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Profile: Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm University, Swedish Collegium of Advanced Studies)
  1. Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi (2014). The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.
    It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of (...)
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  2. Anandi Hattiangadi (2010). The Love of Truth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.
  3. Anandi Hattiangadi (2009). Some More Thoughts on Semantic Oughts: A Reply to Daniel Whiting. Analysis 69 (1):54-63.
  4. Anandi Hattiangadi (2009). Semantic Normativity in Context. In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
     
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  5. Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi (2007). Does Thought Imply Ought? Analysis 67 (296):277–285.
  6. Anandi Hattiangadi (2007). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content. Oxford University Press.
    In Oughts and Thoughts, Anandi Hattiangadi provides an innovative response to the argument for meaning skepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on ...
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  7. Anandi Hattiangadi (2006). Is Meaning Normative? Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.
    Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it merely determines which pattern (...)
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  8. Anandi Hattiangadi (2003). Making It Implicit: Brandom on Rule-Following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):419-31.
    In Making it Explicit, Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normativity--a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road--one that uses normative vocabulary, but treats norms as implicit in practices. I argue that this (...)
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