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Profile: Amelie Rorty (Boston University, Harvard University)
  1.  25
    Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.) (1988). Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
    00 Students of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literature will welcome this collection of original essays on self-deception and related phenomena such as ...
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  2. Ámelie Rorty (2010). Sartre's Still-Life Portraits. Philosophy and Literature 34 (2):329-339.
    Near the outset of Faust, Goethe sets his protagonist to translating the beginning of the Book of John. Dissatisfied with translating logos as Word, Faust tries "In the beginning was Mind" (Sinn), but he quickly retreats: "Can it be Mind what makes and shapes all things? Surely it should be 'In the beginning was Power (Kraft).'" Yet reflecting that Power might be merely latent, merely potential, he perseveres until finally Spirit (Geist) prompts Faust to settle on, "In the beginning was (...)
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  3. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (2008). The Dramatic Sources of Philosophy. Philosophy and Literature 32 (1):pp. 11-30.
    This paper traces some of the sources of Socratic dialectic: myth, drama, lyric poetry, law and the courts, pre-Socratic cosmology.
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  4.  21
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty & Adam Morton (forthcoming). "Appendix: Review of" The Many Faces of Evil: Historical Perspectives". [REVIEW] The Monist.
    review of Rorty's collection on evil. Generally admring, but complaining about the disparate phenomena included under the heading. And remarking on the peculiarities of the Enlish word 'evil' not found in other European languages.
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  5.  3
    Amelie Rorty (forthcoming). The Burdens of Love. Journal of Ethics:1-14.
    While we primarily love individual persons, we also love our work, our homes, our activities and causes. To love is to be engaged in an active concern for the objective well-being—the thriving—of whom and what we love. True love mandates discovering in what that well-being consists and to be engaged in the details of promoting it. Since our loves are diverse, we are often conflicted about the priorities among the obligations they bring. Loving requires constant contextual improvisatory adjustment of priorities (...)
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  6.  99
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1987). The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):399-412.
  7. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1980). Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):333 – 346.
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  8.  57
    Martha Craven Nussbaum & Amélie Rorty (eds.) (1992/1995). Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. Oxford University Press.
    Bringing together a group of outstanding new essays on Aristotle's De Anima, this book covers topics such as the relation between soul and body, sense-perception, imagination, memory, desire, and thought, which present the philosophical substance of Aristotle's views to the modern reader. The contributors write with philosophical subtlety and wide-ranging scholarship, locating their interpretations firmly within the context of Aristotle's thought as a whole.u.
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  9.  69
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1980). Explaining Emotions. University of California Press.
    The philosopher must inform himself of the relevant empirical investigation to arrive at a definition, and the scientist cannot afford to be naive about the..
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  10. Amelie Rorty (1983). Akratic Believers. American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):175-183.
    A person has performed an action akratically when he intentionally, voluntarily acts contrary to what he thinks, all things considered, is best to do. This is very misleadingly called weakness of the will; less misleadingly, akrasia of action. I should like to show that there is intellectual as well as practical akrasia. This might, equally misleadingly, be called weakness of belief; less misleadingly, akrasia of belief.
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  11. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1992). Descartes on Thinking with the Body. In John Cottingham (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge University Press
     
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  12. Amelie Rorty (2009). A Plea for Ambivalence. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. OUP Oxford
     
