
    This paper traces some of the sources of Socratic dialectic: myth, drama, lyric poetry, law and the courts, pre-Socratic cosmology.
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  12.  4
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1985). Self-Deception, Akrasia and Irrationality. In Jon Elster (ed.), The Multiple Self. Cambridge University Press
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  13.  27
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1994). The Hidden Politics of Cultural Identification. Political Theory 22 (1):152-166.
    While cultural identification --cultural essentialism and reification-- can play an important liberating role. it is also internally oppressive; it denies the dynamics of intra cultural divisions.
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  14.  19
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1994). User-Friendly Self-Deception. Philosophy 69 (268):211 - 228.
    Since many varieties of self-deception are ineradicable and useful, it would be wise to be ambivalent about at least some of its forms.1 It is open-eyed ambivalence that acknowledges its own dualities rather than ordinary shifty vacillation that we need. To be sure, self-deception remains dangerous: sensible ambivalence should not relax vigilance against pretence and falsity, combating irrationality and obfuscation wherever they occur.
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  15.  51
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1978). The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Mind 87 (347):343-358.
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  16.  33
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1997). The Ethics of Reading: A Traveler's Guide. Educational Theory 47 (1):85-89.
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  17.  0
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1992). [Book Review] Mind in Action, Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW] Ethics 102:844-846.
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  18. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1992). Mind in Action. Ethics 102 (4):844-846.
     
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  19.  30
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1983). Fearing Death. Philosophy 58 (224):175 - 188.
    Many have said, and I think some have shown, that it is irrational to fear death. The extinction of what is essential to the self—whether it be biological death or the permanent cessation of consciousness—cannot by definition be experienced by oneself as a loss or as a harm.
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  20.  3
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1995). Moral Complexity, Conflicted Resonance and Virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):949 - 956.
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  21. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1986). Essays on Descartes' Meditations. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    The essays in this volume form a commentary on Descartes' _Meditations_. Following the sequence of the meditational stages, the authors analyze the function of each stage in transforming the reader, to realize his essential nature as a rational inquirer, capable of scientific, demonstrable knowledge of the world. There are essays on the genre of meditational writing, on the implications of the opening cathartic section of the book on Descartes' theory of perception and his use of skeptical arguments; essays on the (...)
     
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  22.  35
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1986). The Two Faces of Courage. Philosophy 61 (236):151 - 171.
    Courage is dangerous. If it is defined in traditional ways, as a set of dispositions to overcome fear, to oppose obstacles, to perform difficult or dangerous actions, its claim to be a virtue is questionable. Unlike the virtue of justice, or a sense of proportion, traditional courage does not itself determine what is to be done, let alone assure that it is worth doing. If we retain the traditional conception of courage and its military connotations–overcoming and combat–we should be suspicious (...)
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  23.  66
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1998). The Political Sources of Emotions: Greed and Anger. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):21-33.
  24.  1
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1983). Experiments in Philosophic Genre: Descartes' "Meditations. Critical Inquiry 9 (3):545.
    It would be pretty to think that Descartes’ Meditations is itself a structured transformation of the meditational mode, starting with the dominance of an intellectual, ascensional mode, moving through the penitential form, and ending with the analytic-architectonic mode. Unfortunately the text does not sustain such an easy resolution to our problems. Instead, we see that different modes seem dominant at different stages; their subterranean connections and relations remain unclear.We could try to construct a nesting of mask, face, and skeleton in (...)
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  25.  60
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1997). The Social and Political Sources of Akrasia. Ethics 107 (4):644-657.
    Akrasia is not always --or only-- a solitary failure to act on a person's judgment of what is, all things considered, best. Nor is it always a species of moral or ethical failure prompted by a form of irrationality. It is often prompted by social support and sustained by structuring political institutions.
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  26. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1992). Descartes on Thinking with the Body. In John Cottingham (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge University Press
     
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  27.  14
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1992). The Directions of Aristotle's "Rhetoric". Review of Metaphysics 46 (1):63 - 95.
  28.  17
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1991). The Psychology of Aristotelian Tragedy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):53-72.
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  29.  44
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1974). The Place of Pleasure in Aristotle's Ethics. Mind 83 (332):481-497.
    BACKGROUND: Although placing patients with acute respiratory failure in a prone (face down) position improves their oxygenation 60 to 70 percent of the time, the effect on survival is not known. METHODS: In a multicenter, randomized trial, we compared conventional treatment (in the supine position) of patients with acute lung injury or the acute respiratory distress syndrome with a predefined strategy of placing patients in a prone position for six or more hours daily for 10 days. We enrolled 304 patients, (...)
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  30.  2
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1996). From Exasperating Virtues to Civic Virtues. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):303 - 314.
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  31.  6
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1996). Descartes and Spinoza on Epistemological Egalitarianism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 13 (1):35 - 53.
  32.  42
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1996). User Friendly Self-Deception: A Traveler's Manual. In Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press
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  33. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) (1989). Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
    Students of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literature will welcome this collection of original essays on self-deception and related phenomena such as wishful thinking, bad faith, and false consciousness. The book has six sections, each exploring self-deception and related phenomena from a different perspective.
     
