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Andrea C. Westlund [6]Andrea Westlund [5]
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Profile: Andrea Westlund (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)
  1. Andrea Westlund, Joint Deliberation and the Sharing of Reasons.
    Suppose you and I are planning a vacation. Together we face a series of decisions: Where will we go, and for how long? What accommodations will we take? What activities will we engage in? Various considerations will be relevant to these decisions, including other commitments we each have, our individual preferences and interests, and so on. Plainly our preferences and interests may not line up: I may prefer rustic settings while you prefer cosmopolitan ones; I may prefer a short, responsibility-free (...)
     
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  2. Andrea Westlund, Love and the Sharing of Ends.
    The Center for 21st Century Studies, a UW System Center of Excellence at the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee campus, is a postdoctoral research institute founded in 1968 to foster crossdisciplinary research in the humanities. This series of occasional, on-line Working Papers provides a forum for rapid distribution of ideas in texts that are not yet ready or suitable for publication in more formal academic publications, but still offer valuable content. Usually the authors of Center Working Papers will be Center (...)
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  3. Andrea C. Westlund (2013). Deference as a Normative Power. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):455-474.
    Much of the literature on practical authority concerns the authority of the state over its subjects—authority to which we are, as G. E. M. Anscombe says, subject “willy nilly”. Yet many of our “willy” (or voluntary) relationships also seem to involve the exercise of practical authority, and this species of authority is in some ways even more puzzling than authority willy nilly. In this paper I argue that voluntary authority relies on a form of voluntary obligation that is akin (in (...)
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  4. Andrea C. Westlund (2011). Autonomy, Authority, and Answerability. Jurisprudence 2 (1):161-179.
    Autonomy seems to require that we engage in practical deliberation and come to our own decisions regarding how we will act. Deference to authority, by contrast, seems to require that we suspend deliberation and do what the authority commands precisely because he or she commands it. How, then, could autonomy be compatible with deference to authority? In his critique of Razian instrumentalism, Stephen Darwall lays the groundwork for a distinctively contractualist answer to this question: the normative force of an authoritative (...)
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  5. Andrea Westlund (2009). Anger, Faith, and Forgiveness. The Monist 92 (4):507-536.
    Right after our tragedy, my idea of forgiveness was to be free of this thing, – the anger, the pain, the absorption. It was totally personal. It was a survival tactic to leave this experience behind. It had nothing to do with the offender. The second level was realizing how the word forgiveness applies to the relationship between the victim and the offender. How it means accepting and working on that relationship after a murder. The latter is more complicated. Now (...)
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  6. Andrea Westlund (2009). Rethinking Relational Autonomy. Hypatia 24 (4):26 - 49.
    John Christman has argued that constitutively relational accounts of autonomy, as defended by some feminist theorists, are problematically perfectionist about the human good. I argue that autonomy is constitutively relational, but not in a way that implies perfectionism: autonomy depends on a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external, critical perspectives on one's action-guiding commitments. This type of relationality carries no substantive value commitments, yet it does answer to core feminist concerns about autonomy.
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  7. Andrea C. Westlund (2009). Deciding Together. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (10).
    In this paper I develop a conception of joint practical deliberation as a special type of shared cooperative activity, through which co-deliberators jointly accept reasons as applying to them as a pair or group. I argue, moreover, that the aspiration to deliberative “pairhood” is distinguished by a special concern for mutuality that guides each deliberator’s readiness to accept a given consideration as a reason-for-us. It matters to each of us, as joint deliberators, that each party’s (individual) reasons for accepting something (...)
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  8. Andrea C. Westlund (2009). Review of Kim Atkins / / / Kim Atkins and Catriona MacKenzie (Eds.), Narrative Identity and Moral Identity: A Practical Perspective / / / Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
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  9. Andrea C. Westlund (2008). The Reunion of Marriage. The Monist 91 (3/4):558-577.
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  10. Andrea Westlund (2004). Book Review: A Defense of Abortion. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (3):378-382.
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  11. Andrea C. Westlund (2003). Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: Is Deference Compatible with Autonomy? Philosophical Review 112 (4):483-523.
    She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg, if there was a draught, she sat in it—in short, she was so constituted that she never had a mind or wish of her own, but preferred to sympathise always with the minds and wishes of others. — Virginia Woolf (1979, 59).
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