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  13.  75
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1982). From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments. Philosophy 57 (220):159 - 172.
    During the period from Descartes to Rousseau, the mind changed. Its domain was redefined; its activities were redescribed; and its various powers were redistributed. Once a part of cosmic Nous, its various functions delimited by its embodied condition, the individual mind now becomes a field of forces with desires impinging on one another, their forces resolved according to their strengths and directions. Of course since there is no such thing as The Mind Itself, it was not the mind that changed. (...)
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  14.  69
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1978). Explaining Emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (March):139-161.
    The challenge of explaining the emotions has engaged the attention of the best minds in philosophy and science throughout history. Part of the fascination has been that the emotions resist classification. As adequate account therefore requires receptivity to knowledge from a variety of sources. The philosopher must inform himself of the relevant empirical investigation to arrive at a definition, and the scientist cannot afford to be naive about the assumptions built into his conceptual apparatus. The contributors to this volume have (...)
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  15.  41
    Amelie Rorty (2012). The Use and Abuse of Morality. Journal of Ethics 16 (1):1-13.
    Both morality and theories of morality play many distinctive—and sometimes apparently conflicting—functions: they identify and prohibit wrongful aggression; they chart and analyze basic duties; they present ideals for emulation; they set the terms or justice, rights and entitlements; they characterize the norms of basic decency and neighborliness. Since many of these can, in practice, come into conflict with one another, morality provides guidance for integrating priorities. Claims to morality can, however, be misused as well as used: sanctimonious self-righteousness, self-centered moral (...)
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  16.  40
    Amélie Rorty (2011). Aristotle on the Virtues of Rhetoric. Review of Metaphysics 64 (4):715-733.
    Aristotle’s phronimos is a model of the virtues: he fuses sound practical reasoning with well formed desires. Among the skills of practical reasoning are those of finding the right words and arguments in the process of deliberation. As Aristotle puts it, virtue involves doing the right thing at the right time and for the right reason. Speaking well, saying the right thing in the right way is not limited to public oratory: it pervades practical life. Aristotle’s phronimos must acquire the (...)
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  17. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1976). The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
    In this volume, thirteen philosophers contribute new essays analyzing the criteria for personal identity and their import on ethics and the theory of action: it ...
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  18.  89
    Amélie Rorty (1996). The Two Faces of Stoicism: Rousseau and Freud. Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (3):335-356.
    The Two Faces of Stoicism: Rousseau and Freud AMI~LIE OKSENBERG RORTY Nor do the Stoics mean that the soul of their wisest man resists the first visions and sudden fantasies that surprise [him]: but [he] rather consents that, as it were to a natural subjection, he yields .... So likewise in other passions, always provided his opinions remain safe and whole, and.., his reason admit no tainting or alteration, and he in no whit consents to his fright and sufferance. Montaigne, (...)
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  19.  82
    Amelie Rorty (2010). Questioning Moral Theories. Philosophy 85 (1):29-46.
    Not a day passes but we find ourselves indignant about something or other. When is our indignation justified, and when does it count as moral indignation rather than a legitimate but non-moral gripe? You might think that we should turn to moral theories – to the varieties of utilitarian, Kantian, virtue theories, etc – to answer this question. I shall try to convince you that this is a mistake, that moral theory – as it is ordinarily presently conceived and studied (...)
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  20.  83
    Amelie Rorty (2009). On Being Rational. Ratio 22 (3):350-358.
    To be rational is to be engaged in collaborative, corrigible, historically informed inquiry and deliberation. Critical intelligence is merely the beginning of rationality. Substantive rationality also requires reflective and imaginative inquiry. Its active exercise presupposes trust and mandates a commitment to the common good, to responsible attempts to create the political institutions and social conditions on which intellectual and political trust can flourish. Without these, formal and calculative intelligence are – however brilliant – mere cleverness; and without these, rationality can (...)
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  21. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1980). Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. University of California Press.
    This compilation will mark a high point of excellence in its genre."--Gregory Vlastos, University of California, Berkeley.
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  22. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1992). Mind in Action. Ethics 102 (4):844-846.
     
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  23.  37
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1986). The Two Faces of Courage. Philosophy 61 (236):151-171.
    Courage is dangerous. If it is defined in traditional ways, as a set of dispositions to overcome fear, to oppose obstacles, to perform difficult or dangerous actions, its claim to be a virtue is questionable. Unlike the virtue of justice, or a sense of proportion, traditional courage does not itself determine what is to be done, let alone assure that it is worth doing. If we retain the traditional conception of courage and its military connotations–overcoming and combat–we should be suspicious (...)
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  24. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1986). Essays on Descartes' Meditations. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    The essays in this volume form a commentary on Descartes' _Meditations_. Following the sequence of the meditational stages, the authors analyze the function of each stage in transforming the reader, to realize his essential nature as a rational inquirer, capable of scientific, demonstrable knowledge of the world. There are essays on the genre of meditational writing, on the implications of the opening cathartic section of the book on Descartes' theory of perception and his use of skeptical arguments; essays on the (...)
     
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  25.  40
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1980). Vi. Akrasia and Conflict. Inquiry 23 (2):193 – 212.
    As Elster suggests in his chapter 'Contradictions of the Mind', in Logic and Society, akrasia and self-deception represent the most common psychological functions for a person in conflict and contradiction. This article develops the theme of akrasia and conflict. Section I says what akrasia is not. Section II describes the character of the akrates, analyzing the sorts of conflicts to which he is subject and describing the sources of his debilities. A brief account is then given of the attractions of (...)
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  26.  53
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1978). The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Mind 87 (347):343-358.
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  27. Amélie Rorty (ed.) (1998). Philosophers on Education: Historical Perspectives. Routledge.
    Philosophers on Education offers us the most comprehensive available history of philosopher's views and impacts on the directions of education. As Amelie Rorty explains, in describing a history of education, we are essentially describing and gaining the clearest understanding of the issues that presently concern and divide us. The essays in this stellar collection are written by some of the finest comtemporary philosophers. Those interested in history of philosophy, epistemology, moral psychology and education, and political theory will find Philosophers on (...)
     
