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Andrew Arlig [6]Andrew W. Arlig [4]
  1. Andrew Arlig (2012). Peter Abelard on Material Constitution. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94 (2):119-146.
  2. Andrew Arlig (2012). Parts, Wholes and Identity. In John Marenbon (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 445--67.
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  3. Andrew W. Arlig (2011). Boethius. In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer. 168--175.
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  4. Andrew W. Arlig (2011). Mereology. In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer. 763--771.
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  5. Andrew W. Arlig (2011). Metaphysics. In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer. 771--780.
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  6. Andrew W. Arlig (2011). Universals. In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer. 1353--1359.
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  7. Andrew Arlig (2009). The Metaphysics of Individuals in the Opuscula Sacra. In John Marenbon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Boethius. Cambridge University Press. 129.
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  8. Andrew Arlig, Medieval Mereology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  9. Andrew Arlig (2008). Paolo Crivelli Aristotle on Truth. Philosophical Inquiry 30 (3-4):199-202.
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  10. Andrew Arlig (2007). Abelard's Assault on Everyday Objects. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):209-227.
    Abelard repeatedly claims that no thing can survive the gain or loss of parts. I outline Abelard’s reasons for holding this controversial position. First, a change of parts compromises the matter of the object. Secondly, a change in matter compromises the form of the object. Given that both elements of an object are compromised by any gain or loss of a part, the object itself is compromised by any such change. An object that appears to survive change is really a (...)
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