16 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Andreas Stokke (Umeå University)
  1. Anders J. Schoubye & Andreas Stokke (2015). What is Said? Noûs 49 (4).
    It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning using the notion of a question under discussion. This account explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined, provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences can come to have enriched meanings in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Andreas Stokke (2013). Lying and Asserting. Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.
    The paper argues that the correct definition of lying is that to lie is to assert something one believes to be false, where assertion is understood in terms of the notion of the common ground of a conversation. It is shown that this definition makes the right predictions for a number of cases involving irony, joking, and false implicature. In addition, the proposed account does not assume that intending to deceive is a necessary condition on lying, and hence counts so-called (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  3.  99
    Andreas Stokke (2010). Intention-Sensitive Semantics. Synthese 175 (3):383-404.
    A number of authors have argued that the fact that certain indexicals depend for their reference-determination on the speaker’s referential intentions demonstrates the inadequacy of associating such expressions with functions from contexts to referents (characters). By distinguishing between different uses to which the notion of context is put in these argument, I show that this line of argument fails. In the course of doing so, I develop a way of incorporating the role played by intentions into a character-based semantics for (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  4.  9
    Andreas Stokke (2013). Protagonist Projection. Mind and Language 28 (2):204-232.
    This article provides a semantic analysis of Protagonist Projection, the phenomenon by which things are described from a point of view different from that of the speaker. Against what has been argued by some, the account vindicates the intuitive idea that Protagonist Projection does not give rise to counterexamples to factivity, and similar plausible principles. A pragmatics is sketched that explains the attitude attributions generated by Protagonist Projection. Further, the phenomenon is compared to Free Indirect Discourse, and the proposed account (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  5.  8
    Anders J. Schoubye & Andreas Stokke (2015). What is Said? Noûs 50 (2):n/a-n/a.
    It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning using the notion of a question under discussion. This account explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined, provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences can come to have enriched meanings in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  5
    Andreas Stokke (forthcoming). Proposing, Pretending, and Propriety: A Response to Don Fallis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-6.
    ABSTRACTThis note responds to criticism put forth by Don Fallis of an account of lying in terms of the Stalnakerian view of assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Fallis objects by presenting an example to show that one can lie even though one does not propose to make what one says common ground. It is argued here that this objection does not present (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  44
    Andreas Stokke (2014). Insincerity. Noûs 48 (3):496-520.
    This paper argues for an account of insincerity in speech according to which an utterance is insincere if and only if it communicates something that does not correspond to the speaker's conscious attitudes. Two main topics are addressed: the relation between insincerity and the saying-meaning distinction, and the mental attitude underlying insincere speech. The account is applied to both assertoric and non-assertoric utterances of declarative sentences, and to utterances of non-declarative sentences. It is shown how the account gives the right (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8.  9
    Andreas Stokke (2016). Lying and Misleading in Discourse. Philosophical Review 125 (1):83-134.
    This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under discussion. It argues that to mislead is to disrupt the pursuit of the goal of inquiry—that is, to discover how things are. Lying is seen as a special case requiring assertion of disbelieved information, where assertion is characterized (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  3
    Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes & Andreas Stokke (2016). Information Centrism and the Nature of Contexts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):301-314.
    Information Centrism is the view that contexts consist of information that can be characterized in terms of the propositional attitudes of the conversational participants. Furthermore, it claims that this notion of context is the only one needed for linguistic theorizing about context-sensitive languages. We argue that Information Centrism is false, since it cannot account correctly for facts about truth and reference in certain cases involving indexicals and demonstratives. Consequently, contexts cannot be construed simply as collections of shared information.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  16
    Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes & Andreas Stokke (2015). Information Centrism and the Nature of Contexts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):301-314.
    Information Centrism is the view that contexts consist of information that can be characterized in terms of the propositional attitudes of the conversational participants. Furthermore, it claims that this notion of context is the only one needed for linguistic theorizing about context-sensitive languages. We argue that Information Centrism is false, since it cannot account correctly for facts about truth and reference in certain cases involving indexicals and demonstratives. Consequently, contexts cannot be construed simply as collections of shared information.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  44
    Andreas Stokke (2013). Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading. Philosophy Compass 8 (4):348-359.
    This article discusses recent work on lying and its relation to deceiving and misleading. Two new developments in this area are considered: first, the acknowledgment of the phenomenon of lying without the intent to deceive , and second, recent work on the distinction between lying and merely misleading. Both are discussed in relation to topics in philosophy of language, the epistemology of testimony, and ethics. Critical surveys of recent theories are offered and challenges and open questions for further research are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  34
    Andreas Stokke (2013). Saying Too Little and Saying Too Much. Critical Notice of ‘Lying, Misleading and What is Said’, by Jennifer Saul. Disputatio 5 (35):81-91.
    Stokke-Andreas_Saying-too-little-and-saying-too-much2.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  23
    Andreas Stokke (2012). Truth and Context Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-19.
    Some dynamic semantic theories include an attempt to derive truth-conditional meaning from context change potential. This implies defining truth in terms of context change. Focusing on presuppositions and epistemic modals, this paper points out some problems with how this project has been carried out. It then suggests a way of overcoming these problems. This involves appealing to a richer notion of context than the one found in standard dynamic systems.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  7
    Andreas Stokke (forthcoming). Review of Wright and Jang (Eds.), New Waves in Truth. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  2
    Andreas Stokke (2013). Uoprigtighed og viden via vidnesbyrd. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 48 (2):121-132.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Andreas Stokke (forthcoming). Metaphors and Martinis: A Response to Jessica Keiser. Philosophical Studies:1-7.
    This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography