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Profile: Anders Nes (University of Oslo)
  1. Anders Nes (2016). Assertion, Belief, and ‘I Believe’-Guarded Affirmation. Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):57-86.
    According to a widely held view of assertion and belief, they are each governed by a tacitly acknowledged epistemic norm, and the norm on assertion and norm on belief are so related that believing p is epistemically permissible only if asserting it is. I call it the Same Norm View. A very common type of utterance raises a puzzle for this view, viz. utterances in which we say ‘I believe p' to convey somehow guarded affirmation of the proposition that p. (...)
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  2. Anders Nes (2016). The Sense of Natural Meaning in Conscious Inference. In T. Breyer & C. Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking. Routledge 97-115.
    The paper addresses the phenomenology of inference. It proposes that the conscious character of conscious inferences is partly constituted by a sense of meaning; specifically, a sense of what Grice called ‘natural meaning’. In consciously drawing the (outright, categorical) conclusion that Q from a presumed fact that P, one senses the presumed fact that P as meaning that Q, where ‘meaning that’ expresses natural meaning. This sense of natural meaning is phenomenologically analogous, I suggest, to our sense of what is (...)
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  3. Anders Nes (2012). Thematic Unity in the Phenomenology of Thinking. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):84-105.
    Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some thought episodes, in that it constitutes what I call their thematic unity. Often, when a thought (...)
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    Anders Nes (2015). Review of T. Bayne and M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: OUP, 2011. [REVIEW] Mind 124 (494):607-612.
  5. Anders Nes (2008). Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional? Analysis 68 (299):205–215.
    I question Brentano's thesis that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. The common gloss on intentionality in terms of directedness does not justify the claim that intentionality is sufficient for mentality. One response to this problem is to lay down further requirements for intentionality. For example, it may be said that we have intentionality only where we have such phenomena as failure of substitution or existential presupposition. I consider a variety of such requirements for intentionality. I argue they either (...)
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    Anders Nes (2011). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, by William Fish. Mind 120 (479):856-859.