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  1. Andrea Christofidou (2012). Self, Reason, and Freedom in Descartes' Metaphysics. Routledge.
    I offer a new understanding of Descartes’ metaphysics, arguing that his primary question is ‘what is real and true?’ – not as we have been accustomed to believe, ‘how can I be certain?’ – an inquiry that requires both reason’s authority and freedom’s autonomy. I argue that without freedom and its internal relation to reason, Descartes’ undertaking would not get off the ground; yet that relation has gone unnoticed by successive studies of his philosophy. I demonstrate that it is only (...)
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  2. Andrea Christofidou (2009). Descartes on Freedom, Truth, and Goodness. Noûs 43 (4):633-655.
    Freedom is the least discussed thesis of Descartes' works. Two major issues are: (i) the Fourth Meditation is seen as an unfounded theodicy, an interlude, an interruption to the analytic order; (ii)some passages in Descartes' other works are seen as inconsistent with the Fourth Meditation. First, I argue that Descartes' treatment is philosophical, that freedom underlies his entire philosophical project, defending the indispensability of the Fourth to his metaphysics.I demonstrate that Descartes' conception of freedom differs from the mainstream conceptions, in (...)
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  3. Andrea Christofidou (2009). Self and Self-Consciousness: Aristotelian Ontology and Cartesian Duality. Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):134-162.
    The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be. There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle's hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism. Descartes' conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self-conscious and autonomous human being. The claims that Descartes introspectively (...)
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  4. Andrea Christofidou (2007). God, Physicalism, and the Totality of Facts. Philosophy 82 (4):515-542.
    The paper offers a general critique of physicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the 'explanatory gap' is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed from misconceptions, it suggests that the only plausible (...)
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  5. Andrea Christofidou (2001). Descartes' Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2):215-238.
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  6. Andrea Christofidou (2000). Self-Consciousness and the Double Immunity. Philosophy 75 (294):539-570.
    It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to.
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  7. Andrea Christofidou (1999). Subjectivity and the First Person: Some Reflections. Philosophical Inquiry 21 (3-4):1-27.
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  8. Andrea Christofidou (1995). First Person: The Demand for Identification-Free Self-Reference. Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):223-234.
  9. Peter J. King & Andrea Christofidou (1992). Scepticism: Interdisciplinary Approaches (Proceedings on the Second International Symposium of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research, 1988). Philosophical Books 33 (3):154-155.
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