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Profile: Andrew Bacon (University of Southern California)
Profile: Andrew Bacon (Carleton College)
  1. Andrew Bacon, Restricting the Knowability Principle.
    Could there unknowable truths? Truths which, regardless of any extension to ones capacities or resources, remain impossible to know. The answer to this question is central in the evaluation of semantic anti-realism. But even for a metaphysical realist, the matter is far from closed.
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  2. Andrew Bacon, In Defence of a Naïve Conditional Epistemology.
    Numerous triviality results have been directed at a collection of views that tie the probability of a conditional sentence to the conditional probability of the consequent on its antecedent. -/- In this paper I argue that this identification makes little sense if conditional sentences are context sensitive. The best alternative, I argue, is a version of the thesis which states that if your total evidence is E then the evidential probability of a conditional evaluated in a context where E is (...)
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  3. Andrew Bacon, Vagueness at Every Order: The Prospects of Denying B.
    A number of arguments purport to show that vague properties determine sharp boundaries at higher orders. That is, although we may countenance vagueness concerning the location of boundaries for vague predicates, every predicate can instead be associated with precise knowable cut-off points deriving from precision in their higher order boundaries. -/- I argue that this conclusion is indeed paradoxical, and identify the assumption responsible for the paradox as the Brouwerian principle B for vagueness: that if p then it's completely determinate (...)
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  4. Andrew Bacon (forthcoming). Representing Counterparts. Australasian Journal of Logic.
    This paper presents and motivates a counterpart theoretic semantics for quantifi ed modal logic based on a fleshed out account of Lewis's notion of a `possibility.' According to the account a possibility consists of a world and some haecceitistic information about how each possible individual gets represented de re. A semantics for quanti ed modal logic based on evaluating formulae at possibilities is developed. It is shown that this framework naturally accommodates an actuality operator, addressing recent objections to counterpart theory, (...)
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  5. Andrew Bacon (2014). Giving Your Knowledge Half a Chance. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    One thousand fair causally isolated coins will be independently flipped tomorrow morning and you know this fact. I argue that the probability, conditional on your knowledge, that any coin will land tails is almost 1 if that coin in fact lands tails, and almost 0 if it in fact lands heads. I also show that the coin flips are not probabilistically independent given your knowledge. These results are uncomfortable for those, like Timothy Williamson, who take these probabilities to play a (...)
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  6. Andrew Bacon (2013). A New Conditional for Naive Truth Theory. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (1):87-104.
    In this paper a logic for reasoning disquotationally about truth is presented and shown to have a standard model. This work improves on Hartry Field's recent results establishing consistency and omega-consistency of truth-theories with strong conditional logics. A novel method utilising the Banach fixed point theorem for contracting functions on complete metric spaces is invoked, and the resulting logic is shown to validate a number of principles which existing revision theoretic methods have heretofore failed to provide.
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  7. Andrew Bacon (2013). Curry's Paradox and Omega Inconsistency. Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.
    In recent years there has been a revitalised interest in non-classical solutions to the semantic paradoxes. In this paper I show that a number of logics are susceptible to a strengthened version of Curry's paradox. This can be adapted to provide a proof theoretic analysis of the omega-inconsistency in Lukasiewicz's continuum valued logic, allowing us to better evaluate which logics are suitable for a naïve truth theory. On this basis I identify two natural subsystems of Lukasiewicz logic which individually, but (...)
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  8. Andrew Bacon (2013). Non-Classical Metatheory for Non-Classical Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):335-355.
    A number of authors have objected to the application of non-classical logic to problems in philosophy on the basis that these non-classical logics are usually characterised by a classical metatheory. In many cases the problem amounts to more than just a discrepancy; the very phenomena responsible for non-classicality occur in the field of semantics as much as they do elsewhere. The phenomena of higher order vagueness and the revenge liar are just two such examples. The aim of this paper is (...)
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  9. Andrew Bacon (2013). Paradoxes of Logical Equivalence and Identity. Topoi:1-10.
    In this paper a principle of substitutivity of logical equivalents salve veritate and a version of Leibniz’s law are formulated and each is shown to cause problems when combined with naive truth theories.
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  10. Andrew Bacon (2013). Quantificational Logic and Empty Names. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (24).
    The result of combining classical quantificational logic with modal logic proves necessitism – the claim that necessarily everything is necessarily identical to something. This problem is reflected in the purely quantificational theory by theorems such as $\exists xt = x$; it is a theorem, for example, that something is identical to Timothy Williamson. The standard way to avoid these consequences is to weaken the theory of quantification to a certain kind of free logic. However, it has often been noted that (...)
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  11. Aaron J. Cotnoir & Andrew Bacon (2012). Non-Wellfounded Mereology. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2):187-204.
    This paper is a systematic exploration of non-wellfounded mereology. Motivations and applications suggested in the literature are considered. Some are exotic like Borges’ Aleph, and the Trinity; other examples are less so, like time traveling bricks, and even Geach’s Tibbles the Cat. The authors point out that the transitivity of non-wellfounded parthood is inconsistent with extensionality. A non-wellfounded mereology is developed with careful consideration paid to rival notions of supplementation and fusion. Two equivalent axiomatizations are given, and are compared to (...)
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  12. Andrew Bacon (2011). A Paradox for Supertask Decision Makers. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):307.
    I consider two puzzles in which an agent undergoes a sequence of decision problems. In both cases it is possible to respond rationally to any given problem yet it is impossible to respond rationally to every problem in the sequence, even though the choices are independent. In particular, although it might be a requirement of rationality that one must respond in a certain way at each point in the sequence, it seems it cannot be a requirement to respond as such (...)
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  13. Andrew Bacon (2009). Vagueness and Uncertainty. Dissertation, BPhil Thesis, Oxford University
    In this thesis I investigate the behaviour of uncertainty about vague matters. It is a fairly common view that vagueness involves uncertainty of some sort. However there are many fundamental questions about this kind of uncertainty that are left open. Could you be genuinely uncertain about p when there is no matter of fact whether p? Could you remain uncertain in a vague proposition even if you knew exactly which possible world obtained? Should your degrees of belief be probabilistically coherent? (...)
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