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Profile: Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)
  1. Amy Kind & Peter Kung (eds.) (forthcoming). Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press.
     
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  2. Amy Kind (2014). Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):186-188.
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  3. Amy Kind (2013). The Case Against Representationalism About Moods. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
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  4. Amy Kind (2013). The Heterogeneity of the Imagination. Erkenntnis 78 (1):141-159.
    Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining.
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  5. Amy Kind (2013). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge By Peter Carruthers. Analysis 74 (1):ant110.
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  6. Amy Kind (2012). Sticking to One's Diet: Commentary on “Quining Diet Qualia” by Keith Frankish. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):677-678.
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  7. Amy Kind (2011). Chalmer's Zombie Argument. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  8. Amy Kind (2011). Metaphysics at the Multiplex. The Philosophers' Magazine 55 (55):112-113.
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  9. Amy Kind (2011). Nagel's "What is It Like to Be a Bat" Argument Against Physicalism. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  10. Amy Kind (2011). The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):421-439.
    The puzzle of imaginative desire arises from the difficulty of accounting for the surprising behaviour of desire in imaginative activities such as our engagement with fiction and our games of pretend. Several philosophers have recently attempted to solve this puzzle by introducing a class of novel mental states?what they call desire-like imaginings or i-desires. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the i-desire solution to the puzzle of imaginative desire. The introduction of i-desires is both ontologically profligate and (...)
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  11. Amy Kind (2010). Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):902-913.
  12. Amy Kind (2010). The Vampire with a Soul: Angel and the Quest for Identity. In Thomas Richard Fahy (ed.), The Philosophy of Horror. University Press of Kentucky. 86.
  13. Amy Kind (2009). Is Ignorance Bliss? In Sandra Shapshay (ed.), Bioethics at the Movies. Johns Hopkins University Press. 121.
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  14. Amy Kind (2009). Review of David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).
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  15. Amy Kind (2008). How to Believe in Qualia. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press. 285--298.
    in The Case for Qualia,ed. by Edmond Wright , MIT Press (2008), pp. 285-298.
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  16. Amy Kind (2008). “I'm Sharon, but I'm a Different Sharon”: The Identity of Cylons. In Jason T. Eberl (ed.), Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy: Knowledge Here Begins Out There. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The question of personal identity—what makes a person the same person over time—is puzzling. Through the course of a life, someone might undergo a dramatic alteration in personality, radically change her values, lose almost all of her memories, and undergo significant changes in her physical appearance. Given all of these potential changes, why should we be inclined to regard her as the same person? Battlestar Galactica presents us with an even bigger puzzle: What makes a Cylon the same Cylon over (...)
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  17. Amy Kind (2007). Restrictions on Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427.
    According to representationalism, the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states supervenes on the intentional content of such states. Strong representationalism makes a further claim: the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states _consists in_ the intentional content of such states. Although strong representationalism has greatly increased in popularity over the last decade, I find the view deeply implausible. In what follows, I will attempt to argue against strong representationalism by a two-step argument. First, I suggest that strong representationalism must (...)
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  18. Amy Kind (2006). Panexperientialism, Cognition, and the Nature of Experience. Psyche 12 (5).
    i>: This paper explores the plausibility of panexperientialism by an examination of Gregg Rosenberg.
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  19. Amy Kind, Introspection. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Introspection is the process by which someone comes to form beliefs about her own mental states. We might form the belief that someone else is happy on the basis of perception – for example, by perceiving her behavior. But a person typically does not have to observe her own behavior in order to determine whether she is happy. Rather, one makes this determination by introspecting.
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  20. Amy Kind, Imagery and Imagination. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Both imagery and imagination play an important part in our mental lives. This article, which has three main sections, discusses both of these phenomena, and the connection between them. The first part discusses mental images and, in particular, the dispute about their representational nature that has become known as the _imagery debate_ . The second part turns to the faculty of the imagination, discussing the long philosophical tradition linking mental imagery and the imagination—a tradition that came under attack in the (...)
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  21. Amy Kind (2005). The Irreducibility of Consciousness. Disputatio 1 (19):1 - 18.
    In this paper, by analyzing the Chalmers-Searle debate about Chalmers� zombie thought experiment, I attempt to determine the implications that the irreducibility of consciousness has for the truth of materialism. While Chalmers claims that the irreducibility of consciousness forces us to embrace dualism, Searle claims that it has no deep metaphysical import and, in particular, that it is fully consistent with his materialist theory of mind. I argue that this disagreement hinges on the notion of physical identity in play in (...)
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  22. Amy Kind (2004). The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future. Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553.
    Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this paper, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper understanding of this (...)
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  23. Amy Kind (2003). Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
    I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. (...)
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  24. Amy Kind (2003). What's so Transparent About Transparency? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.
    Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is (...)
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  25. Amy Kind (2002). Knowledge and Mind. Teaching Philosophy 25 (1):98-101.
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  26. Amy Kind (2001). Consciousness, Color, and Content, by Michael Tye. Disputatio.
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  27. Amy Kind (2001). Carruthers, Peter. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Review of Metaphysics 55 (1):125-127.
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  28. Amy Kind (2001). Putting the Image Back in Imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):85-110.
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  29. Amy Kind (2001). Qualia Realism. Philosophical Studies 104 (2):143-162.
    Recent characterizations of the <span class='Hi'>qualia</span> debate construe the point at issue in terms of the existence of intrinsic properties of experience. I argue that such characterizations mistakenly ignore the epistemic dimension of the notion of <span class='Hi'>qualia</span>. Using Ned Block.
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  30. Amy Kind (2001). The Construction of Social Reality. Social Theory and Practice 27 (2):345-351.
  31. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Are Question–Begging, Amy Kind, Qualia Realism, Patricia Marino, Moral Dilemmas & Moral Progress (2001). Not Easily Available 109–114. Philosophical Studies 104:337-338.
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