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Profile: Andrew Botterell (University of Western Ontario)
  1. Andrew Botterell & Carolyn McLeod, Can a Right to Reproduce Justify the Status Quo on Parental Licensing?
    The status quo on parental licensing in most Western jurisdictions is that licensing is required in the case of adoption but not in the case of assisted or unassisted biological reproduction. To have a child via adoption, one must fulfill licensing requirements, which, beyond the usual home study, can include mandatory participation in parenting classes. One is exempt from these requirements, however, if one has a child via biological reproduction, including assisted reproduction involving donor gametes or a contract pregnancy. In (...)
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  2. Andrew Botterell (forthcoming). Reconciling the Principled Approach to Hearsay with the Rule of Law. Supreme Court Law Review.
    My goal in this paper is to argue that the principled approach to hearsay is consistent with the rule of law. I begin by contrasting an instrumental conception of the rule of law with a conception that views the rule of law in primarily normative terms. I then turn my attention to a recent criticism of the Supreme Court of Canada’s principled approach to hearsay and suggest that if Michael Oakeshott’s normative interpretation of the rule of law is adopted, there (...)
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  3. Carolyn McLeod & Andrew Botterell (forthcoming). Not For the Faint of Heart: Assessing the Status Quo on Adoption and Parental Licensing. In Francoise Baylis & Carolyn McLeod (eds.), Family Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges. Oxford University Press.
    The process of adopting a child is “not for the faint of heart.” This is what we were told the first time we, as a couple, began this process. Part of the challenge lies in fulfilling the licensing requirements for adoption, which, beyond the usual home study, can include mandatory participation in parenting classes. The question naturally arises for many people who are subjected to these requirements whether they are morally justified. We tackle this question in this paper. In our (...)
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  4. Andrew Botterell (2013). By the Ties of Natural Justice and Equity. [REVIEW] Jurisprudence 4 (1):138-150.
    A review of Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell and James Penner, eds., Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, 2009).
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  5. Andrew Botterell (2013). Review of Douglas Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays. [REVIEW] University of Toronto Law Journal 63 (1):152-158.
    A review of Douglas Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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  6. Andrew Botterell (2013). Review of Katy Barnett, Accounting for Profit for Breach of Contract. [REVIEW] Canadian Business Law Journal 54:99-106.
    A review of Katy Barnett, Accounting for Profit for Breach of Contract (Hart Publishing, 2012).
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  7. Andrew Botterell (2012). Understanding the Voluntary Act Principle. In François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos (eds.), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law. Hart Publishing.
    In broad outline, the chapter proceeds as follows. As indicated above, the Voluntary Act Principle has two components. The first part, the act component, claims that criminal liability can be imposed on an accused only for the performance of an act. The second part, the voluntariness component, claims that criminal liability can be imposed on an accused only for the voluntary performance of an act. I will argue that both components of the Voluntary Act Principle are in need of amendment. (...)
     
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  8. Andrew Botterell (2011). Review of Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Political Science 44:457-458.
    A review of Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2009).
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  9. Andrew Botterell (2010). Contractual Performance, Corrective Justice, and Disgorgement for Breach of Contract. Legal Theory 16 (3):135-160.
    This paper is about the remedy of disgorgement for breach of contract. In it I argue for two conclusions. I first argue that, prima facie at least, disgorgement damages for breach of contract present something of a puzzle. But second, I argue that if we pay close attention to the notion of contractual performance, this puzzle can be resolved in a way that is consistent with principles of corrective justice. In particular, I suggest that even if a contract gives the (...)
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  10. Andrew Botterell & Chris Essert (2010). Normativity, Fairness, and the Problem of Factual Uncertainty. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 47 (4):663-693.
    This article concerns the problem of factual uncertainty in negligence law. We argue that negligence law’s insistence that fair terms of interaction be maintained between individuals—a requirement that typically manifests itself in the need for the plaintiff to prove factual or “but-for” causation—sometimes allows for the imposition of liability in the absence of such proof. In particular, we argue that the but-for requirement can be abandoned in certain situations where multiple defendants have imposed the same unreasonable risk on a plaintiff, (...)
     
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  11. Andrew Botterell (2009). A Primer on the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):172-196.
    This article is about the distinction between justification and excuse, a distinction which, while familiar, remains controversial. My discussion focuses on three questions. First, what is the distinction? Second, why is it important? And third, what are some areas of inquiry in which the distinction might be philosophically fruitful? I suggest that the distinction has practical and theoretical consequences, and is therefore worth taking seriously; I highlight two philosophical issues in which the distinction might play a useful role; but I (...)
