We focus on the theory of abstraction proposed by the target article. We suggest that abstraction varies at different levels of learning, cognitive development, or cognitive ability. We argue that this theory does not specify how abstraction is done at each of these levels. Because of these weaknesses, the theory cannot explicate how individuals differ in mental time travel at different phases of life or different levels of cognitive ability.

This commentary compares the P-FIT model with psychometric and developmental models of intelligence and shows that there are isomorphisms and divergences between them. All three models involve some common dimensions, but the P-FIT model lacks many of the dimensions of the other models. Then we point to research that can lead to the integration of brain models with cognitive-developmental models.

This paper summarizes a theory of cognitive development and elaborates on its educational implications. The theory postulates that development occurs in cycles along multiple fronts. Cognitive competence in each cycle comprises a different profile of executive, inferential, and awareness processes, reflecting changes in developmental priorities in each cycle. Changes reflect varying needs in representing, understanding, and interacting with the world. Interaction control dominates episodic representation in infancy; attention control and perceptual awareness dominate in realistic representations in preschool; inferential control and (...) awareness dominate rule-based representation in primary school; truth and validity control and precise self-evaluation dominate in principle-based thought in adolescence. We demonstrate that the best predictors of school learning in each cycle are the cycle’s cognitive priorities. Also learning in different domains, e.g., language and mathematics, depends on an interaction between the general cognitive processes dominating in each cycle and the state of the representational systems associated with each domain. When a representational system is deficient, specific learning difficulties may emerge, e.g., dyslexia and dyscalculia. We also discuss the educational implications for evaluation and learning at school. (shrink)

We agree with the target article that assuming language-of-thought (LoT) is useful for the development of cognitive and developmental theories. We note that the target article is weak in its assumptions about development of LoT and possible existence of multiple LoTs. In response to these weaknesses, we outline several developmental principles for LoT development, showing how a developmental theory of LoT springs from probabilistic LoT. We suggest a system 1.5 of reasoning allowing interchange between Bayesian and logical rules as it (...) fits purposes or domain. (shrink)

Two studies substantiating Blair's main postulates are summarized. The first study showed that fluid cognition, reasoning, and perceived competence about reasoning are separate and equipotent partners in g. The second study showed that reasoning, understanding of emotions, and perceived competence about reasoning and emotions partake in the formation of g, substantiating Blair's claim that cognition and emotion are linked in the brain.

Quartz & Sejnowski's (Q&S's) model for constructive learning agrees with the basic assumptions of mainstream cognitive developmental theories. However, it does not detail the neural equivalents of (1) the process of cognitive change per se, (2) the construction and functioning of thought modules, and (3) the involvement of “mindreading” and “mindsteering” in constructive learning. Specifying these equivalents is necessary if cognitive developmental neuroscience and mainstream cognitive development are to be directly connected.