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Profile: Andreas Elpidorou (University of Louisville)
  1. Daniel Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.) (forthcoming). Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Routledge.
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  2. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this paper, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature (...)
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  3. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Phenomenal Concepts. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
  4. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
  5. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Robert D. Rupert's Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines.
  6. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). The Significance of Boredom: A Sartrean Reading. In Daniel Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Routledge.
  7. Andreas Elpidorou (2014). Blocking the A Priori Passage. Acta Analytica 29 (3):285-307.
    I defend the claim that physicalism is not committed to the view that non-phenomenal macrophysical truths are a priori entailed by the conjunction of microphysical truths (P), basic indexical facts (I), and a 'that's all' claim (T). I do so by showing that Chalmers and Jackson's most popular and influential argument in support of the claim that PIT ⊃ M is a priori, where 'M' stands for any ordinary, non-phenomenal, macroscopic truth, falls short of establishing its conclusion. My objection to (...)
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  8. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Dan Zahavi (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  9. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Having It Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly. Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.
    I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one (...)
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  10. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together. Human Studies (4):1-27.
    In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit from an empirically-informed study (...)
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  11. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Reasoning About the Mark of the Cognitive: A Response to Adams and Garrison. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines (2):1-11.
    I critically examine Adams and Garrison’s proposed necessary condition for the mark of the cognitive (Adams and Garrison in Minds Mach 23(3):339–352, 2013). After a brief presentation of their position, I argue not only that their proposal is in need of additional support, but also that it is too restrictive.
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  12. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). The “New Mind” Revisited, or Minding the Content/Vehicle Distinction: A Response to Manzotti and Pepperell. AI and Society 28 (4):461-466.
    I argue that Manzotti and Pepperell’s presentation of the New Mind not only obfuscates pertinent differences between externalist views of various strengths, but also, and most problematically, conflates a distinction that cannot, without consequences, be conflated. We can talk about the contents of the mind and/or about the vehicles of those contents. But we should not conflate the two. Conflation of contents and vehicles comes with a price. In Manzotti and Pepperell’s case, it undermines claims they make about the implications (...)
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  13. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival? Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):43-53.
  14. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Gdzie jest mój umysł? Mark Rowlands o nośnikach poznania. Avant 3 (1).
    [Przekład] Czy nasze umysły wykraczają poza nasze mózgi? W serii swoich publikacji Mark Rowlands argumentuje za pozytywną odpowiedzią na to pytanie. Zgodnie z Rowlandsem pewne typy działań w cielesnych lub materialnych układach należy rozpatrywać jako właściwe i dosłowne elementy naszych procesów poznawczych czy mentalnych. W niniejszym artykule dokonuję krytycznego omówienia stanowiska Rowlandsa.
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  15. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):771-774.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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  16. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Where is My Mind? Mark Rowlands on the Vehicles of Cognition. Avant 3 (1):145-160.
    Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Rowlands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly structures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and mental processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position.
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  17. Andreas Elpidorou (2011). Robert D. Rupert: Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 21 (1):107-113.
  18. Andreas Elpidorou (2010). Alva Noë: Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons From the Biology of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (1):155-159.
  19. Andreas Elpidorou (2010). Imagination in Non-Representational Painting. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
  20. Andreas Elpidorou (2009). The Upsurge of Spontaneity and the Rise of Undivided Subject: The Role and Place of Merleau-Ponty in the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate. In Lauren Freeman (ed.), In/visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
  21. Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou (eds.) (2009). In/Visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.