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  12. Andrew Botterell (2009). Rethinking Criminal Law. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 22:93-112.
    A review of Larry Laudan, Truth Error and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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  13. Andrew Botterell (2009). Should the Supreme Court Cite Living Judges? The Advocates' Quarterly 36:138-140.
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  14. Andrew Botterell (2008). In Defence of Infringement. Law and Philosophy 27 (3):269-292.
    According to a familiar and influential view, rights are not absolute. To the contrary, they can sometimes be permissibly interfered with. I find such a view of rights attractive. John Oberdiek thinks otherwise. In a recent paper in this journal, Oberdiek has argued that any account of rights that incorporates a distinction between infringing and violating a right is indefensible. My aim in this paper is to argue that Oberdiek's worries are misplaced. The paper proceeds as follows. After some terminological (...)
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  15. Andrew Botterell (2007). Why We Ought to Be (Reasonable) Subjectivists About Justification. Criminal Justice Ethics 26 (1):36-58.
    My aim in this paper is to argue that justification should not be conceived of in purely objective terms. In arguing for that conclusion I focus in particular on Paul Robinson’s presentation of that position, since it is the most sophisticated defense of the objective account of justification in the literature. My main point will be that the distinction drawn by robinson between objective and subjective accounts of justification is problematic, and that careful attention to the role played by reasonableness (...)
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  16. Andrew Botterell (2007). Property, Corrective Justice, and the Nature of the Cause of Action in Unjust Enrichment. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 20:275-296.
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  17. Andrew Botterell (2005). Review of Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 114:125-128.
    A review of Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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  18. Andrew Botterell & Robert J. Stainton (2005). Quotation: Compositionality and Innocence Without Demonstration. Critica 37 (110):3-33.
    We discuss two kinds of quotation, namely indirect quotation (e.g., 'Anita said that Mexico is beautiful') and pure quotation (e.g., 'Mexico' has six letters). With respect to each, we have both a negative and a positive plaint. The negative plaint is that the strict Davidsonian (1968, 1979a) treatment of indirect and pure quotation cannot be correct. The positive plaint is an alternative account of how quotation of these two sorts works.
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  19. Andrew Botterell (2003). Colors as Explainers? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):785-786.
    Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) argue that colors are reflectance properties of objects. They also claim that a necessary condition for something's being a color is that it causally explain – or be causally implicated in the explanation of – our perceptions of color. I argue that these two positions are in conflict.
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  20. Andrew Botterell (2003). The Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.
    Many contemporary philosophers of mind are concerned to defend a thesis called a posteriori physicalism. This thesis has two parts, one metaphysical, and the other epistemological. The metaphysical part of the thesis—the physicalist part—is the claim that the psychological nature of the actual world is wholly physical. The epistemological part of the thesis—the a posteriori part—is the claim that no a priori connection holds between psychological nature and physical nature. Despite its attractiveness, however, a familiar argument alleges that a posteriori (...)
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  21. Andrew Botterell (2002). Physicalism, Supervenience, and Dependence: A Reply to Campbell. Dialogue 41 (1):155-161.
    Neil Campbell has argued that certain problems with the doctrine of psycho-physical supervenience can be overcome if supervenience is viewed as a relation between predicates rather than as a relation between properties. Campbell suggests that, when properly understood, this predicate version of supervenience "expresses a form of psycho-physical dependence that might be useful to those who wish to argue for a supervenience-based physicalism”. In this note I indicate why I think we ought to resist this suggestion. First, I argue quite (...)
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  22. Andrew Botterell (2001). Conceiving What is Not There. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):21-42.
    In this paper I argue that certain so-called conceivability arguments fail to show that a currently popular version of physicalism in the philosophy of mind is false. Concentrating on an argument due to David Chalmers, I first argue that Chalmers misrepresents the relation between conceivability and possibility. I then argue that the intuition behind the conceivability of so-called zombie worlds can be accounted for without having to suppose that such worlds are genuinely conceivable. I conclude with some general remarks about (...)
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  23. Andrew Botterell (1998). Mellor on Negative Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):523-526.
    DH Mellor has argued that there can be no negative, disjunctive, or conjunctive properties. This argument has been criticized by Alex Oliver on the grounds that it rests on a contentious identity criterion for facts, but it seems to me that a simpler criticism is available. According to this criticism, the problem with Mellor's argument is that it trades on an ambiguity in the semantics of the phrase "the fact that", according to which "the fact that" can be understood as (...)
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