4 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Amber Griffioen (Universität Konstanz)
  1. Amber L. Griffioen (2014). (Ad-)Ventures in Faith: A Critique of Bishop's Doxastic Venture Model. Religious Studies:1-17.
    While some philosophical models reduce religious faith to either mere belief or affect, more recent accounts have begun to look at the volitional component of faith. In this spirit, John Bishop has defended the notion of faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. In this article, I consider Bishop's view in detail and attempt to show that his account proves on the one hand too permissive and on the other too restrictive. Thus, although the doxastic-venture model offers certain advantages over other prominent (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Amber L. Griffioen (2014). Baseball as a Road to God: Seeing Beyond the Game. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 41 (2):282-287.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Amber L. Griffioen (2013). Irrationality and “Gut” Reasoning: Two Kinds of Truthiness. In Jason Holt (ed.), The Ultimate Daily Show and Philosophy: More Moments of Zen, More Indecision Theory. Wiley Blackwell. 309-325.
    There are at least three basic phenomena that philosophers traditionally classify as paradigm cases of irrationality. In the first two cases, wishful thinking and self-deception, a person wants something to be true and therefore ignores certain relevant facts about the situation, making it appear to herself that it is, in fact, true. The third case, weakness of will, involves a person undertaking a certain action, despite taking herself to have an all-things-considered better reason not to do so. While I think (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Amber L. Griffioen (2007). “In Accordance with the Law”: Reconciling Divine and Civil Law in Abelard. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):307-321.
    In the Ethics, Abelard discusses the example of a judge who knowingly convicts an innocent defendant. He claims that this judge does rightly whenhe punishes the innocent man to the full extent of the law. Yet this claim seems counterintuitive, and, at first glance, contrary to Abelard’s own ethical system. Nevertheless, I argue that Abelard’s ethical system cannot be viewed as completely subjective, since the rightness of an individual act of consent is grounded in objective standards established by God. Likewise, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation