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Profile: Andreas Elpidorou (University of Louisville)
  1.  70
    Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded. Mind and Language.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this essay, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly (...)
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  2. Andreas Elpidorou (2015). The Significance of Boredom: A Sartrean Reading. In Daniel Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Routledge
    By examining boredom through the lens of Sartre’s account of the emotions, I argue for the significance of boredom. Boredom matters, I show, for it is both informative and regulatory of one’s behavior: it informs one of the presence of an unsatisfactory situation; and, at the same time, owing to its affective, cognitive, and volitional character, boredom motivates the pursuit of a new goal when the current goal ceases to be satisfactory, attractive, or meaningful. In the absent of boredom, one (...)
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  3.  77
    Andreas Elpidorou (2016). Seeing the Impossible. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (1):11-21.
    I defend the view that it is not impossible to see the impossible. I provide two examples in which one sees the impossible and defend these examples from potential objections. Theories of depiction should make room for impossible depictions.
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  4.  92
    Andreas Elpidorou (2015). Actual Consciousness By Ted Honderich. [REVIEW] Analysis 75 (4):682-684.
  5.  40
    Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean Account of Emotions. Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    Phenomenological approaches to affectivity have long recognized the vital role that emotions occupy in our lives. In this paper, I engage with Jean-Paul Sartre’s well-known and highly influential theory of the emotions as it is advanced in his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. I examine whether Sartre’s account offers two inconsistent explications of the nature of emotions. I argue that despite appearances there is a reading of Sartre’s theory that is free of inconsistencies. Ultimately, I highlight a novel (...)
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  6.  52
    Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou (2015). Affectivity in Heidegger II: Temporality, Boredom, and Beyond. Philosophy Compass 10 (10):672-684.
    In ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time’, we explicated the crucial role that Martin Heidegger assigns to our capacity to affectively find ourselves in the world. There, our discussion was restricted to Division I of Being and Time. Specifically, we discussed how Befindlichkeit as a basic existential and moods as the ontic counterparts of Befindlichkeit make circumspective engagement with the world possible. Indeed, according to Heidegger, it is primarily through moods that the world is ‘opened (...)
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  7. Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman (2015). Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time. Philosophy Compass 10 (10):661-671.
    This essay provides an analysis of the role of affectivity in Martin Heidegger's writings from the mid to late 1920s. We begin by situating his account of mood within the context of his project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time. We then discuss the role of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung in his account of human existence, explicate the relationship between the former and the latter, and consider the ways in which the former discloses the world. To give a more vivid (...)
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  8. Andreas Elpidorou (2010). Imagination in Non-Representational Painting. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge
  9. Andreas Elpidorou, Phenomenal Concepts. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of phenomenal concepts plays an important role (...)
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  10. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
  11. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Having It Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly. Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.
    I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one (...)
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  12. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together. Human Studies (4):1-27.
    In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit from an empirically-informed study (...)
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  13. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Reasoning About the Mark of the Cognitive: A Response to Adams and Garrison. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines (2):1-11.
    I critically examine Adams and Garrison’s proposed necessary condition for the mark of the cognitive (Adams and Garrison in Minds Mach 23(3):339–352, 2013). After a brief presentation of their position, I argue not only that their proposal is in need of additional support, but also that it is too restrictive.
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  14. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.) (2015). Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Routledge.
    This volume identifies and develops how philosophy of mind and phenomenology interact in both conceptual and empirically-informed ways. The objective is to demonstrate that phenomenology, as the first-personal study of the contents and structures of our mentality, can provide us with insights into the understanding of the mind and can complement strictly analytical or empirically informed approaches to the study of the mind. Insofar as phenomenology, as the study or science of phenomena, allows the mind to appear, this collection shows (...)
     
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  15.  26
    Andreas Elpidorou (2014). The Bright Side of Boredom. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  16. Andreas Elpidorou (2015). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):n/a-n/a.
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature (...)
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  17. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival? Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):43-53.
  18. Andreas Elpidorou (2014). Blocking the A Priori Passage. Acta Analytica 29 (3):285-307.
    I defend the claim that physicalism is not committed to the view that non-phenomenal macrophysical truths are a priori entailed by the conjunction of microphysical truths , basic indexical facts , and a 'that's all' claim . I do so by showing that Chalmers and Jackson's most popular and influential argument in support of the claim that PIT ⊃ M is a priori, where 'M' stands for any ordinary, non-phenomenal, macroscopic truth, falls short of establishing its conclusion. My (...)
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  19.  30
    Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). The Embodied and Social Dimensions of Free Will: The Value of Phenomenology. AJOB Neuroscience.
  20. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). The “New Mind” Revisited, or Minding the Content/Vehicle Distinction: A Response to Manzotti and Pepperell. AI and Society 28 (4):461-466.
    I argue that Manzotti and Pepperell’s presentation of the New Mind not only obfuscates pertinent differences between externalist views of various strengths, but also, and most problematically, conflates a distinction that cannot, without consequences, be conflated. We can talk about the contents of the mind and/or about the vehicles of those contents. But we should not conflate the two. Conflation of contents and vehicles comes with a price. In Manzotti and Pepperell’s case, it undermines claims they make about the implications (...)
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  21.  41
    Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman (2014). The Phenomenology and Science of Emotions: An Introduction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):507-511.
    Phenomenology, perhaps more than any other single movement in philosophy, has been key in bringing emotions to the foreground of philosophical consideration. This is in large part due to the ways in which emotions, according to phenomenological analyses, are revealing of basic structures of human existence. Indeed, it is partly and, according to some phenomenologists, even primarily through our emotions that the world is disclosed to us, that we become present to and make sense of ourselves, and that we relate (...)
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  22. Andreas Elpidorou (2011). Robert D. Rupert: Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 21 (1):107-113.
  23. Andreas Elpidorou (2010). Alva Noë: Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons From the Biology of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (1):155-159.
  24. Andreas Elpidorou (2009). The Upsurge of Spontaneity and the Rise of Undivided Subject: The Role and Place of Merleau-Ponty in the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate. In Lauren Freeman (ed.), In/visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut Für Die Wissenschaften Vom Menschen
  25.  52
    Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Where is My Mind? Mark Rowlands on the Vehicles of Cognition. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):145-160.
    Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Rowlands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly structures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and mental processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position.
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  26.  62
    Andreas Elpidorou (2012). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):771-774.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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  27.  16
    Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Gdzie jest mój umysł? Mark Rowlands o nośnikach poznania. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1).
    [Przekład] Czy nasze umysły wykraczają poza nasze mózgi? W serii swoich publikacji Mark Rowlands argumentuje za pozytywną odpowiedzią na to pytanie. Zgodnie z Rowlandsem pewne typy działań w cielesnych lub materialnych układach należy rozpatrywać jako właściwe i dosłowne elementy naszych procesów poznawczych czy mentalnych. W niniejszym artykule dokonuję krytycznego omówienia stanowiska Rowlandsa.
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  28.  8
    Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Dan Zahavi (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  29. Andreas Elpidorou (2016). Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Routledge.
    _Physicalism and the Spell of Consciousness_ explores the nature of consciousness, arguing that ontologically speaking, consciousness and matter are one and the same since both are physical entities. By synthesizing work in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics from the last twenty years and forging a dialogue with contemporary research in empirical sciences of the mind, Andreas Elpidorou develops an account of the concepts that we deploy when we introspectively examine our conscious experiences, and defends the view that the uniqueness (...)
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  30.  37
    Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou (eds.) (2009). In/Visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut Für Die Wissenschaften Vom Menschen.