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  34.  7
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (2010). The Politics of Spinoza's Vanishing Dichotomies. Political Theory 38 (1):131 - 141.
    Spinoza's project of showing how the mind can be freed from its passive affects and the State from its divisive factions (E IV.Appendix and V.Preface) ultimately coincides with the aims announced in the subtitle of the Tractatus-Theologico-Politicus (TTP) "to demonstrate that [the] freedom to philosophize does not endanger the piety and obedience required for civic peace." Both projects rest on a set of provisional isomorphic distinctions—between adequate and inadequate ideas, between reason and the imagination, between active and passive affects—that Spinoza (...)
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  35.  23
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (2000). Spinoza's Ironic Therapy: From Anger to the Intellectual Love of God. History of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (3):261 - 276.
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  36.  6
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1971). Naturalism, Paradigms, and Ideology. Review of Metaphysics 24 (4):637 - 667.
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  37.  21
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (2006). The Vanishing Subject: The Many Faces of Subjectivity. History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (3):191 - 209.
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  38.  25
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1992). The Advantages of Moral Diversity. Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (02):38-.
    We are well served, both practically and morally, by moral and ethical diversity. Moral deliberation requires the collaboration of distinctive perspectives: consequentialist, deontological, perfectionist considerations each contribute significant dimensions in determining what is good and what is right; virtue theory highlights the development of reliable ethical character.
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  39.  21
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1993). From Passions to Sentiments: The Structure of Hume's "Treatise". History of Philosophy Quarterly 10 (2):165-179.
  40.  3
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1972). Essential Possibilities in the Actual World. Review of Metaphysics 25 (4):607 - 624.
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  41.  32
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1998). Plato's Counsel on Education. Philosophy 73 (2):157-178.
    Plato's dialogues can be read as a carefully staged exhibition and investigation of paideia, education in the broadest sense, including all that affects the formation of character and mind. The twentieth century textbook Plato — the Plato of the Myth of the Cave and the Divided Line, the ascent to the Good through Forms and Ideas — is but one of his elusive multiple authorial personae, each taking a different perspective on his investigations. As its focused problems differ, each Platonic (...)
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  42.  22
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1991). Rousseau's Therapeutic Experiments. Philosophy 66 (258):413 - 434.
    ‘Our passions are psychological instruments,’ Rousseau says, ‘with which nature has armed our hearts for the defence of our persons and of all that is necessary for our well-being. [But] the more we need external things, the more we are vulnerable to obstacles that can overwhelm us; and the more numerous and complex our passions become. They are naturally proportionate to our needs.’.
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  43.  17
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (2002). Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics. International Studies in Philosophy 34 (4):170-172.
  44.  22
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1978). Butler on Benevolence and Conscience. Philosophy 53 (204):171 - 184.
    It is tempting and even useful to read the history of ethics from Hobbes to Rousseau, and even to Kant, as a response to the devastation of making self-interest—the movement to the satisfaction of particular ego-oriented desires—either the basic motive, or the basic form of motivational explanation. After Hobbes, philosophical ingenuity allied with Christian sensibility to search for countervailing forces.
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  45.  18
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1984). Aristotle on the Metaphysical Status of "Pathe". Review of Metaphysics 37 (3):521 - 546.
  46.  23
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1993). The Many Faces of Gibbard's Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Ethics 103 (2):318-328.
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  47. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1989). Relativism, Persons, and Practices. In M. Krausz (ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation. Notre Dame University Press
     
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  48.  14
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1987). The Two Faces of Spinoza. Review of Metaphysics 41 (2):299 - 316.
  49.  17
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1975). Adaptivity and Self-Knowledge. Inquiry 18 (1):1-22.
    In this paper the view is presented that self?knowledge has no special status; its varieties constitute distinctive classes, differing from one another more sharply than each does from analogous knowledge of others. Most cases of self?knowledge are best understood contextually, subsumed under such other activities as decision?making and socializing. First person, present tense ?reports? of sensations, intentions, and thoughts are primarily adaptively expressive, only secondarily truth?functional. The last section sketches some of the disadvantages, as well as some of the advantages, (...)
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  50.  11
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1973). Persons, Policies, and Bodies. International Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1):63-80.
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