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Profile: Andrew Khoury (London School of Economics)
  1. Andrew C. Khoury (2014). Erratum To: Manipulation and Mitigation. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 168 (1):295-295.
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  2. Andrew C. Khoury (2014). Manipulation and Mitigation. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):283-294.
    Manipulation arguments are commonly deployed to raise problems for compatibilist theories of responsibility. These arguments proceed by asking us to reflect on an agent who has been manipulated to perform some (typically bad) action but who still meets the compatibilist conditions of responsibility. The incompatibilist argues that it is intuitive that the agent in such a case is not responsible even though she met the compatibilist conditions. Thus, it is argued, the compatibilist has not provided conditions sufficient for responsibility. Patrick (...)
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  3. Andrew C. Khoury (2013). Synchronic and Diachronic Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):735-752.
    This paper distinguishes between synchronic responsibility (SR) and diachronic responsibility (DR). SR concerns an agent’s responsibility for an act at the time of the action, while DR concerns an agent’s responsibility for an act at some later time. While most theorists implicitly assume that DR is a straightforward matter of personal identity, I argue instead that it is grounded in psychological connectedness. I discuss the implications this distinction has for the concepts of apology, forgiveness, and punishment as well as the (...)
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  4. Andrew C. Khoury (2012). Responsibility, Tracing, and Consequences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):187-207.
    Some accounts of moral responsibility hold that an agent's responsibility is completely determined by some aspect of the agent's mental life at the time of action. For example, some hold that an agent is responsible if and only if there is an appropriate mesh among the agent's particular psychological elements. It is often objected that the particular features of the agent's mental life to which these theorists appeal (such as a particular structure or mesh) are not necessary for responsibility. This (...)
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  5. Andrew C. Khoury (2011). Blameworthiness and Wrongness. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (2):135-146.
    It is commonly held that agents can be blameworthy only for acts that are morally wrong. But the claim, when combined with a plausible assumption about wrongness, leads to an implausible view about blameworthiness. The claim should be rejected. Agents can be blameworthy for acts that are not morally wrong. We will take up the claim in terms of three initially appealing, but jointly inconsistent propositions. The significance of noting the inconsistency is motivated by a consideration of a number of (...)
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