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  28.  34
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1972). Belief and Self-Deception. Inquiry 15 (1-4):387-410.
    In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part II, I (...)
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  29.  69
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1998). The Political Sources of Emotions: Greed and Anger. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):21-33.
  30.  66
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1997). The Social and Political Sources of Akrasia. Ethics 107 (4):644-657.
    Akrasia is not always --or only-- a solitary failure to act on a person's judgment of what is, all things considered, best. Nor is it always a species of moral or ethical failure prompted by a form of irrationality. It is often prompted by social support and sustained by structuring political institutions.
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  31.  17
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1992). Essays on Aristotle's Poetics. Princeton University Press.
    Aimed at deepening our understanding of the Poetics, this collection places Aristotle's analysis of tragedy in its larger philosophical context.
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  32.  16
    Amelie Rorty (2014). The Ethics of Collaborative Ambivalence. Journal of Ethics 18 (4):391-403.
    We are all ambivalent at every turn. “Should I skip class on this gorgeous spring day?” “Do I really want to marry Eric?” Despite being uncomfortable and unsettling, there are some forms of ambivalence that are appropriate and responsible. Even when they seem trivial and superficial, they reveal some of our deepest values, the self-images we would like to project. In this paper, I analyze collaborative ambivalence, the kind of ambivalence that arises from our identity-forming close relationships. The sources and (...)
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  33.  19
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1994). User-Friendly Self-Deception. Philosophy 69 (268):211 - 228.
    Since many varieties of self-deception are ineradicable and useful, it would be wise to be ambivalent about at least some of its forms.1 It is open-eyed ambivalence that acknowledges its own dualities rather than ordinary shifty vacillation that we need. To be sure, self-deception remains dangerous: sensible ambivalence should not relax vigilance against pretence and falsity, combating irrationality and obfuscation wherever they occur.
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  34.  33
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1994). The Hidden Politics of Cultural Identification. Political Theory 22 (1):152-166.
    While cultural identification --cultural essentialism and reification-- can play an important liberating role. it is also internally oppressive; it denies the dynamics of intra cultural divisions.
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  35.  34
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1997). The Ethics of Reading: A Traveler's Guide. Educational Theory 47 (1):85-89.
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  36. Amélie O. Rorty (1980). Agent Regret. In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. Univ of California Pr 489--506.
     
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  37.  34
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1983). Fearing Death. Philosophy 58 (224):175 - 188.
    Many have said, and I think some have shown, that it is irrational to fear death. The extinction of what is essential to the self—whether it be biological death or the permanent cessation of consciousness—cannot by definition be experienced by oneself as a loss or as a harm.
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  38.  25
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1984). Aristotle on the Metaphysical Status of "Pathe". Review of Metaphysics 37 (3):521 - 546.
  39.  42
    Amélie Rorty (1998). Witnessing Philosophers. Philosophy and Literature 22 (2):309-327.
    Philosophic writing appears in a variety of genres, addressed to a variety of audiences; it appears nestled within distinctive 'enterprises' : Plato, Berkeley and Hume wrote dialogues; Augustine and Rousseau wrote autobiographical confessions; Mill and Bernard Williams wrote reports to Parliament; Boethius and Descartes wrote meditations; Bacon, Montaign and Hume wrote essays; Aquinas and our contemporaries contribte articles;Leibniz and Hume wrote histories' they all wrote letters and discourses.
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  40.  47
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1974). The Place of Pleasure in Aristotle's Ethics. Mind 83 (332):481-497.
    BACKGROUND: Although placing patients with acute respiratory failure in a prone (face down) position improves their oxygenation 60 to 70 percent of the time, the effect on survival is not known. METHODS: In a multicenter, randomized trial, we compared conventional treatment (in the supine position) of patients with acute lung injury or the acute respiratory distress syndrome with a predefined strategy of placing patients in a prone position for six or more hours daily for 10 days. We enrolled 304 patients, (...)
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  41.  8
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1995). Moral Complexity, Conflicted Resonance and Virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):949 - 956.
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  42.  30
    Amelie Rorty (1970). Plato and Aristotle on Belief, Habit, and "Akrasia". American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1):50 - 61.
  43.  12
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1988). The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers, and Lairs. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press
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  44. Amelie O. Rorty (1980). Identities of Persons. Noûs 14 (2):266-271.
     
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  45.  14
    Amelie Rorty (2014). Dialogues with Paintings: Notes on How to Look and See. Journal of Aesthetic Education 48 (1):1-9.
    There is no such thing as ART. There are public monuments and celebrations of victories, icons, religious teaching, civic pride, courtier flattery, family legitimation, secularization of the sacred, celebration of the ordinary as ordinary, attempts to shock, political statements, making money, decoration of homes, corporations, visual debates on what the world looks like—debates about what the world is—debates about what we see. On the other hand, we can look at anything—clouds, a tree, a face, a road, a herd of cows (...)
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  46. Amelie Rorty (2009). Spinoza on the Pathos of Idolatrous Love and the Hilarity of True Love. In Moira Gatens (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza. Pennsylvania State University Press
  47.  42
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1996). User Friendly Self-Deception: A Traveler's Manual. In Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press
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  48.  27
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (2000). Spinoza's Ironic Therapy: From Anger to the Intellectual Love of God. History of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (3):261 - 276.
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  49. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1992). [Book Review] Mind in Action, Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW] Ethics 102:844-846.
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  50.  5
    Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1985). Self-Deception, Akrasia and Irrationality. In Jon Elster (ed.), The Multiple Self. Cambridge University Press
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